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 “The Seed Keepers”
Burn our land
burn our dreams
pour acid onto our songs
cover with sawdust
the blood of our massacred people
muffle with your technology
the screams of all that is free,
wild and indigenous.
Destroy
Destroy
our grass and soil
raze to the ground
every farm and every village
our ancestors had built
every tree, every home
every book, every law
and all the equity and harmony.
Flatten with your bombs
every valley; erase with your edicts
our past,
our literature; our metaphor
Denude the forests
and the earth
till no insect,
no bird
no word
can find a place to hide.
Do that and more.
I do not fear your tyranny
I do not despair ever
for I guard one seed
a little live seed
that I shall safeguard
and plant again.
(adaptation by seed freedom activists of the poem by Fawaz Turki - Palestinian poet, b. 1940)
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Abstract
Modern food production may be considered an epitome of the paradoxes that humanity is 
facing as we edge on into the twenty-first century. It is as much the source of problems that 
plague modern societies as it can be its solution. While more food than ever is produced, more
people than ever suffer from some form of malnutrition. Even though agribusiness is 
overtaking energy as the biggest money maker, small-scale farmers and rural populations are 
still the poorest people in the world. Although food appears cheap, calories are largely 
outweighing nutrients, creating food deserts in otherwise wealthy countries. Finally, 
agriculture is potentially as damaging to ecosystems and human health, as it is part of the 
solution for major social and ecological challenges: biodiversity loss, systemic pollution, 
gross social and economic inequities, and climate change. The politics of food are a mirror of 
geopolitics, touching on all the big questions: Grow or degrow? Heed the precautionary 
principle as heralded in international agreements or continue to "manage" risk? Industrialise 
and scale up further or switch to a holistic farming practice that places people and the Earth at
centre, such as agroecology? Continue to allow the commodification and privatisation of 
natural resources or protect them as a commons? Allow countries in the Global South to 
defend their food self-sufficiency or pressure them to produce for global markets? Give 
consumers a real choice or deny them the right to know? Underlying all these questions are 
issues of power and conflicts of interest, with some people part of the “haves” and many 
others of the “have-nots”, some scientists embracing ecology whereas others hold on to 
classical economics, some calling for reform while others prefer a revolution, in other words: 
with many shades of “green” occupying the wide spectrum of food politics. In my thesis, I 
contend that a food system that is simultaneously healthy and fair can only be realised in 
conditions of “substantive” democracy, understood as a polity where social and ecological 
concerns take precedence over other interests, where common resources are under social 
control, and all those people affected by decision-making are also the decision-makers. My 
thesis analyses the democratic and ecological quality of modern food politics to improve 
understanding of the leveraging factors for achieving such a substantive or food democracy.
Keywords: ecological democracy; food democracy; democratic quality; food system; food politics
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Resumo
Uma politeia alimentar global: a qualidade ecologico-democrática da economia política 
da alimentação no século XXI
O sistema alimentar moderno pode ser considerado o epítome dos paradoxos que a 
humanidade enfrenta no século XXI. Tanto contribui significativamente para a rápida erosão 
dos recursos naturais, ecossistemas, e biodiversidade de que os humanos e as espécies que 
coevoluiram com a sua acção dependem, e ainda para o aquecimento global, como foi 
indicado como um factor de alavancagem para ultrapassar estes mesmos desafios. Por outro 
lado, a agricultura tanto está no epicentro de uma indústria emergente lucrativa—a chamada 
“indústria das ciências da vida”, como está na génese de desigualdades socioeconómicas. 
Enquanto uma minoria de explorações controla a maior parte da terra arável, e um grupo 
pequeno de corporações transnacionais domina os sectores das entradas e saídas na 
agricultura—estabelecendo os padrões alimentares e de produção—no mundo rural a vida 
permanece em níveis preocupantes: 75% dos que vivem em extrema pobreza podem ser 
encontrados no campo, enquanto metade das pessoas que passam fome crónica no mundo são 
pequenos agricultores. Ao mesmo tempo, a agricultura está a ser reconhecida por ser o sector 
por excelência para tirar as pessoas da pobreza e da fome, e, de facto, os meios para realizar o 
potencial da agricultura como curadora e protectora das pessoas e seus habitats já existem. 
Mas na realidade, apesar do reconhecimento generalizado dos problemas e potencial da 
agricultura, tal não se tem traduzido em políticas concretas.
A forma como as actividades de produção agrícola e alimentar estão no âmago, não só das 
necessidades humanas básicas como também dos arranjos sociais no nosso mundo, faz com 
que constituam um tema sociológico por excelência, tema esse que desde o século XVIII tem 
sido vivamente debatido (relembre-se os fisiocratas1). A sua pertinência aumenta quando 
consideramos que, com o derrube de barreiras biológicas na agricultura nas últimas décadas—
nomeadamente a capacidade de reproduzir a própria vida—a penetração da agricultura pela 
economia capitalista está a atingir o seu apogeu. A minha tese propõe esquadrinhar as origens 
dos paradoxos que afligem o que pode ser considerado uma actividade humana primordial, 
analisando a organização social, económica, e política do sistema alimentar moderno a fim de 
revelar os factores geradores de injustiça e insustentabilidade no sistema instalado. O foco 
1 A fisiocracia foi desenvolvida em França e gozou alguma popularidade pouco antes da publicação de A 
Riqueza das Nações por Adam Smith. É por vezes considerada a primeira teoria completa de economia.
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está, em particular, sobre a visão democrática do mundo que inspira as acções dos principais 
actores nos sectores agrícola e alimentar, entre eles governos, burocracias internacionais, 
grupos de interesses económicos transnacionais, organizações da sociedade civil, e 
movimentos sociais. A fim de estudar a “substância democrática” do sistema alimentar 
moderno, optei por uma abordagem que convoca o âmbito da sociologia clássica, que se 
articula com as teorias de economia política, cujo grande objecto de análise foi a economia 
capitalista. Pretendi criar uma ponte entre a análise crítica dos pensadores pioneiros da 
revolução industrial e as observações contemporâneas de um mundo interligado pelo 
comércio globalizado. Confrontei ainda com teorias e conceitos recentes, como a 
sustentabilidade, participação pública, governança, deliberação, ecologia, e soberania 
alimentar, que procurei imbuir com as lições da economia política clássica, nomeadamente a 
forma como olha os fenómenos socioeconómicos através da lupa da história moderna e da 
filosofia moral.
O meu primeiro passo foi de pensar o sistema alimentar em termos políticos, identificando as 
relações de poder e os principais conflitos de interesse, apoiando-me na tradição da análise 
sociológica crítica, mas também perscrutando novas abordagens às tomadas de decisão. Esta 
reflexão teórica profunda serviu para apoiar a construção de um modelo de democracia 
“substantiva” ou “democracia alimentar”, que entendo ser uma democracia fundamentada na 
actividade humana de produção alimentar e de outras necessidades básicas, que é, ao mesmo 
tempo, social- e ecologicamente responsiva ao seu demos. Montei este modelo exploratório 
após ter analisado uma diversidade de teorias democráticas e de “qualidade democrática”—a 
medida em que uma política ou decisão respeita a vontade e a necessidade populares—de 
forma a sintetizar os atributos democráticos mais próximos de realizar uma democracia 
alimentar. Assim percorri desde teorias de extensão da democracia liberal, passando por 
teorias que incorporam uma noção de economia democrática, até teorias de democracia 
“profunda” e “radical”. No passo final, apliquei este modelo ao sistema alimentar moderno e 
às políticas alimentares de nove actores2 representativos deste sistema. Baseei-me em dados 
documentais para fazer, por um lado, uma análise biográfica do sistema alimentar moderno e, 
por outro, uma análise crítica dos discursos de cada um dos actores escolhidos. Esta 
abordagem de construção progressiva da teoria enquadra-se na metodologia da teoria 
2 De notar que reservo a palavra “actores” para grupos de interesse bem delineados, que são activos no sistema
alimentar, enquanto o termo “agentes” refere-se a todos os grupos de interesse no sistema.
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fundamentada (Strauss and Corbin 1994), que se mostrou apropriada para apreciar as 
complexidades sociológicas e ecológicas do sistema alimentar moderno. O uso da análise 
crítica de discurso justifica-se, por seu lado, tendo em conta que a organização do sistema 
alimentar pode ser cada vez mais entendida como uma disputa discursiva sobre o 
enquadramento das questões políticas e sobre a construção das regras, normas, e identidades 
dos actores (Fuchs 2005). Seguindo com Fairclough (2001) que o discurso é uma forma 
particular de representar aspectos da vida social, incluindo aspectos desejados, a sua análise 
crítica permite revelar tanto as intenções dos actores como as suas relações com outros actores
e agentes. Usando a metodologia tripartida experimentada por Johnston (2008), fiz o ensaio 
de identificação das tensões ideológicas e contradições inerentes às narrativas que aparentam 
promover o bem-estar e a equidade, observando com que argumentos a hegemonia cultural 
dos grupos de interesse dominantes é reproduzida, e por fim procurando entender como os 
discursos dominantes interagem com as narrativas contra-hegemónicas dos movimentos 
sociais.
A pista que a tese prossegue é a de que somente através de propostas democráticas 
substantivas para a organização de uma sociedade em torno de um sistema alimentar 
poderemos alcançar um modelo organizacional que seja responsivo (i.e. que dê resposta) tanto
às questões de equidade social como àquelas de equilíbrio ecológico. Avaliei a 
substantividade das propostas que encontrei por meio do conceito da qualidade ecologico-
democrática, que defino como a medida em que as tomadas de decisão são responsivas tanto 
ao seu demos como aos desafios ambientais e sociais do nosso tempo. Desta forma, as 
perguntas de investigação principais que organizam a tese são: 
- Qual é a qualidade ecologico-democrática da forma de organização que caracteriza o sistema
alimentar moderno? 
- Qual é a qualidade ecologico-democrática das políticas alimentares que são defendidas por 
diferentes actores no sistema alimentar global?
A dissertação está estruturada em cinco capítulos, uma introdução e uma conclusão. Os 
primeiros três capítulos visam a construção de um modelo democrático exploratório, ancorado
no conceito da qualidade ecologico-democrática, derivando de uma abordagem de economia 
política. No Capítulo 1, procuro descobrir as lógicas da economia política do sistema 
alimentar moderno, apoiada em análises críticas tanto de pensadores pioneiros nesta 
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abordagem, como de teóricos mais recentes. O Capítulo 2 percorre as teorias democráticas, 
focando em particular as que incluem de alguma forma um reconhecimento dos impactos da 
“sociedade comercial” e/ou a organização do sistema alimentar moderno, com o intuito de 
encontrar a abordagem democrática mais apropriada para uma democracia alimentar. O 
Capítulo 3, após analisar as propostas para uma teoria e uma prática de qualidade 
democráticas, faz a síntese das ideias até então discutidas apresentando um modelo tentativo 
de avaliação da qualidade ecologico-democrática das tomadas de decisão. Na segunda parte 
da dissertação, são apresentadas respectivamente a análise biográfica do sistema alimentar 
moderno, sob forma de dados estatísticos e testemunhos (Capítulo 4), e a análise crítica dos 
discursos de nove actores alimentares, entre eles várias organizações supranacionais, um 
representante das grandes empresas transnacionais, e representantes dos movimentos sociais e
camponeses globais (Capítulo 5). Tanto a organização actual do sistema alimentar moderno 
como as políticas alimentares implicadas pelos discursos dos principais actores são 
escrutinadas à luz do meu modelo ecologico-democrático, para aferir o seu potencial para 
alcançar os pressupostos objectivos de maior equidade e sustentabilidade do sistema 
alimentar.
O sistema alimentar que emerge da análise que realizei está muito longe do ideal campestre 
que continua a ser passado aos alunos do ensino primário em países do Norte Global. A 
agricultura e a alimentação estão a ser integradas velozmente numa nova indústria das 
ciências da vida, que reúne grandes corporações nas áreas dos agro-químicos, farmacêutica, 
energia, biotecnologia, e defesa, sustentadas em segundo plano por grandes empresas 
financeiras. É uma indústria “trilionária” que está a ultrapassar em valor a das energias 
convencionais, e que visa levar a comodificação (i.e. mercantilização) e privatização dos 
recursos naturais à sua última consequência. Na sua génese, esta indústria foi muito apoiada 
por fundos públicos e pelo lóbi activo dos governos dos seus países de origem (Garcia 2006). 
Os seus actores estão interessados em capturar o que chamam “biomassa”, um termo 
comercial genérico para organismos vivos, para gerar novas formas de energia, e desenvolver 
novos produtos e organismos sintéticos. Nesta visão, que pode ser apelidada—seguindo 
Garcia (2006) e Pierce (2012)—de biocapitalismo, as barreiras biológicas que a agricultura 
apresenta à sua comodificação completa tendem a ser definitivamente derrubadas, e a 
agricultura passa a ser compradora líquida dos insumos em que dantes estava auto-suficiente, 
como as sementes e os adubos. Este novo campo industrial assegura ainda o seu lucro 
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continuado com a implantação de sistemas draconianos de protecção dos direitos de 
propriedade intelectual sobre os organismos vivos e as técnicas de criação de plantas; com a 
celebração de acordos com cláusulas leoninas de comércio “livre” entre os países líderes na 
biotecnologia e os países fornecedores de bens naturais; e por fim, a passagem de leis 
nacionais derivadas destes acordos, que restringem a liberdade do agricultor em escolher os 
seus insumos.
O sistema que resulta desta hiper-industrialização da agricultura e a sua paralela 
comodificação, favorece principalmente as indústrias dos insumos e do processamento de 
alimentos. O sistema de patentes e a necessidade de atingir uma elevada economia de escala, 
facilita a manutenção de oligopólios ou quasi-oligopólios em todos os passos da “cadeia de 
valor agrícola”, com excepção dos próprios agricultores. O desenvolvimento inigualitário 
entre actores do sistema alimentar, e entre países pioneiros da biotecnologia e os restantes, 
resulta no seu principal paradoxo: enquanto a agricultura e alimentação geram fortunas para 
um punhado de grandes corporações, em particular no Norte Global, metade das pessoas que 
passam fome são pequenos agricultores e a maioria do mundo rural no Sul Global vive em 
situações de relativa pobreza.
Observando os enormes desequilíbrios e desigualdades resultantes do sistema alimentar 
moderno, e ao mesmo tempo reconhecendo mudanças de atitude subtis em alguns actores 
alimentares poderosos, considera-se que a ideia do “movimento duplo” avançada por Polanyi 
continua a ser aplicável. O sector formado por governos, burocracias internacionais, 
corporações multinacionais, e outros actores da nova elite global continua a promover o 
projecto “laissez-faire” junto dos países exportadores de recursos naturais, apesar do 
reconhecimento dos problemas da agricultura industrializada e globalizada. Já algumas 
agências supranacionais como a FAO, crescentemente os governos do Sul Global, e os 
movimentos sociais globais de defesa dos direitos dos camponeses e da natureza, constituem 
um contra-movimento que vai atrasando e por vezes alterando o projecto de acumulação 
capitalista. Em alturas de crise, os próprios proponentes do neoliberalismo como o Banco 
Mundial, tal como Polanyi previu, ajudam a travar os excessos das suas próprias políticas. Na 
verdade, a minha análise de discurso revelou um movimento triplo, com uma divisão no 
contra-movimento entre os que chamei “capitalistas sociais”—com uma definição próxima do
liberalismo social, encerrando ainda a ideia de abertura a sacrifícios em prol da equidade e 
sustentabilidade—e um grupo mais apologista da mudança sistémica, ainda assim bastante 
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heterogéneo, que chamei “democratas ecológicos radicais”. Este último grupo tem 
enriquecido a teoria democrática com conceitos comunitaristas, como ideias de altruísmo, 
solidariedade, direitos da natureza, e a noção do “bem viver” (Buen Vivir). Em reacção à 
pressão dos dois grupos do contra-movimento, o que chamei o “bloco hegemónico de 
comércio” teve que adaptar o seu discurso para incluir o reconhecimento inevitável da 
insustentabilidade do sistema actual. Ainda assim, procura tentar refugiar-se em conceitos 
novos que apenas escondem práticas antigas, como a agricultura “climaticamente inteligente”,
a “economia verde” ou “bioeconomia”, e a “intensificação sustentável”.
A análise ecologico-democrática do sistema alimentar moderno e seus principais actores que 
apresento conduz à conclusão que ainda se está longe de uma politeia global alimentar, no 
sentido de uma comunidade democrática ou um corpo cívico em torno da organização da 
agricultura e da alimentação. A realidade social fica bastante aquém dos discursos promovidos
pelos principais actores alimentares: o sistema alimentar moderno não cumpre sequer os 
índices democráticos mais básicos do meu modelo de qualidade ecologico-democrática. Das 
entidades analisadas, apenas os actores que não estão no poder nem têm interesses comerciais,
abraçam o espectro completo dos atributos ecologico-democráticos apresentados na Tabela 1. 
Os capitalistas sociais, contrariamente aos “hegemónicos do comércio”, aventuram-se para 
além dos atributos mais básicos, incluindo grande parte dos que estão na categoria “controlo 
popular”, e até, tentativamente, reconhecendo mérito aos atributos incluídos na categoria da 
“autonomia”. No entanto, a sua incursão nas filosofias de democracia radical encontra a sua 
fronteira no reconhecimento pleno da autonomia de povos e comunidades na definição das 
políticas alimentares. Tal reconhecimento poria em causa o continuado lucro nas áreas 
agrícola e alimentar dos países líderes nestes sectores, dos quais a maioria tem também uma 
voz maior nos órgãos supranacionais decisores.
Não obstante a ausência de uma politeia alimentar global, ou de resultados concretos das 
políticas para diminuir as desigualdades e desequilíbrios ecológicos, o duplo ou triplo 
movimento que observo está a modificar aos poucos a forma de conceptualizar as práticas de 
tomada de decisão em matéria de recursos comuns. São exemplos disso o reforço do direito à 
alimentação, a vontade política de países do Sul para restringir os direitos das corporações, e o
crescente reconhecimento de alternativas à agricultura industrial, como a soberania alimentar 
e a agroecologia. Uma vez que a aceitação destes conceitos não é compatível com a anuência 
do que chamei os “embargos de comércio”, resta a esperança de que, parafraseando Dewey, 
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os projectos mais inclusivos levem a melhor. Para que isso aconteça, a minha recomendação é
que as tomadas de decisão sejam sempre verificadas a nível da sua qualidade ecologico-
democrática, cuja operacionalização por sua vez deve estar sempre em debate.
Palavras chave: democracia ecológica; democracia alimentar; qualidade democrática; sistema alimentar; 
política da alimentação
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Preface
I am fully aware that my thesis broaches many different themes within the vast and fertile 
field of food and agriculture, calling upon different disciplines for their observation, among 
them sociology, human ecology, economics, and political science. Running the risk of 
overcrowding my analysis was a conscious choice, although I could have taken many 
different routes. But I feel strongly that the socio-ecological dynamics of the food system are 
representative of the way our societies are being organised, as well as of the dominant power 
relations in our societies, alas, in our world, which seems to have become smaller and less 
diverse. I also felt that, in order to make critical observations about the sociopolitical and 
economic organisation of our food system, I needed to connect with several versions of the 
history of the food system, as recounted by anthropologists, sociologists, economists, 
geographers, philosophers, and more recently, ecologists. Additionally, since my main 
concern is with the democratic and ecological deficits of the globalised food system, I wished 
to understand how different currents that are critical of the capitalist and industrialised model 
of human production, explain the economic, social, cultural, political, and ecological 
dynamics at play in this system, which has been dominant for the last few centuries. This led 
me to explore different theories of political economy and of democracy, which greatly 
improved my knowledge of thinkers that hitherto were not much more than names and 
general ideas, while it also changed my mind about some things that I had taken for granted. It
did not make my task of arriving at a tentative model of the "ecological-democratic quality" 
of decision-making in food politics any easier. Swamped with ideas from intelligent scholars 
and practitioners, and with the experience of being active in several national and international 
movements for food and seed freedom, arriving at a valid selection of criteria was a long 
process, during which I matured my ideas a year at a time, one or two papers at a time, one 
conference or project meeting at a time. Given another five years, I am sure my model would 
be different or at least more refined, and that time may then have caught up with some of my 
notions, but as a researcher rather than a philosopher, I have to accept that there is a cut-off 
point for my theoretical improvements. Therefore, in this thesis I offer you my best analysis at
the time of this particular cut-off point, in the hope it contributes to furthering our critical 
understanding of the dynamics of food politics in a globalised, industrialised, and currently 
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highly neoliberal world, and of the criteria that could help measure whether our decision-
making is furthering the goals of economic, ecological, and social justice.
All doctoral candidates have battle stories and the scars to prove them, and now I have my 
own to add to the trove. The challenges seemed endless, but end they did, while new ones 
begin as soon as I lay down the proverbial pen. For being my battle buddies, I have many 
people to thank, but in particular the following: José Luís Garcia, my thesis supervisor, who 
was the first to believe in me and in my research, who gave me endless support and showed 
me the meaning of true academic freedom; Ana Nunes de Almeida, who was the second to 
believe in me and made my dream of coming to the Institute of Social Sciences a reality; my 
parents, who are my biggest fans, whether I deserve it or not, and always, bravely, stand by 
me; my friend for life, Paulo, who is always available to help at the distance of a phone call; 
my fellow transnational political participation aficionadas, Nina Amelung and Britta 
Baumgarten, who patiently kept giving me advice and the benefit of their experience; my food
and seed freedom comrades, in particular Sara, Mara, Paula, Cloé, and Frederica and Pepa, 
who helped me stay in touch with the real issues; my former flatmates Vanesse and Josie, who
witnessed many of my darker moments, and helped me pull through; my daughter Ava, for 
being a teenager and therefore keeping me grounded; my brother and sislaw, Max and Marta, 
for thinking of me and giving me cute nephews; Margarida Silva, for her inspiration, 
availability, and cheer. 
A todas e todos, obrigada e até já!
Lanka Horstink
Lisboa, December 2016
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A global food polity
Introduction
While food intake is an inescapable physiological necessity, eating entails far more than its basic
physiological dimensions. Quite clearly, the act of eating lies at the point of intersection of a whole series
of intricate physiological, psychological, ecological, economic, political, social and cultural processes.
Such intersections present the human and social sciences with some of their most intriguing questions and
challenges. However, in order to rise to such challenges, sociologists may need to be prepared to think
more flexibly about the traditional boundaries of their discipline. (Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 6)
For millions of years humans were content to provide in their food by hunting wild animals 
and foraging for wild plants, while maintaining a nomadic lifestyle. For reasons that are still 
highly disputed, everything changed around 12,000 years1 ago, when humans in several 
warmer regions in the world settled down and became farmers and herders. Today, agriculture
is an integral part of human physiology, psychology, and social organisation, not to mention a 
major environmental driver. Certainly those early humans were unaware to what extent they 
were changing not only the course of their own history, but that of most other species on the 
planet as well. The switch to sedentism coincides not only with the development of complex 
social organisations but also with the rise of disease, inequality, and warfare. From the outset, 
food production may have been a source of wealth and power for rapidly developing elites, 
who used agricultural surpluses as bargaining chips with their subjects and with elites from 
neighbouring primitive states. After the Middle Ages, food became a global business 
controlled by the colonialist countries and the world’s first corporations, that managed to 
secure positions of near monopoly, at the expense of the erstwhile slaves and the modern-day 
cheap labour that substituted them. Besides major asymmetries in the distribution of costs and
benefits in food production, agriculture has also indelibly altered landscapes all over the 
planet and is a major source of pollution and greenhouse warming. But despite farming's large
social and ecological footprint, it is also where we can find the crucial leverage points to 
invert poverty and hunger and produce a much-needed respite for our ecosystems.
1 Estimates vary, but recent excavations prove agriculture was practised at least 11,700 years ago, very
possibly earlier (Willcox 2013).
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The birth of the agricultural food system
Among scholars of the origins of agriculture, the debate on the reasons for its emergence is far
from over and no single explanation has gained sufficient support. On the one hand, it is a 
biological fact that the high energy demands of humans' large brains require them to consume 
(and therefore provide for) a high-quality and energy-rich diet very unlike their primate 
relatives (Beardsworth and Keil 1997). Whether this has spurred them to farming, unlike any 
other species (with a few, non-mammal, exceptions), has not been proven (Wadley and Martin
1993). The latter authors summarise the puzzle as follows: "(1) virtually no other species lives
this way, and (2) humans did not live this way until relatively recently".2 
On the other hand, the choice to farm presents a paradox: strictly speaking, agriculture means 
more work, more risk of famine and disease, and the necessity of accepting crowding and 
other inconveniences of sedentism (Diamond 19873). It does not appear to have offered 
obvious rewards to the hunter-gatherers that decided to make the switch (Wadley and Martin 
1993; Diamond 1999). Farming is now recognised as presenting some significant 
disadvantages, such as increased labour intensity, increased risk of disease and famine, and a 
generally poorer diet (e.g. Wadley and Martin 1993; Beardsworth and Keil 1997; Diamond 
1999). The striking deterioration of health and hygiene post-transition and the prevalence of 
hunger that persists to this day led Marshall Sahlins (1974) to conclude, during his 
observation of the lifestyle of surviving bands of hunter-gatherers, that they were "the original
affluent society".
Even when we reject the idea, as is now more common, that agriculture represented an 
inevitable (and positive) step in the evolution of humans, there remains a plethora of 
hypotheses to explore on how this dramatic change came to pass, among them climate 
change, biogeographical factors, population pressure, competition between individuals with 
"accumulative personalities" (Hayden 1990, 31), and even the hypothesis of the addictive 
properties of milk and cereals that has been advanced by Wadley and Martin (1993). As an 
2 Wadley and Martin 1993, available: http://www.ranprieur.com/readings/origins.html (accessed 15 August
2015).
3 Jared Diamond, The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race, Discover Magazine 1987, available:
http://www.ditext.com/diamond/mistake.html (accessed 15 August 2015).
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example of hypotheses that favour social explanations, Barbara Bender (1978) has argued that
food production has always been about social relations: the creation and upkeep of alliances 
based on exchange was an incentive for surplus production, which was better achieved 
through farming. Brian Hayden (1990) extends this idea, positing an economic causality (the 
desire to accumulate) rather than a strictly social one. Both authors observe that the food 
surpluses achieved through production came to be controlled by an elite, leading to the 
development of social hierarchy as well as inequality. 
Other archaeologists such as David Rindos (1984), Ian Hodder (1990) and Helen Leach 
(2003) offer a different interpretation, making a case for the co-domestication of homo 
sapiens and the plants and animals that they came to control. In this view, at minimum Homo 
sapiens was symbolically and socially domesticated (Hodder 1990), and at maximum 
biologically altered, just like the animals and plants with which humans filled their new 
habitats. Considering the drawbacks of a sedentary life —crowding, restricted mobility, 
interdependence between humans and non-humans, the risk of disease—it appears plausible 
that a domestication-like process occurred for humans to be able to transition to agriculture. 
Researchers differ as to whether they consider the domestication a pre-condition for 
(Beardsworth and Keil 1997) or a consequence (Leach 2003) of agriculture. 
Meanwhile, the biologist and essayist Jared Diamond (1999) offers the provocative 
hypothesis that biogeographical conditions determined the course of history for different 
peoples. His reasoning is compelling and helps to highlight the interdependence between 
forms of food procurement and social organisation. In certain regions of the world it is not 
possible to farm and those that colonised these regions, even if they came from farmer tribes, 
had to revert to hunting and gathering. Hunting and gathering does not generate surpluses and 
therefore does not free up resources to support boat builders, soldiers, or even chiefs. This 
inhibits the development of more complex technology and limits the growth of the population.
In contrast, where farming is possible, populations can be observed to increase dramatically 
and the social organisation necessarily becomes more complex, allowing for hierarchy and 
domination of one group over another. Studying the Polynesian people's expansion over the 
Pacific islands, Diamond shows how different climatic and geographical conditions created 
very different civilisations on different islands, in an effort to explain by analogy how some 
3
A global food polity
peoples (Eurasian) came to dominate others (especially American and African) through the 
advantages conferred to them by intensive farming and the use of steel (not to mention the 
unintentional spread of germs from Eurasia to the Americas that exterminated more 
indigenous people than all warfare combined, see Diamond 1999, Preface).
Just as scientists are not in agreement as to why agriculture emerged, they also vary 
significantly in how they judge the relative importance of the resulting impacts. The 
consequences of the shift from foraging to food production are considered so momentous that 
many speak of an agricultural or Neolithic revolution, even though it took millennia to 
complete and arose independently in at least five sites (Diamond 1999, 99). Some of the more
obvious impacts are those on the natural environment, through what Hole (1992, 374, in 
Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 8) calls the "cycle of use, abuse, abandonment and re-use": 
clearing forests, ploughing fragile topsoil and thus eroding the landscape. Alan Beardsworth 
and Teresa Keil (1997) contend that, where agriculture has been practised for millennia, it is 
now hard to identify areas that could be considered "natural" (i.e. completely unmanipulated 
by humans). Other less obvious impacts are the higher levels of diseases and diminished 
health conditions demonstrated by Hole (1992, 378) and Van der Merve (1992, 372) (both 
cited in Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 22). 
Beardsworth and Keil (1997) further list a number of significant social and cultural impacts, 
which, although not proven to be a direct consequence, are at minimum correlated and 
possibly facilitated by the rise of food production: 
• the concept of ownership arising with the building of food stocks that could 
"command the labour, obedience or political allegiance of others" (Ibid., 21) , allowing
for the emergence of privileged groups and subsequent increase of social inequality; 
• the concept of labour as a way to support debts and obligations owed to others that are 
more powerful and resourceful, as opposed to work directed exclusively to subsistence
needs (Ibid.); and
• the prevalence of warfare (Harris 1978, 35 as cited in Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 23).
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Likewise, the increase in population and the development of metal-based technology would 
very likely not have happened if humans had remained hunter-gathering peoples. Diamond 
(1999, 285), comparing modern-day hunter-gatherer tribes with states, observes how states 
expand and diversify their populations by producing food, while hunter-gatherer societies 
never move beyond the level of chiefdoms. Regardless of causality, changes in food 
procurement correlate with much more complex forms of social organisation, creating the 
conditions in which cities and states emerged.
States represented a big step away from the relatively smaller and simpler human social 
groupings that preceded them. When Diamond (Ibid.) observes contemporary hunter-gatherer 
societies, he finds these to have a relatively horizontal organisation and to lack notions of 
private ownership. He finds that "in general, the larger the size and the higher the density [of 
the population], the more complex and specialized were the technology and organization [...]" 
(Ibid., 63). 
This increasing social complexity and the possibility of social differentiation in the production
and distribution of food surpluses may have facilitated the rise of social inequalities. 
According to Harris, in Beardsworth and Keil's review of the birth of the food system, pristine
states4 may have emerged as an intensification of what were incipient hierarchies around "big 
men" who had an incentive to control food stocks so as to consolidate and increase their 
power (Harris 1978, 70-71, cited in Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 28). Harris contends that as 
populations of these pre-states grow and become denser, the food redistribution systems also 
become more elaborate and move from voluntary to obligatory. The chief becomes a 
monarch, reversing the perceived dependence: while the chief needs the allegiance of his 
followers, the subject of a monarch depends on the latter's generosity. This greater power 
generates an elaborate hierarchy that is literally fed from the reserves controlled by the 
monarchy. Geographical conditions, such as the localisation of early states on limited fertile 
grounds, may then intensify this system while the mere existence of one pristine state may 
encourage the emergence of secondary states, scaling up the self-reinforcing cycle of 
intensification (Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 29).
4 Morton H. Fried (1978) defines a pristine state as one that arose sui generis, neither in response to other highly
organised but separate political entities nor based on pre-existing models (in El Ouali 2012, 61).
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Independently of how we interpret the birth of food production, by the time the first pristine 
states were established, all of the characteristics that can be considered fundamental to 
agricultural production were in place (based on Beardsworth and Keil 1997, 30): 
• a wide range of domesticated animals and plants (and, as we have seen, possibly 
the domestication of humans themselves);
• use of the plough and of irrigation systems;
• discovery of natural fertilisers and the practice of fallowing (setting land aside to 
regain fertility); and
• the trading of relatively non-perishable surpluses.
These forms of agricultural production allowed for societies to evolve, ranging from a 
(relatively speaking) simpler, smaller village to the splendour and complexity of ancient 
civilisations. This evolution was to favour, for reasons we can mostly speculate about, the 
dominance of Eurasian peoples over the rest of the world. Diamond (1999, Chapter 5) 
contends that the domestication of plants and animals set the stage for the creation and 
confrontation between what he calls "history's haves and have-nots" (Ibid., 94). This rift 
between dominant and dominated can be argued to endure in the modern food system that 
came of age after the Second World War, being largely "developed, run and promoted 
worldwide by economic institutions in the rich and powerful nations" (Tansey and Worsley 
2014, 2). 
Inside the modern food system
As the limits set by available technologies and forms of social organisation were gradually 
overcome, what has been called the modern food system5 came into being. This second 
transformation of the methods of food procurement happened faster (over the course of 
5 The use of the term food system rather than food chain or food economy, according to authors Geoff Tansey
and Anthony Worsley (2014), hints at a recognition of the interconnection and interdependence of actors,
activities, and processes involved in food production and distribution, at several levels: biological,
economic/political and social/cultural. 
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several centuries as compared to millennia for the first change in food provision), shifting 
both the pace and the scale of the intensification of food production to ever higher levels. 
During this period, food production was industrialised (i.e. standardised and mass-produced), 
centralised in the hands of a minority of capital holders, and, finally, globalised—uncoupling 
agricultural production from its consumption (Fonte 2002, 15). This new intensification of 
food production overstepped the boundaries of ecosystem balance, in particular through the 
use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 10), as well as the 
boundaries of nation-states. It can be also correlated with the parallel intensification not only 
of environmental degradation but of social inequalities: the hierarchies that were established 
and evolved with the initial food production system, as described by Diamond (1999), can be 
found again in its transformation to an industrial system, albeit with some new actors, among 
them the supranational economic organisations that were founded at Bretton Woods6 and, 
most prominently, the corporation7.
The story of the modern world food system begins in Europe, with Britain leading the way in 
transforming feudal economics into capitalist economics in the lead-up to the first industrial 
revolution. Raj Patel (2008, 77) claims that agricultural commerce reshaped the entire planet, 
making "eating and drinking [...] unimaginable without it". Tansey and Worsley (2014, 35) 
point out how the competitive quest for profitable food stuffs (especially spices) prompted the
exploration of new navigation routes and the subsequent surprise discovery of new continents 
by the Portuguese and Spanish. Ironically, some of the novel foods, unknown to Europeans 
before the middle ages, namely tea and sugar, provided a slightly addictive combination that 
would help exploit factory workers as much as the slaves that produced these food stuffs for 
them (Patel 2008, 80). 
According to Patel's account of the emergence of the modern food system, slave labour, and 
later cheap farm labour, was an essential part of the formula to provide cheap food to 
European cities, which in turn would "grease" the engines of industrialisation (Ibid., Chapter 
6 At Bretton Woods, USA, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund came into being, as well as
plans for what was later called the World Trade Organisation.
7 In my thesis, the word "corporation" is reserved for the large, publicly traded, incorporated businesses that
came into being 150 years ago and that have become the "world's dominant economic institution" (Bakan
2005, 5).
7
A global food polity
4). Other crucial ingredients were the displacement of farmers from Europe to the colonies, 
where they started producing export-focused  "temperate" foods like meat and grains that fed 
back into the world market (Ibid., 81) and the redirection of peasants and landless farmers to 
the factories of Europe's rapid industrialisation. Whereas Europe's expanding bourgeoisie 
eagerly adopted the new-found culinary delights from across the oceans, the diet of the newly 
created working class was very poor, based mostly on wheat and potatoes, while the slaves 
and low-paid agricultural workers in the newly discovered continents became the chronically 
poor of the Global South (Ibid., 87).
Thus Britain led the first big iteration of the modern food system until after the Second World 
War (WWII), when this role shifted to the new superpower, the United States of America 
(USA). The USA, its lands un-invaded, was coping with food surpluses and found a way to 
keep food prices artificially low through subsidised food aid to Europe (Ibid., 90). When, in 
the 1950s, this became an impediment to Europe's recovering farmers, the food aid was re-
targeted at the Global South. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, food aid became too expensive
to ship and was gradually replaced by the export of yield-increasing farm technologies: the 
package of the so-called Green Revolution8. This shifted food production back to developing 
economies, but at a price: rising oil prices in the 1970s drove developing countries to ask for 
credit and, when recession struck, their debt spiralled. Post-WWII supranational institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had the clout to demand 
conditions for loans that other institutions would no longer give to debt-ridden countries. 
These conditions are known as "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAPs)9 and their effects
are well-documented (see footnote): devalued currencies made home-made products cheaper 
for export and foreign-produced goods more expensive, while markets were forced open and 
local producers left without support, unlike the foreign corporations they competed with. In 
8 The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) describes this package as high-yielding varieties of cereals
combined with a significant increase in the use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides as well as irrigation,
available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e06.htm (accessed 20 September 2015).
9 The Whirled Bank Group describes SAPs as "[…] economic policies which countries must follow in order to
qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and help them make debt
repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. Although SAPs
are designed for individual countries but have common guiding principles and features which include export-
led growth; privatisation and liberalisation; and the efficiency of the free market", available:
http://www.whirledbank.org/development/sap.html (accessed 21 September 2015).
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the 1960s, countries of the Global South had yearly food trade surpluses of US$ 7 billion. 
After four decades of "development" this has been transformed into a food deficit of US$ 11 
billion a year (Holt-Giménez and Peabody 2008, 2). Ironically, the same rich countries that 
now impose unconditional free trade on developing countries, such as the USA and Great 
Britain, attained their developed status mainly through protectionism, interventionism, a 
generous subsidy system, and a large public sector, prompting Chang (2002) to speak of how 
wealthy countries are "kicking away the ladder" of progress.
The rise of the modern food system represents a second agricultural revolution because it did 
not just continue but exponentially accelerated the tremendous impact of the activity of food 
production on physical as well as social ecosystems. The profound multi-dimensional 
implications and paradoxes of the social, economic, and political organisation that food 
production requires makes this a challenging topic of sociological interest where boundaries, 
as food system scholars Beardsworth and Keil (1997, 6) recommend, must be kept flexible. 
Reconnecting with the origins of sociology in political economy, my thesis will focus on the 
political, and in particular democratic, implications of the global food production model that 
has come to dominate.
Researching the food polity
Food and agricultural policies have long ceased to be the exclusive purview of nation-states 
and become a matter of international negotiation, to which agreements such as the UPOV 
convention10 to protect plant varieties in 1961, and the one that founded the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)11 in 1994 can attest. Although agriculture was a global affair as early as 
the First Industrial Revolution, when fast industrialising countries needed cheap food for their
new labourers, the development of global food policies is a more recent phenomenon linked 
to the parallel rise of global trade negotiations and global environmental "governance". The 
10 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, available:
 http://www.upov.int/portal/index.html.en (accessed 30 June 2012).
11 Among the agreements that underwrite the WTO is the controversial Agreement on Agriculture, which
restricts the support a government may give to its local food producers. Available:
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm (accessed 16 August 2015).
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policy sector of food and agriculture sits at the intersection of different administrative areas, 
touching among other things on trade, the environment, human rights, and social and 
economic development. 
The idea of governance beyond state borders is a very recent concept that started gaining 
meaning when the institutions of Bretton Woods, and a year later the United Nations, came 
into being. Mark Bevir (2012) believes governance is still mostly the process of governing, 
but argues that nowadays in empirical terms it refers to “processes of rule wherever they 
occur”. New actors and a variety of organisational forms have not only extended governance 
beyond governments' purview, but also transformed it into a practice on its own, to which 
contemporary frameworks for "good governance"12 can attest: offering guiding principles 
such as consensus-oriented public participation, strategic vision, accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, equitability, and inclusiveness. However, as I shall 
demonstrate over several chapters, despite the vibrant rhetoric on how everyone and anyone 
should and can be involved in the “governance” of common affairs, the actual “governing” is 
still exclusively reserved for local, national and supranational authorities. I will also show 
how many of these supranational authorities bear no relationship whatsoever with the 
constituents of the governments that have legitimised these institutions. Therefore, whenever I
use the term governance, I refer to attempts at governing and/or an instrumentalist approach 
to decision-making, rather than a form of democracy.
In the 1970s, the idea of governance of the human environment became key for global 
decision-making. The publication of impacting reports such as Silent Spring by the biologist 
Rachel Carson in 1962, the Club of Rome report Limits to Growth in 197213 and the 
Brundtland report Our Common Future in 198714—the latter two perhaps not as far-reaching 
12 See, for example:
John Graham, Bruce Amos, Timothy W. Plumptre, Governance principles for protected areas in the 21st 
century (2003). 
UN governance guidelines, available: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx (accessed
20 June 2013).
13 Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, available: http://www.clubofrome.org/report/the-limits-to-growth/
(accessed 13 June 2016).
14 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 1987, available:
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm  (accessed 10 May 2013).
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in their critique as the former—did much to bring to light the negative impacts of 
industrialisation on our social, ecological, and even economic environments. These reports 
laid the foundations for a global environmental decision-making style based on principles and 
mechanisms that at best avoid, and at minimum reduce the impact of human productive 
activities, while aiming to achieve levels of development that are socially equitable and 
ecologically sustainable. Among these principles are the Ecosystem Approach, the 
Precautionary Principle, the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (including the right
for affected groups to participate in environmental decision-making) and the Subsidiarity 
Principle15. The nature of the problems faced in the second half of the 20th century, together 
with their urgency, interdisciplinarity, uncertainty, and irreversibility, also called for a 
democratisation of both discourse and decision-making (Martinez-Alier, Munda, and O'Neill 
1998). These problems can often not be translated into probabilities because of unforeseen 
interactions, negative synergies, trans-generational effects, periods of latency, and causal 
opacities, at the same time as their effects can be long-term, potentially catastrophic, and 
irreversible (Jerónimo 2006). As such, “post-normal”16 and other critical thinkers claim 
decision-making in these areas requires broadening the publics that should have a say 
(Funtowicz and Strand 2007).
Despite the consecration of strong principles for decision-making in environmental and 
related matters, the "deep" sustainable turn was short-lived. As the imperative of trade moved 
up in the international agenda, the global equity aspect of sustainability that governments 
initially agreed on, was soon to be ignored by the richer countries while the discourse settled 
into what can be termed a "weak" version of sustainability: ecological limits to development 
should be respected, but can also be stretched, provided the right policies are chosen (Dryzek 
2005, 147). Sustainability is now being claimed by governments and industries alike, even 
when their activities have profound negative social and environmental impacts (Patel 2009). 
The powerful principles from the global environmental governance treaties have been 
reinterpreted to avoid conflict with trade agreements, the mandatory "proof of no harm" that is
15 For a detailed definition of these principles for environmental governance, see Chapter 2, pages 69-70.
16 The concept of post-normal science was developed by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz as a
methodology of inquiry that is appropriate for cases where "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high
and decisions urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, 138).
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part of the Precautionary Principle quickly becoming "no proof of harm" (Traavik and Li 
Ching 2007). The EU version of the precautionary principle17 introduces a measure of 
proportionality that weakens precautionary action: it states that where uncertainty exists, the 
cost-benefit analysis should merely be extended (Funtowicz and Strand 2007). Global 
governance has also shifted from negotiations between sovereign states to protagonism of 
supranational institutions, such as the WTO and the World Bank, whose decision-makers were
not democratically elected and are relatively shielded from public scrutiny, while sensitive to 
the wishes of the most powerful groups in the world (McAfee 1999).
This is how the promises of global environmental governance agreements to halt the 
degradation of the natural systems that humans and fellow species depend on, while 
improving the conditions of that half of humanity that still lives in miserable conditions, have 
come up short 40 years later. Nowhere can this be felt more strongly than in the food system, 
with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reporting that the number of people going 
hungry has stopped decreasing since 2007 and is actually increasing in some regions (FAO, 
WFP, IFAD 2012), and the World Resources Institute (2005) warning that 75 percent of the 
world's poor are from rural populations. These are the populations that are the most dependent
on the "physical and functional availability of natural resources", which, according to the 
groundbreaking IAASTD18 report, "has shrunk faster than at any other time in history due to 
increased demand and/or degradation at the global level" (Global Report 2009, 3). The same 
report (Ibid., 2) shows that despite the enormous growth in trade of agricultural inputs and 
outputs, most food (at least over half) is still consumed where it is produced and 90 percent of
farms worldwide are small (under two hectares). The financial benefits of resource 
exploitation in agriculture, however, tend to accrue not to the farmers, but to the companies 
that sell the inputs for farming, and those that process and retail the food resulting from 
farming19. Agriculture as a sector, crucial as it is to human livelihoods, does not only suffer 
enormous challenges, many of them brought on by its industrialisation and dependence on 
17 European Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, 2000, available: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0001&from=EN  (accessed 24 October 
2016).
18 Report resulting from the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development conducted between 2005 and 2007. Available: 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/Assessments/Ecosystems/IAASTD/tabid/105853/Defa (accessed 18 June 2012).
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fossil fuels (such as the fact that agriculture may account for over 30 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions—Ibid., 3), but also produces enormous inequities, with a minority 
of farms occupying the majority of arable land, a small number of large transnational 
companies dominating food grades and standards while favouring large-scale, monocultural 
farms, and with food increasingly flowing from poorer to richer countries (Ibid., 7). Because 
of the way food and agricultural activities are at the core not only of the social arrangements 
in our world, but also that of the very existence of humans, this is a sociological topic par 
excellence that is hotly debated since the physiocrats20 of the eighteenth century, but perhaps 
never more so than now, as we seem to reach the apex of the capitalist economy’s penetration 
of the world’s food production.
The IAASTD report was a response to "the widespread realization that despite significant 
scientific and technological achievements in our ability to increase agricultural productivity, 
we have been less attentive to some of the unintended social and environmental consequences
of our achievements" (IAASTD 2009, Synthesis Report, 3). It revealed the deep paradoxes of 
what is both the most important human activity, directly linked to the most basic needs, and 
the biggest and for some highly lucrative industry in the world. At a time when the "right to 
food"21 is fast becoming a recognised human right, the fact that many, if not most of those 
working in agriculture, are caught up in a "vicious circle of poor health, reduced working 
capacity, low productivity and short life expectancy" (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 2) is not
just baffling, but morally and democratically unacceptable.
19 A 2013 report by the consultancy KPMG shows the agro-chemical and food companies have the highest 
profit levels in the food production and distribution chain, whereas traders and retailers make their earnings 
through bulk sales. The same report shows that farmers’ gross share of the total value-chain is about 22%, 
even though they are the largest interest group in the production chain. Available: 
https://www.kpmg.com/US/ean/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/agricultural-food-value-
chain-report.pdf (accessed 28 September 2016).
A study for American Congress showed the average farm share in the USA fell from about 41% in 1950 to
15.5% in 2011. Schnepf, Randy. 2013. Farm-to-food price dynamics. Congressional Research Service Report
for US Congress: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40621.pdf (accessed 1 September 2015).
20 Physiocracy was developed in France and popular just prior to Adam Smith’s publication of The Wealth of
Nations. It is sometimes considered to be one of the first complete theories of economics.
21 FAO defines the right to food as a right that "is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in
community with others, has the physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its
procurement". Available: http://www.fao.org/righttofood/right-to-food-home/en/ (accessed 25 October 2016).
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Delving into the paradoxes and challenges of a major human activity, my thesis will explore 
the social, economic, and political organisation of the modern food system to reveal the 
factors that perpetuate the system's inequitable and unsustainable outcomes, focusing in 
particular on the type of democratic world view that motivates the main food actors, among 
them governments, supranational organisations, NGOs, social movements, and farmers 
themselves.
Methodological approach
To explore the democratic substance of the current political economy of food, i.e. the social, 
political, and economic dynamics that tie food actors and food agents22 together in the modern
food system, I have chosen a classical sociological approach, reconnecting with some of the 
great sociological theories that aimed to explain centrally important social issues, in particular
theories of political economy. However, despite my reunion with the early thinkers of the 
Industrial Revolution, from whom I inherit the practice of critical analysis, I also attempt to 
use the bridge provided by some contemporary scholars linking the early criticism of 
capitalism to the observations of globalised trade and food systems in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. These more recent theories include new concepts—sustainability, 
public participation, governance, deliberation, ecology, and food sovereignty—some of which
require "foraging" into different disciplines, if I may be forgiven the pun. As I hope to 
demonstrate in my research, some of these new concepts are in danger of being emptied of 
substantive meaning and therefore require grounding in older and well-discussed ones, such 
as freedom, equality, equity, and popular control. By exploring the new theories in light of the
sociological tradition, I wish to provide a more solid democratic framework with which to 
assess global environmental policies, in particular global food policies.
In this dissertation I will re-conceptualise the food system first in political economic terms, 
and subsequently in "substantive" democratic terms. This means I will aim to identify the 
power relations and main conflicts of interest, and link my observations to several theoretical 
22 I use the term actor for well-defined interest groups in food politics (e.g. NGOs, business associations,
supranational organisations, governments,...), whereas I reserve the broader term agent for all the interest
groups in the food system (e.g. women, peasants, children, companies, consumers,...).
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traditions, most prominently critical sociology, but also research focusing on the newer 
constructs of global governance and public participation. This profound theoretical reflection 
will then be used to build a tentative model for substantive or food democracy, by which I 
understand a democracy that is grounded in the human activity of food and basic needs 
production, while being both socially and ecologically responsive to its demos. In the next 
step, this exploratory model of democratic attributes will guide a documentary analysis of the 
food system, combined with a critical discourse analysis of nine characteristic food actors. I 
am looking for indications of what I have called the "food polity"23—i.e. a democratic 
commonwealth, common government, or citizen body of which the main purpose is the 
common organisation of agriculture and food. My approach, which moves from a theoretical 
reflection based on thinkers from multiple disciplines, to its synthesis in the form of a 
democratic model, and finally to its test against documentary and discourse data, can be 
considered to fall within the grounded theory approach. According to Strauss and Corbin 
(1994), in this methodology theory is either derived from the data or existing theories are 
improved in confrontation with the data. In grounded theory, the research and the 
development of theory are considered parts of the same process, an approach that I believe 
does justice to the sociological and ecological complexities of the modern food system. At the
same time, the use of discourse analysis is appropriate considering that food “governing” can 
increasingly be understood as a discursive contest over the framing of policy issues and the 
construction of rules, norms, and actor identities (Fuchs 2005).
A discourse in this thesis is understood as a particular way of representing aspects of social 
life, including aspects that are desired or possible worlds (Fairclough 2001). A critical 
discourse analysis offers many levels of understanding: besides the deeper intentions of the 
discursant, his or her relationship with his or her primary audience can be revealed, and the 
way he or she interprets the social order. In this manner the ideological tensions and 
contradictions of narratives that apparently promote well-being and equity can be unmasked, 
while it is also possible to observe with what arguments the cultural hegemony of dominant 
interest groups is reproduced, and finally how the dominant discourses interact with counter-
hegemonic narratives of social movements and activist groups. This three-dimensional 
23 I use polity as I would the word politeia from the Ancient Greek: the order of social and political
relationships in a political community, where participants are always in some way dependent on one another.
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approach is used by Josée Johnston (2008) in a food-related case that helped shape my 
methodology. My approach also takes cues from Erica Drummond (2012), who analysed two 
of the food actors that are part of my research, and who worked with the idea of themes in 
narratives, and from John Dryzek (2005), who made a well-known attempt to classify modern
ecological discourses, with important clues as to how to distinguish between discourses that 
are very similar at first glance.
Despite the exploratory nature of my research, it has a defined focus and is guided by initial 
research questions that will be answered throughout the dissertation. My focus is on the 
political economic structure of the food system, a choice that is founded on the strong 
indications that the paradoxes and challenges in agriculture stem from the conflict between 
food as need and food as business. My thesis is that only through substantive (or "deep") 
democratic proposals for the organisation of a food system-based society can we achieve an 
organisational model that is responsive simultaneously to questions of social equity and of 
ecological balance. To evaluate how substantive these proposals are, I will use the concept of 
"democratic quality". In its most conventional understanding, democratic quality is "different 
degrees of democraticness" (O'Donnell 2004, 21). However, each different democratic school 
and democratic thinker has a different definition as to what constitutes a "quality" democracy. 
Based on the theories and thoughts of illustrious predecessors and colleagues, I will develop 
my own model for democratic quality, which I will call “ecological-democratic quality”.
The main research questions were the following:
- What is the ecological-democratic quality—the degree to which decision-making is 
responsive both to its demos and to the environmental and social challenges of our time—of  
the social arrangements that currently shape the global food system?
- What is the ecological-democratic quality of the food policies that are defended by different 
food actors in the global food system?
The following supporting questions helped to delimit the field of study, which was 
nevertheless vast:
• Who are the main food actors and agents in the global food system?
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• What are the main factors that mediate the relations of power in the modern food 
system?
• What is the relative importance of each of the main facets of the food system: social, 
political, economic, and ecological; and how do these interact in the political economy
of food?
• What are the proposals for the democratic organisation of a food system-based society 
that is responsive to both social and ecological questions?
• What are the most promising democratic attributes for identifying substantive 
democratic proposals of (re)organisation of a food system-based society that is 
responsive to both social and ecological questions?
The chosen methodology took me on a predominantly analytical path based on what can be 
considered secondary data, with the necessary risks both former and latter pose to the quality 
of the research. This was balanced on the one hand by using high quality sources—according 
to peer opinions for each area—and on the other, by using multiple sources for important facts
in every phase of the thesis. I was further assisted in the endeavour to build a coherent and 
well-founded argument by an array of creative, knowledgeable, and systematic democratic 
thinkers. The test of the evolving democratic theory against documentary and discourse data 
provided another important validation step. The thesis was always designed to be exploratory, 
conscious as I was of the vastness of this field of study and the fact that I had not greatly 
narrowed down my research focus. Additionally, my choice of framing my research within a 
critical political economic perspective precludes other frameworks from which the food 
system may be studied, such as those that Dryzek (2005) identified as Promethean (a belief in 
industrialism without limits), reformist (what he calls “environmental problem solving”, a 
belief in pragmatic adjustments or reforms to industrialism led mostly by experts and/or the 
market), or ecological modernisation (a more imaginative approach to having the best of both 
worlds, a fairer and cleaner world and continued economic growth). My social interpretation 
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of the available information on our food system and food politics24 is based on the assumption
that the balance of power in society rests in large part, although not exclusively, on the way 
assets (be it physical, social, or cultural capital) are distributed and controlled. I do not 
subscribe to material determinism, but I do believe in, and see indications of, ever present 
dynamics of class, more subtle in some countries than others, which maintain the majority of 
our world in poverty, while a minority holds the majority of the world's natural and monetary 
assets. This perspective predisposes me to democracy-inspired solutions to deal with the food 
system's social and ecological challenges.
This declaration of intentions hopefully provides a framework within which to understand the 
path my research has taken. I firmly believe my predispositions have not diminished the 
wealth of observations on our food system and food politics, including discussing the 
different world views I mentioned previously. I believe my research provides many insights 
for the study of democratic models and democratic quality in general, for the study of the 
sociological implications of what has been called a "commercial society" (Hont 2015) at the 
intermediate level, and finally, for the study of food politics and the success factors for 
improving its democratic quality in particular.
Structure of the thesis
I will present the development of my arguments in a progressive manner over five chapters 
(excluding the introduction and the conclusion). The first chapter sets the stage for a political 
economy of food, which I will show is a potential conditioning factor for the other dimensions
of human society (in particular social, political, and ecological). I will show how issues of 
control of the food economy have created path-dependent supranational policies that affect 
access to food, and to the resources to produce food, in practically every corner of the world. 
24 I use the term food politics in a wider sense than Marion Nestle, the author of Food Politics: How the Food
Industry infuences Nutrition and Health, first published in 2002. Nestle wished to show how food choices are
not only a matter of personal responsibility, but also of political position-taking, and how governments have
conspired with food industrialists to ensure the primary objective of food production is profit generation, not
health or food security. I go one step further by postulating a political economy of food, where farming and
food are tied into a global paradigm of growth, accumulation, and the commodification of nature. In a
political economy of food, the politics of food refer to the decision-making in food production and
distribution in a particular context of power relations.
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Like other important resource-based industries, food is subject to conflicts not only over 
ownership and distribution of resources, but also over values. When Tim Lang (1999, 218) 
speaks of a "titanic struggle between the forces of control and the pressure to democratize", he
is purposefully placing food at the heart of the democratic process, a quasi-universal struggle 
to reassert collective rights of peoples, to invert top-down decision-making, and to place 
human rights over commercial interests. 
The second chapter considers the impact that the political economy, in particular that of food 
production, has had on the democratic organisation of our societies, and will analyse 
proposals for closing what many consider to be both an ecological and a democratic gap in 
global environmental decision-making in general, and food decision-making in particular. I 
will review a rights-based perspective to realising more democracy in the modern food system
as well as myriad democratic theories and practices, varying from proposals for extending the 
existing liberal democracies to approaches that require systemic changes to be applied to our 
social, economic, and political organisational forms. This chapter also connects with the more 
recent theories of co-management of ecological resources and the relative importance of what 
is called "public participation"—i.e. the involvement of citizens in decision-making on 
resources and other matters that affect them. Many of these theories have become 
depoliticised in what some critics consider to be an era of technocracy and extreme 
utilitarianism25 that has shed more holistic conceptions of equity and solidarity. The proposals 
for a more democratic approach to decision-making in a globalised and technological world 
have invariably used neutral or even apolitical concepts such as "civil society", "governance", 
"ecosystem management" and "public participation" (Amelung and Baumgarten 2016) while 
in practice these proposals have amounted to little more than window-dressing in a political 
economy of food that is firmly controlled by an elite. I will attempt to re-politicise what I call 
25 Technocracy is generally understood to be the rule or control of society by scientists, technicians, or
engineers (Gunnell 1982), whereas utilitarianism is understood here as the philosophical principle of
maximising the sum of individual well-being. Rayner (2003) speaks of an “age of assessment” and says that
“in both the North and the South, science, rather than society shapes the agendas for science-in-society
debates”. Much of Brian Wynne’s work revolves around uncovering the social basis for scientific knowledge
and policy decision-making. He calls attention to the “unacknowledged political–economic dimensions of
today’s techno-sciences, including their epistemic implications” (Wynne 2007, 109)
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the "good governance" theories by linking them with theories of substantive or “deep” 
democracy, and by reconceptualising some of the main terms used.
In the third chapter I will analyse theoretical and empirical proposals from several thinkers for
strengthening the democratic quality of decision-making, in particular in environmental and 
food matters, and build an exploratory democratic framework with which to assess the quality
of policy- and decision-making in the modern food system. This framework will serve as a 
reference for the documentary and discourse analyses that are presented in the second part of 
my thesis, consisting of two chapters preceded by an introduction that aims to sketch the 
context that may have shaped the data I collected. Whereas Chapter 4 presents a biography of 
the modern food system in the form of substantial statistical and testimonial data that illustrate
the paradoxes and challenges of the modern food system, Chapter 5 analyses the discourses of
nine different food actors in the food polity, among them supranational agencies, trade-
oriented international interest groups, and social movements that defend the idea of food 
sovereignty26. The indicators resulting from the documentary and discursive research are 
contextualised, organised according to themes, key assumptions, the social order implied, and 
the paradoxes and contradictions encountered. Ultimately, three types of food policies, each 
linked to a particular world view and specific democratic practices, are identified, described, 
and compared. Subjecting the policies I have identified to the test of democratic quality, I 
discuss the implications of each policy style for the achievement of their purported democratic
goals and for the attainment of equity and healthy ecosystems in general.
26 La Via Campesina, the farmers movement that coined the term, defines food sovereignty as "the right of
peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable
methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems". Available:
https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-
38/262-declaration-of-nyi (accessed 30 June 2015).
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I
The political economy of food
Ultimately, food is both a symptom and a symbol of how we organize ourselves and our societies. It is both
a vignette and a microcosm of wider social realities. (Tim Lang, 1999)
A complete transformation of the agriculture and food system, it might be argued, requires a complete
transformation of the society. Certainly, any attempt to create a more humane, just, and ecologically
rational society will have to embrace the struggle for sustainable agriculture. (Editors' note in Frederick
Buttel, Fred Magdoff and John Bellamy Foster 2000, 188)
In their book From Political Economy to Economics, Dimitris Milonakis and Ben Fine (2009)
meticulously document the process by which economics was stripped from its roots in history 
and society, leading to its splitting off from the other social sciences at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Once, political economy was the only social science available, and humans'
productive and other economic activities were analysed in light of historic events, as well as 
the social, political, and even psychological aspects of human cooperation. However, for more
than a hundred years already, economics has been profoundly mathematised, formalised and 
reduced mostly to microeconomics (Ibid., 2), whereas political economy has become a 
neglected, often merely optional, discipline.
As a central human activity, food production has not escaped the aforementioned 
mathematisation, formalisation, and reduction. Despite its "recalcitrant" nature, as Jack 
Kloppenburg reminds us with a term borrowed from Marx, agriculture has been deeply 
penetrated by the dominant form of economic organisation, which is capitalism (2004, 10). 
Kloppenburg explains how, for capitalism to be successful, it must achieve primitive (or 
original) accumulation, by separating the worker from the means of production, and it must 
continue to extend "the commodity form to new spheres" (Ibid., 9). Looking at how 
capitalism transformed farming, he notes that what was once a mostly self-sufficient process 
has become dependent on external resources (new commodities) that need to be purchased 
year after year. These inputs have spawned entire industries, often collectively referred to as 
agribusiness. But as I wish to show in this chapter, the transformation of agriculture into a 
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Fordist1-style industry was more profound and involved orienting production towards so-
called "cash crops"2 rather than food stuffs, since the former are more compatible with the 
existence of a profitable global food industry. Even that advance was not enough and the final 
frontier against which capitalism has more recently been pushing is that of the reproduction of
life itself, transforming seeds and genes but also the knowledge related to them into "data 
commodities"3, as I will demonstrate when presenting the idea of biocapitalism further on.
In this chapter I will present the idea of an integrated world economy revolving in large part 
around food and related natural resources, supported by institutions and rules that model a 
hyper-capitalist world view, and mostly benefitting a minority while bypassing political 
scrutiny by the majority. The argument will be developed in four parts: first I will justify the 
need for an analysis of the political economy rather than the economics of food, in light of the
undeniable contradictions between economic models and the reality of markets and their 
impact; then I will look at how trade overtook environmental (and food security) concerns in 
the 1990s, despite an apparent world consensus on the imperative of equitable sustainable 
development; next I will show how the world's political institutions adapted to this economy-
led world order; and finally, I will sketch the modern political economy of food and comment 
on its implications.
Political economy versus economics of food
My choice of the term political economy to describe the global food system is deliberate. On 
the one hand, I am reminded by scholars such as Richard Swedberg (2000), Philippe Steiner 
(2011), Dimitris Milonakis with Ben Fine (2009), among other economic sociologists, that 
1 We can read Antonio Gramsci's original definition of Fordism in Bonanno and Constance (2001, 1): "a new
form of highly rationalized capitalism involving not only mass production and consumption, and vertical
integration, but also a new culture and political arrangements". Bonanno (2004) further points out that under
Fordism output is heavily standardised and costs are minimised, and that it was under Fordism that
multinational capital became a final reality.
2 A cash crop according to the Random House Dictionary is "any crop that is considered easily marketable, as
wheat or cotton".
3 The recent phenomenon called "Big Data", facilitated by the enormous growth in computing and storage
capacities, and not in the least limited to web data mining but involving the crunching of genome sequences,
is still very much under-discussed. For a comprehensive overview of the challenges, see Boyd and Crawford
(2012).
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sociology was born from economic theory, at a time when the latter was the closest thing to a 
social science existing (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 1). Additionally, the initial central theme of 
sociology that so enthused its founders was the nature of industrial capitalism, to which Karl 
Marx and Max Weber most famously responded and which concerned even Emile Durkheim. 
I wish to reconnect with these origins of sociology. On the other hand, agriculture and food 
are subject to the rules of an increasingly homogeneous and global political economy, and as 
such I believe it is unavoidable that I will need to understand the history, characteristics, and 
impact of the now-dominant free market ideology4 if I am to understand the relations of 
property and power that spring up around food production, and to ultimately analyse the 
democratic quality of food politics or the decision-making in food production and distribution.
Milonakis and Fine (2009, 4) demonstrate how neoclassical economics, the predominant 
economic school today, has removed all historical and social considerations from the study of 
economic relations, to the point of having "become totally intolerant of approaches other than 
its own mainstream". Additionally, its method has separated it even more from historical and 
social approaches, by adhering to strict positivism and the utilitarian rationality of its basic 
units (households and firms), dismissing all other methodologies and entire variables of social
action (gender, social or cultural capital, education, etc.) as lacking in science and rigour. 
Milonakis and Fine advance that with the narrower method came a "loss of discussion of 
methodology itself" (Ibid., 5). Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis (2006) start by 
offering logical proof of the three axioms that exclusively define neoclassical thinking and 
practice (methodological individualism, -instrumentalism and -equilibration), but 
subsequently present supporting evidence for their "practical irrelevance", since these axioms 
are impossible to prove. The authors suggest that despite this theoretical failure, the "hidden 
nature of its three foundational axioms" has helped to avoid pluralist debate and lent the 
neoclassical school its discursive power and epistemic hegemony (Ibid., 5). The authors argue
that there is a feedback mechanism that preserves the status quo: the stronger the discursive 
power of neoclassicism, based on opaque propositions, the less likely it is that the 
4 What is now called neoliberalism or free market ideology, is a version, albeit more extreme, of the laissez-
faire doctrine of early economists. Polanyi (1944 | 2001) describes this as economic liberalism, where the
market is believed to be self-regulated, and government interference kept at an absolute minimum.  He
identified three central tenets for nineteenth century economic liberalism: "(a) competitive labor market,
automatic gold standard, and international free trade" (Ibid., 144).
25
A global food polity
practitioners will engage in methodological debates (Ibid., 16). Facing fewer questions or 
discussions, mainstream economics thus becomes a "religion with equations" (Ibid., 17). 
The apparent long-standing consensus on Western economic theory and methodology, 
although pervasive, is far from unchallenged. The best-known critique comes from Karl 
Marx, who embedded economic analysis firmly in historical and social factors and logically 
proved—using the assumptions of his predecessors (most notably the concepts of freedom 
and rationality) against them—that the economic reality produced by capitalism was in fact 
contradictory, simultaneously producing dialectical opposites such as debt and surplus (see an 
overview of his reasoning in Varoufakis 2015). Marx turned the neoclassical claim that wealth
is privately produced and quasi-illegitimately appropriated by the state through taxation, on its
head by stating that the opposite applies: wealth is collectively produced and privately 
appropriated through a system of production relations and property rights (Ibid.). He was not 
alone in placing economics back into its sociopolitical context. All the classical works in 
sociology—Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Simmel and Weber—touch upon the nature of 
industrial capitalism, employing either moderately positivist or explicitly non-positivist 
methodologies founded on an understanding of both history and social relations (Young 
2009). All of these thinkers postulate a strong connection between the economic and the social
order, although they vary in their interpretation of the relationship: whereas Marx (1911, 11) 
pioneers the belief that the "economic structure of society [is] the real foundation on which 
rise moral, legal and political superstructures and to which definite forms of social 
consciousness correspond", Weber (1920/2002) attributes a larger role to social groups in the 
choice and development of one or the other economic model, believing the drive to 
rationalisation as part of a new work ethic to be a more important factor in the rise of 
capitalism, while Durkheim (1933) follows Marx in lending importance to the economic 
foundation of a society, but differs with him as to the civilising potential of modern societies, 
believing that advanced societies can evolve as moral societies, which rather than pursuing 
individual economic interests, regulate themselves through a negotiation between the state 
and the professional organisations of workers. 
The link between economic and social forms of organisation has also been analysed by 
researchers of food systems. In my introduction I presented several authors (e.g. Bender 1978;
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Hayden 1990) who hypothesise that socio-economic factors, such as the desire to accumulate 
in order to have a better bargaining position, may have motivated the switch to a sedentary 
lifestyle based on food cultivation. These anthropologists also observe how this budding 
economic model of food production and exchange quickly led to the development of social 
hierarchy and more complex forms of social organisation. The biologist and essayist Diamond
(1999) provocatively theorises about a causal chain that starts with biogeographical conditions
influencing the choice of food procurement that in turn helps determine the form of social 
organisation. He bases this on the observation of how the peoples of areas where farming 
intensified—leading them to organise themselves in states—subsequently came to dominate 
others that were still hunting and gathering. Finally, the sociologists Beardsworth and Keil 
(1997) identify potential causal links between the concept of ownership that arose with the 
creation of surpluses and the emergence of a dominant class, and between a new concept of 
labour as a way to support debts and obligations owed to others and the emergence of the 
feudal system.
Karl Polanyi is relevant to my analysis as he has been an important inspiration for more 
contemporary critiques of industrial capitalism both by economists and sociologists and 
because his predictions are closer to our twenty-first century reality. Whilst Polanyi follows 
the Marxist premise that societies are built on economic relations, he questions the nineteenth 
century foundation given to economics: that humans act according to a rationally calculated 
self-interest (1944/2001, 257). As Joseph Stiglitz would famously prove later in the twentieth 
century, Polanyi states that markets never have perfect or complete information that would 
allow for purely mathematical decisions, thus calling for interventions that could ideally 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Unfortunately, these interventions have often 
been used selectively to benefit a minority, often large corporations (Stiglitz in the foreword 
to Polanyi 2001, viii). Polanyi denounces the arbitrary use of the free market ideology, often 
imposed on desirable markets with government and/or supra-governmental support, and often 
after the corporations wishing to conquer these markets have enjoyed a major head start 
through protectionism and subsidies. Another contemporary political economist, Ha-Joon 
Chang, dedicates an entire book to proving that the dominant developed countries employed 
interventionist economic policies coupled with a generous subsidy system and a large public 
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sector to get rich and that they subsequently tried to stop other countries from doing the same,
an approach that inspired the title to his book: Kicking Away the Ladder (Chang 2002).
Fred Block, an economic sociologist and follower of Polanyi, reminds us how the latter 
unmasked the radical break that classical economists made with previous thinkers, in 
subordinating society to the logic of the market, instead of the other way around. Polanyi 
builds his reasoning on the concept of "embeddedness", where economy is "subordinated to 
politics, religion, and social relations" (Block in the introduction to Polanyi 2001, xxiv), 
which he insisted was the reality of human societies until the nineteenth century. Polanyi not 
only argues that the economy should be embedded in society and the natural environment, he 
claims that despite the best efforts of the defenders of self-regulating markets, economy has 
not become disembedded, but that the utopia of reducing all human activities to market 
dynamics poses an unacceptable risk to human beings and the natural environment (Ibid.). 
Just as Marx sees an inevitable end to capitalism because it is based on the exploitation of a 
working class that also needs to ensure consumption of the products it helps produce, Polanyi 
sees human societies as being pushed "to the edge of a precipice" and people resisting, 
therefore inhibiting the full realisation of the free market utopia (Ibid., xxv-xxvii). This is 
what Polanyi calls the "double movement", i.e. the laissez-faire movement versus a 
countermovement that attempts to re-embed the economy (which Polanyi claims may include 
capitalists themselves in times of great uncertainty and volatility) (Ibid., vviii).
Polanyi's ideas are more predictive of twenty-first century economic policies than Marx's. 
Polanyi doesn't see just one class—the working class—resisting the liberalisation of markets 
and the increasing privatisation of goods, but believes that at some point "all groups in society
have participated in this project" (Ibid., xxviii). He sees the liberal project as filled with 
paradox, leading him to believe it was not the result of a natural evolution: not only were 
governments and the public sector instrumental in creating the conditions for liberalisation 
and privatisation, but at several points in history restrictions to the laissez-faire doctrine were 
often inspired by liberals themselves, possibly out of self-protection (Polanyi 2001, 147-148). 
After all, as also pointed out by O'Connor (1998, 159), the growth of a capitalist market tends 
to destroy the social and environmental conditions on which it ultimately depends. The double
movement identified by Polanyi does not just oppose liberals and collectivists, but often, for 
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pragmatic purposes, liberals among themselves, including those in government. He famously 
states that "[w]hile laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action, 
subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was 
planned; planning was not" (Polanyi 2001, 147). 
Polanyi thought that social life could be freed from the chains of economic liberalism, and 
that nations would find democratic means to insulate their citizens and the environment from 
economic excesses, finding a balance between highly integrated international trade and the 
right to sovereignty of participating nations (Ibid., xxxvi). Although this has not happened, the
double movement observed by Polanyi still holds, and global order has not been completely 
given over to what is now called neoliberalism. It faces new obstacles according to Block 
(Ibid.), such as the conflict of interest between peoples of the global South and those of the 
global North. And, as predicted by Polanyi's theory on the Market Society, and as I will 
discuss in the next sections, not only the economy but society itself has been profoundly 
altered to adjust to the ideology behind economic liberalism.
Sustainable if tradeable
Despite the important principles for sustainability5 adopted respectively in 1972 and 19926, at 
successive international environmental summits, the destruction of both human livelihoods 
and their habitats has been unstoppable, facts that have been reasserted time and again by 
peer-reviewed United Nations reports (such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; 
the IAASTD assessment of agriculture 2009; UNCTAD assessment of agriculture 2013; and 
5 These are among others the Ecosystem Approach, the Precautionary Principle, the Polluter Pays Principle,
mandatory environmental assessments, the protection of States from the transference of harmful activities or
substances from other States, the right to access to justice and information and the promotion of participation
of all manner of stakeholders, with a special mention for the role of women, youth and indigenous people.
These landmark principles and guidelines for institutional change were included in the UN's action plan for
sustainable development, Agenda 21 (now merged into the Sustainable Development Goals 2030), available:
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (accessed 9 November 2016).
6 United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972, available:
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 (accessed 11 May
2012).
United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, available:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (accessed 8 May 2012).
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IPCC assessments of climate change, 1990 to 20147). A fact that has been less publicised is 
how, at the same time as the concept of sustainability8 was finally operationalised (a long 
process that stretches from the first environmental summit in 1972 until the creation of 
Agenda 21—see note 5—in the period between 1989 and 1992), what I call “trade caveats” 
(Horstink 2013) started appearing in international environmental agreements, starting with the
Rio 1992 agreement itself9. The neoliberal10 camp in economic policy-making triumphed in 
1995, after the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations culminated in the creation of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), putting down binding agreements for the majority of countries in 
the world to abide by, within an illuminist, neoclassical conception of sovereign states that 
voluntarily limit their sovereignty by deferring to supranational11 institutions, recognising that 
free trade (i.e. the lowering of trade barriers and the opening of national markets to foreign 
competitors) is in their best interest and that the balance of world power is maintained through
international law and/or mutual self-interest (VanGrasstek | WTO 2013, 3-4). 
The WTO, according to Bonanno (2004, 42) has become "perhaps the most important 
economic regulatory agency at the global level", all the while, as has happened with most 
supranational organisations, having "virtually no connections with the citizens of member 
countries". Countries from the Global South complain that they have little or no voice in the 
WTO decision-making system, and consider it the "most non-transparent of international 
organisations"12. Among the 60 agreements that the WTO has been mandated to oversee are 
areas of trade that until its constitution had been exempted, such as agriculture and textile, and
7 History of IPCC reports, available:
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (accessed 26 January 2016).
8 The 1987 so-called Brundtland report “Our Common Future” defines sustainable development as one that
"meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs." Report available: http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm (accessed 20 January 2016).
9 We can read in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration: "Trade policy measures for environmental purposes
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade." Available:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (accessed 20 January 2016).
10 Defined by David Harvey (2005, 2) as "a theory of political economic practices that proposes human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade".
11 Supranational institutions should be distinguished from intergovernmental ones, the former gaining the
capacity for decision-making independently of the governments that helped form the institution (see Sweet
and Sandholtz 1997).
12 Statement of the Third World Network at the WTO Symposia on Trade and Environment and Trade and
Development, Geneva 15-18 March 1999, available:
http://www.twn.my/title/legit-cn.htm (accessed 20 January 2016).
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new areas that were becoming more important for trade such as trade-related services and 
intellectual property. The much disputed Agreement on Agriculture13, the main reason the 
Uruguay round was deadlocked for so long, was designed to end agricultural protectionism 
and trade-distorting subsidies for farmers and exporters, but has had, twenty years later, little 
effect on the agricultural protectionism of countries from the Global North while endangering 
the food security of those of the Global South (see Harriet Friedmann's 2005 overview of the 
consequences of first the British-led and subsequently the USA-led food regimes). Further 
trade liberalisation has so far been deadlocked in the Doha Development Round of negotiation
of the WTO, because of strong protest from the Global South and from farmer-, 
environmentalist-, and anti-globalist movements since the late 1990s. Friedmann (Ibid.) 
shows how large agribusiness corporations, which have grown exponentially after World War 
II, lobby for more rights, such as the protection of their investments and intellectual property 
rights, while countries from the South and the new socio-environmental movements protest 
the decline in food safety, the continued agricultural protectionism of countries in the North 
(often subsidising environmentally damaging inputs and activities), the use of proprietary 
genetic technologies, and the related protection of property rights on living entities. To 
compensate for the lack of progress in a global agreement on trade liberalisation to replace or 
strengthen the WTO, the USA has focused on celebrating bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) worldwide (important ones are the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the Central American Free Trade Agreement). One of the FTAs under negotiation 
involves 30% of global merchandise trade and 40% of world trade in services,14 if or when the
European Union agrees to sign a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with 
the USA. As a supranational organisation with a mandate that partially supersedes the 
sovereignty of its member states (on the European Commission's site we can read that "Trade 
policy is an exclusive power of the EU – so only the EU, and not individual member states, 
can legislate on trade matters and conclude international trade agreements"15), the European 
13 Agreement on Agriculture from the World Trade Organisation, available:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm (accessed 10 May 2012).
14 Self-reported figures from the US Department of Commerce and IMF, available:
http://www.euintheus.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/TTIP_Publicatiopn_85x11in_High_res.pdf (accessed
21 January 2016).
15 European Commission's webpage on Trade Policy, available:
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/ (accessed 21 January 2016).
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Union, through the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, can push through an 
agreement even if it is not supported by European citizens.
Free trade agreements almost inevitably spell disaster for the environment and the financially 
insecure, as Ashish Kothari (2009, 402-403) points out in his overview of the impact of the 
neoliberal model of “development” on India: India has experienced “exclusive” and what is 
called “jobless” rather than “inclusive” growth, leaving many behind in dire poverty and 
hunger, while the practice of clearing forest-land for mining accelerated exponentially after 
India joined the WTO, and while, under pressure from the World Bank, India rolled back 
environmental protection measures, going so far as to create Special Economic Zones where 
companies are unregulated. Joan Martinez-Alier (2002, 11), in his preparatory paper for his 
book The Environmentalism of the Poor, mentions just one of the many distorting effects of 
NAFTA on the Mexican economy, in the form of biopiracy: a North-American company 
managed to patent a Mexican bean variety, even though it was genetically identical to 
traditional bean varieties planted in Mexico, and subsequently started suing Mexican 
exporters of the traditional beans, while heavily subsidised North-American produce was 
flooding the Mexican market.
Steven Bernstein (2004, 157-158) has called the simultaneous development of environmental 
protection measures and neoliberal trade rules since 1992 the "compromise of liberal 
environmentalism", claiming that this has "premised environmental governance on 
embedding the environment in liberal markets". According to Bernstein, some of the 
immediate effects of the primacy of economic integration over political integration were the 
promotion of market solutions for environmental problems and the privatisation of natural 
resources legitimised through the concept of “natural capital”. The aforementioned Principle 
12 of the Rio Declaration states specifically that "States should cooperate to promote a 
supportive and open international economic system [...]" (emphasis added), where open can 
be read as free (trade). Bernstein points out that the Rio Principle 12 served as a legitimation 
of global trade agreements, starting with the WTO in 1995. Successive major environmental 
summits, namely Rio+10 in Johannesburg in 2002 and Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, 
maintained the paradox of continued growth and liberalisation in trade with simultaneous 
promises of protection of the environment and a more just redistribution of costs and benefits 
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of human activities. Rio+10 ushered in the era of public-private partnerships, strengthening 
the idea that environmental management can and should be lucrative and further diminishing 
the alternative of multilateral cooperation among states. Chris Sneddon and colleagues (2006, 
258) define the “Rio compromise” as a move away from "statist and strong managerial 
approaches",  which resulted in governments accepting as perfectly normal the fact that 
transnational corporations should attend environmental summits, which they started doing in 
2002. Kathleen McAfee (1999, 133) has coined a stronger term to describe what she—and 
other scholars, among them John Dryzek (1997/2005)—see as a new global discourse: "a 
post-neoliberal environmental-economic paradigm", that includes Nature as part of the 
world's currencies and dismisses pollution or any externalities as trade-offs. Calling this 
discourse “green developmentalism”, McAfee warns of how it has legitimised the idea of 
Nature and its resources as private property, opening the way for exiling the poor and the 
indigenous from their lands and livelihoods in the name of progress.
The "privatization of environmental governance" as documented by Bernstein (2004, 159) has
not gone unopposed, and in Chapter 2 I will show how what I have called the "sustainable if 
tradeable" premise and its consequences for environmental justice have helped spawn strong 
anti-globalisation and alter-globalisation movements, with one of the biggest of these rallying 
around the idea of an alternative, peasant-based food system: La Via Campesina with 
approximately 200 million farmer-members.
A path-dependent global political economy
Having established that the economy was never truly disembedded from society's social and 
political organisation, I turn now to how the economic sphere nevertheless managed to 
become relatively insulated from democratic politics (i.e. politics where people are either 
invited to participate in decision-making and/or at minimum are represented in decision-
making by people they elected). The first place to look is at the process of institutionalisation 
of the global political economy, because in essence this is how a political economy sustains 
itself over time and acquires legitimacy.
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Polanyi exposes the myth of a free, self-regulating market system in his book (a myth that no 
respectable economist will today maintain), and shows how governments took an active role 
to ensure that the economy would be directed by market prices. The steps taken were multiple
and incremental, making it hard or impossible today to roll back everything that was 
achieved. In England and France, land was made a tradeable good, with its ownership 
protected through legislative reform in the early nineteenth century, and the trade of surplus 
agricultural products was allowed first regionally, then nationally, and finally worldwide 
(Polanyi 1944/2001, 189-190). Similarly, labour became a tradeable good through the 
existence of surplus labour,  a consequence of the rural exodus but also of the shifting of the 
means of production from artisans to corporations. These changes laid the foundation for a 
market-style economy. But in Polanyi's view the most effective institution in the period 
between 1815 and the Great War was that of international finance, which kept a world 
economy functioning long after tensions due to market excesses appeared (Ibid., 16 and 215). 
When the world economy eventually imploded, Polanyi reports, so did the 100 years of peace 
(Ibid., 228). 
Similarly, today, without the economic institutions that have sprung up to promote the 
globalisation of trade after the Second World War, the expansion of capitalism would not have
been made possible or so far-reaching. These institutions are quite similar in function to those 
that Polanyi isolates as responsible for "disembedding" the economy from the political sphere 
prior to the Great Depression—such as the Gold Standard, which according to Polanyi (2001, 
142) ultimately collapsed because it exacted too much flexibility from countries and peoples 
whenever times were tougher, and the Poor Laws in England, which placed a large part of the 
burden of capitalist unemployment on the public sector. Contrary to Polanyi's prediction, the 
power of international institutions created to facilitate world trade has not been 
counterbalanced by a stronger sovereignty of the member-countries. The institutions born 
from the 1944 Bretton-Woods meeting to stimulate worldwide trade have profoundly altered 
not only trade relations, but also the very balance of power between the trade "champions" 
and the countries that simultaneously provide them with resources and purchase the goods 
made with those resources. They have facilitated a scaling up of economics from the 
traditional units of people, households, and companies to units of corporations and countries 
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(with some corporations enjoying revenues that allow them to compete directly with middle-
sized countries16) that compete among themselves, compelling the sociologist Leslie Sklair to 
speak of a "transnational capitalist class, composed of corporate executives, globalizing 
bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals and consumerist elites" (Sklair 2001, 4).
In his view, this global class exists "in order to ensure the conditions for the continued 
accumulation of capital and its legally guaranteed conversion into private wealth" (Ibid., 206).
Sklair's argument is innovative since it extends the concept of class beyond the nation-state, 
where it was traditionally located by sociologists.
In his book, Sklair (2001) builds a careful argument around how global economic integration 
has resulted in and is further promoted by a new social class that supersedes national 
governments and traditional social classes. The continued accumulation of capital and its 
private appropriation require a global capitalist system, which in turn relies on the economic 
institution of the transnational corporation, the political institution of a transnational capitalist 
class (TCC), and the cultural institution of consumerism (Ibid., 206). By using the cultural 
institutions available in each country and often shared between countries, the TCC promotes 
the culture-ideology of consumerism, persuading people that "the business of society is 
business" (Ibid., 26). By appearing as a hegemony, at the same time marginalising trade 
unions and radical oppositions by reframing them as sectional interests, business groups 
convince people that their purpose is natural and universal. Any opposition is disarmed by the 
actions of what Sklair calls the "sustainable development historical bloc", a new version of 
Antonio Gramsci's concept of "new historical blocs", where dominant classes absorb their 
enemies to control the way problems are solved. According to Sklair (Ibid., 207), the 
"sustainable development historical bloc", organised by the TCC, has co-opted the concept of 
sustainable development and is engaging with environmentalist elites and "green" consumers 
to win public argument over to the idea of "manageable environmental problems" as opposed 
to a "singular ecological crisis".
16 The magazine Foreign Policy has been monitoring the size of the largest transnational companies, concluding
for example that Apple has more cash on hand than "the GDPs of two-thirds of the world’s countries". Their
2016 survey is available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/15/these-25-companies-are-more-powerful-than-
many-countries-multinational-corporate-wealth-power/ (accessed 9 November 2016).
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Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (1997) provide additional proof for a globally 
organised dominant group when they set out to show how, in a world that is economically 
increasingly integrated, supranational governance (i.e. “governing”) becomes the organising 
form of choice. Picking up Polanyi's contention that trade in a common market has been a 
way to avoid war since the end of the eighteenth century/beginning of nineteenth century, they
attempt to show how the increase in transnational exchange creates an incentive for the 
expansion of supranational governance (Ibid., 298). Basing themselves on Ernst Haas's theory
of neofunctionalism17, they claim that the evolution from national to intergovernmental and 
finally to supranational rule-making is, in their view, a gradual process where the actors that 
benefit from European rather than national rules, create a push for supranational rules, and EC
(now EU) institutions respond by widening the scope of common rules, in the interest of 
transnational gains and of the spirit of the Treaties that underwrite the European community 
(Ibid., 306). The result is a path-dependent18 trajectory of continuing political integration to 
match the existing economic integration in any given domain, that the authors describe as a 
"self-sustaining dynamic, that leads to the gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, 
not uncommonly, to spillovers in other sectors" (Ibid., 299). This dynamic becomes very 
difficult, if not impossible, to reverse. New supranational institutions (i.e. the European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice) take over roles previously held nationally, by 
their rules facilitating not only cross-border transactions but also cross-border 
communications, which in turn create new, higher-level transactions. Having identified a 
continuum along which decision-making moves from the national to supranational level, the 
17 Schmitter (2002) describes it as "a theory of regional integration that places major emphasis on the role of
non-state actors—especially, the “secretariat” of the regional organization involved and those interest
associations and social movements that form at the level of the region—in providing the dynamic for further
integration."
18 I will follow the definition of path dependence offered by the sociologist James Mahoney (2000, 507): "[...]
path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into
motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties." Although he recognises the
attribution of path dependence is a "theory-laden process", he believes "criteria exist for determining whether
an event is contingent" (Ibid., 508). Path dependence can arise either from self-reinforcing or from reactive
(i.e. posterior events are in part a reaction to antecedent events) sequences of events. One characteristic of
path dependence that helps to explain the concept is its inertia, about which Mahoney says (Ibid., 511): "[...]
once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in
motion and continue to track this outcome." Self-reinforcing sequences can continue in the absence of the
initial conditions that created a particular institution, and can be so effective as to "lock-in" a particular
institutional pattern (Ibid., 515). And finally, path dependence can be alternatively explained using utilitarian,
functional, power, or legitimation arguments.
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authors (Ibid., 312) then claim there is "a high degree of 'stickiness' in movement along the 
continuum". All actors, whether governments, enterprises, non-state organisations, or the 
supranational institutions, adapt their behaviour and expectations to the new rules. Jurgen 
Habermas has also written extensively about the pitfalls of European integration and warned 
early on that "[...] the democratic processes that have gone hand in hand with the nation state 
lag hopelessly behind the supranational form taken by economic integration" (Habermas, 
1992, 1).
The idea of institutional self-reproduction or "stickiness" can easily be applied to the 
supranational organisations that supervise and mediate world trade, among them the WTO, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and to the bilateral and 
multilateral treaties that legitimise their existence and actions. If I apply Sweet’s and 
Sandholtz's reasoning and Mahoney's definition of power-based institutional reproduction, I 
would expect these global institutions to defend and increase their autonomy, and to promote 
the interests of a transnational group (class, if we take Sklair's view), favouring transnational 
governance over intergovernmental decision-making. Similarly, I would also expect these 
supranational organisations to start producing their own rules, independent of governments. 
There are indications that this is happening. Just as the European Union has become more 
than the sum of its member-states and can make a number of autonomous decisions, the 
global capitalist system has taken precedence over national economies and created a path-
dependent dynamic towards further economic integration, supported by supranational 
supervision. Institutions such as the World Bank, WTO and the IMF have developed their 
own governance systems that are good examples of Polanyi's double movement in the way 
they simultaneously support trade and environmental solutions, to paradoxical results: 
Bernstein (2004, 162) shows how the WTO hesitates on issues such as environmental 
labelling and certification, because environmental measures require discrimination whereas 
trade norms prescribe the exact opposite.
Voss and Kemp (2005, 12), when applying the idea of path dependence (which they equate to 
historic determinism19) to socio-ecological transformations, argue that in a situation of 
19 Mahoney (2000, 535) links path dependence and determinism in the following manner: "[...] path
dependence occurs when a contingent historical event triggers a subsequent sequence that follows a relatively
deterministic pattern".
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continuous development such as the one we live in today, "(p)ositive feedback may occur 
between specific developments in technology (e.g. central electricity stations and transmission
networks), corporate organisation (e.g. large-scale vertically integrated utilities), regulation 
(e.g. monopoly provision), consumption routines (e.g. unsuspicious commodity) and 
ecological factors (e.g. domestic coal reserves, invisibility of emissions)", creating a stable, 
often self-organising system structure. They contend that the deeper the economic integration,
both horizontally and vertically, the harder it will be to roll back certain technologies or 
institutions, and the less control any individual agent will have.
The profound economic integration that has occurred worldwide, and the related and parallel 
shift in governance from the regional and national purview to a supranational / transnational 
scope, has had equally profound implications for the functioning of the liberal democracies 
that are themselves relatively new phenomena20. Bonanno (2004, 38) speaks of a "crisis of 
legitimation in which the state is called to justify actions that it cannot fully control and 
regulate". He demonstrates how transnational institutions, shielded as they are from the 
public, have little incentive to legitimate, and depend for their functioning almost exclusively 
on elite bureaucracies (Ibid., 42). As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the world's liberal 
democracies and the traditional labour movements are not prepared to be the counterbalance 
of power that is needed to halt the excesses of economic integration, and so this role has been 
taken up by lone critical scholars, retired bureaucrats, and increasingly global and multi-issue 
social movements. But first I will bring the arguments presented so far to bear on the modern 
food system and modern food politics.
20 Liberal democracies originated in the eighteenth century, inspired by Enlightenment thinkers (who believed
in rights and freedoms as foundations of democracy) and the American and French Revolutions. The liberal
form of democracy, with free and fair elections, separation of powers, and universal suffrage, spread rapidly
to Western Europe after the Second World War, and to the rest of the world after the decolonisation, in some
cases after an intermezzo of dictatorship.
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Sketching a political economy of food
The social psychologist Tim Lang popularised the term “food democracy” in the late 1990s21, 
as an umbrella concept for highly diversely inspired attempts at making food systems more 
accountable to societies. He observed a shift in power from farmers to the industry that 
supplies the input for Green Revolution22-style farming, and from those that process food to 
those that trade and retail it (Lang 1999, 217). In the process, he claims, intermediaries have 
become more powerful than those they mediate between, belying the myth of the consumer 
that has the last word. The changing nature of supply, in Lang's view, has altered the very 
nature of food. Because of the scale and depth of impact of a changing food economy—on 
public health, the environment, and social justice—Lang (Ibid., 218) considers food "a 
vignette and a microcosm of wider social realities", a symbol of competing interests: 
individual versus collective and private versus public. Against the control exerted on the food 
system for the private benefit of an ever smaller group of ever larger businesses, or by 
governments according to capricious food policies, and due to the resulting rise of mass 
inequity in all aspects of the food system, Lang (Ibid.) therefore proposes food democracy as 
a counter-pressure to democratise, to "demand for greater access and collective benefit from 
the food system".
Lang is not alone among scholars in placing food at the centre of the myriad paradoxes 
produced by a capitalist paradigm. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx 
already spoke of a "metabolic rift" in relation to food production: a condition when 
production and consumption of food become separated and people are no longer in charge of 
food production, therefore losing their connection to the land. The sociologist John Bellamy 
Foster (1999) points out that Marx's use of the term metabolism (which he picked up from the
German chemist Liebig) is related to his view of labour as a process between Man and Nature,
21 Frances Moore Lappé (1971) was probably the first to speak of food democracy in her important work on the
true causes of hunger. She has stressed in her work and writings that hunger is caused not by a scarcity of
food but a scarcity of democracy.
22 FAO describes how the Green Revolution spread from US experiments in Mexico and the Philippines to
Europe, South Asia, and South America in the 1960s. The secret of its initial success in increasing yields in
cash crops was a combination of hybrid (i.e. not freely reproducible) plant varieties, intensive irrigation, and
the use of agrochemicals. However, currently FAO also recognises how the Green Revolution is responsible
for the degradation of soil, systemic pollution due to chemical use, the build-up of resistance in pests and
weeds, and the reduction in agrobiodiversity.
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where Man acts upon Nature to satisfy his needs and in this confrontation changes not just 
Nature but Himself, in what Marx calls a "metabolic interaction" (Foster 1999, 380). When 
Marx was writing Capital: Critique of Political Economy, agriculture was going through what
some historians consider the second phase of its industrialisation process: the discovery of soil
chemistry and the growing use of fertilisers to prolong soil life. These discoveries had not yet 
alleviated a sense of crisis related to the near-depletion of the natural fertility of the soil that 
was experienced in the industrialised countries. According to Foster (Ibid., 379), Marx's 
theory of the metabolic rift can be firmly linked to his critique of capitalist exploitation. Marx 
extends his idea of "robbery" of labour to robbery of the soil, and believes this will 
compromise the very means of reproduction of wealth (both soil and the worker). The rift 
appears when industry and trade pressure rural people to migrate, filling the cities with the 
labour needed for factories, while exporting the products of the land far away from that same 
land, breaking the cycle that returns nutrients to the soil. Marx explains this best when he 
discusses “large-scale industry and agriculture” in volume 1 of Capital:
Capitalist production collects the population together in great centres, and causes the urban population to
achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical
motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth,
i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and
clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil...
[...] (Marx, 1867/1976, 637-638)
Marx picks up this thread again when he imagines a future society of associated producers, 
warning that they must "[...] govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, 
bringing it under their own collective control rather than being dominated by it as a blind 
power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy 
and appropriate for their human nature" (1863-65/1981, 959). 
Foster (1999, 401) notices a gap in ecological thinking in sociology after Marx and his 
classical sociology contemporaries such as Weber and Durkheim, who both touched upon the 
social and environmental implications of Western civilisation. The relation between human 
social development—in particular the capitalist model of development—and its environment, 
reassumes importance in the 1980s and 1990s, decades in which I have already identified the 
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simultaneous emergence of global environmental governance attempts and global trade 
hegemony. It is in this period of new paradoxes that James O'Connor (1998) infuses Marxist 
orthodoxy with the growing ecological awareness of his time, suggesting that capitalism's 
disregard for the limits to growth presented by the physical environment constitutes its second
contradiction. Just as capitalism depends on the consumption of its goods by the workers 
whose wages it needs simultaneously to keep low, it also depends on the (cheap) natural 
resource base and the physical environment for its continued growth, the sustainability of 
which it is simultaneously seriously undermining. O'Connor contends that, now more than 
ever, Marx's teachings are useful to comprehend the negative consequences of capitalism. 
There is more than ever a "war of capital on labor", because the capitalist class needs those 
that provide them with labour to do so on their terms, and has found a way through 
globalisation with extreme concentration and centralisation of capital and a global division of 
labour, to weaken the hard-earned labour and living standards rights (O'Connor 1998, 1). 
There are also indications of a new class struggle in the form of international protests against 
supranational organisations such as the World Bank, the WTO, the IMF, against the free trade 
agreements that legitimate them, and the transnational corporations that influence them (Ibid., 
2). These protests have united two or more distinct social classes, that of a critical, mostly 
Western-bred, middle class, and what I observe to be a new global class of “untouchables”, 
mostly indigenous tribes and peasants resisting the expulsion from their lands and resources, 
but also the poorest of the poor and most vulnerable of all: rural migrant workers (on the 
latter, see for example the report of the International Labour Organisation 2012). 
O'Connor atempts to stretch Marx's latent ecological consciousness, developing the latter’s 
idea of labour as a mediator between humans and natural history, which in the process 
changes not only Nature but “Man” and the history of Mankind. The creation of surplus value 
through the exploitation not just of labour, but of Nature itself, ultimately impairs the 
reproduction of production conditions (both social and environmental), creating "not only 
threats to profits and accumulation, but also to the viability of the social and natural 
environment as means of life and life itself" (Ibid., 11, emphasis in original). O'Connor 
imagines that ultimately the new struggle arising from the second contradiction of capitalism 
could lead to a form of ecological socialism. If I fuse the thoughts of O'Connor with those of 
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Sklair for the sake of argument, then the new class struggle could be construed as one 
between the transnational capitalist class and those that are impacted by their actions but have 
been mostly excluded from the decision-making processes. Which classes are impacted varies
from region to region, but the history of the environmental justice movements teaches us that 
what Martinez-Alier (1995) calls “ecological distribution conflicts” are more likely to affect 
groups that are poor, discriminated against or otherwise marginalised and vulnerable. 
Environmental justice as a strategy to resist the unfair and inequitable distribution of 
environmental costs emerged in the 1980s in the USA, where “people of color” were 
disproportionately impacted by the dumping of toxic waste (Martinez-Alier et al. 2016). 
Martinez-Alier et al. point out how ecological distribution conflicts “sometimes overlap with 
other social conflicts related to class, ethnicity or indigenous identity, gender or caste” (Ibid., 
731-732).
Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster and Frederick Buttel, editors of Hungry for Profit23 (2000,
7), place agriculture not only at the origin of capitalism—pointing to how industrialisation in 
England was in part facilitated by the surpluses from agriculture while the new patterns of 
landholding (namely the privatisation of communal property and resulting dispossession and 
exodus of peasants) created a market dependency in agriculture—but also alongside its 
development: "the rise of industry in no way left agriculture behind but was mirrored (indeed 
in some cases prefigured) at each stage by changes in the latter". In their overview, the editors
state that economic concentration has occurred as much or more so in agriculture than in any 
other lucrative industry. Additionally, they say, its reinforcement by technological innovations 
has resulted in the loss of farmers' control over their own labour process—leading to what 
they call the "proletarianization of the farmer" (Ibid., 8), because of the way corporations now
own and control both input and output of agriculture, including the ownership of the natural 
means of food production (plants and animals). The hitherto unparalleled scope of corporate 
ownership that we are seeing in the twenty-first century has been promoted and protected by 
policies of economic liberalisation and the deregulation of agriculture, dictated by the 
wealthiest countries from the Global North. Farmers, especially smaller-scale farmers, are "on
a treadmill", their hand forced by the simultaneous "downward pressure on prices they receive
23 Complete title: Hungry for profit: The agribusiness threat to farmers, food, and the environment.
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[…] and/or the upward pressure on inputs needed for production […]" (Ibid., 12). Even 
though medium-sized family farms are found to be just as or even more efficient than their 
industrial-size counterparts, the latter obtain advantages through bulk selling and buying, as 
well as financial or fiscal benefits. Larger farms also reel in a disproportionate amount of 
government support payments (Ibid., 14). As a result, the number of farms has shrunk 
considerably in the past century (in the USA the reduction was almost two-thirds) (Ibid., 13). 
Any alternative sought by farmers to break the chains of corporate control has resulted in 
inevitable pressure from agribusiness as soon as the alternative scales up, such as has 
happened in the organic food sector, which is becoming increasingly industrialised (Ibid., 18).
Magdoff et al. claim that any alternative to the current, mostly unhealthy and unfair food 
system must bring people closer to agricultural land so that the nutrient cycles can be healed; 
break the power-hold of corporations over food production, processing and sales; and finally, 
ensure a plentiful and healthy food supply for all. Although they find encouragement in the 
myriad alternative food movements (e.g. organic farming, agroecology, fair trade), they 
remind us of the most important reform that needs to be taken on: that of correcting the error 
of commodification of agriculture and Nature, what they call "the moral of the tale", which 
they offer in Marx's words:
The moral of history [...] is that the capitalist system runs counter to rational agriculture, or that a rational
agriculture is incompatible with the capitalist system (even if the latter promotes technical improvements in
agriculture) and needs either the hand of the small farmer living by his own labour or the control of
associated producers. (Marx 189424, in Magdoff et al. 2000, 21)
The rural sociologist Alessandro Bonanno, when studying the contradictions of the capitalist 
growth and profit-seeking paradigm, believes the agro-food sector is the methodological 
example of choice:
While it retains significant regional and local components, a number of agricultural and food products are
either globalized commodities and/or are controlled by corporations that are global. This situation enables
the agro-food sector to be used as the basis of making generalizations for society at large.  (Bonanno 2004,
37)
24 Marx,  Capital, Vol III, chapter 6, section 2, edited and completed by Friedrick Engels, first published 1894,
this online version transcribed and published 1999. Available:
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf (accessed 18 February
2016).
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Nevertheless, although agriculture has been profoundly commercialised, Bonanno and his 
colleague Lawrence Busch, in their Handbook of the International Political Economy of 
Agriculture and Food, point out that under all economic approaches, whether Keynesian, 
radical, socialist, or laissez-faire, agriculture has always been managed in some way, subject 
to "factors pertaining to the economic, social, cultural, political and geopolitical spheres" 
while "these and other factors have been considered central in the directing of agri-food 
development" (Bonanno and Busch 2015, 1). They claim that, contrary to the neoliberal creed 
and prediction, agriculture has not only been meticulously planned but also subject to 
significant intervention by the state. The state (especially the USA) had overt and latent 
reasons to intervene in agricultural production: the need to increase production and 
productivity to feed a growing population (overt) and to control the cost of labour and thus the
satisfaction of the working class through affordable goods (latent). In less-developed 
countries of the Global South, intervention took the form of the modernisation of peasant-
dominated sectors, favouring the strengthening of corporate presence by allowing natural 
resources and labour to be exploited by agri-food corporations. Here again I find that the 
theory of dialectical dynamics or Polanyi's double movement applies because, as this was 
happening, many of these countries also experimented with land redistribution, land 
reclamation, and irrigation programmes favouring smaller farmers (Bonanno and Busch, Ibid.,
3). 
In their overview, Bonanno and Busch affirm that in the 1980s Fordism officially collapsed 
and neoliberalism took over as the panacea for global social and economic problems, with 
overwhelming support from the moderate political left, which moved centre and joined in the 
creation of the so-called Washington Consensus. The editors describe how this new economic 
consensus, a "convergence of interests in support of neoliberal views of political economy", 
reshaped the global economy, which became characterised by spatial decentralisation, 
organisation at the global level, and economic concentration (Ibid., 3). Key commodity 
markets in agriculture came under quasi-monopolistic control, while ever fewer and ever 
larger food retailers started controlling not only distribution but also production processes 
themselves. Food retailers have now taken over as the regulators of the food system, 
determining "food choice and quality" while "legitimized by the convenience that they 
44
A global food polity
provide to consumers" (Ibid., 10). States have stepped back and have let business self-regulate
in many areas. The editors consider that society became “economised”25, a process whereby 
"the organization of social relations is decentered from the state to the market" (Ibid., 4). 
Following principles of economic rationality, political institutions start to act in a corporate-
like manner, elevating profit to a social value and making it the first criterion in decision-
making. Meanwhile, individuals are left to their own devices to solve problems caused by this
deregulation (a corresponding process called “individualisation”, which follows logically 
from another process called “responsibilisation”, where individuals "assume responsibility for
all of their actions") (Ibid.). 
In their handbook, Bonanno and Busch give concrete examples of the effects of neoliberal 
globalisation of agri-food in different regions of the world. The editors observe that, failing to 
challenge the expansion of the corporate agri-food system, most of the existing and emerging 
alternative food systems have been integrated into it. The consequences shared by all regions, 
except for the Global North, are: the loss of food self-sufficiency; the displacement of small 
farmholders and peasants; the concentration of land ownership by national but also 
international elites; and the dependence on an export-based growth model, which creates a 
global country-level division of labour. Within this new order, labour's ability to defend its 
basic rights has been seriously undermined: whereas under Fordism, rural workers, although 
still vulnerable, benefited from wealth redistribution mechanisms, under neoliberalism they 
have been left to fend for themselves, facing reduced wages, greater precariousness and the 
loss of their bargaining position because they now compete with a large "reserve army of 
labor" available all over the world (Bonanno, in Bonanno and Busch 2015, 250). 
The historical sociologist Philip McMichael (2005, 288), who developed the “food regime” 
theory together with colleague Harriet Friedmann in the late 1980s—attributing a 
foundational role to agriculture within the capitalist political economy—argues that twenty-
first century capitalism has found in agriculture novel ways to guarantee the continued 
process of "accumulation by dispossession"26, starting with land expropriation, moving to the 
25 For the use of the terms "economisation", "responsibilisation" and "individualisation", Bonanno and Busch
take inspiration from Foucault 2004 and Dean 2010 (cited in Bonanno and Busch 2015).
26 This concept was created by the Marxist geographer David Harvey to characterise neoliberal capitalist
policies.
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creation of a low-cost global labour reserve (which arises among other reasons because of the 
displacement of peasant farmers), and finally leading to the complete transformation of the 
mode of agricultural production and diets. 
The idea behind the food regime concept is that of a "rule-governed structure of production 
and consumption of food on a world scale"27. McMichael and Friedmann use the concept to, 
in McMichael's words,  "unlock the history of capitalism itself", making it possible to 
"refocus from the commodity as object to the commodity as relation, with definite geo-
political, social, ecological, and nutritional relations at significant historical moments" 
(McMichael 2009a, 163). The idea of international regimes had been developed earlier by 
Stephen Krasner (1983, in Friedmann 2009, 335) as a "specific set of (often implicit) 
relationships, norms, institutions, and rules around which the expectations of all relevant 
actors converge". Food regime analysis thus allows for the identification of "moments of 
hegemony in the global order" as well as "moments of transition", besides the "various social 
forces involved in constructing and reconstructing food regimes" (Ibid.). 
Two regimes have consensually been identified so far, one linked to the period of British 
hegemony (1870-1914) and the other linked to postwar US (United States) hegemony (1945-
1973). Friedmann (2005) has named these respectively the "settler-colonial" and the 
"industrial-mercantile regime". She hypothesises that each regime lasts about 25-40 years, 
after which it is inevitably followed by a crisis or transition period, which in her view is proof 
of Polanyi's "double movement": periods of free market forces are followed by periods where 
regulation is tightened to attenuate the negative impact of unchecked capitalism on people and
the environment (Friedmann 2005, 139). 
According to Friedmann, the two successive regimes in food production have resulted in the 
reinterpretation of the idea of food security28. In an integrated global agrofood sector, the 
primary objective is trade, not food, and food security is left to the markets to achieve, while 
27 Friedmann, Harriet. 1993. "The political economy of food: a global crisis". New Left Review, no. 197: 29-57.
Cited in McMichael 2009a, 142.
28 FAO currently defines food security as follows: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life”. This is a change from the original idea of "adequate food supply"
that emerged in the 1970s. See FAO Policy Brief on Food Security, 2006, available:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf (accessed 11 November 2016).
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the focus shifts to strengthening property rights rather than fighting hunger (Ibid., 134-135). 
McMichael (2009a, 281) describes in detail how the responsibility for food security shifted 
from the nation-state to the global market during the negotiations that established the WTO's 
Agreement on Agriculture29. Under this agreement, states had to give up their food self-
sufficiency and accept minimum quotas of food imports. Although in principle all countries 
had to give up the subsidisation of their agricultural sector, in practice, in the Global North, 
subsidies were uncoupled from prices, taking the form of fuel or export subsidies. This 
continued support allows wealthier countries to practice dumping, forcing Southern countries 
to drastically reduce their price standards, and severely harming the economic viability of 
their own producers. Additionally, McMichael points out the growing precedence of traders 
over producers, especially in commodity markets, with up to half of futures contracts for 
typical agricultural commodities on US exchanges residing in the hands of Wall Street funds 
(Ibid., 282). The final blow, according to McMichael (Ibid., 284-285), comes in the form of 
dispossession (from the land and markets), disempowerment (in many forms: through contract
farming, artificial price setting, political manoeuvring), and dismissal (as inefficient) of the 
small farmer, in the process creating the labour reserve that corporate agriculture needs to 
keep costs down, while severely undermining the capacity of peasant agricultures30 to sustain 
themselves.
McMichael (2000) speculates about the existence of a third food regime, the “corporate food 
regime”31, which he associates with the 1980s rise of neoliberalism. Here, more than ever, 
29 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, available: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm
(accessed 10 January 2016).
30 The term “peasant farming” is increasingly used by social and agroecological movements, the researchers
that inform their cause, and supranational agencies that are sympathetic to their cause (such as FAO) to
distinguish smallholder farming for subsistence and local markets from entrepreneurial farming, in particular
from industrial farming. There is some distinction in the use of the term between activists on the one hand
and researchers and bureaucrats on the other: the former tend to emphasise the criteria of "trade liberalisation,
industrial chemical-intensive agriculture and genetically engineered crops", whereas the latter emphasis the
idea of landlessness and precariousness (Edelman, 2013). The Advisory Committee of the Human Rights
Council tentatively defined peasant in 2015 as: "man or woman of the land, who has a direct and special
relationship with the land and nature through the production of food or other agricultural products. Peasants
work the land themselves and rely above all on family labour and other small-scale forms of organizing
labour. Peasants are traditionally embedded in their local communities and they take care of local landscapes
and of agro-ecological systems". Available:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGPleasants/Session2/ChristopheGolay.pdf
(accessed 12 November 2016).
31 The corporate food regime according to McMichael (2005, 295) is characterised by the "global dispossession
of farmers, reorganization of food supply chains, and centralization of agri-food relations" and has world
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market dynamics are revered as the prime solution for any crises. In return for access to 
markets, states are "willingly" liberalising, which makes them vulnerable to the industrial 
standards and prices set by the agribusiness sectors (Ibid., 23). The main institution of the 
corporate regime is the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (McMichael 2005, 277). With the 
help of the WTO, who acts as a watchdog, corporations have managed to reduce price 
supports in markets where they wish to source, at the expense of local producers (McMichael 
2000, 24-25). Thus they have managed to redefine the terms of development as "globally 
managed growth, with information technologies and bio-technologies as the leading sectors" 
(Ibid., 23), and elevate markets to the prime political institutions to which all other 
institutions, including the democratic institutions, must bow.
McMichael believes the current political economy of food, held together through the 
"complicity of governments, scientists, and agro-chemical corporations" (Ibid., 21), will not 
hold up to the growing dissent over how food security should be achieved (i.e. through a 
profit-driven biotechnological-based approach versus the reassertion of food self-sufficiency).
McMichael identifies weaknesses in the corporate dominance ideology, of which prime 
examples are the practice of greenwashing (claiming sustainable products or actions that are 
only superficial) and the corrupted appropriation of sustainable concepts such as organic 
farming (Ibid., 22). The corporate food regime as a "set of power relations where formal rules 
and operating procedures are subject to continual contention" faces resistance not only "from 
the counter-movements, but the agents of the regime itself" (Ibid.). The principal food agents 
tend to engage in occasional trade wars. But at the same time, as McMichael recognises, the 
global corporate regime is nothing if not resilient, constantly adapting by co-opting some of 
the changes demanded by its critics, such as the need for sustainable development and 
increased efficiency (Ibid., 27).
The 2007 and 2008 food riots in at least 50 countries in the world, provided McMichael, in 
collaboration with Raj Patel, with an opportunity to collect further supporting facts for the 
weaknesses of the corporate regime. They construe the conflict as a clash between two very 
different views of food security: one view has food security embedded in the Bretton Woods 
economic doctrine—thus in principle provided by liberalised markets—whereas the other 
prices "strikingly divorced from cost" (Ibid., 271).
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reinfuses the term with the "notions of power and control" of which it has been stripped, 
preferring to speak of "food sovereignty", which places the decision-making over food back 
with peasants and peoples in general (Patel and McMichael 2009, 10-11). The authors believe 
that the protests may be heralding the start of a new transitional phase and are not merely the 
result of discontent over rising food prices, but a sign that people are becoming aware of the 
political economy of food, and the way it is biased towards powerful agents (Ibid.). The 
authors see this political protest over the rules of the economy as a reassertion of what 
Thompson (1971, in Patel and McMichael 2009, 12) called the "moral economy32". In the 
modern food economy, hunger is not a result of food shortage, but a result of extreme poverty 
making people unable to buy food on the open market33, especially in countries in the Global 
South that are often exporting rather than providing for internal consumption (Ibid., 14). 
Additionally, as I mentioned previously, prices have been decoupled from subsidies, a fact 
that has led to an artificially low "world price" for the major commodities from agriculture 
(Ibid., 17). Producers from the South are unable to compete as their countries shift to 
exporting staple goods and importing up to 25% of their food needs (Ibid.). With the 
dismantlement of social protection, price fluctuations34 will hit vulnerable populations, such 
as dispossessed peasants, urban slum dwellers, and labourers, the hardest (Ibid., 31). Since the
artificially low prices for food and the mobility of capital has helped to keep wages low, the 
victims of the global market are not only the small producers that can't compete but also the 
"vulnerable consumers of wage-foods" that can't procure (Ibid., 20). The authors conclude 
that the ongoing crisis is exposing how intensely degraded social reproduction within the 
capitalist economy has become, and how acute its contradictions (Ibid., 20-21).
In a recent article, Friedmann (2016) expresses her disagreement with the narrative of a 
corporate food regime as developed by McMichael, believing that in opposing "food from 
nowhere" to "food from somewhere"—or globally produced and corporate-driven versus 
locally produced, culturally appropriate food—he is precluding the continued in-depth 
32 "In its original formulation, the idea of a moral economy pointed to the distance between the traditional
paternal modes of support for social reproduction, and the arrangements for the poor under the new capitalist
order." (Patel and McMichael 2009, 13).
33 Frances Moore Lappé was the first researcher to debunk the hunger myth with her seminal book Diet for a
Small Planet (1971/2010).
34 In 2007-2008, the price of corn rose 130%, while rice went up 75%, with large increases also recorded for
other major food commodities (Patel and McMichael 2009, 21).
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analysis of the food system as a showcase of the relations between economy, polity, and 
society. A focus on the corporate domination of the food system may leave out crucial clues 
about the dynamics brought by other agents or the impact of both past and present alternative 
practices, while capitalism's capacity to adapt may make the concept obsolete (Ibid., 675). 
Observing the shift in power within the agrofood sector, from supermarkets to financial 
enterprises, Friedmann imagines other regimes may be in the making. The giant new business 
cluster that unites the industries of food, agriculture, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, seed, and 
even energy, lends merit to the claim that we may actually be observing a "life sciences-
integrated" food regime as hypothesised by Lang and Heasman (2015, cited in Friedmann 
2016, 287).
Vandana Shiva, a researcher from the Global South who has published extensively on the 
global political economy of food, singles out the theme of monopolisation (which, as I shall 
explore in the next paragraphs, occurs at several levels and in several dimensions) as a main 
factor in the development of inequalities both between North and South as well as within 
countries. This monopolisation of resources and markets is alienating smallholder farmers and
peasants from agricultural land, while forcing the remaining farmers to buy proprietary 
packages of seeds and the chemicals that will "boost" their productivity (Shiva, 2000). Shiva 
shows how the promoters of corporate-led agriculture have gone one step further and 
globalised "patents on life": intellectual property rights on living organisms. In 1980, the US 
Supreme Court, interpreting life as "manufacture or composition of matter" opened the 
watergates for the privatisation of living organisms when it authorised a patent on a micro-
organism (Ibid.). Soon after, Shiva writes, the US Patent and Trademark Office was granting 
patents not only on genetically modified organisms, but on biological resources and 
knowledge obtained from indigenous peoples, such as neem, karela and basmati. Even though
it would be relatively simple to make this form of patents illegal, the USA has persisted in 
what Shiva claims can only be construed as biopiracy, using the supranational trade institution
WTO as a legitimising platform (Ibid.). Any country wishing to join the WTO, must pledge to
uphold the US’s and other countries' patents on living organisms, even if their national 
legislation does not allow the patenting of plants and animals. Vandana Shiva herself, together
with two other leading women, fought and won a five-year legal battle to revoke a joint patent
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held by the US government and the corporation MNC on neem, a well-known natural 
pesticide from India (Ibid.). Shiva warns that besides facilitating piracy of indigenous 
biodiversity, current intellectual property rights regimes (IPR) also block technology transfer 
due to the ample protection provided by patents (in order to use the patented product, a license
needs to be obtained and/or royalties have to be paid). This institutionalisation of biopiracy, 
she says, will:
[…] make northern countries into the monopoly owners of knowledge, including knowledge that has
evolved cumulatively and collectively in indigenous cultures, selling it at high cost to already impoverished
and indebted countries of the South, pushing them further into poverty and debt. (Shiva, 2000, 501)
Shiva has termed this new form of exploitation of economically poor but resource-rich 
countries "biocolonialism" (Ibid.) Other thinkers prefer the broader term “biocapitalism” to 
indicate how capitalism has been extended into areas hitherto considered off limits or 
"recalcitrant". Clayton Pierce defines biocapitalism as a "(re)productive model that arose from
the complex set of relations existing between techno-scientific research and neoliberal 
practices of economic development" (Pierce 2012, 722), where under technoscience he 
understands the "conflation of science and technology into a fluid relationship of knowledge 
production" (Ibid., 742). The new possibilities of extraction provided by the advances in 
technoscience stretched the limits of growth in Pierce's view, as much in the natural domain as
in the cultural domain, and were legitimised by the neoliberal economic restructuring that was
initiated in the 1970s (Ibid., 726). Furthermore, Pierce explains, the partnering of academic 
science with the biotechnological and biomedical industries, which effectively fused public 
and private funding, "helped push the neoliberal model of growth into entirely novel regions" 
(Ibid., 727). Finally, a push for legislation and regulation that protected the exploitation of 
genes, microbes, and cells, definitively pulled life and biological processes into capitalist 
processes of accumulation. Pierce agrees with Rajan (2006, cited in Pierce 2012, 739) that 
biocapitalist production, as a special form of high-tech capitalism, is essentially based on 
(often speculative) promises of future productivity or profit. These more prosaic promises of 
profit are dissimulated and legitimised within what Pierce calls a "pseudo-religious ideology 
that links success in techno-scientific research to that of the salvation of the nation" (Ibid., 
728-729).
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José Luis Garcia (2006) understands biocapitalism as parallel movements of commodification
and privatisation of the reproductive resources of Nature itself and the biological phenomena 
that are born therefrom. Like Shiva, Garcia points out that the manipulation of Nature through
the experimentation with DNA recombination, has opened up the possibility to treat biological
resources as products and as property. Whereas on the one hand the involvement of 
technoscience has helped to liken biological processes to mechanical ones, making them 
appear as logical and manipulable as a computer, on the other hand the ideological inroads 
made by neoliberalism starting in the 1970s has extended the right to property and the 
corresponding rights of maximisation of profit and capital accumulation to the biological 
world. Garcia warns about the active building of a "bioeconomy" by prominent political, 
economic, and scientific leaders, who are "channeling large amounts of financing and 
mobilising national and international strategies [...], with the declared aim of rendering 
research useful to the economy and creating leverage in the global economic competition 
game" (Garcia 2006, 983, my translation from the original Portuguese). Coupled with the 
previously mentioned expansion of the right to intellectual property, in particular by means of 
the more restrictive patents, capital managed to penetrate into areas of science previously 
considered to be of public, and not private, interest. Additionally, patents are now allowed for 
mere ideas for an invention, rather than the invention itself, as well as for mere methods of 
research and manipulation, all of which is particularly useful to the genetic industry. Most 
universities now require that inventions be patentable for funding to be extended. Garcia 
presents proof for the counterproductive nature of patents: when they are not contained, they 
stifle rather than stimulate innovation, while patents in the life sciences are also treading 
morally and even scientifically swampy ground (Ibid., 984-986). In line with Shiva's concept 
of  "monopoly owners of knowledge", Garcia shows how companies in the bioeconomy are 
essentially producing and protecting information, having managed to secure highly expanded 
and legally enforced intellectual property rights, protecting "the informational value of the 
products and processes manipulated by biotechnology and by the information technologies" 
(Ibid., 987). According to Garcia what is "exalted" here is "[…] 'information-knowledge' 
founded on the right to property and conditioned by the logic of the dominant economic 
system" (Ibid., 988). Applied to the realm of food, this tendency is removing crop plants and 
seeds, and the right to produce and reproduce them, from the public domain and into the 
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hands of corporations. Vandana Shiva (1991, 51) sums up the threat to our food supply as 
follows:
To use Jack Kloppenburg's analogy of the seed: it is both a “means of production” as well as a “product”.
[...] The seed thus presents capital with a simple biological obstacle; given the appropriate conditions it
reproduces itself and multiplies. Modern plant-breeding has primarily been an attempt to remove this
biological obstacle, and the new biotechnologies are the latest tools for transforming what is
simultaneously a “means of production” and “product” into mere “raw material”.
Garcia further underlines that the appropriation of life and of the means of reproducing life is 
not just a market phenomenon, but that this has been actively supported, co-financed, and 
facilitated by states, as can be gleaned from the history of technoscience. States have also 
been instrumental in promoting a "futures market" (Garcia 2006, 1005): a market of potential 
or plausible rather than tangible products where consumers are "at the service of 
consumption" (Ibid., 1006) and that is held up by the "constancy of the myth of the 
substitution of time by man in his relationship with nature" (Ibid., 1009).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have endeavoured to justify the need for a political economic theory of the 
modern food production and distribution system, while also sketching its contours, dynamics, 
and potential social, political, and economic implications. A picture emerges from the 
reflections and findings of the thinkers presented here of an ordered world food economy that 
"combines state power, the price weapon, and corporate sourcing strategies" (Patel and 
McMichael 2009, 16). It seems appropriate, when observing the disproportionate influence of 
a minority of economically and militarily powerful states together with a minority of very 
large transnational corporations, some of which produce more wealth than many countries of 
our world, to call the world food economy a "regime". Just like Friedmann, I hesitate to call it 
a corporate food regime, because the role of powerful nation-states and increasingly 
autonomous supranational organisations, as well as that of the "culture-ideology of 
consumerism" (Sklair, 2001), has been crucial to creating a hegemony, very similar to what 
Gramsci called "historical blocs". Sklair upgraded to the term "sustainable development 
historical bloc", while Bernstein calls it the "compromise of liberal environmentalism" and 
McAfee has called it "green developmentalism". The way capitalism has managed to 
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penetrate hitherto "recalcitrant" sectors of the economy such as agriculture (Kloppenburg 
2004, 10), would never have been achieved without the synchronised efforts of something like
a "transnational capitalist class", firmly in control of the processes of globalisation, as much 
economically as culturally. In his work, Sklair (2001, 13) puts the idea of this global class to 
the test, using Dahl's test for the existence of a ruling class (as incorporated by Domhoff into a
“class dominance theory”, cited in Sklair 2001), with questions such as: “Is it a well defined 
group? Is there a fair sample of cases where elite preferences run counter to the preferences of
others? Do the preferences of the elite prevail?” After testing his data in this manner, he finds 
in favour of his thesis. Patel and McMichael (2009) present additional proof of a cultural 
hegemony in their analysis of the food riots: the realisation of the capitalist project in food 
and agriculture can be considered successful when protests from the victims of the "food 
regime" are reduced to protests about affording food (i.e. through higher wages), instead of 
issues of moral economy and civil rights. 
Another important finding is the almost completed incursion of capitalism into the biological 
realm, bringing all of its mechanisms—the institution of the market, commodification of 
Nature and labour, the broadening of rights of private property—to bear on the reproduction 
of life itself, making life "a manageable and controllable field" in the words of Pierce (2012, 
740). I would therefore contend that the global food regime we are currently witnessing might
be called the “global biocapitalist food regime”, something both McMichael in later work 
(2009a) and Friedmann (2016) hint at but have not entirely subscribed to yet.
A final concept to retain from the preceding analysis is the important role of knowledge and 
of who controls this knowledge in the bioeconomy that has emerged over the past decades. In 
twenty-first century capitalism, economic value is deemed to derive not from the natural 
resources that are being exploited or manipulated, but from the knowledge associated with 
this exploitation and manipulation, to the point where the knowledge and not the resource 
itself becomes the capital. This knowledge is aggressively protected from competitors and the
general public through increasingly broad and well defended intellectual property rights 
regimes. The real problem with this trend is that this knowledge and the corresponding wealth
accumulation increasingly derive from common resources and traditional knowledge, 
meaning that for all intents and purposes public endowments are becoming privatised, with 
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observable consequences for the world’s new “untouchables”, the first victims of the 
biocapitalist food regime, and unpredictable consequences for everyone else’s food security 
and – sovereignty.
In the next chapter I will explore the implications that a “commercial society”35 has for its 
democratic organisation and study proposals for closing what many consider to be both an 
ecological as well as a democratic gap in decision-making over the food system.
35 Term coined by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century before the term capitalism became popular, also
indicating that his point of view on economic organisation is political-economic rather than exclusively
economic.
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II
Food politics and the democratic question
The greatest deficit in the food economy is the democratic one. By harnessing people’s knowledge and
building their needs and preferences into the design of ambitious food policies at every level, we would
arrive at food systems that are built to endure.
—Olivier de Schutter, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 2014.1
We have every reason to think that whatever changes may take place in existing democratic machinery,
they will be of a sort to make the interest of the public a more supreme guide and criterion of governmental
activity, and to enable the public to form and manifest its purposes still more authoritatively. In this sense
the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy. (John Dewey, The Public and its Problems,
19272)
In the first part of this chapter I will examine the relationship between the global economic 
integration that has been occurring since the beginning of industrialisation and the 
correspondent development of the sociopolitical organisation of the societies involved, in 
particular where those societies, divided into nation-states, are considered democracies—i.e. 
to a reasonable extent responsive to their constituents. I will work from Polanyi's (1944/2001, 
266) assumption that the failure to bring economic organisation under the control of 
democratic organisation has and will continue to cause great suffering, because it is "an 
illusion to assume a society shaped by man's will and wish alone". I will connect with a range 
of democratic theories, from classic to modern. Considering that democracy is one of the 
largest fields of social scientific knowledge, falling in the category of "essentially contested 
concepts" (Gallie, cited in Collier and Levitsky 1997, 433), I will focus my analysis on those 
theories that include considerations of the political economy and/or of economic 
globalisation, thus maintaining my focus on a political economy that drives the democratic 
and ecological quality of the modern food system.
In the second part of the chapter I will channel a selection of democratic theories towards the 
purpose of closing the observed democratic and ecological gaps in food politics (i.e. decision-
making on food matters), which not only persist but appear to widen in the last decades. I will
1 Olivier de Schutter, "Democracy and diversity can mend broken food systems"—final diagnosis from UN
right to food expert,  March 2014, available: http://www.srfood.org/en/democracy-and-diversity-can-mend-
broken-food-systems-final-diagnosis-from-un-right-to-food-expert (accessed 15 January, 2016).
2 Reprinted in Dewey 2012, The public and its Problems: An essay in political inquiry.  
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bring different democratic proposals to bear on my objective, which vary from extending the 
existing liberal democracies, to exploring a rights-based approach, and finally to exacting 
more systemic changes from our social, economic and political organisation.
The concurrent rise of the commercial society and liberal democracy
I borrow from Istvan Hont, a Smith scholar, to clarify the term commercial society, which was
coined by Adam Smith before the use of the term capitalism became popular. Hont (2015, 3) 
says Smith stretched the idea of a "society in which there is much commercial activity" to that
of a "fundamental type of society", a society where social relations have become "market-
like", with corresponding political and moral implications.
The idea that economic organisation conditions social and political organisation is not new. 
For most of our democratic history, the link was explicit. Both the terms economy and 
ecology, apparently contradictory, stem from the ancient Greek word oikos or household. 
These disciplines are both about "running the household", i.e. the imposing of a form of 
organisation on a social group, something Aristotle dedicated some of his writing to. Oikos 
also refers to the household property and, in Ancient Greek times, it was not only the most 
important social but also the main economic unit, defining everyone's place in society and 
generating the income the extended family (including their slaves) needed. In what is often 
considered the cradle of Western democracy, economic standing determined political 
privileges: only those who owned property were allowed to participate in the political life of 
the Greek city-states. This requirement was, almost three millennia later, still inscribed in the 
first Constitution of the United States of America (only landowners might vote). It seems that 
the elite into whose hands the "people" in res publica entrust their sovereignty, have in 
democratic history invariably been an economic elite.
Aristotle, despite his dis-consideration for women and slaves and his disdain for pure 
democracy (which he considered to be a regime where the many ruled in their own interest), 
offers some important reflections on the dynamics of social organisation. In his view, it was 
not practical for the poor to rule, because their inevitable conflict with the wealthy would 
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threaten the survival of the latter. But he also did not think the wealthy should rule in their 
interest, because this would constitute an oligarchy. Just like the authors of the United States 
constitution several millennia later, Aristotle had no faith in the judgment of (most) people. 
His solution was to propose either an enlightened monarchy or an aristocracy, where one or a 
few rule in the interest of all. The solution adopted for the newly created USA was in fact an 
oligarchy, partially abolished in 1870 and only fully abolished much later when in the 1960s 
the practice of poll (or voting) taxes was finally scrapped. The dilemma of a polity (or 
politeia, which in the Aristotelian sense is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy) endangered 
by "the malice" of the poor and "the arrogance" of the wealthy, where the former are 
"consumed by envy" and the latter by "contempt" led Aristotle to place his hopes in a middle 
class and in education as a way of mitigating excesses.3
Almost two millennia later, Niccolo Machiavelli offers his insights on a republican form of 
democracy. Despite his current association with ruthless and immoral politics, having been 
the guide par excellence for many a despot (among them Louis XIV and Napoleon 
Bonaparte), he can nevertheless be credited with creating a contemporary and democratic 
conception of politics, independent from religion, which up to this point had competed with 
monarchs for control of the populations, often acting as a state within a state. His conception 
of politics is rational and pragmatic, asking politicians to decide on facts and not on values. 
Together with Thomas Hobbes, from whom he is separated by more than a century, 
Machiavelli sets the stage for secular and rational politics, aided by the discussion on the right
to religious freedom in a Europe divided between Catholics and Protestants, bringing with it a
corresponding clamour for the right to freedom of expression (Soromenho-Marques 1996, 1st 
and 2nd Essay).  John P. McCormick (2011), in his account of Machiavellian republicanism, 
demonstrates how Machiavelli dedicates significant space to the excesses of the wealthy in his
Discourses on Livy. Machiavelli believed the wealthy had an "unquenchable appetite for 
oppression", leading them to "accumulate wealth, monopolize offices, and gain renown within
republics" (McCormick 2011, 4). He also believed they would defend their "property with the 
utmost obstinance" (D I.37, cited in McCormick 2011, 5), whilst what he called the "free 
3 This summary of Aristotelian thought and comparison with the constitution of the USA was extracted from
the peer-reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available: http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/ (accessed
20 December 2015).
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peoples" would be more inclined to decide in favour of the common good (D I.4, in Ibid., 6). 
He therefore proposed a model of republicanism based on tribunates that excluded wealthy 
citizens (inspired by the Roman tribunes of the plebs), and assemblies where the influence of 
the prominent would be similarly limited. McCormick claims that although Machiavelli has 
been dubbed the founder of modern republicanism, his views on constitutionalising class 
conflict actually make him the last traditional populist republican. His suggestions for 
strengthening the equality base of a polity have been largely ignored, and the model that came
to dominate in the Western world was that of representative government, where common 
people rule indirectly and there is a unitary conception of citizenry. Whereas Machiavelli, just 
as Aristotle before him and Rousseau (but not Hobbes) after him, believed a citizen was as 
much one who was capable of ruling as of being ruled in turn, the liberal tradition that gained 
popularity in the seventeenth century understands citizenship as a legal status rather than a 
political office: a citizen is a free legal person who may act freely within the confines of the 
law and demand the law's protection against other individuals or the authorities themselves 
(Soromenho-Marques 1996). Inspired by Machiavelli's recommendations to control the 
excesses of political and economic elites, McCormick himself proposes a republicanisation of 
modern democracies (what he refers to as a "Machiavellian democracy") through the 
institution of offices or assemblies wherefrom the wealthiest citizens are excluded; the 
reinstating of the use of lottery in combination with election to appoint magistrates; and 
political trials where citizens are the ultimate judges—in this way balancing the negative 
impact that political and economic elites exert on the realisation of the rights to liberty and 
equality.
By the time Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers his thoughts on democracy, he is already a lone 
republican voice in a liberal world. Influential thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke played an important role in depoliticising and de-socialising society, with Hobbes 
proposing an autonomous sovereign to whom subjects pledge allegiance through an 
agreement called a covenant—which concedes him absolute powers and separates him from 
his subjects—and with Locke reducing the family and civil society to "afterthoughts" of 
economic activity (Gottfried 1994). Rousseau's “social contract” hinges on an engaged citizen
who believes that public affairs are more important than private ones (Book 3, ch. 15 of The 
60
A global food polity
Social Contract)4 and his sovereign refers to the people themselves, who may appoint 
government officials to act as their agents, but always have the last and only word in 
legislation. In contrast, the liberal tradition, starting with John Locke, takes its cues from 
Hobbes rather than Rousseau and builds on the former's ideas of the fundamental rights of 
citizens and his justification of government: people form societies and governments to defend 
their natural rights. Locke's natural rights are still with us today, inscribed in many 
constitutions: "Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions".5 Locke goes further than Hobbes, 
transforming the right to private property— a right to be defended against fellow citizens and 
the state itself—into the principal justification for the need for government. He believed 
property (and property inequality) was justified as long as it came from labour that produces 
goods that are beneficial to society. Since “Man” is entitled to his body and to the labour he 
exerts with his body, he should also be entitled to the goods he produces with that labour. 
Locke's theory of property has been regarded as the cornerstone of classical liberalism, 
despite the fact that he premises natural law on religious as much as anthropocentric 
assumptions—there is a God that offers the Earth and its resources for the use of men—and 
even though he actually worried about inequality in the use of resources, because he believed 
they had been given to all men in common and not in private. In his view, each person's right 
to property should not jeopardise everyone else's right to property, not in the least because he 
thought socioeconomic inequality would at some point destabilise the legitimacy of the res 
publica. Unlike the liberals who followed him, Locke established clear limits to property. One
of these was the labour criterium, which meant property had to be derived from labour 
(although his definition of labour was very broad and included the gathering of food). Another
was the “spoilage limit”: he considered unused property to be wasteful. However, what 
liberals took away from Locke's theory was mainly the idea of of property as a natural right: 
morally justified because it derives from labour and legally defensible against other persons 
and the state. 
4 Rousseau's The Social Contract, 1762, as translated by Jonathan Bennett, 2010, available:
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762book3.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
5 Analysis of Locke's ideas on property in this chapter taken from Vaughn (1980).
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Property as part of the right to freedom and a natural right in itself became the cornerstone of 
the commercial society. But the concept, hotly debated in industrialising Europe of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, is to this day contested, in particular the utilitarian 
conception that came to dominate. We read in Hont (2015) that Rousseau rejected the idea of 
a self-balancing utilitarianism, where the pursuit of self interest is thought to ultimately serve 
the common good. Instead, he claimed the poor wound up giving up the regulation of private 
property in return for a status of legal equality. Their equality as citizens did not entitle them 
to equality in property, but only to a theoretically equal opportunity to acquire property. Other
philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, premised the ownership of property on the capacity of 
individuals to exercise restraint and social responsibility. Hont goes on to demonstrate how 
Adam Smith, the founder of classical economics and a younger contemporary of Rousseau, 
recognised the inequalities inherent in the right to property, but was optimistic about the self-
balancing characteristics of a free market, where, given time, property would become more 
evenly distributed. His idea of a modern republic is one born of commerce, a commercial 
society, which, rather than undermining liberty and legality, adjusts its laws to the complexity 
of the economy.
Karl Marx (Marx and Engels 1848/1969) revolutionised the debate on property by 
conceptualising the idea of private property of the "means of production". He identified a new
class, the "owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour" (Ibid., 
14), and a new class antagonism based on the new balance of powers facilitated by the 
inequality in property distribution. Although he did not oppose what he called personal 
property, he called for the abolition of private property—what he called "bourgeois private 
property"—in the case of productive resources that could be used to produce social wealth. In 
a capitalist society, he argued, this social wealth was exclusively siphoned off to a small class 
of owners. Bourgeois private property, he said, "is the final and most complete expression of 
the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the
exploitation of the many by the few" (Ibid., 22).
Its critics notwithstanding, the commercial society has been unstoppable since the writings of 
John Locke. The resulting interdependence of politics and trade that became instituted in the 
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eighteenth century changed the democratic project of Western states forever. Soromenho-
Marques (1996, 156) observes that the meaning of citizenship evolved towards imperial 
patriotism—where people are citizens of a state to which they owe loyalty and in return 
receive rights from—and away from the ideal of cosmopolitan republicanism as advocated by 
Machiavelli or Rousseau. This trend has had profound implications on the interpretation of 
social reality or indeed of many of the political terms used today. Jeff Weintraub (1997, 7) 
notes the differences between what he calls a "liberal-economistic model", which came to 
dominate, and a "republican-virtue" model, based on ideas of political community and active 
citizenship, such as advocated by Rousseau and the North-American John Rawls. The 
utilitarian liberalists start from the premise that individuals pursue their self-interest more or 
less efficiently (an activity deemed rational although it does not refer to reason but rather to 
an instrumentalist approach), that they enter into contractual relations among themselves and 
that these "private" transactions must be protected from interference by the state (Ibid., 8-9). 
Society here is reduced to civil society, as Soromenho-Marques (1996) also points out, and 
the concept of citizen refers to a legal status rather than an agency. Modern republicanism, 
according to Weintraub (1997, 12-13), takes its cue from the politics of the Roman empire 
rather than those of the ancient Roman republics. Weintraub remarks that even an avowed 
liberal such as Alexis de Tocqueville was of the opinion that Roman imperial law perfected 
civil society but degraded political society, because its people became  "highly civilized and 
thoroughly enslaved" (Ibid., 14). In contrast, the republican-virtue approach conceives of a 
public space, sphere, or realm in terms of "public life", where decisions are discussed, 
debated, taken collectively, and executed in concert (Ibid., 10-11). 
The following well-known passage from a British Select Committee in 1811 exemplifies the 
pedestal that economic freedom was placed on as early as the beginning of the nineteenth 
century:
[...] no interference of the legislature with the freedom of trade, or with the perfect liberty of every
individual to dispose of his time and of his labour in the way and on the terms which he may judge most
conducive to his own interest, can take place without violating general principles of the first importance to
the prosperity and happiness of the community […]. (History of Trade Unionism, 1920, 60, in Marshall
1950, 17-18)
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Economic freedom is one of the key liberties birthed by the Enlightenment, and those liberties
together with the principle of equality have underpinned the version of representative 
democracy that came to dominate: liberal democracy. This was such a successful form of 
governance of countries that, despite two world wars, by the end of the twentieth century 
Freedom House counted 120 democracies or 63 percent of the world total6. Polanyi would 
argue that its success would not have been so enduring, had social liberals, who sought to 
rectify the injustices that plagued industrialisation and laissez-faire capitalism, not 
endeavoured to temper the principles of classical liberalism that are the foundation of these 
democracies. Unfortunately, many of the conquests of social liberals were gradually 
dismantled from the 1980s onwards with the rise of neoliberalism, with special mention of the
twin "reigns" of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, heads of the two most powerful states
in the world. True to Polanyi's prediction of a double movement, the general economic decline
in world markets that has characterised the beginning of the twenty-first century has again 
revived an interest in social liberal thought and Keynesian economics7.
Most political scientists and political philosophers would agree that simply classifying the 
democratic organisation of societies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century as 
liberal would be highly reductive. Attempts to interpret the developmental phase of 
democratic organisation that we currently find ourselves in have seen the coining of catchy 
labels, such as Ulrich Beck's "risk society", the German philosophers Gunther Anders and 
Hans Jonas' "technological age", and Anthony Giddens' "reflexive modernisation"8. John 
Keane (2009) speaks of "monitory democracy", which he characterises as a period when 
democracy becomes a universal value and global democracy a new and seemingly possible 
objective, and where decision-makers in all fields of political, economic, and social control 
face public scrutiny and control by myriad institutions, among them local courts, consensus 
conferences, think-tanks, panels of experts, new media and human rights watch panels. Pierre 
6 Freedom in the world 2000, available: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2000
(accessed 20 April 2016).
7 Keynesian economics, after the British economist John Maynard Keynes, goes against the mainstream idea of
a "general equilibrium" in markets and advocates a mixed economy, where the private sector is
complemented by government intervention in times of recessions.
8 Giddens developed this idea with Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash: it highlights how late modern societies oppose
themselves rather than traditionalism such as in earlier modern times.
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Rosanvallon (2008) follows a similar line of thought when he speaks of "counter-democracy".
He understands this as "a form of democracy that reinforces the usual electoral democracy as 
a kind of buttress, a democracy of indirect powers disseminated throughout society—in other 
words, a durable democracy of distrust, which complements the episodic democracy of the 
usual electoral-representative system" (Rosanvallon 2008, 8). Democratic activity—out of 
necessity in the face of increasing risks related to decision-making in a technological era—has
been extended beyond the traditional party and parliamentary politics, to include watchdogs 
and advocacy groups. The ideal of an "industrial democracy", which emulates democratic 
institutions in the non-political spheres of society, starting with the economic sphere (for 
example by electing the executives at companies), and which was popular at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, was definitively abandoned in favour of corporate control mechanisms 
towards the end of the same century (Ibid., 285-287). The embracing of oversight 
mechanisms as a way to balance excesses in the economy has lead, in Rosanvallon's eyes, to 
the paradox of capitalism becoming both "more closely regulated and more unjust, both more 
transparent and more inegalitarian" (Ibid., 288-289). What appears to be a movement of 
democratisation has become instead the "radicalization of the 'unpolitical' character of 
counter-democratic powers" (Ibid., 288-289). Rosanvallon is sceptical of the monitory or 
counter-democratic turn in democracy, believing this to be a sign of the "demise of certain 
political functions" (Ibid., 290, emphasis in original). Instead, Rosanvallon proposes a third 
dimension of democratic experience (the first two dimensions are representative- and counter-
democracy): "theoretical political practice", where, through reflection and deliberation, 
political participants revisit the principles of justice, the relation between public and private, 
the balance between interests of different groups, and the practical implications of the notion 
of popular sovereignty (Ibid., 291-292). Reflecting on the fact that many of the creators of the 
French and American constitutions had an elective aristocracy in mind when they proposed 
the institution of representative government, Rosanvallon proposes that representative 
government actually emerged "in opposition to democracy" (Ibid., 293). This suspicion of 
mass politics has stayed with us over the centuries, shrinking the democratic ideal to "little 
more than the wish to establish a government capable of defending the liberty of its citizens—
a far cry from the old ambition of genuine popular sovereignty" (Ibid., 293). Rosanvallon 
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notes how the idea of a more participatory democracy, which in its most complete form he 
calls "democracy of proximity", has made a comeback since the 1980s, resulting in a wide 
range of practices and experiences, both within and outside of existing institutions. In the 
proposed Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, in 2004, a distinction was made 
between participatory democracy and representative democracy, the former defined as "open, 
transparent, and regular dialogue with representative associations of civil society" (Article I. 
47, cited in Rosanvallon 2008, 295). However, as I will discuss in the second part of this 
chapter, participation in many ways was a functional choice: Rosanvallon demonstrates how it
helped improve decision-making at the local level while simultaneously depoliticising it, 
trading popular protest for popular involvement (Ibid., 296). Rosanvallon's proximity 
democracy is eminently political, i.e. "understanding of problems associated with the 
organisation of a shared world" (Ibid., 22), and offers citizens multiple capacities for action, 
as long as each situation is considered according to its specificity. A counter-democracy that 
does not follow his principles of proximity democracy runs the risk of "[degenerating] into a 
destructive and reductive form of populism" (Ibid., 299). Rosanvallon believes in democracy 
as a process, not as an institution, as patent in his comment "Democracy is defined by its 
works, and not simply by its institutions" (Ibid., 307, emphasis in original).
In the second part of this chapter I move from interpretative theories of democracy in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to more normative ones, in search of the 
attributes for decision-making that could help close the ecological and democratic gaps in 
the governing of the food system that I have postulated. Since there are almost as many 
theories as thinkers, exhaustiveness is not an option, and therefore, as I said before, in order
to maintain internal consistency of the ideas presented in this thesis, I will focus on those 
theories that include either or both the economic and the globalisation dimensions of social 
organisation in their models. After looking at the possibility of a "rights-based" approach to 
strengthening democracy, I will examine a range of "democracies with adjectives" (a term 
by Collier and Levitsky, 1997, illustrating the proliferation of democratic projects), starting 
with those that merely attempt to extend liberal democracy, and concluding with those that 
wish to turn it on its head.
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A rights-based approach to realising food democracy
Thomas H. Marshall (1950) can help us comprehend to what extent the liberal construction of
the citizen has shaped modern representative democracies. Marshall was a product of social 
liberalism as nurtured at the "intellectual hot house" of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, where his colleagues were distinguished intellectuals that helped bring 
about social reform in the United Kingdom, among them Beatrice and Sydney Webb, George 
Bernard Shaw and John Maynard Keynes (Murray 2005, 224). For a rights-based approach to 
democracy, his classification of rights is a good place to start. The development of each of 
three classes he identified, he attributed to the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century, 
respectively:
1. Civil rights: "liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to 
own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice" (Marshall 1950, 
10). 
2. Political rights: associated with representative democracy, including the right to vote, 
hold office, petition and assemble (Marshall 1950).
3. Social rights: "[...] from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to 
the right to share to the full in social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1950/2009, 149).
Each of these classes of rights has corresponding institutions that facilitate in securing these 
rights. Thus Marshall associates the first class with the courts of justice, the second with 
parliament and councils of local government, and the third and last with the educational 
system and social (and health) services (Marshall 1950/2009, 148-149). Marshall questions 
how two contradictory systems effectively developed at the same time and appear to be 
reconciled: the strengthening of civil rights—a system of legal equality—coincides with the 
rise of capitalism—a system of inequality (Ibid., 1950, 29). He suggests that citizenship was 
useful to capitalism, despite the contradiction and potential danger, because a free and equal 
"man" was presumed to be "equipped with the means to protect himself" (Marshall 
1950/2009, 150-151). Likewise, a new idea of social class that emerged from the "interplay of
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a variety of factors related to the institutions of property and education and the structure of the
national economy", substituted the class hierarchies that existed during feudalism (Ibid., 31). 
But in this new system, everyone is responsible for him/herself and wealth is proof of merit, 
whereas the least well-off classes are now regarded as failures (Ibid., 32). The technical 
equality of citizens thus does not translate into effective equality. Status was not eliminated 
from the social system with the celebration of contracts between "men who are free and equal 
in status" (Ibid., 34). As Marshall elegantly puts it: "civil rights [...] confer the legal capacity 
to strive for the things one would like to possess but do not guarantee the possession of any of
them" (Ibid., 34-35) . 
Many NGOs and social movements have embraced a rights-based approach to deepening the 
democratic and ecological dimensions of human development. A rights-based approach builds
on important precedents in the history of human rights to codify existing rights or promote 
new ones. Their cumulative efforts are conceptualised in the 2012 report by the Civil Society 
Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives (Civil Society Reflection Group)9. 
This spontaneous global alliance of civil society organisations considers that: 
[...] the principles and values of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the UN
Millennium Declaration are under siege and urgently need to be revived. This includes the imperatives of
human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, diversity, respect for nature, and common but differentiated
responsibilities. (No Future Without Justice report 2012, 4)
A rights-based approach compels state and non-state actors alike to go deeper in the 
identification of the root causes for the non-realisation of human rights and to face these head 
on (Ibid., 20). The Civil Society Reflection Group recommends to reconfirm existing 
universal principles and rights that have come out of international agreements among the 
world's governments, instead of inventing new ones. Their "sustainability rights framework" 
proposes eight foundational principles that the group considers to be universally consensual 
(Ibid., 23-26): 
9 A joint initiative of Social Watch, Third World Network, DAWN, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Global Policy
Forum, terre des hommes and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Executive summary of the report "No future
without justice" available: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09144.pdf  (accessed 20 June 2016).
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1. The solidarity principle: this is not linked to charity nor philanthropy, but reinforces 
that people are equal and have a shared responsibility for the common good.
2. The "do no harm" principle: derived from the Hippocratic oath, this principle has 
come to be used in humanitarian contexts by supranational agencies such as UNICEF.
3. The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities": this principle was 
enshrined in the Earth Summit declaration of 1992. "The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment 
and of the technologies and financial resources they command" (excerpt from 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration).
4. The polluter pays principle: This legal concept exists since the 1970s and was 
reaffirmed in the Rio Declaration, principle 16, where it states that "[n]ational 
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution [...]".
5. The precautionary principle: Another milestone achieved with the Rio Declaration, 
this principle states that "in the absence of a scientific consensus if an action or policy 
has a suspected risk of causing harm to people or nature, the burden of proof that it is 
not harmful falls on the proponents of this action or policy".
6. The subsidiarity principle: This is a concept of self-determination that comes to us 
from federalism, written into the treaties of the European Union, recommending to 
take decisions at the lowest possible administrative and political level, and as close to 
citizens as possible. It needs to be applied together with the solidarity principle so as 
not to become an argument for arbitrary protectionism.
7. The principle of "free, prior and informed consent": This principle is present among 
others in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 and the 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade of 1998. Proposed actions 
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or projects by governments or corporations must be subjected to the consent of the 
communities that will be affected by them.
8. The principle of peaceful dispute settlement: This principle can be found in the UN 
charter, where Article 2 says that "All Members shall settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered".
The Civil Society Reflection Group  (2012, 27) also advances four fundamental values to 
complement the eight foundational principles, together forming a framework for justice:
1. Freedom: "Men, women and children have the right to live their lives in dignity, free 
from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice". Freedom, 
nevertheless, has its moral limits, namely where our freedom may interfere with 
others' freedom and in the "do no harm" principle.
2. Equality: The interpretation given to equality can be considered its strong, non-liberal 
version—"No individual and no nation or group must be denied the opportunity to 
participate in and to benefit from development". This value includes the concept of 
intergenerational justice, a key characteristic of strong sustainability.
3. Diversity: "Human beings must respect one another, in all their diversity of belief, 
culture, language, looks, sexual orientation and gender".
4. Respect for nature: "Respect must be shown in the conduct towards all living species, 
the use of natural resources, and the ecosystems as a whole". The authors believe all 
living species have intrinsic rights and reject their objectification in current economic 
thought. The indigenous notion of Buen Vivir captures the value of respecting nature 
quite well: "Vivir Bien means sharing [...] living in community, in fraternity and, 
especially, in complementarity [...] not competing, living in harmony among peoples 
and with nature, producing for our needs protecting the environment [...] [to] recover 
the health of Mother Earth" (David Choquehuanca, Bolivian foreign minister in 2011, 
cited in Civil Society Reflection Group 2011, 28). Countries such as Ecuador and 
Bolivia have already gone one step further by incorporating the rights of nature in 
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their constitutions. Although theories on the intrinsic rights of Nature and the Earth 
have been discussed for more than a century and some examples exist of natural 
entities given a legal status (such as the river Whanganui in New Zealand10), the 
operationalisation of these rights is far from consensual and far from concluded. There
is significant debate about what beings in nature should have legal identity and who is 
legitimised to represent these beings or ecosystems (see Fish, 2013).
Although the choice of universal principles and values as listed above may be considered 
ideological in the sense that together they express a world view that is openly opposed to the 
liberal democratic model of politics and economics, they nevertheless stem from this same 
model, albeit not under the exact same interpretations. Their essence has been captured by 
successive global declarations, conventions, and treaties on development and the human 
environment. Unfortunately, governments have "mostly failed to translate them into 
enforceable obligations and specific policies" (Civil Society Reflection Group 2012, 29). The 
report (Ibid., 29) offers three examples as proof: the collapse of climate negotiations (failure 
to accept the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities), the persistence of 
hunger and poverty (failure to apply the solidarity principle), and the nuclear catastrophes of 
Chernobyl and Fukushima (failure to comply with the precautionary principle). Some rights, 
such as human rights, are well-recognised, but find it hard to compete with the extended rights
of corporations, which may move their capital freely, pollute, and sue governments if health 
regulations cut into their profits, while people are restricted in their movement and in their 
capacity to sue corporations for harmful practices. Other principles and values have not even 
been codified into rights yet, among them the principle of intergenerational justice and the 
granting of the status of entity to Nature.
Before I expand on how the concept of human rights can be applied to democratise food 
politics, a word of caution on the rights-based approach in general. Rawls and other thinkers 
before and after him have pointed out the downside to the defence of absolute rights, which 
may create perverse situations. Rawls (2001) believed, for example, that to have personal 
property was a basic right or liberty, but that the absolute right to unlimited private property 
10 Agreement entitles Whanganui River to legal identity, New Zealand Herald, 30 August 2012, available:
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10830586 (accessed 13 May 2016).
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(specifically of natural resources and means of production) was not. Marx, as we know, took a
more radical view and demanded that the right to private property be abolished. Much earlier, 
Kant made each person's rights conditional on that of the others. Besides recognising limits to 
rights, and recognising that certain rights can conflict with others, we must also create a 
context for rights. Except for certain basic rights, rights should not be set in stone, they need 
to be interpreted and translated into actionable norms. This interpretation and translation, in 
turn, requires a healthy democratic polity, capable of asserting moral rights even in the 
absence of the law, and equally capable of re-examining legal rights when they have been 
deemed immoral. Tim Lang (2007, 12) confesses he was troubled by the notion of food rights:
"Food rights can be abstract and lost. Food democracy has to be fought for and built into food 
culture".
The right to food that is implicit (but not specified) in the Declaration of Human Rights has 
been used to justify government and civil society intervention in the food regime. Since 2000, 
a Special Rapporteur on the right to food has been mandated by the Human Rights Council of 
the United Nations to "monitor the situation of the right to food throughout the world" and 
promote "the full realization of the right to food through dialogue with relevant actors by 
participating in seminars, conferences, expert meetings".11 In the absence of an independently 
defined right to food, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has issued a declaration so as to refine, and where necessary remediate, the understanding of 
the concept:
[..] the right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with
others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement. The
right to adequate food shall therefore not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it
with a minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients. The right to adequate food will
have to be realized progressively. However, States have a core obligation to take the necessary action to
mitigate and alleviate hunger [..], even in times of natural or other disasters. (General Comment No. 12 of
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 199912, italics in original)
11 Special Rapporteur on the right to food, available:
h  ttp://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx  (accessed 9 May 2016).
12 Twentieth Session of the Committee on economic, social and cultural rights, 26 April – 4 May 1999,
available:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/righttofood/documents/RTF_publications/EN/General_Comment_12
_EN.pdf (accessed 9 May 2016).
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After assessing the world's food situation and the way food is tied in with dramatic challenges
such as hunger, poverty, environmental degradation, and climate change, the Committee 
reached the consensual conclusion that:
[..] the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the human person and is
indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights.
It is also inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of appropriate economic, environmental
and social policies, at both the national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and
the fulfilment of all human rights for all. (Twentieth Session of the Committee on economic, social and
cultural rights) 
Although the right to food has yet to be included as a stand-alone right according to the wider 
interpretation given it in later years, statements such as the one presented above have certainly
aided in strengthening the demands of social movements in the field of food and farming. 
This and other rights to secure sustainable livelihoods "become embedded in everyday 
political and social expectations", provide a strong rational for civil society campaigns, while 
they help to engender "[t]he collective vision of how one should be treated and what one 
deserves, simply by being human" (Anderson 2008, 594). What Molly Anderson calls "rights-
based food systems" is a valid, potentially effective, approach to achieving food democracy, 
as she reminds us when looking back on the Civil Rights struggle in the USA: "when enough 
people assume a right, stopping them is impossible" (Ibid.). Based on her appraisal of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of its discussion and 
refinement over the years, Anderson comes up with the following six criteria for a rights-
based food system:
• Absence of human exploitation. 
• Democratic decision-making on food system choices that have impacts on people in more than one
sector of the system (e.g., consumers and producers, or distributors and producers). 
• Fair, transparent access by producers to all necessary resources for food production, including
knowledge. 
• Multiple independent buyers. 
• Absence of resource exploitation. 
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• No impingement on the ability of people in other locales to meet these criteria (e.g., through trade
relationships that undermine decent wages, fair prices, environmental quality, and transparency of
access to information in other countries). (Ibid., 600-601, literal transcription)
A rights-based approach to improving democracy "focuses on people as rights bearers, 
entitled to demand accountability of their governments and other powerful entities for their 
policies and actions", making it superior to market-based solutions that are linked to what are 
generally passive consumer choices (Ibid., 601). When rights are recognised by rights-bearers,
it may strengthen their resolve to demand these rights, while campaigning for rights ensures 
they "become embedded in everyday political and social expectations", ultimately 
contributing to transforming "the collective vision of how one should be treated and what one 
deserves, simply by being human" (Gready and Ensor, cited in Anderson 2008, 594). A rights-
based framework demands the redistribution not only of resources, but of participation in 
decisions on resource distribution and ownership of the means of production, work 
conditions, and remuneration. As a universal right rather than a privilege that not all may 
afford, food can be rescued from the neoliberal conception of individual responsibility, 
becoming instead the shared responsibility of all individuals, groups, communities, and 
nations.
The concept and cri de guerre food sovereignty can be considered a radical outgrowth of the 
rights-based food system approach, although it goes beyond claiming rights and calls for an 
alternative paradigm, as such fitting in comfortably with the radical ecological democratic 
proposals I will discuss further on in this chapter. Publicly launched in 1996 by the global 
farmers' movement La Via Campesina, food sovereignty is understood to mean the human 
right of all people to healthy, culturally appropriate, sustainably-grown food, and the right of 
communities to determine their own food systems (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005; Declaration of
Nyeleni 200713).
Food sovereignty offers an alternative to contemporary transnational attempts at 
environmental governance, and is based on four pillars: the right to food, the access to 
productive resources, the promotion of agroecological conversion of production, and 
13 Declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty, at Nyéléni, Mali, 27 February 2007, available:
http://www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290 (accessed 15 May 2012). 
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equitable trade with strong local markets (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005). The call for food 
sovereignty both echoes and amplifies the voices of social movements everywhere struggling 
for land reform, control over local resources, fair markets, neighbourhood food systems, and 
sustainable agriculture. It is posited firmly against the reigning paradigm of liberalised 
agricultural trade, which grants access to markets on the basis of market power and results in 
low, often subsidised, prices; denies local producers access to their own markets; and 
encourages less developed countries to specialise in a small number of export commodities, 
thereby neglecting often essential local food crops (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005; La Via 
Campesina 2009). Rosset (2003) sums up the imperative of food sovereignty as follows: 
Food sovereignty says that feeding a nation’s people is an issue of national security—of sovereignty. If the
people of a country must depend for their next meal on the vagaries of the global economy, on the goodwill
of a superpower not to use food as a weapon, or on the unpredictability and high cost of long-distance
shipping, then that country is not secure, neither in the sense of either national security or food security.
(Rosset 2003, 1) 
Food sovereignty places the resources needed for food and other basic amenities in the public 
realm, as a common good, to be shared equitably by peoples. It opposes the commodification 
and privatisation of Nature that is sweeping the globe. It advocates forms of farming and food 
production that are ecological, biodiverse, local, sustainable, and socially just. In the view of 
its proponents, agriculture must be removed from international trade agreements, and the right
to farm and to eat culturally appropriate food elevated to a human right (Rosset 2006; Holt-
Giménez 2009; Patel 2009). Although food sovereignty has concrete demands and policy 
framework proposals, it is not locked into one or other particular policy option, instead it asks 
to analyse all options in light of their capacity to realise certain basic rights. This prompted 
Patel (2009, 663) to recall Hannah Arendt's affirmation in his rundown on the etymology of 
food sovereignty: "the first right, above all others, is the right to have rights". Proponents of 
food sovereignty are "invoking a right to have rights over food" (Ibid.). As a non-
instrumentalist and non-productionist approach to governance (in the sense of co-
government), food sovereignty has caught the attention of thinkers and practitioners of deeper
forms of democracy as a way out of our path-dependent socioeconomic systems. According to
Pimbert (2010, 2) food sovereignty is “a process that seeks to expand the realm of democracy 
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and regenerate a diversity of locally autonomous food systems”. Food sovereignty, as a school
of thought and action, forces us to reinterpret the most basic of democratic principles, liberty 
(liberty as autonomy) and equality (equality as equity), while introducing us to new principles
and rights, such as altruism, solidarity, the rights of Nature and the right to food.
The food sovereignty movement is possibly the largest social movement in the world, and is 
unique in how it combines overt protest and resistance to the dispossession of peasants and 
indigenous peoples from their lands and resources, with the active promotion of “farmer 
innovation and horizontal sharing and learning” (Rosset and Martínez Torres 2013). One 
example of this methodology of “Diálogo de Saberes” (an interactive, horizontal learning 
methodology) is the “Campesino-a-Campesino” methodology or CAC, which is inspired by 
the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, further refined by his heirs into a critical peasant 
pedagogy (Ibid.). It is through CAC that La Via Campesina spreads and improves the science,
practice and philosophy of agroecology14.
After this incursion into the basic rights that underpin most democratic theories and how they 
may be used as benchmarks for strengthening the democratic quality of global decision-
making, in the next sections I will analyse different proposals for deepening democracy, to 
assess their potential success in improving the democratic legitimacy of commercial societies. 
Although democratic quality and democratic legitimacy will be discussed in significant detail 
when I construct my exploratory model for food democracy, an indication of my basic 
understanding of these concepts may be helpful. By democratic quality I understand the 
"substantiveness" of a democratic model or institution, i.e. how close it is to fulfilling its 
original promise of rule of the people. However, the latter concept is not at all consensual, 
which is why for each democratic thinker there is a corresponding democratic theory, and why
it is more useful to speak of "dimensions of democracy" than "degrees of democracy". I will 
discuss this elusiveness at length in Chapter 3, for now it is important to retain that my idea of
quality or substantiveness is linked to my objective of grounding democracy in the human 
14 Michel Pimbert, a scholar who has extensively studied the concepts and practices of food sovereignty and
agroecology, explains that the term was coined in 1928 by Bensin and has since evolved and become
explicitly linked with food sovereignty. He says: “[a]t the heart of agroecology is the idea that
agroecosystems should mimic the biodiversity levels and functioning of natural ecosystems”. In
“Perspectives: agroecology as an alternative vision to climate-smart agriculture”, June 2017, available:
https://www.ileia.org/2017/06/26/agroecology-alternative-vision-agriculture/ (accessed 30 June 2017).
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activity of food and basic needs production, while making it both socially and ecologically 
responsive to its demos.
Democratic legitimacy is an equally elusive (and contested) concept. Rosanvallon (2011) 
reminds us how, strictly, this concept refers to the acceptance of a rule or institution by all the 
people, in the absence of coercion. In practice however, in representative democracies, a 
majority (sometimes only technical), and not the totality of people, vote certain 
representatives into office (what Rosanvallon calls electoral legitimacy), while these 
representatives have received a gradually broader mandate over the decades (what he calls 
bureaucratic legitimacy). Legitimacy has thus become diluted. Rosanvallon endeavours to 
reinstitute a substantive version of legitimacy, which in his view will be an indicator for the 
quality of democracy: "[a] broader, more searching definition of legitimacy is [...] an essential
component of any effort to expand the meaning of democracy" (Ibid., 9).
Democracies with adjectives in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
In the oft-cited article by David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997, 430), the authors warn to 
avoid "conceptual stretching" in the search for new forms of conceptualising democracy. The 
popular pursuit of ever fresher explanations for democratic flaws in social arrangements has 
resulted in a proliferation of "democracies with adjectives". Collier and Levitsky point out the
importance of anchoring these "democracies with adjectives" in procedural definitions, such 
as suggested by Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl (respectively 1947 and 1971, cited in 
Collier and Levitsky 1997, 431). They remind us of the philosopher Gallie's analysis of 
"essentially contested concepts", by which he meant to stress that democracy is "the 
appraisive political concept par excellence" (1956, cited in Collier and Levitsky 1997, 433, 
emphasis in original). They recommend to use Sartori's rule of thumb for the organisation of 
concepts: 
[...] concepts with fewer defining attributes commonly apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the
ladder of generality; whereas concepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and hence are
lower on the ladder. (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 434, emphasis in original)
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In the view of these authors it is not enough to distinguish between types of democracy 
(parliamentary democracy versus presidential democracy), but the researcher should also look
at degrees of democracy. This can be achieved by revising the root definition of democracy by
adding attributes (for example whether an elected government can effectively exercise its 
power or whether the society in question guarantees social equality) deemed to be necessary 
for democracy to be realised (Ibid., 443-444). Nevertheless, if these extensions of the 
definition are not consensual, they will result in conflicting definitions of democracy, i.e. a 
continuation of its status as an "essentially contested concept". Although the authors' 
reflection is useful as a reminder to researchers to be careful in their definition of democracy, 
it does not help us to navigate the many "democracies with adjectives" that the history of 
political science and philosophy offers us. I contend that for practical purposes it is important 
to accept that democracy is a concept under construction, as John Gaventa (2006) has said. At 
the same time, to avoid gerrymandering with the definition, as Collier and Levitsky (1997) 
ironically warn, the boundaries and foundations of my own definition-in-progress, must be 
stated as clearly as possible.
Extending the liberal democratic project
A recurrent theme in my thesis is the fact that the rise of the commercial society and the 
corresponding version of representative democracy—called liberal democracy—which 
developed around it has been surrounded by controversy from the start, suffering from 
criticism both from the outside as well as the inside. Much of the literature on democracy has 
been dedicated to analysing the perceived flaws of this dominant form of social arrangement 
since the eighteenth century, and to devising solutions to mitigating, avoiding, or transforming
its (less democratic) effects.  This current of thinkers, although very diverse, can be 
considered to aim at extending the existing liberal democracies so that they conform more to 
the original republicanist idea that inspired the American and French constitutions. Many of 
these thinkers, because of their thoroughness in dissecting the attributes for democracy, also 
helped lay the groundwork for more radical democratic proposals, which I will discuss in the 
last sections of this chapter.
78
A global food polity
Two very prominent rationalist universalists—i.e. those who attempt to discern values and 
principles applicable to all humankind and believe humans can find truth through the use of 
their reason—are Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls, who can be considered to have done the 
groundwork for what is now called the deliberative school in democracy. John Rawls is 
generally considered to have attempted to reconcile liberal democratic ideas with a more 
profound conception of equality, whereas Habermas developed a model that builds on what he
believed to be the rational potential of human beings (rational is here understood as the 
capacity to use reason through communication), present in everyday speech, and which he 
hopes will supersede what he considers to be the one-sided version of rationalisation of 
modern societies (Bohman and Rehg 2014). Both philosophers are critical of capitalism, or at 
least of laissez-faire capitalism. Rawls' solution was to temper capitalism with principles for 
justice that adjust liberties and inequalities so as to benefit the least-advantaged members of 
society (justice as fairness: by fairness Rawls meant equal access to opportunities). Rawls 
does not see the need to restructure property distribution in this way, but he does firmly reject 
utilitarianism, claiming that a principle of utility is incompatible with true equality (1999b, 
40) and that no institution may be justified "on the grounds that the hardships of some are 
offset by a greater good in the aggregate" (1971/1999a, 13). To guarantee his principles of 
basic justice, he advocates what he calls a "well-ordered constitutional democracy", based on 
deliberation, where citizens "exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning 
public political questions" (Rawls 1999b, 138). Rawls' democracy maintains not only its 
liberal aspects, but also the institution of political representation, since he defines "public 
reason" narrowly: referring only to the official forums needed for achieving agreement in a 
pluralistic society (McCarthy 1994, 50).
Habermas' proposal is broader, he wishes to redefine basic concepts for human interaction 
using a collective lens, so that truth is what would be agreed upon by participants with equal 
capacities of discourse, equal social status, and with all of them focusing on the common 
good, while legitimacy is strengthened by requiring all those to whom for example a law 
applies to participate in its creation. Given ideal conditions for public reason (notably 
conditions of full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality), what Habermas calls the “ideal 
speech situation”, he believes decision-makers can reach decisions that benefit the common 
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good. His conception of democracy fits in with advocates of "strong democracy" like 
Rousseau and Marx, extending the idea of sovereignty to the people rather than just their 
representatives. In this conception of sovereignty, not only actions but also laws are subject to 
Habermas' legitimacy test: they must gain "the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of 
legislation that in turn has been legally constituted" (1996, 110). This discursive process must 
take place at several levels, not just to arrive at the truth of the consequences of decisions, but 
to assess its moral rightness, to judge the authenticity of the different options available and 
their respective feasibility and efficiency. These discussions take place in Habermas' public 
sphere, which can be found not just in governing institutions but in any publicly accessible 
space where information is exchanged and sociopolitical discussion can take place, and 
where, importantly, free and equal citizens aim at a shared understanding of issues of public 
importance. Although Habermas initially identified this public sphere in early bourgeois 
democracies, he later conceded that his conception of public sphere was idealised, there are 
no instances in history where the ideal speech situation is consistently maintained. He instead 
proposes a pragmatic approach that joins philosophy with the social sciences so that his 
normative claims can be understood and tested within their modern historical context, that of 
a complex society where ideal conditions rarely arise, but of which the agents are 
intersubjective rational beings capable of creating meaning collectively.
Robert Dahl constitutes a school all by himself with a democratic theory that is partially 
founded on an analysis of the political economy. He picks up on the contention made by de 
Tocqueville in Democracy in America that liberty and equality would become incompatible 
ideas, an affirmation echoed by John Rawls who, as I have shown, tried to reconcile both 
concepts. Dahl (1985, 1) recalls how important figures of the American Constitutional 
Convention "were deeply concerned that political equality might conflict with political 
liberty". They feared that democracy, especially majority rule, could limit the rights of 
property owners (Ibid., 2). Majority rule is a theme that Tocqueville latches on to when 
analysing the democratic institutions in the USA, since he believed liberty to be the highest 
value and foresaw that, just as equality's rise was inevitable, so was the threat of a despotic 
majority, because in a democracy "all barriers to the unlimited exercise of power are 
removed" (Ibid., 9). Dahl places their assessments in the context of what was still largely an 
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agrarian society at the time, with a real possibility of, in particular white men becoming equal 
in property, knowledge, and standing. He tempers this with what really happened: the 
revolution of the modern corporation, which became the principal employer of most North-
Americans (Ibid., 3). The liberty of these new corporate citizens, in Dahl's view, has seriously 
undermined the balance of political and economic equality, since corporations have direct 
access to political structures and the resources to sway political decisions in their favour. Dahl
asks whether there is an "inescapable trade-off between liberty and equality, so that we can 
only enjoy the liberties we now possess by forgoing greater equality" (Ibid., 4). He proposes 
an alternative economic structure that he believes could "strengthen political equality and 
democracy by reducing inequalities originating in the ownership and control of firms" (Ibid.). 
The conflict between equality and liberty in his view resides in the broad definition of liberty, 
which includes a "personal and inalienable right to property" (Ibid., 161). Like McMichael 
and other political thinkers, Dahl classifies the current political economy as "corporate 
capitalist" (Ibid.). He singles out political equality as a crucial and determining value for a 
juster democracy, arguing that it is a pre-condition for other human values (Ibid., 5). In a 
similar vein, he identifies ownership inequalities as a major source of social, cultural, and 
economic inequalities (Ibid.). Dahl analyses in detail de Tocqueville's reasons to fear the 
“tyranny of the majority”15, aiming to find some core principles that may guide decision-
making in a democracy so that both majority and minority interests are safeguarded. This 
leads him to define injustice and tyranny in a way that would permit teasing out the instances 
of their occurrence. Dahl agrees with Fishkin (1979, cited in Dahl 1985, 18) that there are no 
safeguards against tyranny: "[n]either procedural requirements, such as majority rule or its 
various modifications all the way to unanimity, nor absolute rights, nor 'structural principles' 
like John Rawls's two principles of fairness can be counted on to prevent tyranny". Dahl's 
original proposal for a fully functioning "polyarchy" is to strengthen associationalism and 
effect a change in enterprise ownership, with worker-owned and worker-controlled companies
guaranteeing economic, social, and political equality and consequently a healthier democracy.
15 This famous concept by de Tocqueville touches upon the practice in most democratic governments to lend
absolute sovereignty to the majority, with the corresponding risks that this power entails for the interests of
minorities.
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Another universalist, Salvador Giner, considers that it is more important to define human 
beings as moral persons than to pre-establish principles of justice or interaction. Giner, just as 
Rawls and Habermas, believes moral norms are produced through negotiation and agreement 
among different interest groups within a society. But this does not satisfy him as morally 
substantive. He calls for a revival of the Kantian categorical imperative (act only according to 
maxims that you would will to be universal law, placing all men and women on equal status in
dignity and freedom, as ends rather than means), which he believes will lead to the production
of a society based on moral principles, instead of the other way around (Giner 2012, 392). 
Like Kant, he is attributing responsibility and capacity for restraint to men and women. Giner 
believes human beings have moral intuitions and that our aim is "the dream of our 
civilization: that of making each individual, without exception, a rationally autonomous and 
morally sovereign being" (Ibid., 373). Giner is a representative thinker of the republican 
school, to which deliberative democrats also adhere. Republicanists advocate active 
citizenship and "republican virtue", or, as Giner calls it, "civic virtue" to counter an 
illuminated elite (aristocratic democracy) to run the political institutions (Giner 1998). In 
Giner's view, neither liberalism nor communitarianism are compatible with "full universal 
citizenship", only a republican polity—what he calls "third democracy"—creates the 
conditions for collective decision-making that promotes the common good. Giner wishes to 
revive republicanism, freeing the polity from both liberal formalism and the impasses of 
communitarian tribalism, handing responsibility for political decisions back to citizens, who, 
just as in Habermas' public sphere, enter into "constant, rational, secular and open dialogue" 
(Ibid.). For Giner, it is not enough to have political institutions to guarantee basic rights, what 
is needed is a vigorous citizenry. 
Staying with the republicanists, it is important to mention the North-American political 
theorist Benjamin Barber as the epitome of contemporary "strong" democracy theory. Strong 
democracy, as defined by scholars Prugh, Costanza and Daly (2000, 112)—based on Barber's 
more complex conceptualisation—is when "people—citizens—govern themselves to the 
greatest extent possible rather than delegate their power and responsibility to representatives 
acting in their names", and when politics is "a fact of one's life, an expected element of it, a 
prominent and natural role in the same manner as that of parent or worker". Barber calls his 
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(republican) theory "participatory politics", contrasting his principles of "politics as a way of 
living" with the individual rights perspective of liberal democracy. A fierce critic of what he 
considers a "thin" version of democracy, whose values are "prudential and thus provisional, 
optional, and conditional—means to exclusively individualistic and private ends" (Barber 
2003 | 1984, 4)—Barber wishes to develop an "alternative justification" for democracy, 
rescuing it from liberal culture, with which it has been associated for all of modern history 
(Ibid., 25). His alternative theory re-associates democracy with the idea of civic virtue based 
on participation, citizenship and political activity. The concept of “politics as a way of living” 
ties Barber in with the democratic theories of Hannah Arendt—who believed that the active 
engagement of citizens in the governance of public affairs provided them with public 
freedom, public happiness, and most importantly, political agency (d'Entreves 2014)—and of 
John Dewey—who called democracy "the idea of community life itself" (1927, cited in 
Barber 2003, 119). Barber himself rejects any resemblance to Arendt's thoughts (Ibid., 118). 
Just the same, these three theorists have in common that neither romanticised public life as a 
form of "associated life" nor humans as naturally cooperative and solidary. They believed 
humans had to strive to be citizens, to conquer what Arendt calls the artificiality of political 
life (d'Entreves 2014), but that when they did master this civic virtue, democracy became an 
"end as well as the means" (Barber 2003, 120), helping human relations to "transcend the 
necessities of life", in Arendt's words (d'Entreves 2014).
The deliberative democratic proposal
Deliberative democracy deserves a separate mention, since it has developed and matured as a 
school of thought for longer than any of the other "democracies with adjectives" and is cited 
by many scholars as a realistic extension to representative democracy. Deliberation as a 
criterium has also been taken up by other schools of democratic thought, whether they agree 
with the normative principles of deliberative democracy or not. John Dryzek (2000) therefore 
claims we can speak of the deliberative turn in democratic theory. Many heavy-weights in 
political and philosophical thought have contributed to the development of the core 
foundations of deliberative or discursive democracy (among them John Rawls, Joshua Cohen,
83
A global food polity
and Jurgen Habermas), while it is probably the democratic theory that has been most tested in 
empirical research. 
The concepts of deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are sometimes used 
interchangeably, but should be distinguished: participation in political decision-making, a 
basic tenet of the participatory school, does not necessarily require the use of deliberation, a 
key condition for deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats believe they are demanding 
more of democracy than the guarantee of basic rights. John Gaventa (2006) imagines an 
overlapping scale where proposals for more substantive democracy can be placed, ranging 
from strengthening democratic accountability through the promotion of a "robust civil 
society" (2006, 14); to inviting citizens to be "co-governors" through the institution of 
participatory practices (Ibid., 15); or improving the quality of "public talk" and the conditions 
for equality in public participation as proposed by deliberative democratic theories (Ibid., 17);
and finally to the concept of empowered participatory governance as developed by Archon 
Fung and Eric Olin Wright (2003, cited in Gaventa 2006, 19)—which aims to institutionalise 
participatory practices in such a way as to both deepen the democratic substance as well as 
legitimise decisions emerging from these practices. These approaches all aim to elevate the 
citizen from a consumer exercising a right to choice (in the neoliberal democratic model) or as
someone with strong rights to freedom from the state but an otherwise somewhat passive role 
in politics (in the liberal representative model), to a participant with strong rights as well as 
responsibilities (Ibid., 11-12). Gaventa believes the debate in participatory democracy has 
shifted from whether and how citizens should be involved in decision-making to what he calls
"next generation questions" about concrete results of their involvement and respective 
implications for representative democracy (Ibid., 7). 
For deliberative democrats the guarantee of citizen participation is not enough, they say the 
decision-making processes must also be deliberative, i.e. based on "means of arguments 
offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality" 
(Elster 1998, 8). Empirical research has in fact shown that more deliberative forms of 
participatory processes score higher on broad quality criteria (such as joint gains, added 
information and innovative ideas) than less-intensive stakeholder processes (Marris et al., 
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2001; Beierle, 2002; Pimbert and Wakeford, 2003; Dryzek and Tucker, 2008). Simone 
Chambers (2003, 308), in her review of the history and status of deliberative democratic 
theory and practice, claims it is first and foremost a school that rejects liberal individualist or 
economic understandings of democracy, instead grounding itself in the concepts of 
accountability and discussion, so that "(t)alk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-centric
democratic theory". The focus shifts from voting to the "communicative processes of opinion 
and will-formation that precede voting" and "(a)ccountability replaces consent as the 
conceptual core of legitimacy" (Ibid.). Thus, in her view, deliberative democracy is not 
designed to be an alternative to representative democracy, but rather its expansion. She places 
it in between the advocacy for rights (understood here as prioritising individual rights over 
interests of the State or a popular majority) and democratic theories that place community 
rights and the common good over individual rights (in line with communitarian theories) 
(Ibid., 309). Those steering this middle course, such as Jurgen Habermas, believe rights and 
popular sovereignty have a common origin, one does not exist without the other:
We are legal persons protected by rights only to the extent that we are authors of those laws. We are authors
only to the extent that we are persons under the law. (Habermas 2001, cited in Chambers 2003, 310)
Without disregarding the enormous amount of literature available on the theories and projects 
of proponents of deliberative democracy, for the purposes of this chapter I will sum up the 
core arguments, relying on two of the theory's most active defenders:
• Democracy hinges on effective communication between all interested parties rather 
than the bargaining between or the aggregation of all preferences (Cohen 2003);
• Communication, when focused on the common good, brings those affected by 
decisions together to discuss alternatives on equal footing, making use of their 
capacity for reasonable arguments (Cohen 2003); 
• The deliberative procedure is the main source of legitimacy of political decisions and 
even laws: "Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses" (Habermas 1996, 107).
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In their analysis of deliberative democracy in practice, specifically looking at documented 
instances of public deliberation, Michael Delli Carpini, Fay Cook, and Lawrence Jacobs 
(2004, 325) find substantial indirect support for the "democratic potential of deliberation", but
warn that this potential is "highly context dependent and rife with opportunities for going 
awry". Although there is even less research available on the political outcomes of deliberation
than on its procedural aspects, the authors reach a similar conclusion for both aspects of 
deliberation. James Fishkin, a scientist who has designed practical models of deliberative 
democracy in several countries since the late 1980s, claims that deliberation "makes a 
difference and it makes a difference to both opinion and behavior" (Fishkin and Laslett 2003, 
4). His experience with the format of Deliberative Polls that he created, shows that randomly 
selected participants do significantly change their opinion, that this can be linked to them 
becoming better informed, and finally that these cumulative changes have a large effect on 
their voting behaviour.
Deliberative democratic theory and practice is generally considered to have come of age, with
a vast literature and over 25 years of experiments with deliberative publics, each of which 
extensively reported and cross-examined. Taking stock, some of its most recognised scholars 
now propose to go beyond "the study of individual institutions and processes to examine their 
interaction in the system as a whole" (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 2). In a systemic approach, the 
idea is to "assess institutions according to how well they perform the functions necessary to 
promoting the goals of the system" (Ibid., 10). The eight researchers suggest to use three 
largely consensual functions of a deliberative system—"seeking truth, establishing mutual 
respect, and generating inclusive, egalitarian decision-making" (Ibid., 22)—to assess the 
strength of certain groups of institutions and practices. Additionally, they describe five, what 
they call pathologies, which may hinder the deliberative ideal in any system: tight-coupling 
(when parts of the system are too linked to provide a self-corrective function); decoupling 
(when parts of the system stop being able to positively influence other parts); institutional 
domination by state, party, or other group with state-like authority; social domination by one 
type of social interest or by a social class; and entrenched partisanship (when all actors in the 
system are too sharply divided to listen to each other). Although deliberative theorists are not 
all agreed on the role of deliberation in democracy, in general they identify with three basic 
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functions for deliberative systems: epistemic, ethical, and democratic. The first refers to the 
goal of "produc[ing] preferences, opinions, and decisions that are appropriately informed by 
facts and logic and are the outcome of substantive and meaningful consideration of relevant 
reasons"; the second to the "promot[ion] of mutual respect among citizens"; and finally the 
third relates to "promot[ing] an inclusive political process on terms of equality" (Ibid., 11-12).
What Mansbridge et al. (Ibid., 25) call the "practical and empirical turn" in deliberative 
democracy has inspired a parallel, but more instrumentalist, field of research and practice, 
called "public participation". Before looking beyond the "tweaking" of liberal democracies, I 
will consider the contributions of this discipline, which has become extremely popular in 
liberal democracies.
The "thinness" of public participation
To evaluate the substantiveness of democratic proposals made by proponents of the field 
called public participation, I rely on Barber's dimension of "thin" versus "strong" democracy 
(Barber 2003). Thin democracies, he says, are founded on an individualistic rights 
perspective, vindicating private rights while undermining collective ones and diminishing the 
active role of citizens in democratic decision-making. Instead, a strong democracy celebrates 
the civic association amongst humans, and their capacity for sharing and interdependency. A 
strong democracy is "the politics of amateurs, where every man is compelled to encounter 
every other man without the intermediary of expertise" (Ibid., 152). Barber advocates that 
every citizen be "his own politician" (Ibid.). Barber's version of what he calls “participatory 
politics” requires citizens to take part in the definition of all the conditions for political 
debate: identifying values, issues, agendas, and options (Ibid., 157). 
With these criteria in mind, I will now look at the concept and practice of public participation.
The International Association for Public Participation defines public participation as "the 
process by which an organization consults with interested or affected individuals, 
organizations, and government entities before making a decision"16. To the critical democratic 
16 IAP2: Good public participation results in better decisions, available: http://www.iap2.org/ (accessed 6 May
2016).
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scholar this definition immediately signals a loss rather than a gain in democratic substance, 
due to the implicit top-down approach. The definition leads me to think that public 
participation cannot be considered a theory in itself, but rather a practice that is informed by 
different theories. 
The adoption of public participation practices in local, national, and supranational decision-
making was a gradual process that is linked to the development of environmental 
consciousness and to the idea of "governance" beyond governments. Mark Reed traces the 
appearance of public participation back to the 1960s, when the focus was on raising 
awareness, with local perspectives included in data collection and planning in the 1970s, local
knowledge recognised in new participatory techniques in the 1980s, participation becoming 
the norm in the sustainable development agenda in the 1990s, and finally, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, the first critiques of participation and "disillusionment over its 
limitations and failings" emerging (Reed 2008, 2418). Initiatives such as Participatory 
Budgeting, Citizen Juries, and Deliberative Polling are all examples of public participation. 
According to Reed (2008, 2418), the drivers most cited for the rise of citizen involvement in 
decision-making are: 
• The recognition of the complexity, uncertainty, and potential scale of environmental 
problems that demands transparent, flexible and inclusive decision-making; 
• the rising public scepticism about science and the public's increasing knowledge of, 
and interest in, environmental problems; 
• the growing idea of a democratic right to be involved in environmental decision-
making—as enshrined in successive international treaties: the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
the European Commission's White Paper on Governance17, and the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention18, but also in national legislation, for instance in member-countries of the 
EU; 
17 EU Commission (2001). European Governance - A White Paper. COM (2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001,
available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm (accessed 20 November 2016).
18 The Aarhus Convention of the United Nations, available: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/ (accessed 2
May 2016).
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• the embracing of concepts and practices of sustainability by an increasing number of 
scientists and politicians; 
• and, finally, claims of higher quality and durability of decision-making that involves 
the impacted citizens. 
Even the staunchest defenders of "free" global markets, such as the World Bank, have 
embraced some form of "participation" (see the 2009 World Bank's Guidelines for Multi-
Stakeholder Engagement19). The integration of Agenda 21—the action plan resulting from Rio
1992—in local and national policy-making was especially successful in Europe. Many local 
and national governments have, at least in spirit, moved beyond the mechanics of 
representative democracy by introducing legislation that mandates not only integrating 
environmental concerns into decision-making but also consulting those that are impacted by 
these decisions. 
Notwithstanding a number of encouraging examples of effective public participation (e.g. 
participatory budgeting in Brazil as reported by Avritzer, 2009; citizen-driven debate and 
decision-making on controversial technologies in India as reported by Pimbert and Wakeford, 
2003), the jury is not out yet on its impacts. The review of best practices undertaken by Reed 
(2008) suggests that effective public participation is contingent on many different factors, 
such as the degree of empowerment and capacity-building in participants, the stages of the 
process that citizens are involved in, the representativeness of the participants, the degree of 
clarity and participants' agreement on objectives, the suitability of the methods for the context
of a particular participation process, the skills of the facilitators, and the incorporation of local
as well as scientific knowledge. So far, there are only enough indications to claim that public 
participation can in fact improve the quality of environmental decisions. As discussed under 
the section on deliberative democracy, deliberative forms of participatory processes are 
superior, according to broad quality criteria, to less-intensive stakeholder processes. The 
inclusion of lay people in even the most complex environmental issues has been shown to 
19 Guidance note on bank multi-stakeholder engagement, available:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-
1193949504055/4348035-1298566783395/7755386-1301510956007/Multi-Stakeholder-Engagement.pdf
(accessed 18 June 2016).
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result in the generation of better, more consensual, sometimes highly creative alternatives, 
while they also help to educate, resolve conflict, and build trust (Beierle, 2002, Felt and 
Fochler, 2008). But at the same time, Reed (2008, 2426) warns us that the quality of decisions
in participatory contexts is also contingent upon the factors mentioned earlier, or in other 
words, depends on the quality of the process that leads to the decision. Other scientists have 
found that participation is in most cases not associated with actual changes in the behaviour of
public and private decision-makers, nor connected explicitly with the actual decision-making 
processes (Dubreuil and Baudé 2008, Sclove 2010). Brian Wynne (2005) questions the 
substance of public participatory initiatives, claiming the framing limits of these processes, 
such as the exclusive discussion of downstream effects and the embedding of the debate in 
risk discourse, are inhibiting substantive participation and failing to confront the deeper 
cultural assumptions and commitments of scientists and policy-makers. Wynne was one of the
scientists involved in the European Commission's PABE project20, which revealed entrenched 
views about the public shared by numerous policy actors. These preconceptions hinder the 
debate and increase the discrepancy between public demands and public policies (Marris et al.
2001). In their study, Ulrike Felt and Maximilian Fochler (2008) found that participation—in 
Europe—is too often presented as an end in itself and defined, and practised, in a top-down 
manner. Alan Irwin (2001) found that, at least in the British context, the link between policy 
concerns of citizens and practical outcomes of participated decisions is, at best, weak. The 
lack of substantive results in the democratisation of decision-making may be explained in part
by the narrow view that policy-makers tend to have of public participation. Institutions of 
decision-making conventionally understand public participation to be the process wherein 
those institutions consult with interested or affected individuals, groups, or other organisations
before making a decision (Rowe and Frewer 2004), as opposed to an on-going effort of joint 
deliberation and decision-making such as idealised by deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2000) 
and by “post-normal science”21 theorists (Funtowicz and Strand 2007). Fonseca, Schmidt and 
Delicado (2015), in their analysis of a popular participatory methodology called World Wide 
20 Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe, available: http://csec.lancs.ac.uk/archive/pabe
(accessed 20 June 2014).
21 The concept of post-normal science was developed by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz as a
methodology of inquiry that is appropriate for cases where "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high
and decisions urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, 138).
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Views, found that, despite the enthusiasm of participants—who felt the discussion was 
impartial and balanced—this model tends to favour participants with higher education, 
limiting debate because themes are suggested in a top-down manner while the expression of 
opinions is restricted to a questionnaire. In another study, this one on risk perceptions, 
Delicado and Gonçalves (2007) confirm the "participatory" bias towards more educated and 
wealthier social groups, which have the conditions to search for (environmental) information, 
to process it, and finally, to act on it.
Whether despite or because of the disillusionment with formal public participation and the 
lack of results in attempts at global governance, uninvited forms of participation in policy-
making have sprung up, changing the political landscape from easily identifiable and clearly 
delimited political actors to myriad amorphous organisations and movements that act across 
borders. These spontaneous forms of public participation, such as the rise of online petitions 
and online fora for mass mobilisation—sometimes resulting in off-line mass protests as was 
the case of Acampadas and Occupy, protesting against what are often construed as elite 
excesses or abuses of power—as well as local mobilisations against technocratic decisions, 
should, en rigueur, be grouped under what Pierre Rosanvallon has called "counter-
democracy" or what Keane terms "monitory democracy": the emergence of "power-
monitoring and power-contesting mechanisms, both within the ‘domestic’ fields of 
government and civil society and beyond, in cross-border settings that were once dominated 
by empires, states and business organisations" (Keane 2008, 3). Counter-democracy exists 
when citizens are no longer content to just cast their vote but wish to "express themselves", 
"become involved", and "intervene", actions that in Rosanvallon's view should be viewed "not
as anti-democratic, but rather as a corrective to the failures of legitimacy in electoral 
democracy" (Jerónimo and Garcia 2011, 12). Despite the conceptual distinction, these 
spontaneous forms of bottom-up politics have positively influenced the generally top-down 
initiatives of public participation, freely experimenting with new forms of collective decision-
making and lobbying. Facilitated by the communicative and organisational functionalities of 
the Internet, they may also have opened the way for what Andrew Chadwick (2007) calls 
"hybrid mobilization movements"—somewhere between an interest group, a social 
movement, and the wing of a political party—of which the Internet based organisations 
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350.org, Avaaz, and MoveOn are examples. These can be considered new attempts at 
governance, in the sense of rule-making, which are as innovative and flexible as they are 
democratically "thin" and potentially dangerous (see Horstink 2017 for an in-depth analysis of
these new movements).
Rosanvallon (2008) is extremely critical of the twin concepts and practices of governance  
and participation. He argues that governance is too vague a concept, since it can refer to any 
form of rule-making, whether corporate or public. Its promotion and increasingly popular 
practice represent, in his view, a disfavour to democracy and to the idea of sovereign nation-
states, since it implies the depoliticisation of decision-making under the guise of 
heterogeneous networking, complex decision-making, and a false absence of hierarchy (Ibid., 
260-261). Choosing governance over the strengthening or transformation of liberal 
democracies opens us up to the risk of the subversion of national and international laws and of
our deeper democratic ideals. Governance solutions tend to override national and international
law, even when decisions are made by a minority of governments, corporations, and/or 
supranational agencies. Governance may seem like a quick fix to complex problems, but its 
publics are dubious (non-state actors can be any group ranging from indigenous tribes to 
multinational corporations) and its democratic quality, in the sense of substance, leaves much 
to be desired. Instead, its focus is on practical attributes, such as transparency and 
accountability, that are normally associated with business management practices, and that 
have now penetrated institutions of supranational decision-making, to which the UN's good 
governance guidelines can attest.22 
In a similar vein, Rosanvallon warns against seeing participation as a "simple and 
comprehensive solution to all the problems of democracy" (Ibid., 297). As examples of its 
limitations, he reminds us of the tendency for opinions to become polarised, the danger of 
systemic bias when following a "consensual as opposed to conflictual conception of 
democracy", and the impact of inequality in the resources of different participating groups 
(Ibid., 298). When participation really means consultation, pairing it with governance makes 
22 UN governance guidelines, available: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx  
(accessed 20 June 2013)
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for a dangerous cocktail. This is what Gaventa (2006, 8) means when he warns that 
"democracy is an ongoing process of struggle and contestation rather than the adoption of a 
standard recipe of institutional designs". It is not enough to get the procedures of democracy 
right, "deepening democracy" means creating "a process through which citizens exercise ever 
deepening control over decisions which affect their lives" (Ibid., 11). Avritzer (2009) also 
criticises what he considers a Northern-inspired democratic elitism within the conception of 
democracy. In democratic elitism, public participation is the institutional answer to the fear 
that active minorities have of the "indisciplined masses" and their capacity for mobilisation. 
By institutionalising public participation, an elite may create the illusion of political inclusion,
when in fact it is practicing social exclusion. Avritzer says:
Democratic elitism was based on two main theses: first that in order to be preserved, democracy must
narrow the scope of political participation; and second that the only way to make democratic decision-
making rational is to limit it to elites and to restrict the role of the masses to that of choosing between
elites. (Avritzer 2002/2009, cited in Gaventa 2006, 13).
Nina Amelung and Britta Baumgarten (2017), editors of a special issue on transnational 
participation, make the bold recommendation to do away with depoliticised terms such as 
public participation, civil society, or civic engagement, and to instead use the term political 
participation. They cite Berger (2009, in Amelung and Baumgarten 2017) to define what they 
mean by this:
[…] political engagement encompasses most of the activities that we normally associate with political
participation or citizenship: voting, contacting representatives, contributing financially to representatives or
interest groups, following political issues (via any media format), associating with groups intended to
influence political outcomes, attending rallies or demonstrations intended to influence political outcomes,
or running for (or holding) political office.
They claim public participation is a misleading term because there is never just one public, 
rather, as Dewey proposed, there are many publics and each has its own issues. The 
confounding of public participation with participatory democracy is arguably a recent 
phenomenon: in reality, most democratic thinkers (Habermas, Saward, Beetham, Dahl, 
Avritzer) favour the term political participation, whereas the term public participation has 
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become popular mostly among environmental scientists and governance practicioners, who 
have drifted away from democratic theories towards instrumentalist approaches.
Beyond liberal democracy: radical theories
My journey into democracies “with adjectives” continues as I look at proposals that do not 
simply remedy or extend existing liberal democracy, but instead ask for the realisation of the 
foundational principles of democracy, bringing it closer to the ideal of "rule by the people". 
Examples of classical attributes of democracy that are considered insufficiently realised are 
equality—although it may exist as a legal right, enormous social and economic inequalities 
persist, which can be argued to negatively affect people's political rights, as discussed under 
Marshall—and freedom—power imbalances limit the extent of freedom all people may enjoy.
For example, people are not free to take up jobs anywhere they wish, they may not say all 
they like (risk of libel in some countries), and their unequal conditions may limit their 
choices. Even when citizens are, in principle, allowed to vote and run for public office, and 
when elections are regularly realised, these democratic desiderata are not necessarily fulfilled.
Arjan Appadurai argues that the era of globalisation has brought to the fore a contradiction 
between the simultaneous practice of state-bounded democracy and weak respect for 
democratic values at the global scale (Appadurai 2001, 42), creating severe inequalities 
between peoples living in different parts of the world and, as Sklair (2001) argues, between 
peoples of different classes (a transnational capitalist class versus the rest of the world).
The conceptions of more “substantive" democracies that live up to or even improve on the 
original democratic ideal have been grouped under different names, which I will roughly 
classify as the schools of deep democracy and radical democracy. Some of the thinkers 
previously discussed (such as Barber) have proposed strengthening democracy in ways that 
approach them to the deep democracy school (which has a profound neo-humanist 
inspiration), compelling me to avoid over-classifying each typology.
Deep democracy originally emerged from the reflections of the Jungian psychologist Arny 
Mindell and offered a new way to see reality, based on a holistic appreciation of all people, all
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awareness levels—both individual and collective— and all frameworks of reality. Mindell 
(2002, Preface) went on to develop concrete tools for deepening democracy in groups and 
forums, transforming group processes so that "everyone and every feeling" is represented and 
all participants are aware of the "diversity of people, roles and feelings" and of how to 
communicate and switch roles according to the requirements of the moment. Subsequent 
thinkers, in particular the philosopher Judith Green and the anthropologist Arjan Appadurai, 
have stretched the concept to societal and transnational levels, respectively. Green (1999, vi) 
advances the project of deepening democracy as an existential and cultural emergency, 
because there are strong indications that "a purely formal democracy is existentially 
unsustaining and culturally unsustainable, as well as ideologically hollow and operationally 
subvertible" (emphasis in original). She points to two pathologies that plague societies such as
that of the USA: "existential nihilism"—where people lose all sense of security and agency 
and daily activities have no meaningfulness nor permanence—and "ontological 
rootlessness"—where the connection with place and with "communities of memory and hope"
is disrupted (Ibid., vii). Green claims deep democracy is the ontologically and 
epistemologically more realistic project. Deep democracy "would prepare people to 
understand and to act effectively within the relational processes that are actually emerging 
within our shared social and natural environment" (Ibid., xiv). Green's book seeks to guide 
scholars from all disciplines to take full advantage of a comprehensive philosophy of deep 
democracy. Appadurai (2001) expands on this, claiming non-governmental actors are here to 
stay and part of a new paradigm for enlightenment and equity that transcends the traditional 
locus of politics at the nation-state. For Appadurai, deep democracy is a "democracy without 
borders" (2001, 43), developed from the roots up in local conditions and offered as a mediator
of the "speed of capital, the powers of states and the profoundly local nature of actually 
existing democracies" (Ibid., 39).
Within radical democracy, many subtypes have been proposed, some of them the product of a 
single scholar, such as ecological democracy (of which Vandana Shiva's earth democracy is a 
sub-subtype), inclusive democracy (Takis Fotopolous), social ecology (Murray Bookchin), 
living democracy (Frances Lappé) or empowered democracy (Roberto Unger). As the term 
implies, radical democracy returns to the roots of democracy. It does not accept the liberal 
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compromise of a having a bit less political influence in exchange for individual and largely 
consumption-based freedoms. In most instances, rather than adhering to the individualist 
perspective of democracy, it embraces the communitarian view, placing the group or 
community and its common resources over the individual and his or her needs. Roberto Unger
(1987, 213) defines radical democracy as "one that carries to a further extreme the authority 
of combinations of will over social arrangements" and that "destroys privileged holds upon 
the resources for society making" (Ibid., 286). While different inspirations exist (participatory 
politics as proposed by Polletta, 2002; a post-structuralist view of power as suggested by 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; or concerns with global social justice as in the case of Della Porta, 
200423), the proposals all have in common a contestation of all forms of power hierarchies and
the care they take to avoid "totalizing grand narrative(s)" (Pickard 2006, 22). Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe (1985/2001) are generally credited with conceptualising and popularising
the term radical democracy, although many other thinkers (like Paulo Freire decades before) 
have offered what can be termed radical proposals for democratic practice. Laclau and Mouffe
argue that oppressive power relations in society should be made visible in order to change 
them. They propose to build democracy around difference and dissent. A key concept in their 
influential thinking is hegemony24, adopting Gramsci's definition, as an explanation for the 
"very unity existing in a concrete social formation" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 7). In the 
authors' view, hegemony explains the dynamics of oppression better than the concept of class.
They consider the Jacobin imaginary of a "unitary and homogeneous collective will" and on 
"history in the singular" to be on the verge of being dissolved, creating a theoretical crisis, 
which they propose to solve through the logic of hegemony, framed as a “logic of the social”, 
a new definition of social relations (Ibid., 2-3).
Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung (2004) take a different perspective on radical democracy, 
bringing it back into the folds of realist democrats. This deradicalisation of radical democracy 
is questionable, especially since other democracies “with adjectives” (single or double) exist 
that could satisfy these deliberative democrats' desires for distinguishing their project (i.e. 
23 Authors cited in Pickard 2006.
24 Antonio Gramsci is credited with the concept of cultural hegemony, which demonstrates how a dominant
class need not rule through oppression, but by having its definition of reality accepted by other classes as
common sense.
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strong democracy or deep democracy). Nevertheless, there is some merit in their suggestion 
of typifying a radical project according to its focus on three political values: responsibility (in 
the sense of civic virtue), equality, and political autonomy (linked to legitimacy in the sense 
that people should "live by rules they make for themselves". But their solution stays within 
participatory-deliberative arrangements that enter into a dialectic with arrangements of 
competitive representation, hopefully transforming and strengthening each other. This account
leaves out core questions that Laclau and Mouffe answered more convincingly, albeit 
complexly, through the concept of hegemony. When issues of power are not addressed, any 
democratic solution risks being co-opted within the dominant discourse.
Finally, radical democratic practice and thinking in the last two or three decades has benefited
greatly from the (re) emergence of the values, experiences, practices, and world views from 
indigenous and peasant communities that were forced to fight for their lives and livelihoods 
when corporations, often supported by local or national governments, took the place of the old
“conquistadores” in depriving them of their land and resources. The philosophies of Buen 
Vivir or living well (I use the plural because unlike the Western ethical tradition, Buen Vivir is
not a universal proposal but a diversity of world views that share some key principles), and its
counterparts in India (Swaraj or self-rule) and Africa (Ubuntu or humanity) are original in that
these alternative proposals for social and economic organisation come from groups that have 
been traditionally marginalised, namely indigenous tribes and peasants (for a more complete 
explanation, consult Kothari, Demaria and Acosta 2014). Social movements and radical 
democratic scholars have picked up on these philosophies and politicised them, while two 
countries, Ecuador and Bolivia, have actually institutionalised the rights pertaining to Buen 
Vivir. What grants the sister concepts of “Buen Vivir”, “Swaraj” or “Ecological Swaraj”, 
“Ubuntu”, and the more recent umbrella concept of food sovereignty as well as the Northern-
born idea of degrowth, their counter-hegemonic appeal is the fact that they invert the role of 
the community versus the market, and that they equate the rights of people with the rights of 
Nature—not to mention that they demand that these rights trump any private economic rights. 
This represents the most radical break with the anthropocentric capitalist tradition attempted 
thus far, and is also what makes these alternative world views so subversive in the eyes of the 
established powers. As an example, in this alternative world view, the rights of the community
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are allowed to curb the freedom of individuals—including legal persons such as the 
corporation—when this freedom encroaches upon the well-being of the entire community or 
the health of the natural organisms it depends upon.
I will now look at some spin-offs from radical democracy before finalising with concrete 
democratic proposals centred on the food system.
Takis Fotopoulos, who is simultaneously extensively praised and criticised, has earned his 
place in the democracy debate. He espouses the most radical of approaches within the radical 
democracy current, and is therefore very useful to the task of finding measures of substantive 
democracy. Fotopoulos' Inclusive Democracy project rejects the enlightenment's belief in 
progress and, like Laclau and Mouffe's proposal for radical democracy, places power 
structures and relations at the centre of the analysis, postulating that these "structures and 
relations [...] crucially condition values and culture rather than the other way around" 
(Fotopolous 2000). This places him, as well as Laclau and Mouffe, and other radical/ 
ecological democrats, firmly apart from the reformist and progressive proposals for deepening
democracy. Fotopoulos is highly critical of post-modernist and what he calls "new social 
movements" (he places political Greens and feminists in this category). He advocates creating
new structures based on new outcomes (for example, alternative economic institutions to 
work towards a confederal economic democracy), rather than teaching people a new ideology 
and values. Fotopoulos argues that we can only get rid of the growth ideology and its 
internalisation through consumerism, by dismantling the market economy and "its offspring, 
the growth economy" (Ibid.). Our current commitment to affluent living standards stems from 
the internalisation of "the values and ideology of the market economy’s ruling elites" (Ibid.). 
What Fotopoulos (Ibid.) calls "life-style changes" are not sufficient to "create an alternative 
consciousness for a radical transformation of society, as they do not specify any clear aims 
related to the institutional framework of a sustainable society". The philosopher and 
economist proposes instead to fuel a mass political movement that has as its main aims: "to 
replace the market economy and representative ‘democracy’ with institutions securing the 
equal distribution of political, economic and social power and to create a new ‘hegemonic’ 
ideology based on the values of inclusive democracy". An inclusive democracy brings polity, 
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economy and Nature back together in society, from which they have been long separated, 
leading Fotopoulos to establish the abolition of state, money, and market as sine qua non 
conditions for the realisation of his democratic project. Fotopoulos rejects movements (such 
as many deep ecology movements) that embrace spirituality as part of the development 
process, arguing that "irrationalism is incompatible with a democratic society" (his take on 
rationalism is based on reason and/or an appeal to facts, as opposed to intuitions, instincts, 
feelings, or revelations). Instead, the movement Fotopoulos and his supporters advocate is one
that works at two levels from the start: changing ideas and values, and changing structures. By
creating "popular bases of political and economic power", i.e. "local public realms of direct 
and economic democracy", the movement works to change social organisation from the 
bottom up. Fotopoulos presents both a strategy and a programme for the inclusive democracy 
project in the book he edited in 1997, Towards an inclusive democracy.
The political theoretician Murray Bookchin initially was an inspiration for the inclusive 
democracy project, but ended up parting ways with Fotopoulos. Bookchin developed his own 
"liberatory social project", to aid the "transition from a hierarchical society to an ecological 
one" (Fotopoulos 1999). Like Fotopoulos, Bookchin had a Marxist background, and like him 
later embraced libertarian socialist views, incorporating the concept of ecology as a political 
category to the New Left (Bookchin 2015, Introduction by Debbie Bookchin). He was the 
first to "equate the grow-or-die logic of capitalism with the ecological destruction of the 
planet" (Ibid.), even before Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. His readings and reflections led 
him to propose the theory of "social ecology", tracing the "historical, anthropological, and 
social roots of hierarchy and domination and their implications for our relationship to the 
natural world" (Ibid.). His interest and experience with face-to-face participatory democracy, 
general assemblies, and confederation, led him to dedicate the last fifteen years of his life to 
the democratic concept of communalism or communalist politics, proposing libertarian 
municipalism as a concrete first step towards its realisation. The basis of his vision is the 
recurrent formation that can be found in any revolutionary moment in time: the phenomenon 
of the popular assemblies, what Hannah Arendt called the "lost treasure" of the revolutionary 
tradition (Ibid.). Bookchin is one of few thinkers to avoid entrapment by the attraction of 
democracies with adjectives and to propose a profoundly new ideology, firmly grounded in 
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the necessities of our time, arguing against ideological extremes and offering instead a radical 
but realistic emancipatory alternative. Libertarian municipalism walks a political middle 
ground between accepting an authoritarian state and demanding full autonomy, without 
avoiding any of the issues discussed under Fotopoulos (i.e. the need to confront power 
relations and an irrational growth paradigm). By infiltrating local government while changing 
its structures, and then linking municipalities in a confederation, using the institution of the 
popular assembly for decision-making, Bookchin believes humanity has a real chance of 
fulfilling a liberatory social project that combines "the state and the street". 
Bookchin also brought his theories to bear on agriculture, which he considered a "social and 
cultural phenomenon unique to humanity" that has been "reduced to a mere industrial 
technique" in the past century, "divorced from its roots in the totality of nature". Bookchin 
(1976) early on advocated a radical approach to agriculture based on the recognition of the 
land as our home and that of the species supporting us (oikos) and letting go of the illusion 
that humans are the masters of the natural world. A radical agriculture combines science and 
art in an ecological outlook that is not just environmentalist, but holistic, communitarian, and 
anti-Promethean. It should be part of an ecological society, as opposed to isolated, and aim to 
re-establish ecocommunities that link decentralised cities to villages and the land, "scaled to 
human dimensions, both to afford the greatest degree of self-management possible and 
personal comprehension of the social situation" (Ibid.). It should be guided by what Bookchin 
calls an "ecotechnology", which chooses a middle way between existing "highly centralized 
labor-extensive forms on the one hand and decentralized, craft-scale labor-intensive forms on 
the other" (Ibid.). It is easy to see how this vision of radical agriculture fits in with the 
proposal for libertarian municipalism Bookchin was to develop later in life. It enriches both 
the democratic and the ecological dimension of his proposal for social organisation.
Leslie Sklair—discussed several times in this thesis—has a Marxist inspiration similar to that 
of Bookchin and Fotopoulos. He analyses alternatives to capitalism and their relative 
usefulness in facing the double crisis he has identified—class polarisation and ecological 
unsustainability. These are: cooperative democracy, socialist globalisation, and the culture-
ideology of universal human rights (Sklair 2002, Chapter 11).
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"By genuinely expanding the culture-ideology of human rights from the civil and political spheres, in
which capitalist globalization has often had a relatively positive influence, to the economic and social
spheres, which represents a profound challenge to capitalist globalization, we can begin seriously to tackle
the crisis of class polarization and ecological unsustainability". (Sklair 2002, 299)
In Sklair's view, an expansion of human rights should be the basis of a new world order, while
cooperative democracies would be the transitional forms of society—helping to strengthen the
agenda for self-reliance and localisation—whereas the final objective would be socialist 
globalisation. He shows how the broadening of human rights is a realistic project, since there 
is growing recognition of the positive link between human rights and human development (as 
evident in the UNDP Human Development Report, 2000, and in the discussion on the right to 
food, presented earlier). Parallel to these demands, the movements for the inherent rights of 
Nature and for the recognition of the crime of ecocide are finding echo with ever more 
politicians25. Sklair presents examples of market socialism—an intermediate step towards 
social globalisation—such as producer co-operatives in Spain that are countering 
undemocratic corporations with democratically run workplaces, the exclusion of public 
utilities and resources from the market, and the restriction of private ownership of productive 
resources in general (2002, Chapter 11). The minimum condition for these alternatives is that 
"private ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange is restricted to 
small-scale enterprises, in order to prevent the emergence of a transnational capitalist class 
and its local affiliates" (Ibid., 302). Sklair's conception of democracy is that of a participatory, 
bottom-up democracy, where people "have an ongoing voice in what is done in their names" 
(Ibid., 323). His practical proposals can be aligned with those of Dahl, Fotopoulos and 
Bookchin (who all advocated decentralising economic control), as he believes the ideal basic 
units of socialist globalisation to be self-governing producer-consumer cooperatives.
It appears most of the radical democratic proposals embrace the joint cause of social and 
ecological justice. I will look at a few more examples, before turning to food-centred 
democratic proposals. Berkeley-based Randolph Hester, who combines landscape architecture
and sociology as his passions, explains why ecological democracy makes sense:
25 The last Climate Summit also provided a stage for the Third International Rights of Nature Tribunal,
organised by ecological movements in collaboration with renowned lawyers. Information available:
http://therightsofnature.org/rights-of-nature-tribunal-paris/ (accessed 16 May 2016).
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Democracy is government by the people. It is exercised directly through active involvement in a locality
and indirectly through elections, following principles of equality and attending to individual needs and
broader community goods. Ecology is the science of the relationships between organisms, including our
environment and us. It encompasses the study of natural processes, ecosystems, and interactions of humans
with each other, other species, and the cities we occupy. It includes principles of social and environmental
function and interconnection. It is also a comprehensive, long-term way to think creatively. Ecological
democracy, then, is government by the people emphasizing direct hands-on involvement. Actions are
guided by understanding natural processes and social relationships within our locality and the larger
environmental context. (Hester 2006, 4)
Ross Mitchell defines ecological democracy in a more pragmatic manner, coming closer to a 
minimum requirement for a liberal democratic society that recognises the inevitability and 
democratic foundation of a strive for sustainability:
Ecological democracy can be conceived as an alternative democratic model that: 1) strives to incorporate
interested citizens into environmental decision-making, and 2) lacks structural features that systematically
concentrate environmental amenities into the hands of particular social groups, while imposing
environmental and ecological degradation on others (Mitchell 2006, 463).
The environmental geographer Michael Mason (2012), who prefers the term environmental 
democracy, reminds us that the origins of modern environmentalism, especially in Europe, 
were largely conservative, with its defenders believing that the conservation of natural 
resources was compatible with the maintenance of elite democracy. It was only in the 1960s, 
after the publication of Silent Spring, that environmentalism developed into many different 
political projects. The environmental euphoria was short-lived, as early as the 1980s 
neoliberals started gaining ground, sowing denial of systemic environmental problems. 
Nevertheless, within liberal democracy, conceptions of strong sustainability, strong equality, 
and justice, such as those advocated by Habermas, Rawls and Barber, although largely 
reformist, helped to gain recognition for the imbalance between the economic and the political
maturity of Western societies, and broke ground for more participatory approaches to 
decision-making. But Mason (2012, 38-39) argues that in order for environmental democracy 
to "acknowledge the critical, irreplaceable, role of formal political institutions (and 
environmental planning) in making collectively binding decisions", it will have to be a more 
critical project than the liberal perspective provides. Mason attributes a moral and a 
102
A global food polity
deliberative dimension to environmental democracy, suggesting that "those existing 
democratic practices and institutions which further environmentalist ideas in an inclusive 
manner are more likely than market-based or bureaucratic decision-making models to 
generate decisions which are strongly responsive to social and ecological concerns" (Ibid., 
212). Finally, at the global level, Mason suggests embracing an environmental rights project 
and opening up obligatory spaces for collective decision-making at national and supranational
levels whenever environmental implications are expected.
The concept, also considered a perspective, of the “commons”, bears relation to ecological 
democracy but spurred its own theory and practice called democracy of the commons or 
commons democracy. The term derives from a traditional English legal term that was most 
famously used in the 1968 article by Garrett Hardin entitled The Tragedy of the Commons, 
which spurred a debate on management of common resources that continues to this day. The 
late Elinor Ostrom rescued the term from the doom that Hardin condemned it to and provided 
many examples of successful commons management, besides systematising the factors 
involved in developing ecologically and socially sustainable co-governance of common 
resources. She argued both against strong state control over resources and against market 
control (i.e. privatisation of common resources by either corporations or individuals) as 
solutions to resource dilapidation, proposing a third way: the development of durable 
cooperative institutions which are run by the resource users themselves (Ostrom 1990). She 
managed to identify the variables, rules, and constraints that are at play in complex systems of
so-called "common-pool resource management", and developed an open-ended framework for
the self-organisation of common-pool resources. She never explicitly formulated a democratic
theory to sustain her perspective for resource governance, but around her thought and work a 
current sprung up, summarised by Joan Subirats in the following way:
The great objective of democracy should be to build a world capable of including everyone. Everyone as
they are. A democracy inserted in a world that is not obsessed by continued growth while sniffing at the
consequences that this brings. A democracy in a world that allows for a reconciliation between subject and
nature. A common world. (Subirats 2011, 5-6, my translation from the Castellan) 
Subirats argued that the reflection over commons management has matured enough for us to 
elevate it to the status of socio-economic paradigm. Inspired by Harold Laswell's definition of
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politics as "who gets what, when, how",26 Subirats places the commons back into the centre of
policy-making. In this way, a new logic of governance emerges where needs trump 
consumption, use and relations trump exchange and transactions, relative abundance replaces 
scarcity, cooperation takes over from competition, sharing from a standpoint of autonomy 
takes over from an authority in charge of regulating conflict (Subirats 2011, 78-79). Subirats 
believes the commons perspective opens up very different paths than the ones we have 
become used to and that are often presented to us as the only ones possible. Instead of the 
State-Market dichotomy that offers us a choice between hierarchy and competition, a 
democracy and economy based on a shared responsibility for the commons have the potential 
of creating a space of social autonomy where state and market have subordinated roles.
As Hester aptly puts it, the building of ecological democracy is like preparing for a wedding 
with "something old, something new, something recurring, something true" (Hester 2006, 4, 
italics in original). Hester understands it as the marriage of applied ecology and participatory 
democracy: two areas that enliven each other, direct democracy infusing ecology with local 
wisdom and the community spirit, ecology supporting democracy with the knowledge needed 
to create sustainable human habitats. In my observation, theorists that combine more 
substantive forms of democracy with strong ecological concerns, whether they call their 
approach social ecology, political ecology, ecological democracy, environmental- or earth 
democracy, will premise a strong correlation between political-economic choices and levels of
social and environmental development versus degradation. They will argue that the benefits of
economic growth are more likely to accumulate in the hands of an elite of countries and 
powerful classes within those countries, whereas the costs (such as pollution, loss of soil and 
biodiversity, less access to nutritious food, and increased poverty) are largely supported by 
poorer countries and more vulnerable population groups. They will point out a direct link 
between increased economic prosperity and increased environmental burden, arguing the 
former is "predicated upon the increased privatized-maximization of profits via the increased 
socialized-minimization of the costs of production" (Faber and McCarthy 2003, 38, italics in 
original). Furthermore, they will argue that the balance of power between capital, state, and 
communities decides where the weight of the ecological burden will rest (Ibid., 39). They will
26 This is the subtitle of Harold Laswell's 1950 book on politics, cited in Subirats 2011, 77.
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usually embrace the notion of environmental justice, understood as the fair distribution of 
benefits versus environmental risks and harms across social groups (Dryzek 1999; Faber and 
McCarthy 2003). Finally, proponents of ecological democracy converge in the belief that 
bringing the potential victims of environmental degradation within the political process not 
only improves the fairness and legitimacy of environmental decision-making but also its 
quality, in terms of the effective protection of natural resources and satisfaction of those that 
depend on them. 
Thinkers of ecological democracy differ, however, on how far they are willing to go in their 
rejection of the industrialist model of production and how much autonomy they grant the 
communities that are affected by social and environmental degradation. Some thinkers remain
within the liberal tradition, even though they firmly reject neoliberalism, instead advocating 
the effective realisation of the principle of democratic equality in order to achieve "ecological 
rationality" (Dryzek 1999, 266). But others, like Ashish Kothari and Vandana Shiva have 
become voices from the "radical ecological democracy" current, opening up a new tendency 
for double adjectives to distinguish between the plethora of democratic proposals and 
projects. Radical ecological democrats add, to the basic tenets of ecological sustainability and 
social equity, values that are part of a vision of an alternative world, inspired by indigenous 
tribes and peasant communities, such as respect for diversity and pluralism, the need for 
cooperation instead of competition, assigning responsibilities to rights—i.e. ethical citizenship
—recognising the dignity of labour, acknowledging the subsistence economy—which sustains
most small farmers and rural populations—and finally, envisioning a new conceptualisation of
the Buen Vivir or "good life" as "simple living and the qualitative pursuit of happiness" 
(Kothari 2009, 404). Vandana Shiva, having developed her democratic theory over the course 
of three decades in which she was engaged in diverse social and environmental movements, 
calls her version of struggle-inspired ecological democracy “earth democracy”27. Contrasting 
with the social-liberal and deliberative-democratic traditions, and with the more 
anthropocentric theories within radical democracy, these two views connect with indigenous 
traditions and values, going beyond purely cognitive arguments, placing common interest 
over individual interest. Vandana Shiva phrases it as follows:
27 This is also the title of her 2005 book.
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Earth Democracy is both an ancient worldview and an emergent political movement for peace, justice and
sustainability. Earth Democracy connects the particular to the universal, the diverse to the common, and the
local to the global. It incorporates what in India we refer to as vasudhaiva kutumbkam (the earth family)—
the community of all being supported by the Earth. Native American and indigenous cultures worldwide
have understood and experienced life as a continuum between human and nonhuman species and between
present, past, and future generations. (Shiva 2005, 1)
In this outward-going perspective, the need for ecological democracy comes from a profound,
empirical understanding of the interconnectedness of all life. There is no attempt to achieve 
rational enlightenment, because it is assumed we can rely on a collective consciousness and 
wisdom that goes back to the dawn of humans. This traditional wisdom tells us "the earth 
does not belong to man", in the words of the nineteenth century Indian chief Seattle (cited in 
Shiva 2005, 1). Earth democrats denounce the ownership of the rich because it is based on the
dispossession of the poor (Ibid., 2). As I have discussed in the chapter on Political Economy, 
the concept of ownership has been stretched to include the reproductive capacity of life itself. 
Shiva (2005) denounces the "ownership society" that she claims is leading to a new and final 
"enclosure of the commons" (a reminder of the tragic dispossession of English small farmers 
in the eighteenth century, when common land was converted into the exclusive private 
property of large landowners). Shiva proposes the concept of “living economies” where "the 
earth's resources are shared equitably to provide for our food and water needs and to create 
meaningful livelihoods", economies that are globalised through "ecological processes and 
bonds of compassion and solidarity, not the movement of capital and finance or the 
unnecessary movement of goods and services" (Shiva 2005, 5). Similarly, earth democracy is 
a living democracy where fundamental freedoms and basic rights are reclaimed, while people 
accept common responsibility to "protect life on earth, defend peace, and promote justice" 
(Ibid.). Shiva coined ten principles that have served as an inspiration for communitarian 
movements: 
1. All species, peoples, and cultures have intrinsic worth; 
2. The earth community is a democracy of all life;
3. We must defend biological and cultural diversity; 
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4. All beings have a natural right to sustenance; 
5. Earth democracy is based on economic democracy, which protects the common good; 
6. Local economies are at the heart of living economies; 
7. A living democracy means inclusion, diversity, ecological and social responsibility;
8. Earth Democracy is based on living cultures, that each have equal right to existence based on our shared
humanity and shared membership of the earth community; 
9. Living cultures are not only diverse but ecological, based on reverence for life;
10. What is globalised is peace, care and compassion as opposed to competition, conflict, greed and fear.
(Shiva 2005)
Vandana Shiva connects neatly with the food democrats who will conclude my forage into 
democracies with adjectives, because she chose to focus on seed, food, and water— resources 
she considers vital to the survival of the human species—in her endeavour to help shape an 
earth democracy.
To make the review of “double-adjective” democratic proposals more complete, I should 
expand a bit more on the concept, currently also a political slogan, of degrowth. The term was
proposed by political ecologist André Gorz in 1972 but only three decades later picked up by 
environmentalists keen on re-politicising environmentalism, which by then had been 
thoroughly weakened by ideas of reformism, ecological modernisation28 and “green growth”29.
We can read in the article reviewing the evolution of the degrowth current of thinking that 
“degrowth is an attempt to re-politicise the debate on the much needed socio-ecological 
transformation, affirming dissidence with the current world representations and searching for 
alternative ones” (Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, and Martinez-Alier 2013, 192). More than 
40 years ago, Gorz already foresaw the paradox between the survival of the capitalist system 
28 Ecological modernisation “claims that new technologies and efficiency improvements are key solutions to the
ecological crisis” (Demaria et al. 2013, 198).
29 Green growth is understood by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), one
of its major proponents, as “fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets
continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies”. Available:
http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/whatisgreengrowthandhowcanithelpdeliversustainabledevelopment.htm
(accessed 15 December 2016).
107
A global food polity
and the need to halt or even invert growth as a necessary precondition for global equilibrium 
(Gorz, 1972, in the proceedings from a public debate organised by the Club du Nouvel 
Observateur, cited in Demaria et al. 2013, 195). Currently employed as a counter-hegemonic 
discourse, degrowth, despite being a product of European schools of thought, shares some 
interesting similarities with the radical democratic proposals from the Global South: the idea 
that ecosystems (in Buen Vivir philosophies these terms are not used, instead they speak of 
Nature or Mother Nature and living beings) have value in themselves and do not simply 
provide useful resources or services; the idea that we may privilege the survival of these 
ecosystems / living organisms over industrial production and consumption systems; a 
rejection of the idea of growth as development and of “human beings as economic agents 
driven by self-interest and utility maximisation” (Ibid., 197); a re-conceptualisation of what 
constitutes well-being; and a strengthening of popular control over essential natural resources.
The equally recent concept and slogan of food sovereignty also shares these communitarian 
and bio-centric principles. Like food sovereignty, degrowth also draws on additional 
disciplines and schools of thought, both enriching and diversifying the concept. Among these 
are ecological economics, commons democracy, post-normal science, and the concepts and 
practices of environmental justice and climate justice activism. Unlike food sovereignty, 
degrowth is not a universal proposal, but a dynamic academic as much as activist field, where 
some thinkers complement others, and other thinkers get into conflict with each other. 
Whereas many degrowth activists focus on actively opposing the existing growth paradigm, 
others prefer to build the alternatives for a “degrown” society, and there is no agreement on 
whether reformism rather than revolution may be used as a transitional strategy. Demaria et 
al. conclude that degrowth is a good example of a science that is led by activists, bringing an 
activist slogan into the academic arena where it may be strengthened in the ensuing debate, 
and then fed back into activist struggles (Ibid., 210).
Where degrowth differs markedly from democratic proposals from the Global South, 
including food sovereignty, is in its relative silence on class issues, whether the growing 
inequalities that can be observed in even the wealthiest countries or the conflicts between 
industrial elites (including corporations and the governments, supranational institutions and 
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financial enterprises that support them) and the poorest of the poor: indigenous peoples and 
peasants.
Proposals for food democracy
The term food democracy was popularised by the social psychologist Tim Lang in the late 
1990s. He felt the study of food politics was enlightening because it touches not only on our 
modern economies but also our modern societies, and requires drawing on many different 
disciplines in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of their workings and 
implications. He launched the idea of food democracy to "highlight the great struggle over the
centuries, in all cultures, to achieve the right of all citizens to have access to a decent, 
affordable, health enhancing diet, grown in conditions in which they can have confidence" 
(Lang 1998, 18). Neva Hassanein picked up the thread when she analyses the concept's 
usefulness in achieving change in the food system in her 2003 article. She asserts that, since 
the discussion over the sustainability of food and agriculture systems is deadlocked in 
conflicts over values and in uncertainty as to outcomes of the different approaches, 
democratising the agro-food system appears as a pragmatic choice to further its 
transformation. Hassanein quotes Prugh et al. (2000, in Hassanein 2003, 79) who in turn draw
on Benjamin Barber's strong democracy theory to argue that "because the conflict is about 
values, sustainability must be socially and politically defined". Food democracy means 
"people can and should be actively participating in shaping the food system, rather than 
remaining passive spectators on the sidelines" (Ibid.). Hassanein believes food democracy 
would not be complete without what Welsh and MacRae (1998, cited in Hassanein 2003, 80) 
call "food citizenship": when people are empowered to regain the food-related skills that have
been lost with the industrialisation of food, transforming them from "passive consumers into 
active, educated citizens". Hassanein (Ibid., 83) creates a parallel between the rationale of 
post-normal scientists for the application of a more participatory, non-linear science, and the 
rationale for food democracy—"a method for making choices when values and interests come
into conflict and when the consequences of decisions are uncertain". Hassanein (Ibid., 84) 
concludes that food democracy can be considered a pragmatic methodology in Dewey's 
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understanding of democracy—as a process, "an ongoing method requiring gradual, 
participatory, intelligent action on the part of educated and informed publics".
The struggle to elevate access to food and to resources to produce food to an intrinsic right 
benefited tremendously from the tireless work of engaged researchers to document and map 
the failings of the food system. Though they are many, two merit special mention: Josué de 
Castro and Frances Moore Lappé. Already in 1946, Josué de Castro, physician, social 
scientist, author, activist, and the son of a farmer, published the first book of many on the 
phenomenon of hunger, The Geography of Hunger (later republished as The Geopolitics of 
Hunger). His work was highly original, because at the time hunger was an under-recognised 
problem and its causes, mostly economic, were obscured. De Castro divided Brazil into food 
areas classified according to food availability (type and quantity) and food accessibility 
(affordability). For example, if half of the population in a certain area suffered from 
malnutrition, that area would be classified as an "area of endemic hunger" (Vasconcelos 
2008). De Castro made an important link between socio-economic class and hunger and 
denounced the reigning ideas that the hungry were just lazy and that over-population caused 
hunger, attributing responsibilities to the capitalist class and to he state in the persistence of 
hunger. During his time at the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, his 
ideas became known worldwide.
Frances Moore Lappé followed De Castro's footsteps when in the late 1960s she started 
investigating the causes of poverty, in particular the way hunger is linked to poverty, and in 
the course of her research discovered that the world was actually producing enough food, but 
that the food system that had been put in place perpetuated hunger. This lead her to publish 
Diet for a Small Planet in 1971, a book that helped denounce both the myth that hunger 
persists because there is not enough food and too many people, as well as the dramatic 
environmental and social consequences of the modern Northern diet, in particular its reliance 
on meat (Lappé 1971/2010). Lappé is famous for saying that the problem of hunger and 
malnutrition is not "scarcity of land or food [but] scarcity of democracy" (Ibid., introduction 
to the 2010 edition). 
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Conclusion
The first chapter of this thesis attempted to reconstruct the political economy of the food 
system. My analysis revealed the dominance of a political and economic elite on the structure,
decision-making, and outcome of human food production and distribution activities, on a 
global scale. This elite, which Sklair calls the transnational capitalist class, secures its power 
on the one hand by relying on the path dependence that characterises the global growth 
economy and locks it in institutions that are favourable to an elite, and on the other hand by 
fomenting the "culture-ideology of consumerism"—persuading people that "the business of 
society is business" (Sklair 2001) and that there is no alternative to global capitalism (Sklair 
2002). Inspired by Friedmann and McMichael's idea of regimes, and by Garcia and Shiva's 
analysis of the "ownership society", I have tentatively called the food system that is now in 
place, the "biocapitalist food regime", in which the commodification and ownership of 
Nature, a necessary condition for capitalist expansion, has breached hitherto "recalcitrant" 
sectors of activities—not just agriculture but the reproduction of life itself. The present 
chapter then embraced the lengthy, never complete, but important task of reviewing the 
concept and practice of democracy in what some have aptly called a commercial society. If 
certain elites, among them corporations, powerful governments, and supranational institutions
that were not mandated through democratic processes, are deliberately (often covertly) 
subverting political decision-making, this is a serious threat to the basic democratic values of 
freedom, equality, and responsiveness, making our liberal democracies very "thin", in Barber's
words. It is also a considerable threat to the realisation of even the most conservative notions 
of food security. "Thin" democracies that are based on an economic rationale have no 
incentive to adequately feed the world, especially those who can't afford what's offered on 
sale. In my search for remedies to heal the democratic and ecological gap in political 
decision-making, I therefore scrutinised democratic theories, ranging from those extending or 
strengthening liberal democracy, to those calling for a new economic order—for example 
where workers rather than corporations call the shots. Taking into account the progress made 
at supranational level with the expansion of human rights to include economic and social 
rights, some of which have already been adequately operationalised (such as the right to food 
and to resources to produce food), any proposal for a more substantive democratic form of 
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social organisation, would greatly benefit from using these established rights as their 
foundation—even in the absence of an international court to judge violations of the right to 
food. Human rights is a well-established doctrine in multiple disciplines, able to generate 
consensus among widely different schools of thought. Taking these rights and expanding them
as far as they will logically and morally stretch, will then provide room to add other criteria of
democratic quality, whether related to content, procedure, or outcome of democratic 
processes. Starting with the most solid theories and theorists, it is possible to build a model of 
democratic quality that has an incontestable framework (at least to self-avowed democrats), 
even though the "upholstery" may turn out to be too radical for the taste of those that prefer to
remain within the liberal democratic tradition. This is the task I take on in the next chapter, 
where I present my analytical model for achieving democratic and ecological quality in food 
politics. 
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III
The dimensions of food democracy
Quais são os fatores ocultos desta verdadeira conspiração de silêncio em torno da fome? Será por simples
obra do acaso que o tema não tem atraído devidamente o interesse dos espíritos especulativos e criadores
dos nossos tempos? Não cremos. O fenômeno é tão marcante e se apresenta com tal regularidade que,
longe de traduzir obra do acaso, parece condicionado às mesmas leis gerais que regulam as outras
manifestações sociais de nossa cultura. Trata-se de um silêncio premeditado pela própria alma da cultura:
foram os interesses e os preconceitos de ordem moral e de ordem política e econômica de nossa chamada
civilização ocidental que tornaram a fome um tema proIbido, ou pelo menos pouco aconselhável de ser
abordado publicamente.
What are the true concealed reasons for this silence conspiracy on hunger? Is it merely a coincidence that
the theme hasn't properly attracted the interest of modern speculators and creators? We don't believe that.
It is such a prominent phenomenon and so very stable that very unlike a coincidence, it seems to be
conditioned to the same rules that control all other social manifestations of our culture. It is a deliberate
silence that comes from the very essence of our culture: the interests and prejudice of moral, political and
economic nature of our so called western civilization made of hunger a taboo or at least an issue
considered improper to be dealt with publicly.
—Josué de Castro, Preface for the ninth edition of Geografia da Fome, 19651.
In my quest for a democratic model that can respond adequately to the twin challenges of 
social equity and ecological balance, while placing food production— the oldest and most 
important social activity of our civilisations—at its centre, I will explore the notion of 
democratic quality. Democratic quality, just as the concept of democracy to which it refers, is 
an elusive term that, according to more prudent political thinkers, requires careful clarification
and constant review, and, ideally, a consensus about its minimum indicators. The most 
conventional understanding of democratic quality is "different degrees of democraticness" 
(O'Donnell 2004, 212), while the terms dimensions or indices of democracy are equally 
popular, conveying the same idea of a democratic scale. The notion of democratic quality is 
generally used to evaluate the democratisation of nation-states, starting from some bare 
minimum threshold—such as that proposed by Leonardo Morlino (2004): universal suffrage; 
free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source 
of information—and from there on assessing the relative degree to which they have achieved 
what are understood as the main objectives of democracy. In the liberal tradition these are 
1 Cited in and translated by Silva and Garcia (2016, 161).
2 Guillermo O'Donnell (2004) attributes a common grounding (human agency) to human development, human
rights, and democracy, and warns that "(i)t is theoretically impossible to identify precisely the set of rights
and capabilities that would be necessary and jointly sufficient for generating an 'adequate' level of human
development, human rights, or political rights" (Ibid., 11), although he believes this should not inhibit us to
attempt to define them.
113
A global food polity
usually understood to be freedom and political equality, with some tendency for North 
American scholars to emphasise freedom, while their Western European counterparts stress 
equality (Campbell 2008). Well-known democratic rankings are those from the Polity project3,
Freedom House4, Robert Dahl, David Beetham, Guillermo O'Donnell, Arend Lijphart, and 
Axel Hadenius. In this chapter I will assess the different conceptions of democratic quality to 
arrive at my own definition.
Defining democratic quality
Leonardo Morlino (2002, 3-4) offers a pragmatic, if quasi-instrumentalist, contribution to the 
conceptualisation of democratic quality, which derives from his observation of how the term 
is applied in industry and marketing. In this tradition, quality is thought of as something that 
is satisfactory in procedure (using replicable, precise and timely processes), in content (in 
structure and functioning), and in result (satisfying the target audience). When applied to 
democratic states, a "quality" democracy would then be one that demonstrates efficient, 
effective, and accountable decision-making and application of the law (procedure); where 
citizens, associations and communities "enjoy at least a moderate level of liberty and 
equality" (content); and, most importantly, will have instituted a "broadly legitimated regime 
that completely satisfies citizens" (result) (Ibid.). This conceptualisation is similar to the dual 
definition that Carayannis and Campbell (2009, 224) offer: "democracy as a method or 
procedure, based on the application of the rule of the majority", but also as a substance or 
substantial, as a realisation of fundamental rights. The dual or triple definitions in both cases 
are not meant to be distinctive, but rather overlapping.
Morlino defends the use of the term democratic dimensions rather than democratic criteria, to 
underline that democracy comes in degrees. He illustrates this matter of degree with a case-
study from his own country of birth, Italy: despite being a developed country with a mature 
democracy, it shows many fragilities in the effectiveness of the protection of political, civil, 
and social rights. An established democracy may have many or even all of the institutions in 
place, but they can be distorted, circumvented, only partially implemented, or created just for 
3 Available: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (accessed 13 July 2016).
4 Available: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (accessed 13 July 2016).
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appearances. As an example, Italy grants legal equality between women and men, but women 
are persistently discriminated against on the job market (Ibid., 36). The absence of positive 
discrimination means disadvantaged groups continue to be marginalised, among them women,
homosexuals, unemployed, and poor. Also, even though Italy has a pluralistic party system, 
the dominant parties have a strong gate-keeping role, impeding the participation of citizens in 
political decision-making.
In order to assess the democratic quality of a state or organisation, scholars need to create a 
framework that defines democracy and its attributes or dimensions, and, if they wish to 
conduct an empirical study, choose indicators for each of the attributes. To that effect, Michael
Saward (1994, 7) warns that "defining democracy is a political act". Saward argues that 
indices of democratisation or democratic quality can only be known within a full theory of 
democracy. He claims that defining democracy according to reality would constitute a 
definitional fallacy, whereas an etymological approach will generate diverse and ambiguous 
interpretations of such claims as “rule of the people”. In Saward's view, a more promising 
approach is to define democracy according to certain basic principles. He exemplifies with 
David Beetham’s focus on popular control and political equality as key principles, Robert 
Dahl’s choice of competition and participation, and Axel Hadenius’ preference for the free 
expression of the will of the people (i.e. through elections) and the guarantee of political 
freedom as the pillars of democracy. 
Not all democratic scholars agree that what we should be measuring is the degree of 
democraticness—O'Donnell (Ibid., 65) goes as far as to say "in dubio pro democracy", thus 
placing democracy as an end in itself. Some propose that, instead of assessing whether a 
democracy (or democratic organisation) is fulfilling its potential, we should look at whether it 
is realising its main purpose, which generally follows from its most basic definition: rule by 
the people. In this line of thought, Stein Ringen (2011) suggests that to fulfil the purpose of 
democracy is to satisfy the will of the people. Even if scholars accept this, their job is far from
concluded, they will still have to define who "the people" are. John Dewey's answer to this 
question was to define a public for each situation that demands political decisions:
The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an
extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for. (Dewey 1925-27/
2012, 21)
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A further distinction may be made between necessary—basic freedoms and rights—and 
sufficient conditions for democracy—or what O'Donnell (2004, 18) calls a "minimal 
sufficient set". O'Donnell claims that the necessary conditions are theoretically undecidable, 
therefore "there is no theoretical or intersubjectively general valid way of clearly and firmly 
establishing a minimal sufficient set of these rights" (Ibid., 20). Even if we agree on a set of 
freedoms and rights, their meaning varies across generations, between countries, from 
democratic theory to democratic theory. He therefore turns the question around, asking what 
are the basic conditions that will enable an individual to function as an agent5. I will discuss 
his elaborate answer further on.
There are also substantial differences in how narrowly or how broadly democracy is defined, 
or, in Campbell's (2008, 20-21) words, how focused—democracy as a property of the political
system—or how comprehensive—also referring to society, the economy and /or the 
environment—the underlying theories of democracy are. Whatever the key dimensions 
chosen, Saward (1994, 7) recommends that, for any definition of democracy and democratic 
quality to be "of real value", "the assumptions involved must be justified explicitly and 
convincingly". He offers the example of the principle of equality: its justification could start 
with the claim that all people are equal in some respect (such as in self-determination or in 
rationality) and from this it may be deduced logically that they should therefore be treated 
equally in the political organisation of society. Once the equality principle is established, the 
logically necessary conditions for democracy can then be further deduced. 
I will now look at the attributes for democratic quality as defined by different traditions, 
starting with the participatory and strong democrats, most of whom adhere to the basic 
principles of liberal democracy—freedom and equality—but who accord a bigger role to the 
state for improving the conditions of the less fortunate, complementing political equality with 
social and economic equality (Dewey 1925-27/ 2012, 3). As Dewey says, later to be echoed 
by John Rawls and Thomas Marshall: "Liberalism, has to assume the responsibility for 
making it clear that intelligence is a social asset and is clothed with a function as public as is 
its origin, in the concrete, in social cooperation" (Ibid.). 
5 O'Donnell's (2004, 13) definition of the human being as an agent is of someone "endowed with sufficient
autonomy for deciding what kind of life she wants to live; has the cognitive ability to reasonably detect the
options available to her; and feels herself to be, and is construed by others, as responsible for the courses of
action she takes”.
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Liberal democratic theories of democratic quality
John Dewey's 1927 pragmatic but substantive interpretation of democracy can be considered 
foundational for the (new) republican, civic virtue, and strong participatory theories of 
political organisation that were to come later. Dewey is especially critical of classical 
liberalism in the way that it separates the individual—whose interests are considered absolute 
and to be protected at all costs—from political society—where government is accorded the 
most limited of roles and where the public sphere only exists to regulate the rights of 
individuals. In early deliberative democratic fashion, Dewey believes the interpersonal 
relations between people are a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for democracy 
(Dewey 1925-27/ 2012, 8). Decisions derive their legitimacy from the deliberative process 
whereby minorities and majorities make their positions known in a reciprocal manner. Dewey 
believed the majority of today could be the minority of tomorrow, as long as political equality 
is made effective and citizens participate in the public sphere (Ibid., 12). He rejects elitism, 
despite recognising the limitations of ordinary citizens in making fully informed decisions. 
Citizens are nevertheless, in his view, in the best position to judge the issues that affect them. 
Dewey came up with an interesting condition for legitimacy (a potential attribute of 
democracy): "[…] the burden of proof must rest with those who seek less rather than more 
inclusive arrangements" (Ibid., 22). This means that a decision cannot be considered 
legitimate if it is not informed by those who will suffer the consequences of the decision. By 
placing this condition, Dewey transforms the idea of freedom: on the one hand, freedom is 
restricted by legitimate political decision-making, on the other, only by legitimising the 
decision-making in the sense of giving citizens control over it, is freedom made possible. He 
thus resolves the tension between ruler and ruled, by ultimately placing political power with 
the latter. Dewey, an early strong participatory and deliberative democrat, views political 
participation as constituent of democracy, in that it is not just actual participation that defines 
democracy, but also potential participation, to be employed whenever the need arises so as to 
review, possibly overturn, decisions that have been taken (Ibid., 23). This idea also ties in with
his definition of publics: each public is a polity that needs to take or review decisions together.
John Rawls (2001, 8) constructs a theory of liberal democracy from the idea of what he calls a
"well-ordered society—a society effectively regulated by a public conception of justice". This 
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conception of justice, which he emphasises is political and not general, needs to be widely 
shared, the political and social institutions—including the judiciary, the economic system, 
family, education,...—must adhere to its principles, and finally, people have to be able to 
apply the publicly recognised principles of justice. Rawls recognises that the deepest 
foundational principles of democracy through the ages, freedom (or liberty) and equality, are 
in reality conflicting values, because liberty hampers equality—such as the freedom to 
accumulate property—whereas equality limits liberty—criteria of distributive justice will 
inevitably limit the freedom to accumulate property. Because of this clash, there is no general 
agreement as to the order and weight of each of the basic principles (Rawls 2001, 2). By 
postulating a hypothetical "original position"—where people are unaware of their social or 
economic status—Rawls is able to generate principles of justice that all free and equal people 
would agree to, because each person will have exactly the same opportunity as the next, thus 
realising the fairness aspect of justice. For Rawls, freedom is predicated on the capacity of 
people to influence the institutions of society, whereas equality is based on people's moral 
capacity to engage in social cooperation. He therefore has a republican view of the polity, 
conceptualising society as a "fair system of cooperation" where free and equal people are its 
"fully cooperating members" (Ibid., 24). This polity is guided by two principles of justice, 
presented below, which have the role of specifying the fair terms of social cooperation: what 
are the rights and duties of the cooperants, how benefits arising from the social cooperation 
should be distributed, and how burdens to sustain the cooperation should be assigned (Ibid., 
7).
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which
scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the
greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (Rawls 2001, 42)
Robert Dahl, a contemporary of Rawls, was equally interested in improving the 
substantiveness of the two basic principles of liberty and equality. However, he did not 
believe structural principles like those proposed by Rawls could avoid injustices in liberal 
democracies. He postulated that democracy evolves along two dimensions, which are 
essentially his interpretations of liberty and equality: contestation—also called public 
contestation or political competition—and participation—operationalised by attributes such as
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inclusiveness and the right to be elected. His argument builds from the fundamental 
assumption that all persons are equal, in the sense of being equally capable and equally 
entitled to participate in decision-making about their fate and that of their community. An 
ideal democratic process, according to Dahl (1998, 37-38) is based on strong equality and 
should include at minimum effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding 
(i.e. access to comprehensible information), exercising final control over the political agenda, 
and inclusion of (all) adults. Dahl distinguishes between smaller democratic associations and 
what he calls "large-scale" democracy, the modern representative democracies. For the latter 
to realise his stronger version of equality, he expects them to fulfil six conditions or political 
institutions: the existence of elected officials; the occurrence of free, fair, and frequent 
elections; freedom of expression; access to alternative sources of information; associational 
autonomy (the right to form independent associations or political parties); and inclusive 
citizenship (Dahl 2005). In essence he is describing the polity of his home country, the United
States of America, where the sixth requirement was (at least technically) fulfilled in the 
twentieth century. The fact that it took 25 centuries for democracies to start fulfilling all six 
conditions, prompts Dahl to distinguish modern democracies with the epithet “polyarchal”, in 
the sense of "rule by the many" (Dahl 2005, 192). 
Dahl's criteria are interesting starting points for a democratic quality framework, since they 
are based not only on his own reflections but also those of great democratic thinkers that 
preceded him and whom he had widely read, among them John Dewey. His initial rationale to
restrict liberty and strengthen equality (which got diluted when he developed the idea of 
polyarchal democracies) is very useful for "deeper" democrats. But he is also criticised for 
proposing criteria that are more appropriate to ideal democratic associations than as standards 
for democracy, be it constitutional, substantive, or procedural (Tilly 2007). Dahl's 
requirements for large-scale democracies are questionable, they appear to describe the ideal 
interaction between citizens and the officials that represent them rather than offer indicators 
for measuring or comparing democracies, while some requirements may actually conflict with
others (Ibid., 11).
Michael Saward (2000) points out the lack of correspondence between Dahl's initial five 
criteria for democratisation and his definition of a polyarchy, i.e. modern representative 
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democracies. Whereas the five criteria derive from a strong version of political equality, with 
each adult person deemed equally well-qualified to participate in decision-making affecting 
his or her interests, the six institutions that characterise polyarchies according to Dahl, have 
shed all instruments of direct democracy.
Thomas Marshall, who wrote in the aftermath of the Second World War, also did not consider 
freedom and equality to be sufficient conditions for democracy. He proposed to strengthen 
democracy through the promotion of social rights, which he considered the third wave of 
rights to be gained by citizens (after political rights, the first wave, and civil rights, the 
second). He famously stated: 
[…] civil rights [...] confer the legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to possess but do not
guarantee the possession of any of them. A property right is not a right to possess property, but a right to
acquire it, if you can, and to protect it, if you can get it. (Marshall 1950, 34-35) 
His core argument is that to possess liberties (rights) is not the same as being able to exercise 
them. The right to freedom of speech is of little substance for uneducated people, because 
they might have difficulty to formulate what they want to say and most likely will not be 
heard even if they tried speaking. Marshall claims that freedom and equality are not realised 
just because they are enshrined in law, their realisation must come from the guarantee of 
social rights6.
Benjamin Barber (2003, 4) developed a theory of "strong democracy", in opposition to the 
"thin" democracies that result, in his view, from liberal democratic thought, by serving 
exclusively individualistic and private ends. In a strong democracy, citizens "are made 
capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and 
participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good nature" (Ibid., 117). Barber's 
proposal is that of an enlightened participatory democracy, similar to Dewey's idea of a 
pluralist society. Barber criticises Rawls' conceptualisation of democracy, arguing that John 
Rawls never offers any other motive for justice than that of rational self-interest: inequalities 
are to be distributed so as to benefit the least advantaged in a society, because you may end up
least advantaged yourself; tolerate others because you wish to be tolerated; be careful what 
you decide as a majority, because one day you may be a minority. The dangers of this 
6 As discussed in the previous chapter, social rights are defined as: ranging "[...] from the right to a modicum
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in social heritage and to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1950/2009, 149).
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minimalism, says Barber, are that when majorities are enduring they will systematically 
discriminate minorities, they have no "good" reason to respect them. Barber rejects the 
epistemological assumption of liberal democratic theory that there is a knowable independent 
foundation for democracy. He sides with Dewey in viewing politics as necessarily 
experimental, as a process. Dewey believed that "democracy entails a kind of openness in 
which its substantive meaning—that is, what concerns it addresses and what ends it pursues—
is always in the process of being determined" (Dewey 1925-27/ 2012, 24). Barber (2003, 131)
echoes this practical spirit: "Politics is what men do when metaphysics fails; it is not 
metaphysics reified as a constitution". The key attributes of a strong democracy that Barber 
advances (although he did not offer a systematic list like Dahl has done) are: effective 
participation, autonomy—a central tenet, necessary to realise "the idea of a self-governing 
community of citizens" (Ibid., 117), and the guarantee of social and economic rights. His 
theory embraces conflict, pluralism, and the existence of private and public spheres of action, 
and at the same time rejects elitism. Since he resists universal truths that may underlie 
democratic conceptualisations, his proposal for democratic legitimacy is the constant test of 
politics, albeit recognising the need for civic education to avoid constant and chaotic 
bargaining.
Amartya Sen (1991), although essentially remaining within a liberal democratic tradition with
its emphasis on individual responsibility, offers economists a solid argument for the 
realisation of equity (a strong form of equality, signifying the equal distribution of a good 
among members of a community). Studying famine, he found that the conditions for 
acquirement of food were the determining factors when people went hungry, not whether 
enough food was being produced. This led him to conceptualise market relations as an 
exchange of entitlements. A person's entitlement is the "set of alternative commodity bundles 
that the person can acquire through the use of the various legal channels of acquirement open 
to someone in his position" (Ibid., 36). Famines in this conception are failures of entitlement 
relations, people starve when their "entitlement set does not include any commodity bundle 
with enough food" (Ibid., 37). He later expanded on this concept, by creating the idea of a 
"capability set", a broader metric than the classical “growth in GDP per capita”, and which 
was adopted by the United Nations Development Programme. Poverty and development, in 
Sen's framework, respectively limit or expand a person's capability to live a good life. The 
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capability approach is useful as a way of humanising economics, as it goes beyond the idea of
people simply acquiring means and instead considers what they can do with these means. 
Sen’s approach is however, by his own admission, not a theory of justice or democracy, and 
therefore not specifically useful for my framework. 
Guillermo O'Donnell, some of whose contributions I have already discussed in this chapter, 
advances an original conceptualisation of democracy that is grounded in the moral 
assumptions that all human beings are agents—endowed with autonomy for making 
decisions, capacity for reasoning, and responsibility for his or her actions—and that 
democracy cannot be dissociated from human development and human rights. A crucial 
argument in O'Donnell's reasoning is that, although the moral assumption of agency has been 
legally enacted in modern democracies, it requires conditions for the exercise of the rights that
derive from this agency (as I have also discussed under Marshall: political rights without 
corresponding civil and social rights risk becoming empty promises). According to O'Donnell,
a democratic regime—i.e. one that has fair and institutionalised elections and offers equal 
opportunity for political participation (O'Donnell 2004, 17)—is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for democracy. To safeguard the agency of human beings, some basic 
rights and capabilities—which are possibly overlapping—must be guaranteed, but since it is 
not possible to theoretically define what this minimum set of rights and capabilities must be 
(among other reasons, because they are context-bound), they must instead be determined in an
on-going political process (Ibid., 11). O'Donnell offers the following proposition as a 
definition of democracy:
Democracy has five unique characteristics in relation to all other political types: (a) fair and
institutionalised elections; (b) a set of participatory rights and political freedoms without which those
elections would be meaningless; (c) an inclusive and (boundedly) universalistic wager; (d) a legal system
that enacts and backs—at least—the rights and freedoms included in the definition of a democratic regime;
and (e) a legal system that prevents anyone from being de legibus solutus. The first three characteristics
pertain to the regime, the last two to the state. (O'Donnell 2004, 33, emphasis in original)7
The conditions that O'Donnell sets for achieving democratic quality are particularly pertinent 
to the democratic model for social and ecological realisation that I am attempting to construct.
He builds a careful framework that starts with conditions for a democratic regime, to which he
7 Two clarifications: 1. O'Donnell's concept of the universalistic wager has its equivalent in the term "political
equality", every adult has the same right to participate in political organisation "by voting and eventually by
being elected" (O'Donnell 2004, 16). 2. de legibus solutus means "not bound by the laws". O'Donnell
understands by this that no one is above or beyond the law.
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adds conditions for a democratic state, and finally those for a diverse, non-discriminatory, and
tolerant social context. He claims that, in order for the rights of political citizenship to become
effective, the social context must nurture the development of human beings as agents and 
legally protect diversity—in information, opinion, and association. The quality of democracy 
according to O'Donnell is dependent on the quality of human development and the guarantee 
of human rights, the exact description of which must be discussed in an on-going manner in 
the political arena.
When constructing his Democracy Ranking, David Campbell (2008) takes a cue from 
O'Donnell by extending the quality of democracy beyond the quality of politics, to the quality 
of society—to which he also adds the environment, as an unavoidable factor of human 
development. He adds five non-political dimensions to his ranking: gender fairness, economic
wealth distribution, knowledge sharing and -advancing, health of the population, and health of
the environment. They are intended to measure the performance of a democracy, in addition to
the traditional political dimensions, such as freedom, and free and fair elections.
David Beetham, who, together with Stuart Weir, undertook a democratic audit of the United 
Kingdom in the 1990s, elects two key dimensions—popular control and political equality—
for his conceptualisation of the quality of democracy. He argues that they derive logically 
from the historical conception of democracy as rule of the people, and defends his choice as 
follows:
The first principle [popular control] is underpinned by the value that we give to people as self-determining
agents who should have a say on issues that affect their lives; the second [political equality] is underpinned
by the assumption that everyone (or at least every adult) has an equal capacity for self-determination, and
therefore an equal right to influence collective decisions, and to have their interests considered when they
are made. (Beetham 1993, 7, in Beetham 1994)
The principle of popular control ensures that people have a say in decision-making within 
their society, whereas the principle of political equality ensures that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to exercise control over decision-making. The principles are like dimensions, 
since they may be more or less fully realised. Because these dimensions are too broad to 
measure the degree of democracy in a society, Beetham developed what he called 
"intermediate" principles. For instance, to measure popular control, the intermediate 
principles are, among others: the authorisation of public officials by the people, the 
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accountability of a government to the people (directly and through institutions), and the 
responsiveness of government to the demands channelled through public opinion (Weir and 
Beetham 1999/2002, 8-9). In turn, these mediating principles require the realisation of a 
number of rights and capabilities, such as the access to information, the freedom of expression
and association, and the active participation of citizens. The other key principle—political 
equality—is embedded in all of the above intermediate principles and indicators. However, 
the authors believe the best indicator for political equality is representativeness: "the degree to
which [the political institutions] reflect the diversity and pluralism of society, not only in 
respect of political opinions, but of social composition and identities" (Ibid., 9). For the 
purposes of their audit, Weir and Beetham operationalised their key and intermediate 
principles by creating four areas or "components" of democracy: open and accountable 
government; a democratic society ("richness of associational life, the accountability of 
economic institutions, social inclusion, [...], a culture of tolerance and civic responsibility"); 
free and fair elections; and the guarantee of civil and political liberties (Ibid., 9-10). The final 
step in order to be able to measure a country's democratic score, was to create a set of criteria 
for each of the components of democracy, based on their respective definitions.
Michael Saward (1994) elects political equality and responsive rule—in the sense of 
satisfaction of the wishes of a majority of citizens, a stronger principle than one that is based 
on procedures—as key democratic principles. Saward then stipulates 24 constitutionalised 
conditions or indices of democratisation that can be grouped under the headings of: basic 
freedoms (speech, movement, association,...); citizenship and participation (conditions for 
voting, running for office, and decision-making); administrative codes (institutional 
procedures); publicity (public documentation of political decision-making); and social rights. 
These are, says Saward, the "logically necessary conditions of democracy" that follow 
deductively from the equality assumption and the responsive rule definition. The conditions 
he identifies refer predominantly to rights, freedoms, and decision mechanisms. Saward warns
that some popular values—political stability, justice, nationalism, the environmental 
imperative, and efficiency—may actually enter into conflict with the democratic principle. 
Saward believes these conflicts must be handled on a case-by-case basis since there is no 
"satisfactory trade-off principle" to guide their resolution, and suggests that "ever more 
democracy is not necessarily a good thing" (Ibid., 20).
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Pierre Rosanvallon's (2008) theory of counter-democracy is an attempt to broaden definitions 
of democracy beyond the electoral process, reconceptualising the existence of conflict and 
distrust as inevitable but also necessary for the maintenance of healthy democracies. Counter-
democracy is in effect a conceptualisation of the democratic dimension of popular control. 
Rosanvallon (Ibid.) proposes that counter-democracy manifests itself through three 
democratic mechanisms that go beyond traditional democratic institutions: 1. powers of 
oversight over or surveillance of the elected (which Rosanvallon demonstrates has historically
been a fundamental right complementing the right to vote); 2. forms of prevention (by 
organising to veto certain decisions); and 3. the testing of judgments (a demand for 
accountability in the absence of responsiveness, what Rosanvallon calls a "democracy of 
accusation"). This reconceptualisation helps to shine a different light on modern democracies, 
a less pessimistic one, where citizens may have lost interest in voting but have taken up other 
forms of exercising control. But, according to Rosanvallon, the rise of counter-democracy 
brings with it the risk of depoliticisation of democratic institutions (Ibid., 22). Counter-
democracy explains that people are, perhaps more than ever, participating in influencing 
decision-making, but because they do this outside of democratic institutions, Rosanvallon 
says: "[t]he problem today is an absence of meaning rather than an absence of will" (Ibid., 
306-307). Rosanvallon relies on Dewey's idea of publics for every situation, coupled with 
what he feels is a need for new democratic legitimacy in the face of crumbling democratic 
institutions, and puts forth a democracy where legitimacy is provided by proximity, i.e. those 
closest to the situation or problem should be the ones involved in the respective decision-
making.
Finally, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) propose eight conceptual dimensions 
of democracy to assess the quality of representative democracies, based on their three-fold 
definition of quality: five procedural dimensions, concerning the rules and practices in a 
democratic state—rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, and 
horizontal accountability; two substantive dimensions, related to "content"—respect for civil 
and political freedoms, and guarantees of political equality (with underlying social and 
economic equality); and finally a dimension for "result"—responsiveness to citizen demands 
and preferences. For each of these dimensions, the authors provide an empirical definition 
based on assumptions about the conditions under which each dimension is strengthened or 
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weakened. The authors recognise that "the different elements of democracy are so densely 
interactive and overlapping that it is sometimes difficult to know where one dimension ends 
and another begins" (Ibid., xxxii). When one of the dimensions is maximised, other 
dimensions may be neglected, such as when a government is highly responsive to majority 
wishes but might overrule the demands and needs of minority groups, or when bureaucratic 
processes to ensure popular sovereignty diminish freedom and equality. Diamond and 
Morlino claim a high-quality democracy is one that manages to balance the "virtues that lie in 
tension" (Ibid., xxxiii).
Two other empirical approaches may serve as an example of how the theories of quality of 
democracy that I have so far discussed can be operationalised. The International IDEA 
framework for democratic assessment8 recognises that democratisation is a process and that 
democratic practices can be compared but not prescribed. Its researchers therefore moved 
away from the more common practice of country ranking and developed a more 
comprehensive framework. Its key democratic principles are popular control over decision 
makers and political equality of those exercising that control, supported by seven "mediating" 
values, "through which people have sought to give effect to these principles in a country's 
institutional arrangements and practice" (Beetham et al. 2008, 22). The mediating values 
identified by the authors were: participation, authorisation, representation, accountability, 
transparency, responsiveness, and solidarity (Ibid., 23). With these values in mind, the 
researchers built an extensive assessment framework that assists assessors in the task of 
(comparatively) evaluating the democraticness of the institutions in a given country. True to 
their belief that democracy is a process, they further stress that the assessment should be 
adapted to local conditions and legitimised by widening the assessment team so that it is 
representative of the country in question, and by making it accountable to the people of the 
country. 
Axel Hadenius, who took it upon himself to isolate valid and measurable criteria for 
democracy, remains within the political democratic conceptions of Beetham and Saward by 
claiming that public policy "is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people 
whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals" (1992, 7-9). Hadenius conducted an 
8 Developed by researchers at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. See Beetham
et al. 2008.
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assessment of the level of democracy in 132 countries, using the key dimensions of electoral 
process and degree of political freedom (granted to citizens of a democratic state). He 
operationalised them with attributes such as level of suffrage, periodicity of elections, 
effectiveness and honesty of elections, organisational freedom, media freedom and absence of
political oppression and violence. In contrast with the previous approach, Hadenius' indices of
democracy are measured by aggregate and quantitative indicators that are not open to debate.
Deliberation as democratic quality
Deliberative democrats have had some success in operationalising what they believe to be a 
key condition for democratic quality: deliberation is how citizens rule their common affairs 
through the public use of reason. It can be considered an attribute of the principle of political 
participation, which has been advanced as a key dimension by most if not all of the 
democratic thinkers presented here. According to the reasoning of deliberative democrats, 
deliberation is an important, for some the only, source of democratic legitimacy, while it 
greatly improves the quality of political participation, which further strengthens the substance 
of democracy. As I discussed in the previous chapter, there is considerable empirical support 
for the claim that deliberation improves decision-making according to broad quality criteria 
such as joint gains, added information, social learning, and innovative thinking. 
Communication among equals employing their capacity for reasonable arguments, when 
focused on the common good, is deemed superior to the bargaining or aggregation of 
preferences that typify representative democracy (Cohen 2003). One of the staunchest 
defenders of deliberative democracy, Jurgen Habermas, developed a standard of 
communicative rationality based on his evolutionary theory of communicative action. In what 
he called the "ideal speech situation", free and equal participants genuinely attempt to 
understand the issues under discussion and the respective arguments, accede to the "force of 
the better argument", and accept the consensus that results from this process (Habermas 
1979). Barber also attributed a central place to politics in a strong democracy, grounding 
politics in "reasonable public action based on community consent" (2003, 161), and placing 
his faith in talk as able to "build community as well as maintain rights and seek consensus as 
well as resolve conflict" (Ibid., 177). According to Mansbridge et al. (2012), after more than 
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25 years of theorising and experiments, deliberative democracy has now taken a "systemic 
turn". They propose to look at the interaction between democratic institutions and processes, 
in order to assess to what degree they are fulfilling the three largely consensual functions of a 
deliberative system: "seeking truth, establishing mutual respect, and generating inclusive, 
egalitarian decision-making" (Ibid., 22). Deliberative democracy boasts a comprehensive set 
of methodologies to guarantee these outcomes, among them smaller-scale formats such as 
Citizen Juries and Deliberative Opinion Polls, and larger-scale ones such as Participatory 
Budgeting. The double challenge remains to scale deliberation up sufficiently to ensure that it 
goes beyond mere case studies of participatory “governance”, and to ensure that it produces 
responsive political outcomes.
The inclusion of deliberation as a democratic condition is not without its detractors. While 
few will deny that democratic deliberation strengthens democracy, many are cautious to adopt
the idea of a deliberative democracy. Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001, xvii) agree with the idea
of going beyond an aggregative model of democracy, but reject the search for consensus, 
reconciliation, or a "fully inclusive we", arguing this goal is a conceptual impossibility. 
Instead, they see key roles for conflict and division in pluralist democratic politics. Saward 
(2000) sums up the main questions about deliberation’s role as a democratic condition: How 
important is it to legitimacy? Who deliberates? Should standards of rationality dictate the 
process? What are the goals of deliberation? What are the appropriate sites for deliberation? 
He rejects the idea of a deliberative democracy, believing there is a difference between "(1) 
having an opportunity to participate, and (2) having an opportunity to have an opportunity to 
participate" (Ibid., 16). Instead, he sees a democratic need for the more institutionalised 
elements of a democratic society, claiming "[f]ormal democracy is best seen as democracy 
built upon direct democratic foundations" (Ibid., 21). 
Grounding democratic quality in ecological democracy
Having discussed the wealth of proposals for operationalising democratic quality within the 
liberal democratic tradition, I turn now to the suggestions that arise from "deep", radical, and 
ecological democracy. The criteria proposed by its proponents arise from democratic theories 
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that often turn entrenched democratic dimensions such as freedom and equality on their 
heads. Although there are a number of political theorists within the liberal democratic 
tradition that criticise the liberal model and call for significant changes in political 
organisation, they rarely advocate abolishing the capitalist socio-economic model, and 
although they may not agree with utilitarianism, they tend to remain within an individualist, 
instrumentalist view of social action. In other words, they are often progressive, but never 
radical. A radical view takes an unforgivingly close look at the workings of modern polities, at
how they are interwoven with the economic model that has been reigning the planet since the 
eighteenth century, and at their consistent unresponsiveness to a large part, if not the majority, 
of the world's people. Although some radical democratic theories, discussed in the previous 
chapter, tend to emphasise the empowerment of the disenfranchised (Laclau and Mouffe, 
Unger, Fotopolous), most also incorporate, or have more recently incorporated, political 
ecological considerations (Bookchin, Sklair), and some are founded on an explicit recognition
of the socio-ecological dynamics of human organisation (ecological democracy, Earth 
democracy, food democracy). The first group, firmly rejecting the atomism, instrumentalism, 
and alienation that are characteristic of capitalist democracies while clamouring to abolish all 
forms of domination and inequality, sees the autonomisation of interest groups as crucial in 
order to achieve a radical and plural democracy where difference, political struggle and 
contestation are actually welcomed (Laclau and Mouffe 1985/2001). The second traces the 
persistence of social and ecological destruction to the existence of a capitalist hegemony that 
perpetuates hierarchy and domination, as much over humans as over Nature, and proposes to 
have the culture-ideology of human rights—or in Bookchin's version the idea of popular 
control—invade the economic and social spheres, where it would present the most profound 
challenge to the capitalist model (Sklair 2002). Finally, the last group, although not in the 
least homogeneous, generally favours the adoption of concepts from ecology (holism, 
interconnection, synergy, and a bio-centric point of view) and communitarianism (attributing 
rights not only to individuals but to the community, with a focus on social cohesion and 
solidarity), in some cases adopting traditional and indigenous notions of "earth care", into 
democratic theory.
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) merit special, though necessarily brief mention because of their 
profound theory of radical democracy, grounded by their own admission in critical theory, 
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post-structuralism, post-marxism, and Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Their complex 
conceptualisation of democracy does not specifically embrace an ecological perspective but 
its proposed methodology is useful to any radical theory of democracy. They build their 
model around concepts that most democrats avoid or seek to overcome in some way: the 
concepts of difference, dissent, and antagonism. Rejecting the Third Way that has become 
popular with the Western political Left, who have come to conceive of politics as a neutral 
terrain where controversial issues are resolved through dialogue, Laclau and Mouffe take the 
idea of dissent a lot further than Rosanvallon, all the way outside of the liberal democratic 
model. Their prime condition for achieving radical democratic quality is the acceptance of 
antagonism by balancing the democratic ideal of unity with the democratic necessity of 
autonomy. No single struggle should be allowed to impose its agenda on the other struggles, 
but nevertheless each struggle learns from the other, in the process striving to improve the 
democratic quality of social organisation.
I will next consider the conditions for ecological democracy that have been advanced by the 
very diverse camps within ecological democratic thought, starting with the more pragmatist 
approaches and then moving on to the more normative ones. The practical camp is 
represented here by Dietz, York, and Rosa (2001), and Mitchell (2006), who have all put their 
criteria to the test. Rooted in two premises—that the existence of participatory democratic 
institutions correlates positively with the improvement of environmental conditions, and that 
the future of today's democracies is in turn dependent on the equitable distribution of natural 
resources—Mitchell offers five facilitating and five hindering factors for the realisation of 
ecological democracy, which are respectively: environmental altruism, discursive modes of 
democracy, strong perceptions of environmental crises, cultures supportive of participatory 
democracy, and mutually reinforcing local-global networks (facilitating); and international 
capital and related powerful interests, closed democratic systems, inequities in social 
conditions, the prioritisation of scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge, and 
ineffective or nonexistent political mediating structures (hindering). The sociologists Dietz, 
York, and Rosa (2001, 4), in their quest for "trying to identify the social structural and cultural
determinants of sustainability", reject the measures of sustainability proposed by the camp of 
ecological modernisation (an optimistic but also "thin" approach discussed previously) and of 
reflexive modernisation (an upgraded version of the previous camp, which pays more 
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attention to the democratic quality of decision-making). They argue that what is missing from 
studies measuring countries' sustainability, is an analysis of "the structural forms that will 
facilitate or inhibit the kind of societal discourse that will lead to discursive rationality around 
environmental problems" (Ibid., 11). Dietz et al. propose three structural forms or conditions 
for ecological democracy, which they define as a democracy where environmental problems 
are effectively engaged with:
1. Underpinning discourse with altruism and diversity—the former facilitates a focus on 
the common rather than on selfish "good", and the latter empowers minorities or 
oppressed groups in decision-making; 
2. the availability of information from different sources on the analysis of environmental 
problems (what they call substantive grounding, from Habermas' idea of drawing on 
both the life world—daily experience—and the systems world—scientific study and 
accumulated knowledge); and
3. the absence of constraints such as excessive power of capital, military, religious or 
other interests that do not embrace sustainability. 
Dietz et al.'s work is promising, but the above categories are broad and normative and their 
indicators are therefore necessarily very crude. Nevertheless, by retesting existing indices for 
welfare and environmental impact on 80 nation-states, the authors discovered that rising 
affluence is correlated with rising environmental impacts—contrary to the claims of 
ecological modernists, even though countries that score higher on the Freedom House index 
do express more concern about sustainability. The ecological-democratic indicators developed
by the authors, such as women's empowerment, cultural diversity, international NGO 
participation, and lack of state repression, did appear correlated with indicators for 
sustainability, but the results did not allow for concrete conclusions.
Roy Morrison (1995) offers a prescriptive theory of ecological democracy that has inspired 
many thinkers who arrived at this concept later. He sees ecological democracy as a balance 
between freedom and community, which he considers two indivisible values. Freedom is 
understood here not as the negative rights protected by governments, but "in the context of 
responsibility and self-management" (Ibid., 12), whereas the community provides the 
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structures to protect individual rights (Ibid., 5). To build an ecological civilisation, Morrison 
(Ibid., 12-13) envisions three interdependent pillars: democracy (free, but enlightened choice);
balance (between freedom and community, supported by notions of justice); and harmony 
(resting upon "the ability to articulate and understand needs, and to search for points of 
agreement"). 
Non-Western conceptions of ecological democracy have greatly enriched this school of 
thought. For example, Vandana Shiva's idea of "living democracy" captures indigenous 
traditions and values, while developing a modern political movement for peace, justice, and 
sustainability, where life is understood as "a continuum between human and nonhuman 
species and between present, past, and future generations" (Shiva 2005, 1). For radical 
ecological democrats like Shiva or Kothari, the values ascribed to an ecological democracy 
have a decidedly communitarian and bio-centric inspiration: granting equal rights to existence
and sustenance to all beings, placing the common good above individual interests, insisting on
preserving biological and cultural diversity, and finally, calling for inclusion and ecological as
well as social responsibility. 
The concept of "Buen Vivir" or Good Life, having become popular at the World Social Fora 
that are now a landmark counter-meeting to the government-dominated Earth Summits9, and 
having been adopted into constitutions of two Latin American countries (Ecuador and 
Bolivia), is offered by radical ecological democrats, as well as social movements and some 
political parties, as an alternative development paradigm for living on this Earth that is both 
new and old, balancing life, culture, and work, and creating harmonious relations between 
people, community, society, and Earth. In its politicised version, Buen Vivir's guiding 
principles attempt to compatibilise solidarity among people with the respect for Nature 
through the deepening of democracy by promoting certain social, economic, and 
environmental rights and conditions (Acosta and Martínez (org.) 2009). One of the concrete 
developments in Buen Vivir advocacy has been the granting of rights to Nature, included in 
the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia, with Bolivia having taken the step in 2010 to 
translate the concept into law, in which Mother Earth is defined as a collective subject of 
9 Example of the World Social Forum 2016, available: "https://fsm2016.org/en/sinformer/a-propos-du-forum-
social-mondial/" (accessed 27 July 2016).
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public interest with inherent rights to life, diversity of life, water, clean air, equilibrium, 
restoration, and to be free of contamination10.
Food sovereignty and degrowth are quite recent, eminently political concepts, used as cris de 
guerre on a global playing field, which have been inspired by the socio-biocentric world 
views presented by the Buen Vivir philosophies. Where these approaches differ is in that food 
sovereignty is overtly linked with radical ecological democracy (the democratic anchors of 
which I will discuss next) and its roots in the Global South, whereas degrowth is characterised
by a wider spectrum of proposals ranging from moderate radical views to deeply radical ones,
and from more decidedly Western-inspired world views to indigenous cosmo-visions.
Ashish Kothari is a prominent proponent and scholar of radical ecological democracy, which 
was inspired by grassroots initiatives in India and other parts of the world. Its core principles 
for democratic and ecological quality are direct democracy, local and bioregional economies, 
cultural diversity, human well-being, and ecological resilience. Kothari stresses that the 
transition to this new framework needs to be "guided not only by hard-headed rationality but 
also by a strong ethical and emotional foundation" (Kothari 2014, 36). Criticising the ever-
dominant focus on growth, whether staunchly neoliberal or softened by an ecological or 
reflexive modernisation inspiration (such as the concept of Green Economy11 that was 
launched in 2012 by supranational agencies), Kothari appeals to a pathway "to shared well-
being led not by the state, nor by the market, but instead by communities and collectives of 
citizens" (Ibid., 37). In a radical ecological-democratic framework, equity and social justice 
remain at the core of democracy, but are complemented by a respect for the limits of the Earth
and the rights of all species. The idea of human well-being is broadened, like in Buen Vivir, 
beyond physical and material dimensions to include socio-cultural, intellectual, and spiritual 
dimensions. The dual key dimensions for this framework are not freedom and equality, but 
ecological sustainability and human equity. Also patent in radical ecological democracy is the 
10 Bolivia's Law of the Rights of Mother Earth as summarised by Sourcewatch, available: 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Bolivia's_Law_of_the_Rights_of_Mother_Earth#cite_note-1 
(accessed 27 July 2016).
11 Although there is no real consensus on the meaning of Green Economy, on the site of the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs we can find a possible definition: “one that results in improved
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological
scarcities. It is low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive”. Available:
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1446 (accessed 15 December 2016).
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rejection of liberal democratic principles and neoliberal economics, to be replaced with 
community and solidarity inspired principles, besides economic and localised democracy.
Food democracy as a special case of ecological democracy
Turning now to conceptualisations of food democracy, which I consider to be a version of 
ecological democracy that has food at its centre, and where food is viewed as a key resource 
for human welfare as well as a key condition for improving the health of our ecosystems. 
Molly Anderson (2008), whose rights-based approach was discussed in the previous chapter, 
advances six conditions for the realisation of food democracy, inspired by the Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Covenant of the United Nations: 
1. the absence of human exploitation; 
2. democratic decision-making about the food system choices that impact more than one 
interest group in the system; 
3. fair and transparent access to the necessary resources for food production; 
4. multiple independent buyers; 
5. the absence of resource exploitation; and 
6. the absence of factors that may hinder the realisation of the previous criteria. 
She justifies her choice for rights-based criteria over the more commonly cited conditions of 
localisation and sustainability, by pointing out that the ideas of local and sustainable food, 
besides lacking in coherent definitions, are easily subverted—as when a large supermarket 
chain sells industrially produced organic food, displacing both small producers and retailers; 
or when local sustainable food is only affordable to an elite, with poorer population groups 
finding themselves in so-called "food deserts"12. Linking the environmental and economic 
dimensions of food to the social dimension, and grounding the latter in human rights, is in 
Anderson's view the best route to democratising the food system, which in turn she believes 
heightens the chances for ecological concerns to be incorporated in decision-making. 
12 This term will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
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Food sovereignty may be considered a practical outgrowth of the rights developed within the 
Buen Vivir school, which was its inspiration. Operationalised gradually over the two decades 
since the term was coined by the peasant movement La Via Campesina, food sovereignty 
singles out the following priority areas: the right to food, the access to productive resources, 
the promotion of agroecological conversion of food production, and equitable trade with 
strong local markets (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005). Although the first two principles can be 
considered conditions for food sovereignty or democracy to occur, very similar to the 
conditions that Anderson advances, the latter two are closer to being goals and would be more
difficult to operationalise. There are nevertheless strong empirical as well as moral arguments 
in favour of the objective of founding an agricultural conversion on the science, philosophy, 
and practice of agroecology—with the double aim of making agroecosystems healthy and 
making food systems just (see among others Altieri and Uphoff 1999; IAASTD 2009; de 
Schutter 2010). 
The general consensus on the conditions that need to be fulfilled for food sovereignty to 
occur, are: 
1. recognition of the constitutional right to food; 
2. agrarian reform benefiting the landless and farming people; 
3. the protection of natural resources so that they remain healthy and free of restrictive 
intellectual property rights; 
4. the prioritising of food production for nutrition over trade; 
5. ending the speculation of food and restricting control of transnational corporations and
institutions over food policies; 
6. promoting social peace, rejecting the use of food as a weapon; 
7. reinstating democratic control over food, by giving access to food decision-making to 
smallholder farmers and rural women, at all levels, including the United Nations.
The right to food, a core claim in food sovereignty activism, is actually a set of rights. 
Believing this, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Patel manages to reduce the conditions for food 
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democracy to one essential right, inspired by Hannah Arendt's right of rights: "a right to have 
rights over food" (Patel 2009, 663). This right to have rights incises upon attributes of strong 
democracy: the right to participate in decision-making about food production and distribution,
the right to control what happens with our food, and the right to have access to essential 
resources for food production and/or acquirement, including knowledge. 
Michel Pimbert's (2006) proposal for realising food sovereignty draws on different, more 
republicanist and deliberative democratic inspirations. At the heart of systemic change, in his 
view, lies the need for "transforming knowledge and ways of knowing". Based on this insight,
he proposes six "interrelated processes and mutually reinforcing processes of transformation" 
(Ibid., 16) to achieve food sovereignty: 
• developing citizenship—"politics are too important to be left to professionals" (Ibid.); 
• creating interdependent confederations composed of networks of citizen-based 
organising bodies that link villages, towns, neighbourhoods of cities and ecological 
units, similar to proposals of bioregionalism; 
• employing dual power—combining the grassroots organising model with infiltration 
in local government, similar to Bookchin's proposal of municipalism; 
• embracing equity and gender inclusion, by raising the voices of poor women in policy 
discussions; 
• reclaiming property rights and territory, by redistributing land and access to natural 
resources, thus widening the self-determination of indigenous communities; and 
finally
• democratising globalisation by "levelling the economic playing field for democratic 
participation and sustainable livelihoods" (Ibid., 17), for example through the creation 
of a minimum income, curbing financial speculation, and providing a more equitable 
sharing of jobs.
Other proponents of food democracy (Lang 1998; Hassanein 2003) stress the importance of 
empowering people—by informing and inspiring them—to play an active role in shaping the 
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food system, in other words to regain social control over the food system. They place food 
production, a fragile as well as destructive, abundant as much as scarce, essential, lucrative, 
and much disputed human activity, as the "locus of the democratic process" (Lang 2007). The 
democratisation of food production holds the promise of solving many of humanity's major 
challenges simultaneously: ecosystem degradation, social and economic inequities that 
perpetuate hunger and poverty, malnutrition (both undernutrition and obesity result from lack 
of nutrients), and climate change. Since the concept of sustainability is persistently contested 
because it "inevitably involves both conflicts over values and uncertainty about outcomes", it 
follows that sustainability needs to "be socially and politically defined", requiring the widest 
possible participation of all affected parties (Hassanein 2003, 77 and 79). Lang and Hassanein
are not specific on the conditions they would demand for food democracy to occur, since they 
focus more on the development of food policies, but the ideas that stand out in their thoughts 
are: popular control, effective equality in decision-making, equal access to knowledge, and 
"food citizenship"—a concept that moves decision-making on food beyond neoliberal notions 
of "food as commodity, people as consumers, and society as marketplace" (Hassanein 2003, 
79-80).
The search for attributes of the strongest possible democracy would not be complete without a
consideration of Shiv Visvanathan's concept of cognitive justice, which he defines as "the 
right of many forms of knowledge to exist because all knowledges are seen as partial and 
complementary and because they contain incommensurable insights" (Visvanathan 2001). The
project of "democratising" democracy would not be possible without democratising 
knowledge. It is not enough to involve communities, stimulate participation, and to label 
alternative knowledge systems as "ethno-science" or even "non-knowledge" (Visvanathan 
2005). An epistemic challenge is needed and this entails not just participation but cognitive 
empowerment, not just being heard but changing the terms of dialogue. Looking at examples 
of social movements in India, Visvanathan (Ibid.) argues that a rights-based approach was not 
sufficient: although it was adequate against torture, it was relatively helpless against 
scientifically legitimised discourses, in which the notions of Nature, food, and nutrition, have 
all been changed to suit the techno-scientific13 policy model.
13 Even though the term technoscience has been with us since the 1970s, its definition is highly complex and
not at all consensual. Common to most conceptualisations, however, is the idea of a blurring of boundaries
between "science, technology and society, between natural and engineering/technical sciences, between
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Constructing a framework for the ecological-democratic quality of decision-making
Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002) offer useful recommendations for the construction 
of a democratic framework for purposes of analysing data. I will use them as caveats, even 
though my proposed documentary and discourse analysis will be qualitative and exploratory. 
The researchers recommend conceptualising democracy using explicit and well-justified 
criteria, anchored in a theory of democracy: first identifying the attributes of democracy and 
then organising them by level of abstraction, neither delimiting excessively nor deficiently14. 
The next step is to select multiple indicators from multiple sources to measure the attributes, 
taking care to cross-check their overlap and to decide what the measurement level will be. 
Finally, when applicable, rules should be specified as to the level of aggregation of data.
An example of their method for operationalising democratic indices, based on Dahl's 
attributes for democracy, follows in Figure 1., gradually moving from more to less abstract 
(Ibid., 24).
After reviewing existing democratic indices, the authors conclude that most of them have 
important flaws: whether because of how democratic quality is defined—either overly 
restricting or overly extending their definitions; or the way the empirical scope is often 
restricted; how key attributes are omitted or exaggerated; and finally how indicators are 
selected. The high correlation found between the indices may indicate that all are drawing on 
the same "fundamental underlying realities", but at the same time may also be reproducing the
same biases (Ibid., 29).
biology and technical systems, between theory and practice, between nature and culture, between the given
and the fabricated, between autonomy and algorithmicity, between eternal facts and human-made values,
between science and politics" (Schmidt, 2011). For those that use the term negatively, it rejects the idea of
science as a pure and value-free practice, and instead places it at the heart of politics and economics, which it
is deemed to serve.
14 The authors claim that the dominating tendency is that of minimalist definitions, leaving out important
attributes, often for the sake of measurability.
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Concept ►  Attributes ►   Components of attributes ► Indicators (examples)
Democracy ► Contestation ►   Right to form political parties  ►  Number of political parties
►  ...
►    Freedom of press ►  Number of media companies
►  Size of media companies
►  ...
► Participation ►    Right to vote ►  Existing laws  
►    Fairness of voting process ►  ...
►    Access of parties to public financing ►  ...
►    Extent of suffrage ►  Percentage of suffrage
Figure 1. Level of aggregation in democratic indices
Source: Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 24.
I will now present my choice of attributes that I consider will best operationalise my version 
of democratic quality. My search is for a model for substantive food democracy, by which I 
understand a democracy that is grounded in the crucial human activity of food and basic needs
production, while being both socially and ecologically responsive to its demos. I argue that a 
strong conceptualisation of democracy is warranted because globalised human economic 
activities, in particular those related to basic needs production, are arguably as much behind 
the growing class polarisation (simultaneous growth of wealth and poverty) as they are behind
the ecological crisis that humanity is facing (Sklair, 2002). The demonstrated unstoppable 
privatisation of wealth (including "natural capital") and socialisation of social and 
environmental costs that characterises capitalism, in particular its most recent form—which 
some call biocapitalism—are not solvable through procedural adjustments, but call for 
considerable structural changes in order to bring common resources back under popular 
control. The enormous socio-ecological challenges that persist in the twenty-first century call 
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for socio-ecological responses, leading me to define democracy beyond the purely political 
realm, as O'Donnell, Campbell and other thinkers have done. I hope to have shown in this 
chapter that the classic dimensions of freedom and equality are insufficient to guarantee the 
"ecological-democratic" quality of modern decision-making.
My analysis of proposals for democratic quality and the realisation of ecological democracy 
has provided me with an extensive list of potential attributes of ecological-democratic quality.
For the purposes of a documentary and critical discourse analysis, some of these attributes, 
although strong candidates, are impractical. Variables that measure outcome had to be 
excluded or adapted, such as social learning and responsiveness. Others are too prone to 
populism to distinguish between discourses, such as accountability and diversity, but couldn't 
be left out for normative reasons. Finally, some variables require empirical measurements, 
such as the existence of constraints for democracy, the rule of law, and the facilitation of 
implementation. My final framework considered these research limitations as well as my 
intention to distinguish between weak and strong forms of democracy. It is my belief that 
strong forms of democracy will deliver the equitable distribution of costs and benefits of 
natural resources, and the management of those resources according to the interests of all 
peoples. Equity and social control over common resources are thus core attributes in my 
democratic framework. But other attributes are needed to stay true to the inspiration of 
ecological democracy and to the philosophy of democracy as an ongoing political process. I 
decided to keep the list longer, in order to be able to test the comparative effectiveness of 
attributes in measuring the ecological-democratic quality of decision-making in food politics, 
but also to be able to compare food discourses and policies on a range of attributes ranging 
from a more liberal-inspired style, to a participatory style, and finally a radical-ecological 
style.
As Diamond and Morlino warn, any combination of the democratic attributes discussed in this
chapter runs into problems of high interaction between attributes, boundary blurring, and 
over- or under-emphasis of certain attributes in detriment of others. To minimise these pitfalls,
I followed Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) advice and aimed for completeness in defining each 
attribute. Nevertheless, my final model is exploratory and open for adjustment after testing it 
against empirical data.
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I chose to work with four main democratic dimensions, which I describe in the following 
paragraphs, whereas the resulting model is presented in Table 1: 
1. A dimension of basic democratic attributes, which are those that most democratic 
thinkers would agree with and that are generally part of the value system of liberal 
democracies. The most important attributes in the "basic democratic" dimension are 
freedom and equality. Since freedom is too broad a concept, ultimately also meaning 
"autonomy", which I placed in a separate dimension, I will refer here to classic basic 
freedoms, which are those of speech, movement, religion, petition and association, 
whereas equality will refer to political equality, an equal right to participate in 
decision-making. Freedoms, or liberties, are tangled up with the idea of rights, such as 
the right to life, to justice, to be free from slavery and torture. Despite the promises of 
a rights-based approach, I prefer to focus on attributes of democracy that do not 
necessary need a legal system to be upheld, but can be agreed upon by members of a 
given organisation, community, or even society, staying true to a radical theory of 
democracy.
2. The dimension of popular control, as proposed by many proponents of stronger 
democracy. In the broadest sense, this is the core democratic idea of rule of the people.
In a stricter sense, popular control is social legitimacy, which is the idea that people 
should decide on issues that affect their lives, although for instance Beetham (1994) 
kept it more open (less radical), saying that people should have a say in issues that 
affect their lives. 
3. The dimension of autonomy, understood here in the more radical sense of self-
determination or the "right to have rights". The "right to have rights" means people can
decide which rights they want to have, they are not simply rights bearers, but rights 
makers. The concept of autonomy has always been implicit in democratic thinking, 
but is rarely made explicit. In its implicit understanding, it means people are 
autonomous in their conscience and reasoning, and can decide about their lives, a 
necessary precondition for democracy. Autonomy also plays a part in the idea of state 
sovereignty, of each state deciding autonomously within their own borders. But 
autonomy as self-determination has a dark side to it, at least from the viewpoint of a 
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state, a government of a state, or a supranational organisation. Autonomy as autarchy 
(self-rule) opens the way for individuals or groups to act or function independently, 
which in turn may conflict with the rule-making of a majority group. And autonomy as
autarky (self-sufficiency) opens the way for individuals or groups to detach 
themselves from national and/or global economies, which may harm the interests of 
other groups that rely on this national/global system of exchange. At the same time, it 
is important that autonomy be reconciled with other (more solidary) democratic 
dimensions, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) attempt, so that whatever social 
arrangement results from the political struggle of wills, may satisfy all peoples. 
Precisely because of this controversy, autonomy is in my view a key dimension of 
democracy, one that should not be ignored.
4. A negative democratic dimension, understood as democracy's function of preventing
the existence of unfreedom, inequality, and inequity. Typically, I should include human
rights in this category, but as I stated, my framework focuses on social arrangements 
between individuals and groups who are interested in establishing principles for the 
flourishing of both humans and their habitats.
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Table 1. Framework for assessing ecological-democratic quality
Dimension of 
democracy
Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
Basic Democratic
Dimension
Political equality This is political participation in decision-
making without domination of any 
group's interests and without 
discrimination on the basis of factors such
as gender, age, ethnic, or socioeconomic 
group.
I rely on O'Donnell's (2004) argument for equality, that all human beings are agents—
endowed with autonomy for making decisions, capacity for reasoning, and responsibility 
for his or her actions. The moral and legal recognition of agency, in his view, extends each 
human being a set of basic rights necessary to support their agency. Beetham (1994) 
justifies the democratic attribute of equality with the assumption that "everyone (or at least 
every adult) has an equal capacity for self-determination, and therefore an equal right to 
influence collective decisions, and to have their interests considered when they are made".
Political equality ensures that everyone has an equal opportunity to exercise control over 
decision-making. Although political equality is generally uncontested, social and economic
equality is more controversial.
A good indicator of equality is representativeness (Weir and Beetham 2002).
Political freedom The basic political freedoms that need to 
be guaranteed in democratic decision-
making: freedom of speech, movement, 
religion, petition, and association. It is 
also a criterium to ensure that all parties 
to the decision-making are free from 
coercion.
Dewey (1925-27/ 2012) transforms the idea of freedom: on the one hand, freedom is 
restricted by legitimate political decision-making, on the other, only by legitimising the 
decision-making in the sense of giving citizens control over it, is freedom made possible. 
Equality and Freedom are realised by certain basic rights: political, civil, and social, which 
I have not explicitly included in this framework. These rights hold the promise of realising 
a number of key democratic attributes, but are in themselves not sufficient.
The basic freedoms recognised by most democratic thinkers or practitioners are freedom of
speech, of movement, and of association. 
Morrison (1995, 12) proposes a balance between freedom and community, where freedom 
is understood "in the context of responsibility and self-management", whereas the 
community provides the structures to protect individual rights.
Accountability This refers to the accountability of both 
decisions and decision makers, and in that
sense also encompasses the principles of 
transparency and publicity.
To verify the claim we need to ascertain whether and how balanced and comprehensible 
information informing policies and the process and results is presented by decision makers,
and whether it is possible to hold decision-makers responsible for their decisions.
Table 1. (cont.)
Dimension of 
democracy
Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
Responsiveness The responsiveness of decisions and 
resulting policies to the beneficiaries of 
these decisions. Also the extent to which 
beneficiaries wishes under-build the 
decision-making or are satisfied by it.
Saward (1994) defines responsiveness as the satisfaction of the wishes of a majority of 
citizens. More radical thinkers, including myself, believe decisions have to be responsive 
to the needs of the groups affected by decisions. Since it is not always possible within the 
context of this dissertation to measure the results of the policy proposals analysed in the 
next chapters, I will assess responsiveness as an intention to satisfy the wishes of 
beneficiaries (not necessarily the majority) of certain policies or measures. The food actors 
that are more willing to make difficult decisions and show they are orientated towards 
action, are valued more positively.
Popular Control
Active inclusion This is a stronger version of equality, 
seeking to include and empower all 
interested and affected parties in the 
decision-making process.
Active inclusion means an ongoing endeavour to ensure fair and meaningful participation 
of people affected by decisions,  providing free and transparent access to information and 
knowledge, and the necessary democratic spaces for civic involvement to occur.
This is based on Habermas' (1991) conditions for the public sphere. According to Dewey 
(1925-27/ 2012, 23), it is not just actual participation that defines democracy, but also 
potential participation, to be employed whenever the need arises to review, possibly 
overturn, decisions that have been taken.
Cohen (1997a) advocated deliberative inclusion as a condition for democracy. All citizens 
having equal rights, regardless of their background or culture, they should be included in 
discussions that concern them.
Equitable distribution of 
common resources
Ensuring benefits and costs resulting from
common resources are equitably 
distributed among the users of those 
resources, according to both their level of 
usage and their needs. In the strongest 
sense it is a willingness to re-balance the 
existing power structures by placing all 
interested parties on equal footing, 
independently of their pecuniary 
investments in the exploitation of 
common resources.
This means ensuring intergenerational, inter-gender, and socioeconomic equity in the 
access to resources that are important to human survival and development, and in access to 
welfare. The ideas of equity and gender inclusion go beyond freedom and equality.
Equity involves understanding what people need to live full, healthy lives, and to 
participate in the steering of public affairs. Equality does not result in equity. I understand 
equality as giving everyone the same rights or resources, whereas equity means giving 
each person what they need to thrive.
The term equity unfortunately may have different, sometimes opposing, meanings. For 
example, in Morton Deutsch’s (1975) understanding, equity is a more liberal concept than 
equality: equity means redistributing benefits according to merit, whereas equality implies 
that all interested parties have the same right to the benefits. To resolve the tension, as a 
third principle of redistributive justice, Deutsch identifies need. Here I merge his idea of 
need with that of merit to be able to use equity in the justest possible sense.
Deliberative decision-
making process
This is the practice of converging on 
common interests through the 
According to Dryzek (1995), democracy is a matter of effective communication between 
all interested parties, not just preference aggregation. Habermas (1996, 107) believed the 
Table 1. (cont.)
Dimension of 
democracy
Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
advancement of rational-critical 
arguments (Cohen 1997a). Cohen 
describes the ideal deliberative procedure 
as one where all those that are affected by
decisions come together to discuss 
alternatives on equal footing, presenting 
reasonable arguments to defend their 
interests, while aiming to reach decisions 
focused on the common good that are 
agreeable to all. 
deliberative procedure to be the main source of legitimacy: “Just those action norms are 
valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in a rational 
discourse”. His "ideal speech situation", is one where all participants have free and equal 
access to each other, reasonably discuss the issues and weigh the arguments, accepting the 
"force of the better argument", and the resulting consensus (Habermas 1979).  Habermas 
(2008, 50) identifies four presuppositions for deliberation to be legitimate: 1. all those 
capable of making a relevant contribution have been included; 2. all participants have 
equal voice; 3. all participants are free within the deliberative process to speak their mind 
without deceiving others or themselves; 4. the deliberative process can be found free of 
sources of coercion. 
For Dewey (1925-27/ 2012, 11), decision-making is a "process by which the social 
organism weighs considerations and forms its consequent judgment: that the voting of the 
individual represents in reality, a deliberation, a tentative opinion on the part of the whole 
organism".
In the deliberative democracy tradition, which has solidified considerably in the last 
decades, the debates are expected to take place in terms of conceptions of the common 
good as opposed to bargaining for particular interests. Barber (2003, 156) insists that for 
politics to succeed, all individuals and groups must put their values and ideas and 
conceptions of the good to the test of politics itself.
On the other hand, Bohman (1996) is less concerned about discursive rationality and the 
pursuit of consensus through the better argument, defending instead an open, plural, and 
inclusive public interaction where common interests are constructed based on cooperation, 
dialogue, and a willingness to commit to the resulting decisions. I will take some cues from
Bohman when developing the questions for my own ecological-democratic survey, thus 
supporting a more communitarian form of deliberation.
Cognitive justice The constitutional right of different 
systems of knowledge to exist as part of a
dialogue and debate, thereby 
strengthening the participation of lesser-
recognised groups with cognitive 
representation, and democratising 
knowledge itself (Visvanathan 2005).
Visvanathan (2001) believes that many forms of knowledge should be allowed to co-exist 
"because all knowledges are seen as partial and complementary and because they contain 
incommensurable insights". For him, this entails not only the right to be heard, but also the 
right to change the terms of dialogue, achieving cognitive empowerment rather than merely
cognitive participation.
Michel Pimbert contributes to a more complete conception of cognitive justice—what he 
calls "knowledge that is ecologically literate, socially just and relevant to context" (Pimbert
2006, 1)—in the context of food democracy:
"The whole process should lead to the democratisation of research, diverse forms of co-
Table 1. (cont.)
Dimension of 
democracy
Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
inquiry based on specialist and non-specialist knowledge, an expansion of horizontal 
networks for autonomous learning and action, and more transparent oversight." (Ibid., 16-
17)
He goes on to state that this "implies 1) cultural values that emphasise more direct citizen 
participation in determining research agendas, regulations and policies; 2) new professional
values, participatory methodologies and behaviour; 3) the adoption of a learning process 
approach in the production and validation of knowledge; and 4) enabling policies that offer
citizens adequate material security and time for democratic deliberation in the context of 
more localised food systems and economies" (Ibid., 9).
Dietz et al. (2001) offer a possible operationalisation with their term "substantive 
grounding":  the availability of information from different sources on the analysis of 
environmental problems. This in turn is based on Habermas' conciliation of the information
and experience created in the "life-world" (society) as opposed to the "systems-world" 
(world of more formal knowledge) (cited in Dietz et al., Ibid.).
Finally, Cohen (1997b) also emphasises the idea of "reasonable pluralism":  accepting 
different world views, even when they are incompatible, so that the holders of these views 
may co-exist on terms that are acceptable to all.
Social legitimacy Can be construed as a strong version of 
accountability and of democratic 
legitimacy when those that bear the 
consequences of decisions by others have 
a final say or, in an even stronger version,
a definitive say in decision-making;15 
Beetham (2013) defines legitimacy as 
"the normative dimension of power 
relations, and the ideas and practices that 
give those in power their moral authority 
and credibility". Social legitimacy takes 
this a step further and hands this power 
over to those affected by decisions.
One possible operationalisation of social legitimacy is to determine "that the burden of 
proof must rest with those who seek less rather than more inclusive arrangements" (Dewey 
1925-27/ 2012, 22). 
For social legitimacy to be achieved, liberal rights need to be radicalised so that all 
stakeholders bear the collective responsibility for and ownership of decisions (Munton, 
2003). The criteria to assess this legitimacy may be either external or internal (to the belief 
system in question).
Dryzek (2000) claims social legitimacy is achieved when those that bear the consequences 
of decisions by others have a final say in decision-making, whereas Shiva (2005) proposes 
a stronger form, demanding that “those who bear the consequences of decisions and 
actions are the decision-makers”.
15 Deliberative democrats prefer the term “democratic legitimacy”, whereas social legitimacy has been used more often in legal contexts. The latter term is however closer to Habermas' idea of
legitimacy as requiring the consent of all those to whom decisions or laws will apply.
Table 1. (cont.)
Dimension of 
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Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
Political participation In its strongest and more republicanist 
definition, political participation is how 
members of a group, community, or 
society, take responsibility for decisions 
that affect their lives.
Dewey considered political participation to be constituent of democracy. The possibility of 
participation (what he called potential participation) should be ever present, to be 
employed whenever the need arises to review, possibly overturn, decisions that have been 
taken (1925-27/ 2012, 23). He further claimed that there is a public for each decision-
making situation. 
Berger (2009, cited in Amelung and Baumgarten 2017) gives an idea of the activities that 
should characterise political participation: "political engagement encompasses most of the 
activities that we normally associate with political participation or citizenship: voting, 
contacting representatives, contributing financially to representatives or interest groups, 
following political issues (via any media format), associating with groups intended to 
influence political outcomes, attending rallies or demonstrations intended to influence 
political outcomes, or running for (or holding) political office".
Political participation asks of members of a polity to get involved in the shaping of their 
own common destinies. Participation should not just be extensive (with as many involved 
as possible), but intensive, with people regularly taking part in the running of their 
communities.
Autonomy
Contestation Contestation is defined less liberally here 
than Dahl's original term: as the 
acceptance of the ideas of dissent, 
conflict of ideas as well as conflict of 
interests. The term also overlaps with 
Dewey’s idea of potential participation, 
in the sense that affected parties must be 
able to overturn decisions when these are 
found to harm “more inclusive interests”.
This concept simultaneously embraces Dahl's more liberal idea of contestation as 
competition and debate, as well as the idea of conflict or antagonism derived from diversity
as advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, and finally, Rosanvallon's concept of counter-
democracy.
Machiavelli embraced the idea of conflict for his Tribunes of the Plebs. Geuna (2013, 18) 
demonstrates how Machiavelli attributed an important role to conflict, as much at the 
inception of the republic as during its normal functioning: "developing within particular 
institutional channels, conflict preserves the liberty of the republic even when this has 
become a form of rule of law". Machiavelli believed that the institutionalisation of the 
crucial value of liberty owed more to the political conflict between antagonistic parties 
than to the orders and laws that came later. 
Contestation partially overlaps with the idea of reflexivity, of diversity or pluralism, and 
that of "right of rights". But it is more than an effort to accept different opinions or ways of
living, or to introduce the practice of reconsidering certain decisions and rules: it is the 
cultivation of a new culture where dissent is welcomed. This means ideal decisions are 
neither reached by majority voting nor by consensus in the sense of consent, but are based 
on a comprehensive agreement that faces the conflict of ideas and interests head on, and 
which no participant decided to block. Decisions must ensure, as discussed under social 
legitimacy, "that the burden of proof must rest with those who seek less rather than more 
Table 1. (cont.)
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inclusive arrangements". 
Reflexivity This is an attitude of collective self-
awareness, self-inquiry, and self-
confrontation that is deemed a necessary 
condition to break with path dependency 
in decision-making and for social learning
in democratic practices to occur (Voss, 
Bauknecht, and Kemp 2006).
Voss et al. (2006, 7) define reflexivity as “the dealing of modernity with its own 
implications and side-effects”. Although their intention is largely reformist, reflexivity 
holds great promise since it permits the development of critical thinking and the adoption 
of a social learning approach, working to improve the capacity for future decision-making 
by learning from our mistakes. Properly carried out, reflexivity enables us to emancipate 
ourselves from our path-dependent choices.
This concept partially absorbs the ideas of contestation, conflict, and counter-democracy 
advanced respectively by Dahl, Barber, and Rosanvallon. Democracy here is viewed as a 
process, or in Dewey's (1925-27/ 2012, 24) words: "democracy entails a kind of openness 
in which its substantive meaning—that is, what concerns it addresses and what ends it 
pursues—is always in the process of being determined". Barber firmly rejected universal 
truths about democracy and believed democratic legitimacy is achieved by the constant test
of politics, whereas reflexivity is a component of "honest" politics. In this latter sense, 
reflexivity is the capacity to keep conflict productively alive in decision-making.
Social control over 
common resources
This is a strong version of democratic 
control and of the attribute of equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits of the 
use of common resources. It suggests 
bringing common resources for human 
development and welfare under the 
control of those who depend primarily on 
these resources.
Democratic control over resources has been proven insufficient, especially in liberal 
democratic regimes. Common natural and other resources (such as knowledge) have been 
systematically privatised. The idea of social control over common resources aligns itself 
with theories of the commons and claims of food sovereignty and of radical ecological 
democrats, asking that common resources remain in the hands of its primary users, whose 
right to access, use, and decision-making must be guaranteed by secondary users.
Diversity This is the acceptance of different 
cultures and life styles, as long as they 
are, within reason, equally accepting of 
others.
The concept of diversity places conditions on other attributes, in particular those of active 
inclusion and deliberation. It exacts tolerance and respect from groups wishing to decide 
on issues of common interest, and the courage to face potential conflict of values, ideas, 
and interests when dealing with groups that diverge in belief, culture, language, sexual 
orientation, or gender. It also means granting autonomy to groups that wish to run their 
own affairs. Diversity is not a consensual term, and its place in democracy is contested. It 
can interfere with political equality. That's why I introduce a limit to tolerance of 
difference, which is that given by Hannah Arendt: tolerance will not tolerate intolerance.
Table 1. (cont.)
Dimension of 
democracy
Democratic attribute Definition How to operationalise the attribute
Altruism This is the capacity, in particular in 
decision-making, to relinquish some 
personal or collective welfare for the 
welfare of others that are more needful. It 
is a strong form of solidarity.
Mitchell (2006) coined the term “environmental altruism”, defined by people's degree of 
selflessness with respect to the environment. In the present analysis, I prefer to use the 
broader term, to allow for consideration of social as well as ecological factors.
Negative Dimension
Rights of Nature The rights of Nature can be considered a 
negative right when seen as the "freedom 
from destruction" of natural organisms.
The first four principles of Shiva's (2005) Earth Democracy in essence refer to the negative
right of all beings to be free from harm and allowed to thrive: 1. All species, peoples, and 
cultures have intrinsic worth; 2. The earth community is a democracy of all life; 3. We 
must defend biological and cultural diversity; 4. All beings have a natural right to 
sustenance.
Restriction of elite 
control
This principle, inspired by Machiavelli, 
asks decision makers to restrict the 
control over majority (or public) interests 
by a minority interest group. It also aims 
to counter-balance the influence of 
socioeconomic and political elites on 
decision-making in the public interest, 
with some form of citizen control.
Machiavelli proposed a model of republicanism based on the one hand on tribunates that 
excluded wealthy citizens, and on the other hand on popular assemblies where the 
influence of the prominent is equally limited. Inspired by Machiavelli’s proposals for 
reconciling the idea of economic class with political accountability and popular 
empowerment, McCormick (2011) proposes to create a citizen body that excludes 
socioeconomic and political elites from decision-making in the public interest, while 
appointing "common people" by random selection, to oversee and censure government and
state authorities.
Several ecological democrats warn of the dangers of the concentration of resources and 
capital in elite hands, and propose restricting their power as a condition for ecological 
democracy. Thus, Dietz et al. (2001) speak of combating the excessive power of capital, 
military, religious, or other interests that do not embrace sustainability.
Sklair (2001) has called this elite the Transnational Capitalist Class.
This notion also takes a cue from Rawls (1999a), who avowed that concentrations of 
wealth would allow "a small part of society [to] control the economy and indirectly 
political life itself".
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Introduction to the democratic analysis
Democracy as compared with other ways of life is the sole way of living which believes wholeheartedly in
the process of experience as end and as means; as that which is capable of generating the science which is
the sole dependable authority for the direction of further experience and which releases emotions, needs
and desires so as to call into being the things that have not existed in the past. For every way of life that
fails in its democracy limits the contacts, the exchanges, the communications, the interactions by which
experience is steadied while it is also enlarged and enriched. The task of this release and enrichment is one
that has to be carried on day by day. Since it is one that can have no end till experience itself comes to an
end, the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all
share and to which all contribute.
—John Dewey, Creative Democracy: The Task before Us, essay, 1939.
In order to test the exploratory model for ecological-democratic quality that I have developed,
and to be able to derive some conclusions as to which democratic attributes are the stronger 
candidates for comparing models of decision- and policy-making according to their ecological
and democratic quality, I have chosen a grounded theory approach. Strauss and Corbin (1994)
define this as a methodology where researchers either derive their theory from the data, or 
improve existing theories in confrontation with the data. The data collection and analysis, as 
well as the development of theory, are all considered parts of the same process. Grounded 
theory is an appropriate methodology when the research data consist of interviews, field 
observations, and documentation, as is the case in my research. Even though the entirety of 
my research constitutes a critical analysis of the social, economic, and political arrangements 
that characterise what I consider to be a core human activity—food production—I chose to 
divide the analysis in two parts. In the first part of my research I critically examined both the 
documented history and the main schools of thought in the political economy of our 
industrialised and globalised world, zooming in on the modern food system whenever 
possible, extracting the main factors that mediate the relations of power in the global food 
system and the attributes that facilitate or hinder the realisation of a substantive food 
democracy. 
In the second and present part, I wish to test my critical theory-in-progress on two forms of 
empirical data: documentary and discourse. In order to strengthen the internal validity of my 
research I have used, whenever possible, multiple sources. The main focus of my empirical 
research is on the critical / comparative analysis of food policy discourses (more specifically, 
critical discourse analysis or CDA). The documentary analysis serves both as a context and as
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a check for the nine discourses from key food actors that I will assess according to their 
ecological and democratic quality. Whereas a carefully constructed CDA can be a reliable and
valid tool, the documentary analysis of a system as large and complex as the modern food 
system will unavoidably be rudimentary. Yet the enormous amount of information available 
on the food system represents both a limiting and a facilitating factor: since several key data 
have been confirmed by multiple sources, they may permit less equivocal conclusions.
Ideally, in order to complete my observations, I wished to include first person testimonies of 
the food actors that I chose to study. Unfortunately, FAO—a crucial food actor—adopted a 
new policy that prohibits its staff from giving interviews to researchers. Unable to interview 
all the food actors, I decided to direct my grounded and comparative analysis exclusively to 
their written discourses. 
The documentary data will be presented in biographical form in Chapter 4, guided by the 
democratic model presented in Chapter 3, but without yet bringing its full weight to bear on 
the data. Similarly, the critical discourse analysis is informed by the conditions for substantive
food democracy that I have teased out in previous chapters, but will focus firstly and foremost
on the themes, key assumptions, narrative strategies, and contradictions that can be found in 
the texts. Only after having completed the two analyses, will I test the exploratory model for 
ecological and democratic quality that I presented in Table 1, using questions that I have 
developed for each the attributes. The questions are presented at the end of this introduction. 
In this manner, I will compare the ecological-democratic characteristics of the global food 
system and those of the discourses of nine key food actors. The theoretical model so far has 
purposefully been left relatively broad and open, to allow for a selection and further study of 
the more robust variables for the confrontation of different policy options and/or 
sociopolitical arrangements.
Before presenting the research in the next two chapters, I wish to sketch the context in which 
many of the documents for the documentary research, and most of the texts that I selected for 
discourse analysis, have been written. The context will help interpret the texts, even though at 
the same time, in a first iteration, I will attempt to suspend all pre-existing categories to allow 
the texts to speak for themselves as much as possible, registering the themes as they appear. 
Often, important information is left out of policy texts, as Drummond (2012), one of the 
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inspirations for my CDA, discovered in the two case studies on food actors that she 
conducted. Drummond advises to look for omissions since they help legitimise arguments in 
the narrative as much as truth claims will. The texts need to be combed to reveal the structure 
of the argumentation as well as inconsistencies, contradictions, and paradoxes. Providing a 
context will therefore assist in detecting what is missing.
With some justifiable exceptions, the majority of documents that helped uncover the structure 
of the global food system are not older than six or seven years (2009), with many not older 
than four or five years (2011-2012). Taking into consideration the complex socio-ecological 
dynamics of the modern food system, this is as recent as global data will get in this field. The 
nine reports selected for CDA—of which a list can be found in Appendix A—are, with one 
exception, all less then two years old. The same applies to the supporting documents for the 
CDA (additional reports that were used to cross-check statements). The timing is relevant 
because the year 2015 was particularly important for global environmental decision-making. 
Only the future will tell if it was a historical year, but nevertheless the promises that were 
made by governments from all over the world on social and environmental matters were the 
most ambitious so far in the history of environmental governing. This was the year the G7 
committed to ending extreme poverty and undernutrition by 2030, as well as to moving to a 
zero carbon economy by 2100. It was the year the UN General Assembly adopted 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)1—representing 169 specific targets—to replace the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the framework of which expired in this same year. 
The SDGs form the broadest sustainable policy agenda yet and include bold statements such 
as eradicating (rather than simply combatting) poverty and hunger, and defending full equality
for women and men. This new Agenda for Sustainable Development became even more 
convincing with the inclusion of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda2, adopted in the same year 
by 150 countries to finance critical public services that may help tackle social, economic, and 
environmental challenges across the developing world. Finally, at the end of 2015, the 195 
countries represented at the UN Climate Conference in Paris (COP21)3 agreed to keep global 
1 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, available: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L.85&Lang=E (accessed 10 September 2016).
2 Final text of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, “Financing for Development”, available: 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf (accessed 16 September 2016).
3 Final text of the so-called Paris Agreement, available: 
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warming below 2 degrees Celsius (above pre-industrial levels); to increase ambition in 
combatting climate change by setting a higher floor from which to create national climate 
action plans (by taking the 188 national plans that had so far been submitted as the minimum 
floor); to assume national—and not just common—responsibility; and to report regularly on 
progress. The same month, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) launched a G20 
coordinated—and Rockefeller Foundation financed—technical platform to measure and help 
reduce food loss and waste,4 while developed countries finally agreed at a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) meeting in Nairobi to end their subsidies of farm exports with immediate
effect5.
The increasing substantiveness of promises for social and ecological well-being, coupled with
a growth in detail of action agendas, denote a gradual change in the attitude of “globalising” 
bureaucrats, who appear to become more willing to sacrifice some national wealth in return 
for a more equitable and ecologically more sustainable world. The adoption of the SDGs 
comes at the heels of a long process of reflection and discussion on the relative failures of the 
MDGs. Some developments that are specific to the food system have been: 
• The reform of the Committee on World Food Security in 2009, as a reaction to the 
2007 and 2008 food crises (now allowing input from any interested parties, instead of 
only a selection of “experts”); 
• The proposal of key frameworks to tackle the social and ecological challenges of the 
global food system, such as the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests6 in 2012, and the Principles for Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems7 in 2014; 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf 
(accessed 17 September 2016).
4 More information available: http://www.fao.org/platform-food-loss-waste/en/ (accessed 18 November 2016).
5 The text of the so-called “Nairobi Package” is available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm (accessed 20 November 2016).
6 Available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf (accessed 20 November 2016).
7 Available: http://www.fao.org/3/a-ml291e.pdf (accessed 20 November 2016).
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• The strengthening and politicisation of the concept of food security, originally coined 
in the 1970s, when it referred almost exclusively to food supply8, whereas since 2000 
its social and political dimensions have been recognised9; 
• The gradual operationalisation of the moral and legal concept of the “Right to 
Food”—currently written into the constitutions of over 40 countries (FAO 2006, 
Policy Brief). 
• The adoption of the right to food as a social right also resulted in the year 2000 in the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (now called Human Rights Council). 
• Finally, in 2014, the UN Human Rights Council passed what has been considered a 
landmark resolution to establish a working group to develop a legally binding 
instrument on transnational corporations (TNCs)10 and other businesses with respect to
human rights.11 The treaty, promoted mostly by countries from the Global South and 
opposed by wealthier countries such as the USA and those of the EU, aims “to 
regulate TNC behavior so that states implement their human rights obligations to 
protect people against harm from TNC activities” (Right to Food and Nutrition Watch 
2015, 41).
Despite these positive developments and the recent, largely unprecedented agreements among
governments, not much has actually been put in motion as I write in the Summer of 2016. 
Only 22 percent of countries have ratified the Paris agreement, when a minimum of 55 
percent is necessary to start the plan12. The “Nairobi package” (ending farm export subsidies 
8 World Food Conference 1974.
9 In FAO’s 2002 publication The State of Food Insecurity in the World, the idea of social access is added to the
definition of food security, which now reads: “Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.
10 UNCTAD definition: "[...] an enterprise comprising entities in more than one country which operate under a
system of decision-making that permits coherent policies and a common strategy". Available:
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx (accessed 20 September 2015).
11 The text of the resolution is available: https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/G1408252.pdf (accessed 2 December 2016).
12 The threshold for entry into force was achieved on 5 October 2016, but 60 countries have yet to ratify, while
the president-elect of one of the two largest polluting countries (the USA, the other being China), has already
threatened to take no steps to live up to the agreement.
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by wealthy countries) has not been put in motion, to the despair of the least developed 
countries who cannot compete with the subsidised products that flood their markets. 
Meanwhile, the USA and the EU are rushing through bilateral and multi-lateral trade 
agreements that may seriously weaken the sovereignty of weaker and/or poorer nation-states. 
Agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), to be 
celebrated between the USA and Europe, and similar agreements all over the world—the 
largest of these being the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP involving the USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia and four other countries—are being negotiated behind closed doors, with only 
lobbyists from corporations able to influence the discussions, while civil society is kept out. 
Leaked documents have nevertheless made the intentions of the negotiators clear: many food 
safety regulations are to be weakened or eliminated, governments will cease to have 
discretionary powers over their food systems, and businesses will be able to sue governments 
that hamper their profit margin outside of the legal system, using arbitration (Right to Food 
and Nutrition Watch 2015, 50). The trade primacy that I uncovered when analysing the 
political economy of the modern food system in Chapter 1, receives it confirmation in what I 
have called “caveat” clauses in the latest global environmental agreement: these reveal that 
the SDGs will not place any specific demands on industry or on powerful countries to restrain
themselves—all action is voluntary and will not harm trade. In fact, the SDG agenda pushes 
for a new WTO agreement—which has been hampered because of serious complaints from 
countries from the Global South about the restrictions that the 1994 WTO convention places 
on public procurement of food by national governments13—by implying that the Doha 
Development Agenda should be wrapped up quickly (Target 17.10 in the SDG agenda). It also
asks for the WTO to be the regulating institution in matters of global trade (Target 68), despite
the fact, as I will further demonstrate in Chapter 4, that the WTO is not an independent 
institution. According to the WTO itself (cited in Oxford Farming Conference 2012), the USA
and the original 15 EU countries contribute to over 50 percent of the WTO’s budget, while 
they also lodge over 40 percent of the trade-related complaints. There is even specific mention
13 The so-called Uruguay Round of negotiations (the predecessor of the current Doha Round) culminated in
over 60 agreements, of which one of the most contested ones is the Agreement on Agriculture mentioned
previously. Among other restrictions this agreement does not allow governments to subsidise food for their
own people by directly or indirectly favouring local producers, since this is considered a “trade distortion”.
Read more about the WTO and how it harms the food security interests of countries in the Global South in
the 2015 Right to Food and Nutrition Watch report.
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of trade liberalisation in the SDG agenda, which could mean a continuation of the 
controversial approach called the Washington Consensus (Ibid., Target 68). Finally, one of the
“5 P's” touted as the motto of the agreement (the idea of P's itself is inspired by business 
practice rather than politics or ethics), represents partnership, a term that implies an equal 
standing that many of the actors in the food system do not have14, whereas a term such as 
solidarity or cooperation would have been more embracing of justice and equity. As discussed
in previous chapters, partnerships are the new buzzword since its first use at the Earth Summit
in Johannesburg in 2002, and no international agreement or report is now complete without it.
I will discuss the concept in more detail when I look at the different discourses in Chapter 5.
The aforementioned former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, 
observes in his concluding report (De Schutter 2014, 4):
Most stakeholders agree, in general terms, on the urgent need for reform. Measured against the requirement
that they should contribute to the realization of the right to food, the food systems we have inherited from
the twentieth century have failed. Of course, significant progress has been achieved in boosting agricultural
production over the past fifty years. But this has hardly reduced the number of hungry people, and the
nutritional outcomes remain poor.
He notes, with concern, how trade continues to trump food, people, and equity (Ibid., 19):
The ninth Ministerial Conference of WTO, held in Bali, Indonesia, from 3 to 7 December 2013, which
failed to place food security above trade concerns, provides a textbook illustration of the need to improve
coherence of global governance for the realization of the right to food: no area, not even trade, should be
left aside from discussions concerning this paramount objective. 
The negotiations in Bali resulted in an extremely watered-down so-called “peace clause” to 
provide relief for the food security programs of less wealthy countries. This clause, on the one
hand, was clothed in ambiguous language, raising doubts as to its validity, and on the other 
hand, was only conceded by the richer countries after poorer countries agreed to sign the first 
multilateral agreement foreseen by the Doha Development Round—the Trade Facilitation 
agreement15 (Right to Food and Nutrition Watch 2015, 47). The negotiations were resumed in 
2015 in Nairobi, with the Doha Round’s conclusion being announced with much fanfare, 
14 Under target 17.16 we can read: “Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented
by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial
resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular
developing countries”. Available: http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/ (accessed 8 December 2016).
15 Trade Facilitation is an aspect of trade liberalisation, establishing provisions for “expediting the movement, 
release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit”, WTO definition available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm (accessed 15 September 2016).
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albeit completely prematurely, by the promoters of global trade (such as the business 
association World Economic Forum (WEF), representatives from the US government, and the 
World Trade Organisation itself). This prompted the new Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, Hilal Elver, to intervene and remind national and international bureaucrats that 
“development” has been a missing link in the Doha Development Round and that WTO rules 
have systematically undermined the right to food.16
In the 2015 report on the impact of business operations on people’s livelihoods (in particular 
nutrition), organised by the Right to Food and Nutrition Watch initiative, one contributor 
gives the following example of the extreme injustice of global food politics:
To understand the level of inequity involved, consider this: the US spends approximately US $75 billion on
just one of its food subsidy programs—Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), popularly
known as the food stamps—for 47 million beneficiaries. This translates to US $1,608 annually per person.
Contrast this with the US $20 billion dollars that India is proposing to spend to cover 867 million
entitlement holders under its National Food Security Act (2013). This is less than US $25 per person each
year. The US thus provides roughly 64 times more food aid compared to what India intends to provide per
person per year. While the WTO considers the US SNAP program as non ‘trade-distorting’, it regards
India’s National Food Security Act as ‘trade-distorting’ since it is providing price support to food producers
by purchasing produce above the ERP. (Patnaik, in Right to Food and Nutrition Watch 2015, 45)
Similarly, Guimarães and Fontoura (2012), when analysing discourses at the 2012 RIO+20 
Earth Summit, found that, despite a stable, and in some cases growing use of the ecological- 
and social-inspired discourses of "food security", "non-GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
measures of wealth", and "sustainability", their effectiveness is largely annulled. In part, this 
is due to the lack of concrete definitions and operationalisations of these concepts, while 
additionally the use of equally strong discourses such as "scientific credibility", "green 
economy", "natural capital", and "public-private partnerships" helps to overshadow alternative
solutions. The term "food sovereignty", which encloses strong notions of justice and equity, 
was actively resisted at the Earth Summit by businesses and governments of wealthier 
countries. Guimarães and Fontoura conclude that the Rio+20 summit resulted in the 
reaffirmation of the power of the private sector and of wealthier countries in setting the global
environmental agenda (Ibid., 47). They offer this as proof of the capacity of the overarching 
discourse of green capitalism (now rephrased as "green economy") to co-opt the concerns of 
16 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commisisioner, “UN expert urges trade ministers to focus 
concrete outcomes on food security,” 15 December 2015, available: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16888&LangID=E (accessed 12 
September 2016).
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the public, environmental NGOs, and social movements, thereby robbing concepts such as 
sustainability and equity of their militancy. In their view, the idea of what they call “green 
reformism” is the most prominent discourse of our time, pervading the actions of national and
supranational governing institutions alike, while openly aligned with the interests of large 
businesses. 
Other, equally hegemonic17 narratives that are common in the texts of institutional food actors 
are that of "technological change" and "economic growth", used to justify an approach to 
agriculture that combines a reliance on science and technology with increasing production for 
export markets and the attainment of economies of scale (Friedmann 2000, cited in the case 
study by Drummond 2012). Johnston (2008) identifies a meta-discourse among business food 
actors that she terms "conservation through consumption", and which she saw in action at the 
organic supermarket chain Whole Foods Market. She deems it to be business' response to the 
discrediting of the older "liberal capitalist productivism" discourse, by co-opting ecological 
concerns into the culture-ideology of consumerism.
I find the world in 2016 both substantially different and the same as the world in 1996, when 
heads of state present at the World Food Summit reaffirmed “the right of everyone to have 
access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”18. It is different because the social 
struggle for equity in the food system has been globally recognised and important advances 
have been made in identifying the factors that underlie persistent hunger and poverty. The 
right to food has been inscribed in several national constitutions and is an integral part of 
international agreements. The Committee on World Food Security was drastically reformed in
2009 to allow inputs from all sectors of society—with an emphasis on people directly 
impacted by food policies—and has granted a more prominent role to civil society groups. 
But it is the same because, while food production continues hitting all-time highs, and while 
drug, chemical, and biotech behemoths continue to merge in multi-billion dollar deals19, 795 
17 I use hegemony in the Gramscian sense, as power created culturally, through ideas and knowledge, by
consent rather than force.
18 Rome Declaration on World Food Security 1996, available: 
http://www.fao.org/WorldFoodSummit/sideevents/papers/Y6959e.htm (accessed 10 October 2016).
19 The drug and chemical company Bayer announced in the beginning of 2016 that it was looking to acquire
agri-chemical company Monsanto for US$ 62 billion. Meanwhile the Chinese chemical company
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million people still go hungry while many more suffer from some form of malnutrition 
(including obesity), and at least a third of the world is still achingly poor20. These are some of 
the facts that I will bring to light in a short biography of the food system in the next chapter. 
The final chapter will then take a look at how different food actors deal with the food system’s
paradoxes in their discourses.
Questions to guide the assessment of ecological-democratic quality
For each attribute of each dimension of ecological-democratic quality, I have prepared one or 
two questions that will help assess whether the practice, decision-making process, or policy—
whether proposed or effective—can be deemed ecological-democratic in the sense that I have 
gradually developed in my research.
Basic Democratic Dimension
Political equality: Are all affected parties to the decisions given the opportunity to influence 
decision-making and to have their interests considered? Is the decision-making process free of
domination by one or more interest groups or discrimination of any kind?
Political freedom: Are the basic freedoms for democratic decision-making recognised—
freedom of speech, of movement, of religion, of petition, and of association? Are all parties to
the decision-making free from coercion?
Accountability: Are decisions made with full disclosure of the information supporting the 
decision? Are decision-makers held responsible for the consequences of their decisions?
ChemChina is taking over Monsanto’s rival Syngenta.
20 World Hunger Education Service, available http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-
facts-and-statistics/ : 2.1 billion people in the developing world lived on less than US$ 3.10 a day in 2012. 
The World Bank now insists on measuring only extreme poverty—less than US$ 1.90 a day—which they say
dropped from 35 percent of the world population to 10.7 percent, available: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview (accessed 21 October 2016).
162
A global food polity
Responsiveness: Will the decisions and proposed policies correspond to the wishes and needs 
of the targeted and/or impacted beneficiaries?21
Dimension of Popular Control
Active inclusion: Are all interested and affected parties contacted and included in the 
decision-making process?
Equitable distribution of common resources: Will both benefits and costs of the use of 
common resources be equitably distributed among the users of those resources, according to 
both their usage and their needs?
Deliberative decision-making process: Are decisions taken cooperatively by the affected 
parties under conditions of equality and the employment of reasonable arguments? Does the 
decision-making process reflect the willingness of all parties to reach decisions in the interest 
of the common good?
Cognitive justice: Is the knowledge that under-builds the decision-making ecologically 
literate, socially just, and relevant to context?22
Social legitimacy: Are those who bear the consequences of the decision-making, the final 
decision-makers? Does the burden of proof rest with those who seek less rather than more 
inclusive arrangements?23
Political participation: Are all the publics who are potentially affected by decision-making 
involved in all the phases of the decision-making process, including its implementation and 
evaluation? Is decision-making understood as the common management of the affairs of a 
group, community, or wider polity?
21 This question in a more comprehensive survey would be stated as follows: Do the decisions and resulting
policies correspond to the wishes and needs of the decision-makers’ constituents?
22 This question is derived from Michel Pimbert’s (2006) conception of cognitive justice.
23 This question is derived from Dewey’s principle for social legitimacy (1925-27/ 2012, 22)
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Dimension of Autonomy
Contestation: Are decisions the result of a comprehensive agreement among all interested and 
affected parties, after consideration of all conflicts of interests and ideas? Can affected parties 
overturn decisions when these harm more inclusive interests?
Reflexivity: Do decision-makers subject their decisions and policies to tests of collective self-
awareness, self-inquiry, and self-confrontation? Are there indications of social learning, i.e. 
have decision-makers changed their attitudes as a consequence of the re-evaluation of 
decisions?
Social control over common resources: Are primary users of common resources also the 
primary decision-makers in matters pertaining to these resources?
Diversity: Does decision-making take into account the right to self-determination of culturally
or socially divergent groups, as long as the latter are equally respectful of this right?
Altruism: Are decision-makers willing to relinquish personal or collective welfare in the 
interest of others that are more needful?
Negative Dimension
Rights of Nature: Are natural organisms, including ecosystems, protected from harm and 
allowed to thrive?
Restriction of elite control: Are socioeconomic and political elites barred from deciding on 
issues of the common good? Are the interests of those who seek more inclusive arrangements 
given precedence over the interests of those who seek less inclusive arrangements?
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IV
The ecological-democratic quality of the food system
The documentary data that I will present in this chapter to support my democratic analysis 
comes from three secondary sources (where possible, these sources are combined): 
supranational agencies of “rule making” from among the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods institutions, several of which will be also be the subjects of my CDA; civil society 
organisations and scientists that conduct independent research on the food system; and 
multi-actor, multi-country, multi-disciplinary assessment teams, such as the one that 
delivered the 2009 IAASTD24 report. Most of the documents are the result of research or 
meta-research presented as reports, and rely on statistical indicators that are most often 
provided by the same sources—FAO and World Bank—who have the resources to regularly
collect statistical data on the food system. Following Scott’s (1990) guidelines for 
documentary research, the selected sources are authentic, credible (when not internationally
known, at least recognised in their field of expertise), and representative of the knowledge 
pertaining to the global food system. Given the wealth of statistical and anecdotal 
information available on the food system, I had to proceed with what is called “data 
reduction”. In this stage, inevitably a lot of information gets left out while it may be unclear
what the priorities are for keeping some information and losing other. I tried to minimise 
this bias by, on the one hand, focusing on data that is representative of the political 
economy of the food system—i.e. illustrates the dynamics of the economic and political 
relations—and on the other hand, carefully listing the sources for verification purposes. 
Additionally, as I mentioned before, I cross-checked the facts whenever possible. 
The biography of the modern food system will be presented in four parts: the first will 
discuss new powerful food actors who act globally, the second will examine how these food
actors operate and to what consequences, the third will look at the main losers in the 
24 Report resulting from the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development conducted between 2005 and 2007, available: 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/Assessments/Ecosystems/IAASTD/tabid/105853/Defa (accessed 18 June 2012).
165
A global food polity
modern food system, while the fourth and last will examine the role of technoscience25 in 
legitimising the modern food system.
The modern food system and the new food actors
My main object of study, the global food system, is typified by complex socio-ecological 
dynamics, interwoven into many, if not all areas of human existence. The definition adopted 
by the Committee on World Food Security for the field of “agriculture and food systems” is 
useful to clarify what policy-makers are referring to:
Agriculture and food systems encompass the entire range of activities involved in the production,
processing, marketing, retail, consumption, and disposal of goods that originate from agriculture, including
food and non-food products, livestock, pastoralism, fisheries including aquaculture, and forestry; and the
inputs needed and the outputs generated at each of these steps. Food systems also involve a wide range of
stakeholders, people and institutions, as well as the sociopolitical, economic, technological and natural
environment in which these activities take place. (Committee on World Food Security, Principles for
Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 2014).
This characterisation of the activities surrounding agriculture and food illustrates clearly how 
central these activities are to human existence and how they impact on our global socio-
ecological systems.
While it is still correct to speak of food systems in the plural, since locally organised food 
production persists in most parts of the world and is estimated to contribute between more 
than 50 to more than 70 percent of the world’s food consumption with a fraction of the land 
that industrial agriculture uses26, it is also possible to identify a globalised food system that 
impacts on food production, distribution, and consumption all over the world. Two important 
indicators are the growth in international trade in agricultural and food products, and the 
25 As discussed in Chapter 3, for those that use this term negatively, it is a rejection of the idea of science as a
pure and value-free practice, instead placing it at the heart of politics and economics, which it is deemed to
serve.
26 Graeub et al. conducted a meta-study in 2015 to correct the grave imprecisions in food production statistics.
Until then it was widely assumed, based on unclear sources, that 90 percent of farmers are smallholder
farmers and that collectively they produce between 70 and 80 percent of the world’s food. Graeub et al.,
widening the sample and using best available data, find that 98 percent of farmers are so-called “family
farmers” (the exact definition varies from country to country and was maintained by the authors, but it is
important to distinguish the family farm from the smallholder), who own at least 53 percent of agricultural
land and produce an equal share of the world’s food. This is an average since in many countries the
contribution is higher, for example in Brazil the family farm sector is estimated to produce 70 percent of
national food consumption.
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increasing concentration of this trade in the hands of very large transnational corporations. 
Clapp and Fuchs (2009) add the volatility in food prices, felt especially poignantly in 2007 
and 2008, as another strong indicator of the global nature of the modern food system. Senauer
and Venturini (2005), while examining the indicators for a globalised food system, offer 
several key insights:
• Processed foods are taking over from traditional agricultural commodities in relative 
importance in global trade;
• in turn, these foods are increasingly produced in a different country (or countries) 
from those where they are sold, presenting one of the highest degrees of 
transnationality;
• large companies dominate global agricultural trade (in 1999, the food industry had the 
fourth largest number of entries in the list of the largest 100 TNCs); and
• there has been a marked shift from national to global retailing.
A very recent study in Spain, conducted by Brunori et al. (2016), and which included the 
systems theorist Mario Giampietro, challenges the oft-cited dichotomy between “local” and 
“global” food systems. The results from their case studies indicate that “differences between 
‘local’ and ‘global’ are dispersed along a local–global continuum, and that in real life local 
and global do not always belong to separate settings or domains”, and that “[fo]od chain 
actors, adapting continuously to a changing environment, establish relations with a 
multiplicity of other actors for a variety of reasons and animate multiple chain 
configurations”. Despite this high interconnectedness, the researchers were able to rank food 
supply chains according to their relative sustainability, using aspects relating to geography, 
product identity, distance between input and production as well as producer and consumer, 
smaller sizes, the level and quality of chain coordination, and use (and type) of technology.
Transnational corporations are a relatively new player in the modern food system, but they 
were highly instrumental in shaping its latest version, which Holt-Giménez and Peabody 
(2008, 4) call the "agri-foods industrial complex", and which comes into existence during the 
1970s. The authors claim that the agri-foods industrial complex was largely built with public 
funds, including for research, and based on the collection of valuable peasant germ plasm 
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from Asia and Latin America. Even though agri-businesses are private enterprises, they have 
enjoyed the support of the governments where they originated and their activities have been 
legitimised by the supranational agencies that these governments sponsor (Ibid., 2). In 
Chapter 1, I presented arguments by Garcia (2006) and Pierce (2012), among others, on how 
the capitalist reproductive model that some call biocapitalism has been financed by a fusion of
public and private funding, and has been actively protected by prominent political, economic, 
and scientific leaders, who defend that research should be useful to the economy and who 
have no qualms about privatising public knowledge or resources.
Since the corporation has become a major food actor, it is important to understand what 
corporations are exactly, and how they are different from other enterprises. Corporations have 
been a form of organising business for about 300 years, but it was only in the twentieth 
century that "corporate capitalism" became, and now remains, the norm (Bakan 2005, 13). For
a while it was banned in England—until 1825—but after that their number grew quickly on 
both sides of the North Atlantic. The investigative writer Joel Bakan (2005) ascribes the 
ascent of the modern corporate era to the railroad barons of the nineteenth century in the USA 
and in England. Railroads were "mammoth undertakings requiring huge amounts of capital 
investment", favouring the corporate or joint form of financing (Ibid., 10). The concept of 
limited liability made publicly traded corporations possible, removing an important obstacle 
to their growth by eliminating the risk that investors incurred. And grow they did. According 
to a ranking by Global Justice Now, based on 2015 data from the CIA World Factbook and 
Fortune Global 500, 69 percent of the top 100 largest economic entities in the world are 
corporations and not countries.27 Three of them, Apple, Shell, and the food corporation 
Walmart stores—which is the richest corporation in the world and the tenth largest economic 
entity—are richer than Russia, Belgium, and Sweden combined. The top 10 largest 
corporations, including the previously named three, have a combined revenue that exceeds the
combined income of the world’s 180 “poorest” countries. The numbers become even greater 
when the sample is broadened to 200 economic entities. The corporations’ share then jumps to
over 75 percent.
27 Global Justice Now, “10 biggest corporations make more money than most countries in the world combined”,
12 September 2016, available: http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2016/sep/12/10-biggest-corporations-
make-more-money-most-countries-world-combined (accessed 25 October 2016).
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Although there are currently millions of corporations around the world, a Swiss study found 
that in reality a mere 147 corporations are at the centre of the global economy, controlling 40 
percent of the world's wealth (Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston 2011). The study looked at all 
transnational corporations, which at the time totalled 43,060, and managed to create the first 
map of the "worldwide structure of corporate control" (Ibid., 2).
Matching the rise of the transnational corporation, the first supranational institutions came 
into existence in the twentieth century and are now just as much an integral part of our 
political and economic landscape. Supranational institutions are forms of governance or rule-
making "whereby sovereign states agree to abide by norms which are adopted at a higher 
level of organization" (Best 2005, 2). Their ascension has been most successful in economic 
policy-making (as opposed to environmental or social governance attempts). Best explains 
that the first supranational institution in the European Union was created to regulate two 
industries—coal and steel—in 1951. The European Court of Justice was initially established 
to regulate the resulting European Coal and Steel Community, and later helped advance the 
integration of European policies in other areas (Ibid.). The Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) were likewise born from a desire of the 
victors of the Second World War (in particular the USA) to be in control of the global 
economy, and their functioning and legitimacy has been tied to the functioning and legitimacy
of what continues to be the world’s dominant economic power (Köchler, 2006). Köchler 
claims that the supranational organisations of the United Nations continue to suffer from a 
built-in bias towards the world's most powerful countries, which are also the five permanent 
members of the Security Council.
It is important to remember that neither of these two powerful economic and political food 
actors, the corporation and the supranational organisation—which have direct access to 
democratic governments all over the world, is in itself a democratically run institution. In the 
book The Common Good, Noam Chomsky famously stated in relation to corporations:
[…] it's ridiculous to talk about freedom in a society dominated by huge corporations. What kind of
freedom is there inside a corporation? They're totalitarian institutions—you take orders from above and
maybe give them to people below you. There's about as much freedom as under Stalinis m. (Chomsky et al.
1998, 19)
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In relation to supranational institutions, Bonanno (2004) warns that these are very effectively 
shielded from input by citizens, reducing their need for legitimation. Bonanno denounces how
“their functioning is largely based on the executive actions of elite bureaucracies with only 
remote—and in some cases non existent—links with the constituencies they are supposed to 
represent” (Ibid., 42). And Habermas predicted, even before the European Common Market 
came into being: 
The fact that states of the European Community are gradually growing together, especially with the caesura
that will be created when a common market is introduced in 1993, sheds light on the relation between the
nation-state and democracy: the democratic processes constituted at the level of the nation-state lag
hopelessly behind the economic integration taking place at a supranational level. (Habermas 1992, first
published in 1990)
Even the successor to the Common Market, the European Union, despite its directly elected 
European Parliament, still concedes little more than advisory status to its elected bodies, 
whereas its legislative and executive powers are discretionary (Bonanno 2004, 42). In this 
way, nation-states are burdened with the task of legitimising decisions that were not taken by 
democratic institutions nor via democratic processes, decisions that additionally are often 
beyond the nation-state’s control (Ibid.).
In order to illustrate the extent of the “transnationalisation of social relations” (Bonanno 2004,
44) and the characteristics of what Sklair (2001) calls the “transnational capitalist class”, in 
the next sections I will present a selection of lesser-known facts about the functioning of the 
food system, supported by infographics.
Food: a trillion dollar business, but not for everyone
At present time, the global food and agricultural market, from “seed to shelf”, is estimated to 
bring in around US$ 7 trillion in annual sales28, possibly making this the biggest market in the 
28 Plunkett Research’s estimate for 2015 was US$ 7.8 trillion, which in turn is based on the World Bank’s
estimate that food and agriculture make up 10 percent of the world’s GDP. Plunkett Research, “Food,
Beverage and Grocery Overview”, available: https://www.plunkettresearch.com/industries/food-beverage-
grocery-market-research/ (accessed 2 September 2016).
FAO reported in 2014 that the contribution of agriculture alone came down from 4.3% of global GDP to
3.3% between 1970 and 2014, which would translate to approximately US$ 2 trillion. In contrast, the
contribution of food processsing has increased significantly and in wealthier countries surpasses that of
agriculture. Available: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-economic/en/ (accessed 12 December 2016).
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world, taking over the lead from the energy market (for which a global value is surprisingly 
hard to find, but the most mentioned number has been US$ 6 trillion for 201029). 
The characteristic that stands out most when looking at the numbers for food and agriculture, 
is the degree of concentration in each of the sectors. The illustration in Figure 2, created by 
Oxfam International, brings this fact to light quite dramatically. It is based on 2012 data and 
reveals the 10 most powerful (processed) food and beverage companies, which together 
control almost all of the brands that are available at retail chains in most countries in the 
world.
Source: Oxfam International, 2013, Behind the Brands campaign30
Figure 2. Corporate control of the food supply
29 Amongst other informal sources, Daniel Yergin mentions this number in his 2011 book The Quest: Energy,
Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World. Most energy reports only present quantities, not value.
30 Oxfam International, “Behind the brands”, available: https://www.behindthebrands.org/ (accessed 16
September 2016).
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Figure 3 shows the so-called hourglass shape of the agrifood market: communication between
the two large groups of farmers and consumers—respectively bottom and top—is mediated by
small groups of very large traders, processors, and retailers. Oligopolies or partial oligopolies 
(markets that are dominated by several large firms) are present in all fundamental markets for 
industrial food production: whether seeds, chemicals, trading, processing, or retailing (Holt-
Giménez and Patel 2009, Chapter 2; Oxford Farming Conference 2012). The existence of 
oligopolies is exemplified in Figure 3 for four industries: grain trade, retail, agrochemicals, 
and commercial seeds.
Sources: IAASTD 2009 (Synthesis Report) / Ketill Berger and UNEP / GRID-Arendal (hourglass graph); Oxford
Farming Conference 2012 (sectorial data)
Figure 3. Concentration in food and agricultural markets
Generally, when the average four-firm concentration ratio in a particular market exceeds 50 
percent, that market is considered to be controlled by a cartel. In 2011, the threshold for the 
definition of a cartel was exceeded in all food-related industries except for fertilisers (ETC 
Group 2013; European Commission 2015). In some countries, the concentration is extreme: in
Australia, just three companies control over 75 percent of the retail market for food and in the 
USA, three firms are in control of more than 80 percent of maize exports (FAO 2003).
Philip Howard (2009) was one of the first scholars to empirically demonstrate the extreme 
consolidation in the commercial seed industry, which has largely been taken over by 
pharmaceutical and/or chemical companies. Howard claims the seed industry has become a 
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market where competition is no longer based on price, with the top four seed firms, which 
control 56 percent of the global proprietary seed market, able to command price premiums for
their products, as long as these continue investing in research and in advertising (Ibid., 1270). 
Howard finds that “[o]ne motivation for continuing competition in these arenas is that they 
serve as barriers to entry to other firms, thus protecting an oligopoly’s high rate of profit” 
(Ibid.).
Howard’s well-known information graph depicting the concentrated seed market is presented 
in Figure 4. It shows how pharmaceutical and chemical companies have been merging over 
the past two decades while they penetrated the agricultural markets, and how they now control
the seed industry. Howard found that the largest firms were the result of buy-outs, mergers, or 
joint ventures involving more than two hundred firms (Ibid., 1273).
Source: Howard 2009
Figure 4. Diagram of the “Life Sciences” corporations
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The concept of “food chain clusters”, a form of concentration, was coined almost twenty 
years ago and exemplified most poignantly by the research of Hendrickson and Heffernan 
(2002). The authors identify several strategies that food and agriculture firms follow as they 
develop: they can integrate horizontally by growing in the same sector; they can integrate 
vertically by moving “upstream or downstream in the agriculture and food commodity 
chains” (Ibid., 350); and they can globalise using the two previous strategies in new countries.
Hendrickson and Heffernan (Ibid.) comment: “Each of these different strategies—all of them 
increasing the concentration of ownership and control in the food system—are highly 
dependent on the formation and sustaining of relationships and networks”. The researchers 
present the example of ConAgra: this giant corporation produces its own livestock feed and 
the agrochemicals and seeds that supply this market (it teams up with Dupont to control the 
latter two sectors), besides raising its own cattle, slaughtering it, processing, and broiling it. 
Additionally, it is one of the largest millers in the USA, trades its own grain, and processes 
and retails food. Hendrickson and Heffernan warn that in a food chain cluster, “the food 
product is passed along from stage to stage, but ownership never changes and neither does the
location of the decision-making”.
The extreme integration in food and agricultural markets is not limited to corporations, but 
stretches to countries as well. The richest countries in the world command a disproportionate  
share of world agricultural trade. As discussed earlier, whereas in the 1960s the countries of 
the Global South had a yearly positive trade balance in food exceeding US$ 7 billion, four 
decades later their surplus had been transformed into a food deficit of US$ 11 billion a year 
(Holt-Giménez and Peabody 2008). A handful of countries in the South have been able to 
maintain their earlier advantage (in particular Brazil and India), and are part of the top twenty 
countries that dominate food and agricultural trade (see Figure 5), which collectively account 
for approximately 70 to 78 percent of global exports and 65 to 70 percent of global imports in 
2014 (based on numbers by Oxford Farming Conference 2012 and the research company 
Knoema31).
31 Knoema, “Major exporters and importers of food and agricultural products”, 2014, available: 
http://pt.knoema.com/cduhihd/world-exports-and-imports-of-agricultural-products (accessed 20 September 
2015).
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Source: Oxford Farming Conference 2012, based on data from FAO Statistical Yearbook, 2010
Figure 5. Top exporting countries in agriculture
Source: Oxford Farming Conference 2012, based on data from UNCTAD 2009
Figure 6. Home economies of the world’s top agribusiness TNCs
Likewise, as illustrated in Figure 6, 89 percent of the transnational corporations that currently 
dominate trade come from only 20 countries, with the majority originating either from the EU
or North America (Oxford Farming Conference 2012, 14). In a similar manner, agricultural 
land is concentrated in only 25 countries (75 percent of land), with only five countries (China,
USA, Brazil, Australia, and Russia) possessing one third of the world's agricultural area (Ibid.,
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34).  This land, in turn, is concentrated mostly in the hands of large-scale farmers and food 
corporations, which operate predominantly in North- and Latin America and Western Europe 
(Figure 7a). 
Source: IAASTD 2016, based on statistical data from FAO, 2014
Figure 7a. Global distribution of farms
The most recent comprehensive meta-study to estimate the number, size and distribution of 
farms worldwide, conducted for FAO by Lowder, Skoet, and Raney (2016), calculated that 
there are over 570 million farms in the world, of which the majority are small (84 percent of 
farms are less than 2 hectares in size) and family-run. The average farm size varies greatly 
between regions (Figure 7b). On the whole, the study found small farms (under 2 hectares) to 
control only 12 percent of agricultural land worldwide.  This means that only 16 percent of 
farms occupy 88 percent of all farmland, as exemplified in Figure 8. But, whereas in most of 
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific (excluding China), the majority of farms are smaller than 2 
hectares and the control over the land is more evenly distributed among the classes of farms 
(with few very large farms), in Latin America and the Caribbean, farms are on average larger 
and very large farms (over 1,000 hectares) control practically half of all agricultural land. The 
authors conclude there is a trend for the concentration of land in the hands of large-scale 
farms in higher-income countries, while simultaneously, average farm size is decreasing in 
most lower-income countries. They did not manage to corroborate the oft-cited claim that 
“small farms feed the world”. This does not mean the claim should be rejected, but more 
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studies are needed to prove the importance of small farms in the provision of domestic food 
needs. Most importantly, it is urgent to distinguish between the production of cash-crops 
(which is usually, although not exclusively, concentrated in large-scale farms) and the 
production of food for local consumption, while also distinguishing between larger and 
smaller family farms. A study in Brazil indicated that family farms (operated by an individual 
or household and under 80 hectares in size) could be contributing as much as 70 percent of 
domestic food consumption (de França et al 2009, cited in Graeub et al. 2016). Using a 
conservative approach to the definition of family farms, Graeub et al. (2016) estimate they 
may be responsible on average for at least 53 percent of the world’s agricultural production, 
but that regionally their contribution to domestic caloric requirements varies between 36 
(South America) and 114 percent (Asia and Europe).
Source: IAASTD 2016, based on data from IFAD 2010
Figure 7b. Average farm size per region
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Source: FAO 2014
Figure 8. Distribution of agricultural land per land size class
GRAIN asks how, if small farms are getting smaller in all lower- to upper-middle income 
countries, big farms are getting bigger. The answer, they feel, lies in the fast increasing 
appropriation of farmland in countries in the Global South by foreign countries and 
corporations, a phenomenon called “land-grabbing”. A report by the High Level Panel of 
Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE 2011, 8) placed the average estimate of land 
under international negotiation in 2010-2011 at between 50 and 80 million hectares. The Land
Matrix, an independent land monitoring initiative that started in 2009, managed to record 
1,204 concluded land acquisition deals covering over 42 million hectares of land up to the 
launch of their latest report (Nolte et al., October 2016). They find that Africa is the most 
targeted continent, with 42 percent of concluded deals, followed by Eastern Europe, while the 
top individual target countries are Indonesia, Ukraine, Russia, Papua New Guinea, and Brazil
—these five countries represent 46 percent of the total area sold. Rather than giving use to 
abandoned agricultural land, the land deals actually target some of the best croplands, often in
highly populated areas, which creates an unfair competition for land between foreign 
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governments and corporations and local, poor communities. The UNCTAD report on 
agriculture (2013, 238-243) presents cases in Africa where farmers were removed from land 
that was leased to foreign investors, often at ridiculously low prices or even for free (in the 
most flagrant case, in Ethiopia, 700,000 indigenous people were being forced into villages to 
free up land for investors). The Land Matrix finds land acquisitions by foreign investors 
favour capital-intensive, low labour-intensive production methods: where crops have already 
been planted on acquired land, they are most often so-called cash crops: oil seeds (with oil 
palm being highly popular), corn, wheat, and sugar crops. The Land Matrix initiative warns 
most of these crops can also be used for energy purposes. The private sector is 
overwhelmingly the beneficiary of these land acquisitions (70 percent of buyers). GRAIN 
warns that the main investors in land are now from the financial sector, rather than countries 
or agri-business corporations. In particular, there has been a significant rise in farmland 
investments by pension funds, while another major player is the development finance 
institution, a less than transparent international actor that provides assistance in development, 
based on aid funds from wealthy countries that it invests for a profit (GRAIN 2016).
Figure 9 shows the evolution of farms in a developed country, in this case the USA, between 
1945 and 2002. While the rural population and the farm share of population decreased, 
average farm size more than doubled and off-farm labour rose from 27 to 93 percent.
Source: Dimitri, Effland, and Conklin 2005
Figure 9. Evolution of the structure of US agriculture
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The extreme concentration of market power in food and agriculture in the hands of a limited 
number of corporations from a limited number of countries that have historically wielded an 
economic as well as a political advantage, has repercussions not only at many different levels 
of the “food chain”, but at different levels of the sociopolitical arrangements as well. Owing 
to the peculiar circumstances of the Second World War, which changed the balance of power 
in favour of the USA, many supranational institutions have a decision bias towards the main 
victors as well as the main vanquished, who were allowed into the club as a way to motivate 
and gear their countries towards (liberal) democracy. The 2012 report by the Oxford Farming 
Conference concluded, after reviewing the indices of economic and political concentration of 
wealth generation in food and agriculture, that economic power continues to reside in North 
America and Europe, despite the growth of some other large exporters such as Brazil and 
New Zealand. They also find indications that major EU and North American economies are 
controlling trade in exporting countries from the Global South through their transnational 
agribusiness corporations (Ibid., 24). Given that these economies have privileged access to the
international institutions of political power, their economic power translates into political 
power, enabling these countries to impose their will on other countries. This is exemplified in 
Figures 10 and 11, which demonstrate the balance of powers at two crucial supranational 
organisations of trade, respectively the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank.
Source: Oxford Farming Conference 2012, based on data from WTO 2011
Figure 10. Who controls the WTO?
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Source: Oxford Farming Conference 2012, based on data from World Bank 2011
Figure 11. Who has the votes at the World Bank?
ETC Group, a longtime corporate watch group in the global agro-industrial sector from 
Canada, documented the indices of a corporate-controlled bioeconomy— which they define 
as the commercial exploitation of the Earth’s reserves of terrestrial and aquatic biomass—in 
preparation for the 2012 Earth Summit. They found largely invisible clusters of corporate 
giants from different sectors of the life sciences industries, working together in joint ventures 
and other forms of partnerships. In this way they linked the chemical giant Dupont to the oil 
giant BP, who are working together to make seaweed fuels and bioplastics. Moreover, they 
also found the chemical corporation Dow Chemical working with the energy company 
Chevron, the food company Unilever, the agribusiness company Bunge, and the US military 
to develop synthetic biology. Their findings, coupled with the previously mentioned Swiss 
study on corporate concentration, help to uncover an “entangled web of corporate control” 
(ETC group 2011, iii). ETC Group warns that:
The world’s largest companies are converging around biomass in anticipation of a post-petrochemical
future. That doesn’t mean they’re simply grabbing land and natural resources; they’re also investing in new
technology platforms to transform plant-derived sugars (from food and fibre crops, algae, all kinds of plant
matter) into industrial products. The gravitational pull of biomass is creating new constellations of
corporate convergence across diverse industry sectors. (ETC group 2011, ii)
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The business of agriculture seems less and less about providing food and other essentials, and 
more about facilitating the industry of food. Value in the so-called food chains is captured 
mostly beyond the farm gates, as I will show next. World Bank data for 201332 tells us that the
raw products from agriculture only account on average for 3.1 percent of world GDP—
although the less developed the country, the higher the dependence on agricultural income: in 
poorer countries agriculture contributes on average 24.5 percent of GDP, while employing 70 
percent of the labour force (WTO 2014). We can find more support for the idea of an 
industry-driven food system in UNCTAD's 2009 report on agricultural investment: the authors
find that retail, trader, and processor TNCs are about 12 times larger than purely agricultural 
TNCs (UNCTAD 2009, 28).
Life at the edges of the hourglass model
Having shown the degree of concentration of economic and political power that has occurred 
in food and agriculture, I will now look at the two principal victims of this imbalance: farmers
and consumers, the two largest interest groups or agents in the food system.
Even though staple and processed food in the modern system initially became significantly 
cheaper, this trend was halted in the 1980s and after 2000 actually inverted with dramatic 
results (Figure 12). High food prices can have dire consequences for the poor, especially in 
countries in the Global South, where the poorest quintile of the population may spend up to 80
percent of income on food (FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2011).
32 World Bank indicators for agriculture and rural development, available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator?
display=graph (accessed 12 September 2015).
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Source: FAO, WFP, IFAD 2011, 11: FAO Food Price Index, adjusted for inflation
Figure 12. Trend in world food prices
At the same time, the farm value of food has dropped: in the USA, for example, it has come 
down by more than one third, despite the fact that food processors and retailers have had 
decreasing real costs all-round (Testimony on market concentration by Professor C. Robert 
Taylor to the US Senate Agriculture Committee in 199933). Another report (Schnepf 2013), 
prepared for US Congress in 2013, found that the average farm share in the final price of food
has fallen from about 41 percent in 1950 to 15.5 percent in 2011 in the USA alone (Figure 
13). Even after the commodity-driven price hikes of 200834, farm prices returned to their 
previous levels, whereas retail prices levelled off (Figure 14). What’s more, farm share does 
not yet refer to the portion that stays with the farmer, this is even less: about half of the farm 
share or 7.9 percent. The remainder of the farm share goes to agribusiness and other industry 
groups that provide the inputs for farm production (Schnepf 2013, 4). Outside of the USA, 
especially in the Global South, the proportion is much worse: based on research by Oxfam in 
2002, Patel (2008) calculates that a coffee grower in Uganda receives US$ 0.14 for a kilo of 
coffee beans. By the time this coffee is served somewhere in the Global North, it will cost 
US$ 26.40 per kilo, almost 200 times the value retained in Uganda, placing the proportional 
farm share of coffee at about half a percent (Ibid., 9-10).
33 Testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, available: 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.auburn.edu/ContentPages/50250976.pdf (accessed 18 
November 2015).
34 World Bank report on the price hikes, available:  
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6820/WP4682.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 5 
November 2015).
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Source: Schnepf 2013, based on data from the USDA
Figure 13. The farm’s share of food value
Source: IAASTD 2016
Figure 14. Percentage change in the prices of retail foodstuffs v. farm gate prices between 1980 and 2000
Meanwhile, a 2013 report by the consultancy KPMG shows the agrochemical (which provide 
the input for conventional farming: seeds and agrochemicals) and food companies have the 
highest profit levels in the food production and distribution chain (on average pulling in 
around 15 percent before income tax), whereas traders and retailers make their earnings 
through bulk sales, compensating for lower margins by selling in huge quantities. The report 
also indicates that agribusiness corporations have been improving their earnings by 
integrating vertically: both traders and retailers have moved into the food processing sector, 
the most profitable of all food and agriculture sectors, while in all sectors joint ventures are 
taking place. These joint ventures also include public sector initiatives, such as fair trade and 
other certification schemes, and even food aid organisations, giving large corporations 
questionable access to decision-making in the public interest. Within the agribusiness value 
chain calculated by KPMG, farmers, even though they are the largest group by a factor of 
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hundreds, retain approximately 22 percent of the value share, with which they still need to pay
the input (agrochemical and insurance) industry.
One of the major paradoxes in food and agriculture, highly illustrative of a system that is 
focused on trade, is that those who produce food are the ones that go the hungriest. It is 
generally estimated that approximately 2.5 billion people live directly from small-scale 
agricultural production, either as farmers or partial farmers, or as part of farming households 
(FAO 2012b). Unfortunately, they also comprise the majority of the world’s undernourished 
population and most of those living in abject poverty—living on less than US$ 1.25 a day 
(IFAD/UNEP 2013).35 They are often forced to work on the most infertile soils, while their 
plot sizes are ever decreasing (Ibid.). Even though they have the least resources of all actors in
the globalised food system, they are expected to invest in productivity improvements, under 
penalty of being left out of the market. When disaster strikes in the form of drought or pests, 
smallholders, who are generally cash-poor, are unable to purchase expensive imported foods.
A study by the International labour Office showed that nearly eight out of ten working poor 
who subsist on less than US$1.25/day live in rural areas. This means that most jobs in rural 
areas do not ensure sufficient levels of income for workers to afford adequate food for 
themselves and their families (ILO, 2012).
The widespread underinvestment in small-scale farming may have been a big mistake: more 
and more studies are showing that small farms are more productive and more efficient per unit
area than larger farms (Rosset 2000 and FAO 2014 estimate they can be more productive by a 
factor of between two and ten). The so-called “inverse farm size-productivity relationship” 
has been systematically observed in Russia, India, Africa, Asia, Europa, and Latin America 
(Barrett, Bellemare, and Hou 2010). Rejecting the mostly economic explanations that have 
been offered, the well-known agroecologist Miguel Altieri, who has been researching the 
relative productivity of small-scale farming for many years, states with some confidence that 
small farms in regimes of polyculture (multiple crops) outperform farms that operate in 
regimes of monoculture (one single crop), which is the dominant regime used in industrial 
agriculture. Altieri measures the outputs in harvestable products per unit area, because when 
measured crop for crop, large monocultures will at first glance have larger yields (although 
35 The World Resources Institute (2005) estimated the proportion of poor in rural areas to be 75 percent.
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not under all circumstances as I will discuss next). He advances that the reason that diverse 
small farms do better is because “polycultures reduce losses due to weeds (by occupying 
space that weeds might otherwise occupy), insects, and diseases (because of the presence of 
multiple species), and make more efficient use of the available resources of water, light, and 
nutrients” (Altieri 2009, 105). Small farms are also more likely to use non-chemical farming 
techniques (using on-farm resources and natural pesticides). As one example of many, a 2003 
study in the USA (Lotter, Seidel, and Liebhardt) found that organic farming of maize 
significantly outperformed its non-organic counter-version in four out of five drought years. 
In the previously mentioned joint report on smallholders by the UN agencies IFAD and UNEP
(2013), it is argued, based on recent studies, that growth in agriculture is the best solution for 
poverty reduction, superior to manufacturing or services (in one of the studies a one percent 
increase in agricultural per capita GDP was found to reduce poverty five times more than a 
one percent increase in any other sector). The report also concluded that smallholders are key 
agents of nutrition, potentially able to provide a nutritionally adequate diet for their 
households. Finally, seeing as a large share of the working poor are involved in agriculture, 
developments in this sector have a major impact on welfare throughout much of the world 
(ILO, 2012). 
Consumers, or to use a more sociological term, people, notwithstanding the fact that most of 
the products are meant for their consumption, are another victim of the highly concentrated, 
highly globalised, modern food system.  Even though agricultural production has been 
growing for decades and is currently—technically—able to satisfy the caloric needs of the 
world’s population almost twice over36, hunger persists, while other nutrition-related disorders
—such as obesity and diabetes—are on the rise. FAO’s 2015 report on the state of food 
insecurity in the world (FAO, IFAD, WFP 2015) estimates 795 million people going hungry, 
while a little under 800 million are considered extremely poor (World Bank 2016), and almost
half the world’s population lived on less than US$2.50 a day in 200537. The former UN 
36 In FAO’s 2012 Statistical Yearbook (FAO 2012d) we can read that the world produced the equivalent of over
13 quadrillion calories in 2010, in other words 5359 kcal on a per capita daily basis, when average daily
requirements are between 2100 and 2300 kcal in poorer countries, according to the sixth world food survey
conducted by FAO in 1996. De Schutter (2014) believes that the requirements are higher, but they are still
largely inferior to world production. What happens is that both production and distribution are unequally
divided across the world.
37 The concept of “extreme poverty” may be hiding the fact that poverty is more generalised than supranational
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Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, warns in his final report (2014) that 
malnutrition is being underreported because current tallies exclude short-term 
undernourishment and do not take into account higher daily energy requirements for those 
that perform physically demanding activities (which is the case of the majority of the poor). 
The Special Rapporteur estimates two billion people globally “lack vitamins and minerals 
essential for good health”. At the same time, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports 
1.9 billion adults were overweight in 2014, of which 600 million were considered obese38. 
WHO claims worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 and that obesity and 
overweight is killing more people than hunger. Obesity and hunger are two sides of the same 
coin of malnutrition that can be increasingly be found in low- and middle-income countries. 
WHO calls this the “double burden” of disease, and warns that it is now not uncommon to 
find undernutrition and obesity co-existing in communities and households.
The term “food deserts” is relatively new (although Beaulac, Kristjansson, and Cummins 
place its genesis in the early 1990s) but its implications are dramatic. Beaulac et al. (2009) 
define them as “areas characterized by poor access to healthy and affordable food”, and find 
enough indications to affirm that they exist, at least in the United States (more evidence is 
needed to confirm food deserts in Europe and other regions). In general, Americans who are 
both poor and from minority cultural groups, will have poor access to healthy food, either 
because it is not on offer in their communities (convenience stores and small grocery stores 
are the dominant feature in low-income and African American communities, while White and 
affluent neighbourhoods will have a wider variety of stores), or because healthier food baskets
command higher prices. The consequences of a poor diet have been well-studied and I will 
not repeat them here, but what is relatively under-studied is how diet-related diseases 
discriminate against race and socioeconomic class. Ford and Dzewaltowski (2008) are but one
example of researchers making the association between food deserts in disadvantaged areas 
organisations would like to admit. The World Bank has stopped presenting world averages for poverty lines
above the newly defined US$ 1.90 cut-off point, whether in their reports or on the <data.worldbank.org>
repository. All statistics are presented in such a way that it is near impossible to sketch a global picture of
poverty. Nevertheless, based on older data, from 2005, almost half of the world population (close to 3 billion)
lives on less than US$ 2.50 a day (UNDESA 2009). When the poverty line is screwed up to US$ 10 a day
(roughly US$ 300 a month, below the minimum wage of any OECD country), it is found that 95 percent of
people in the Global South live below this line (Ravallion, Chen, Sangraula 2008).
38 WHO, “Obesity and overweight”, Fact sheet, June 2016, available:
 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ (accessed 15 December 2016).
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and an increased risk of obesity. The link can be observed in many more regions in the world: 
an Indian study (Misra et al. 2001) found what they called an “appreciable prevalence” of 
several diet-related diseases (obesity, dyslipidaemia, and diabetes) in migrants settled in urban
slums. Strikingly, one study warned that “by 2015 noncommunicable diseases partially caused
by overnutrition in both children and adults, such as type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and 
coronary vascular disease, will overtake undernutrition as the leading cause of death in low-
income countries” (Tanumihardjo et al. 2007). The authors explain: “Poverty results in food 
insecurity and often hunger, which can lead to malnutrition. Furthermore, the absence of a 
diversified, nutrient-dense diet can lead to overnutrition, subsequent obesity, and failure to 
meet micronutrient requirements”. They call attention to the problems of hidden hunger 
(chronic undernutrition in terms of nutrients) and of obesity among the poor, who often rely 
on less expensive, energy-dense foods as opposed to more expensive, nutrient-rich foods. 
Monsivais and Drewnowski (2007) proved in the same year that energy-rich food is 
considerably cheaper than nutrient-rich food: nutrient-rich food can be more than 10 times as 
expensive per 1,000 kcal as energy-dense food, whereas the latter are also more resistant to 
food price volatility. The authors claim that this may help explain why lower income groups 
suffer higher rates of obesity.
A new model of science and policy-making
The rise of concentrated markets where economic and political power are equally 
concentrated, is matched by a significant change in how science is conducted, and in how it 
informs policy-making. Steven Druker recalls in his groundbreaking 2015 book on the 
technoscience and business of genetically modified organisms, Altered Genes, Twisted Truth, 
how, in his farewell address in 1961, an American president who had also been a military man
launched a strong caution to the people of his country and of the world against the 
strengthening alliance between government and what he called the “military-industrial 
complex”. Noting how scientific research had been transformed into a well-funded, large-
scale, commercial enterprise, and how interconnected scientists and government officials 
were becoming, Dwight Eisenhower warned:
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[...] in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal
and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite.
(cited in Druker 2015, 59)
Druker extensively documented the cover-up of the risks posed to humans, animals, plants, 
and ecosystems from the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture and 
food. After he had to sue the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to release its files on 
the approval process of genetically engineered foods, Druker discovered how the FDA, 
protected by successive governments (including the Obama administration), and in collusion 
with the biotech industry (in particular its quasi-monopolist leader, Monsanto), not only 
helped usher GMOs into the food chain, but deliberately deluded the public into thinking that 
genetically modified food is equivalent to, and as safe as, natural food, needing no special 
regulation or precaution whatsoever (Druker 2015, Introduction). 
Reviewing the facts on GMOs, Druker feels confident in affirming that these foods present 
unacceptable risks, as demonstrated by the lack of consensus on their safety—with wildly 
disparate reports—and their rejection by most consumers. Enough convincing studies have 
come out that point to the high toxicity of the most widely sold GMOs and of the herbicides 
that are part of the package offered by the agrochemical corporations. The update to the 
IAASTD report (2016, 47) shows that GMO cultivation is mostly limited to large-scale 
monocultures of maize, soybeans, cotton, and rapeseed that are either herbicide-tolerant, 
produce their own insecticide, or both. These cash-crops are destined for the food-processing 
and animal feed industry, and are not meant nor appropriate for satisfying domestic food 
requirements. All the claims of the biotech industry as to the benefits of GMOs have been 
refuted in the past decade: claims of higher yields, claims of decreased pesticide use, claims 
of safety to humans, animals, and the environment, and even claims of benefits to farmers.39 
39 I present some examples of studies overturning the biotech industry’s claims, for a complete overview please
consult Druker 2015:
1. A meta-study by The Organic Center (Benbrook 2009) shows that crops from genetic engineering (GE)
have been responsible for an increase of 383 million pounds of herbicide use in the USA alone. When he
repeated his analysis three years later (Benbrook 2012), the number had increased to 527 million pounds.
2. The meta-analysis of 25 years of research on agricultural pesticide chemical groups conducted on behalf of
the International Agency for Research on Cancer resulted in their changing the classification of glyphosate,
the main GMO herbicide, to probably carcinogenic to humans. The announcement is available here:
http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/MonographVolume112.pdf  (accessed 13 September 2015).
3. An analysis of the performance v. the documented risks of the biotech company Monsanto’s flagship
herbicide Roundup presents strong proof for the immediate withdrawal of this product (Antoniou et al. 2011).
4. As to the benefits v. harm to farmers of adopting the technology, reports are starkly divided between those
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Any one of the previous conclusions should have sufficed to halt the commercialisation of 
GMOs. It can only be said with certainty that GMOs make good money to their proprietors, 
who sell them as a package with compatible pesticides and herbicides made by the same 
corporations (ETC Group in its 2011 Communiqué documented the stellar growth in revenue 
and increasing concentration in the combined agribusiness markets: The biotech sector as a 
whole made US$ 8 billion in profits in 2009, with only 13 companies accounting for 89 
percent). But added to this is another shocking fact: the studies that are intended to prove that 
GMOs are safe are shown to be, in Druker’s words, “remarkably shoddy” (Ibid., 263). The 
studies are mostly conducted by the biotech industry, unchallenged by the FDA and its 
European counterpart EFSA (European Food Safety Authority), and in fact very often 
corroborated without any further study by these two agencies that supposedly represent the 
public interest. Systematically, the industry’s studies downplay or misrepresent the risks of 
GMOs while inflating their benefits, and in some cases outright hide negative results 
associated with the use of GMOs. The fact that GMOs are still on the market, actively 
supported by successive US governments, while their circulation in the European Union 
persists despite widespread resistance by civil society as well as attempts to ban them by 
numerous governments, is due not to any identifiable benefit of these products (besides the 
potential high profits), but entirely to the incredibly strong lobby of the biotech industry and 
the willingness of some scientists, together with scientific and governmental institutions, to 
suppress evidence and distort the truth about the impact of these organisms (Druker 2015, 
Executive Summary40). Druker goes so far as to say that:
[...] the manifold problems caused by GE [genetic engineering] foods have been obfuscated; and if they
had instead been openly and accurately reported, the agricultural bioengineering enterprise would have
collapsed. (Druker 2015, Executive Summary)
Giampietro, observing the arbitrariness with which the commonly agreed-upon precautionary 
principle is effectively applied in technoscience fields such as that of bio-engineering, reveals 
a deeper epistemological problem, confronting conceptions of risk, preferred by industry, with
triumphalising GMOs’ successes and those uncovering their failures. An analysis by the anthropologist Stone
(2012) attempts to untangle the controversies in the case of Bt cotton (a GMO adopted for production in India
in the late 1990s). Among other inconsistencies in the triumphalist data, he finds that most (94 percent) of the
rise in cotton yields are prior to large-scale adoption of the technology. 
40 Steven Druker, Executive Summary of Altered Genes, Twisted Truth, available: 
http://alteredgenestwistedtruth.com/additional-content/executive-summary/ (accessed 12 September 2015).
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those of uncertainty or ignorance, defended by post-normal scientists. Moreover, he considers 
that conventional risk analysis, which is predominantly applied, is powerless when dealing 
with evolutionary processes (genetics), from whence uncertainty and ignorance can not be 
banned. He recommends (2002, 466) moving from “the paradigm of ‘substantive rationality’ 
(trying to indicate to society optimal solutions) to that of ‘procedural rationality’ (trying to 
help society in finding ‘satisficing’ solutions)”. 
Considering that the biotech industry satisfies the criteria for the existence of a cartel, it is 
unsurprising that farmers who have signed contracts with these companies are facing 
escalating costs. Benbrook (2012) shows that farmers are coping with increases in several 
areas: the price of GE seeds is between 50 to 100 percent higher than that of conventional 
seeds, while the need to manage chemical-resistant weeds (an increasingly common problem 
in the case of herbicide-resistant GMOs) has increased herbicide costs almost three-fold since 
1996. On the escalating use of chemical control in agriculture, the editors of the peer-
reviewed collaborative assessment on knowledge, science, and technology in agriculture, 
IAASTD (2009) state:
The history of chemical control illustrates a phenomenon in agricultural science and technology
development, in which early success of a technical innovation (often measured by a single agronomic
metric such as productivity gains), when accompanied by significant private sector investment in
advertising and public relations and by direct and indirect policy supports from dominant institutional
arrangements, translates into narrowing of organisational research and extension objectives, widespread if
uncritical grower adoption and delayed recognition of the constraints and adverse effects of the technology
(e.g., resistance, health hazards, etc.). (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 99)
On an anecdotal yet relevant note, the association of agricultural biotechnology companies, 
Croplife, withdrew from the IAASTD process in protest against the project team’s alleged 
“ideological stance on GMOs, pesticides and global trade” (IAASTD 2016, 47), while three 
pro-GMO countries (USA, Canada, and Australia) refused to formally sign the report.
I have shown how the new actors of the modern food system—the corporations and their 
allies at national and supranational institutions of policy-making—have subjected agriculture 
to industrial concerns and standards, creating concentrated and highly verticalised markets 
where oligopolies can dictate not only the rules of trade, but also those of production, 
distribution, consumption, and knowledge creation. The capitalist incursion into the field of 
food and agriculture would, however, not be complete without the strong Intellectual Property
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Rights regimes that are the result of long-term lobbying by TNCs and their supporting 
governments, and which have been consecrated in international agreements such as the 
Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO and the UPOV convention41. These agreements 
effectively legitimise the privatisation of Nature, despite contradicting other conventions, 
such as the European Patent Convention42, which explicitly excludes animal and plant 
varieties, as well as the biological processes for the production thereof, from patentability. In 
1980, a court decision in the USA on genetically modified bacteria essentially paved the way 
for a proliferation of patents on plants and animals.43 The authorisation to patent life was 
upheld in Europe in 1998—after a long period of lobbying by the US government and biotech
industry—with the adoption of the biotechnology Directive44, and introduced as an obligation 
for WTO members, by means of the TRIPS agreement45.
The editors of the IAASTD report sum up their concern for the impacts of widespread patents 
on food on the (free) availability of genetic resources, in particular in more vulnerable 
countries, as follows:
Genetic resource management over the past 150 years has been marked by an institutional narrowing […]
This narrowing is illustrated in history by four major trends: (1) a movement from public to private
ownership of germplasm; (2) unprecedented concentration of agrochemical, seed corporations, and
commodity traders; (3) tensions between civil society, seed corporations, breeders and farmers in the
drafting of IPR; (4) stagnation in funding for common goods germplasm. These trends have reduced
options for using germplasm to respond to the uncertainties of the future. They have also increased
asymmetries in access to germplasm and benefit sharing and increases vulnerabilities of the poor. […].
New ownership and IPR regimes have restricted movement and made development of non-commercial
(public) good constructs more expensive. These changes have limited those actors that do not have legal,
commercial and financial power. (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 87-88)
41 The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
42 Article 53 of the European Patent Convention excludes plant varieties and animal species. Available:
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/ar53.html (accessed 10 September 2015).
43 Read the ruling in the so-named “Diamond v. Chakrabarty case” here:
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/case.html (accessed 10 October 2015).
44 Text of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biological inventions, available: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31998L0044 (accessed 10 October 2015).
45 Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS agreement forces countries to provide patent or similar protection over plant
varieties. A short analysis is available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/GRAIN.pdf  (accessed 10
September 2015).
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Support for a new paradigm
Despite the largely pessimistic view of the modern food system—in terms of its capacity to 
realise basic democratic criteria—which I presented here, support for systemic changes has 
been increasing in the last decade, in particular since the publication of the comprehensive 
assessment on agriculture by the IAASTD initiative. Later reports have corroborated 
IAASTD’s diagnosis, which in turn is largely in tune with the one I have attempted to 
demonstrate in this chapter. Neither do the editors of the UNCTAD report on agriculture 
(2013, i) mince their words when they say:
The world needs a paradigm shift in agricultural development: from a "green revolution" to a "truly
ecological intensification" approach. This implies a rapid and significant shift from conventional,
monoculture-based and high external-input-dependent industrial production towards mosaics of
sustainable, regenerative production systems that also considerably improve the productivity of small-scale
farmers. We need to see a move from a linear to a holistic approach in agricultural management, which
recognizes that a farmer is not only a producer of agricultural goods, but also a manager of an agro-
ecological system that provides quite a number of public goods and services (e.g. water, soil, landscape,
energy, biodiversity, and recreation)
More recently, the former Rapporteur on the Right to Food for the United Nations, Olivier De 
Schutter, speaks of a "critical governance gap" that occurs when supranational organisations 
do not have the rights of people at heart, while multinational corporations are given rights that
are not balanced by obligations, and which take primacy over basic human rights. As he was 
taking his leave, De Schutter called for "the world’s food systems to be radically and 
democratically redesigned to ensure the human right to adequate food and freedom from 
hunger".46 He confirms that “[t]he eradication of hunger and malnutrition is an achievable 
goal. However, it will not be enough to refine the logic of our food systems – it must instead 
be reversed.”
De Schutter, as well as the multi-disciplinary, multi-country expert team at IAASTD, and the 
researchers of UNCTAD’s latest agriculture report “Wake up before it’s too late” are agreed 
on a number of fundamental insights:
46 Democracy and diversity can mend broken food systems - final diagnosis from UN right to food expert, 
available: http://www.srfood.org/en/democracy-and-diversity-can-mend-broken-food-systems-final-
diagnosis-from-un-right-to-food-expert (accessed 1 October 2015).
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• The focus on a “supply-side productivity problem” (UNCTAD 2013) is questionable 
and distracting from the real problems: hunger is the result of a lack of purchasing 
power and/or food self-sufficiency.
• The world does not need another Green Revolution, but instead a new focus on 
equitable and regenerative sustainability in farming, with the farmer recognised not 
only as a producer, but as the caretaker of agro-ecosystems. Agriculture is a unique 
activity because it sits at the intersection of economic, ecological, social, and cultural 
needs. It is the one sector that can potentially achieve food security for all and pull 
rural people out of poverty and hunger.
• Given the scale of the negative impacts of industrial agriculture, there is no avoiding 
the imperative of a profound transformation of the global food system and its markets, 
which will pose serious issues of governance and power. Unfortunately, governments 
and corporations from the top agricultural trade countries are not moving beyond weak
reforms of industrialised agriculture. Meanwhile, a worrying integration of food, 
energy, and financial markets is taking place (UNCTAD 2013, 7).
• Any approach will have to be two-track, which is one “that drastically reduces the 
environmental impact of conventional agriculture, on the one hand, and broadens the 
scope for agroecological production methods, on the other” (UNCTAD 2013, i).
They have also embraced the key idea that agriculture is as much at the heart of major 
challenges that humans are facing in the twenty-first century—hunger, poverty, climate 
change, biodiversity and ecosystem loss—as it is a major leverage factor to face these 
challenges. To conclude the biography of the modern food system, in Table 2 I present a 
comprehensive account of both the negative and positive leverage effects of agriculture.
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Table 2. Agriculture as both source and solution for major challenges
The negative leverage effects of agriculture The positive leverage effects of agriculture
1a) Persistent hunger
FAO (FAO, IFAD, WFP 2015) reports that 795 million people are still going hungry. These 
numbers are not consensual, since FAO changed its methodology before concluding what was a 
25-year longitudinal study of hunger47—this changed its estimate for 2012 from 925 million to 
868 million (FAO, WFP, IFAD 2012). De Schutter (2014, 4) believes malnourishment is being 
under-reported. He says that “these figures do not capture short-term undernourishment, because 
of their focus on year-long averages; they neglect inequalities in intra-household distribution of 
food; and the calculations are based on a low threshold of daily energy requirements that assume a
sedentary lifestyle, whereas many of the poor perform physically demanding activities”. Neither 
do they capture the regional differences, with almost a quarter of people in Sub-Saharan Africa 
suffering from hunger, while South-East Asia made tremendous progress (FAO, WFP, IFAD 
2015). The numbers also fail to reveal the irreversible impact of hunger on, for example, pregnant 
women and children. De Schutter (2014, 4) warns calorie intake is not a sufficient indicator for 
nutrition.  He notes with particular concern the fact that 165 million children are considered 
stunted in 2014, calling attention to the fact that these children are “so malnourished that they do 
not reach their full physical and cognitive potential”.
When broadening the criteria, we find that chronic malnourishment affects almost a third of the 
world population: FAO estimates approximately 2 billion people suffer from so-called 
micronutrient deficiencies (FAO, WFP, IFAD 2012). 
1b) Food production is more than sufficient
Current food production is more than enough to feed the world. Food availability rose from about 
2,220 kcal/person/day in the early 1960s to 2,790 kcal/person/day in 2006-08 (FAO 2012d), while 
2016 FAOSTAT48 data already speaks of 2,870 kcal/person/day. Similarly, the supply of fat and 
protein has risen from respectively 66.95 and 70.08 g/capita/day in 1992 to 82.56 and 80.49 
g/capita/day in 2011 (FAOSTAT). Based on a rough average minimum dietary requirement for the 
world population (1,850 kcal/person/day, based on data for 2006-200849) there is enough food 
produced currently to reasonably feed over 10 billion people. If we consider the full agricultural 
production (i.e. cereals that would go to animal feed or biofuels), there is even enough to feed over 
two and a half times the current world population: the world produced over 13 quadrillion calories 
in 2010, equivalent to 5,359 kcal on a per capita daily basis (FAO 2012d). 
A comprehensive review of dietary energy supply from different sources and in different regions in
the world is available at the WHO website.50 It shows how average food production is both 
sufficient and adequate in terms of nutrition, but that it does not get to everyone who needs it, 
either in quantity or in quality.
47 FAO’s Food Security methodology, available: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/fs-methods/fs-methods1/en/ (accessed 5 November 2016).
48 FAO STAT, available: http://faostat3.fao.org/browse/FB/*/E (last accessed 10 December 2016).
49 FAO Statistics division, Minimum Dietary Energy Requirements, available: http://tinyurl.com/h3brbjf 
50 World Health Organization, Global and regional food consumption patterns and trends, available: http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/ (accessed 15 December 2016).
Table 2. (cont.)
The negative leverage effects of agriculture The positive leverage effects of agriculture
1a) Persistent hunger (cont.)
If we then add WHO’s numbers for overweight, we realise that the majority of people in the world
suffer from some form of malnutrition. In fact, obesity, which was once rampant in wealthier 
countries but is now rising rapidly in low- to middle-income countries, having more than doubled 
since 1980, has been shown to be a form of malnutrition in several studies, due to higher 
consumption of processed foods with high energy and fat content and the parallel decrease in the 
nutrient content of industrially farmed food (see the WHO site for more details).  Obesity shares 
hunger's main cause: poverty, because energy-rich food is considerably cheaper than nutrient-rich 
food (Monsivais and Drewnowski, 2007). The World Health Organization estimates that in 2014, 
1.9 billion adults were overweight, or 39% of the world’s adult population. Of these, 600 million 
were considered obese.51 According to WHO, obesity and overweight currently kill more people 
than underweight.
It is nevertheless generally recognised that food production is currently more than sufficient. 
Recent FAOSTAT data estimates that the average dietary energy supply in 2015 was close to 
2,900 kcal per person per day. It is now a well-recognised fact that poverty precludes many people
from accessing the food they need.52 Although poverty is currently being under-reported, numbers
from 2005 tell us that almost half the world’s population is possibly still living on less than 
US$2.50 a day (UNDESA 2009) and that, at the poverty lines of industrialised countries (at least 
US$ 10 a day), 95% of the Global South should be considered poor (Ravallion, Chen, Sangraula 
2008). Finally, most of the poor,  between 70 and 75%, live in rural areas  (IFAD 2010).
2a) Unequal distribution of costs and benefits
Food prices, after decades of decrease, have been rising since 2007 (FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2011). 
Price volatility is high: despite occasional decreases, FAO’s Food Price Index shows a rising trend
2b) Investment in small-scale agriculture can pull people out of hunger and poverty
Research by FAO shows that investment in agriculture is five times more effective in reducing 
poverty and hunger than investment in any other sector (FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012). According to
51 WHO, “Obesity and overweight”, Fact sheet, June 2016, available: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ (accessed 15 December 2016).
52 World Food Programme, “What causes hunger?”, available: http://www.wfp.org/hunger/causes (last accessed 10 December 2016).
Table 2. (cont.)
The negative leverage effects of agriculture The positive leverage effects of agriculture
2a) Unequal distribution of costs and benefits (cont.) 
for the past decade.53 At the same time, healthy food is more expensive than "junk" food, placing a
heavier burden on lower economic groups to access more nutritious food, which explains why 
obesity is more prevalent in these groups (Monsivais and Drewnowski 2007). 
Whereas agrifood corporations continue to register record profits, even during food crises, such as
those experienced in 2007/2008 (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2009), farmers need second jobs to 
make ends meet: 93% of farming households in the USA in 2002 had off-farm employment, 
compared to 27% in 1945 (Dimitri, Effland and Conklin 2005, 3). Farmland is highly inequitably 
distributed, as much between countries (25 countries hold 75% of land (Oxford Farming 
Conference 2012), as between farm size types: the 16% largest farms control 88% of agricultural 
land worldwide (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016). 
Land-grabbing is aggravating this imbalance: The Land Matrix, an independent land monitoring 
initiative, registered 1,204 concluded land acquisition deals covering over 42 million hectares of 
land up to the launch of its latest report (Nolte et al., October 2016). It found that Africa is the 
most targeted continent, with 42% of concluded deals, followed by Eastern Europe, while the top 
individual target countries are Indonesia, Ukraine, Russia, Papua New Guinea, and Brazil—
(representing 46% of the total area sold). The top five investor countries are Malaysia, the USA, 
the UK, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. Together, these account for 45% of the land under contract 
and 37% of all deals. Western European investors (the top five being the UK, the Netherlands, 
France, Jersey and Cyprus) are involved in 315 concluded deals, covering nearly 7.3 million 
hectares, which makes this the biggest investor region,  followed by South-East Asia. The land 
acquisitions favour capital-intensive, low labour-intensive production methods, focusing on high-
2b) Investment in small-scale agriculture can pull people out of hunger and poverty (cont.)
the World Bank, 1% growth in GDP from agriculture increases the expenditures of the three 
poorest deciles by at least 2.5 times as much as 1% growth from the rest of the economy (World 
Bank 2007, 30). Cited in the same report, a 2005 study by Bravo-Ortega and Lederman finds that 
an increase in overall GDP coming from agricultural labor productivity is on average 2.9 times 
more effective in raising the incomes of the poorest quintile in developing countries and 2.5 times 
more effective for countries in Latin America than an equivalent increase in GDP coming from 
nonagricultural labor productivity. Agriculture can also provide an important haven against global 
economic and financial turmoil, often more effectively than other sectors (FAO 2013). 
In 2007 almost half of the world population or approximately 3 billion people still lived in rural 
areas and of these, nearly 1.5 billion are considered economically active in agriculture (World Bank
2007), while a total of 2.5 billion people are estimated to depend on agriculture for all or part of 
their subsistence (IFAD and UNEP 2013). Most of these people live in developing countries, where
agriculture can contribute as much as 34% to GDP (World Bank 2007, 27). Although on average 
20% of the global workforce is employed in agriculture, this percentage rises in lower-middle 
income (around 40%) and low-income countries (around 60%) (Ibid.).
53 FAO, World food situation, 2016, available: http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed 15 December 2016).
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value crops, which can be used for food as much as for energy purposes. UNCTAD (2013) 
presents proof that land deals in Africa displace local communities, involve ridiculously low 
2a) Unequal distribution of costs and benefits (cont.) 
prices per hectare, and aim at producing cash-crops, especially biofuels, while speculating with 
land prices. The investors in Africa are not only China and the Gulf states, but increasingly 
Western firms and rich individuals, backed by investment funds with ties to Goldman Sachs and 
JP Morgan, and even universities such as Harvard (UNCTAD 2013, 239).
In Western Europe, employment in agriculture is negligible: on average, no more than 5.2% of the
population works in farming, according to 2010 World Development Indicators from the World 
Bank54. In the Global South, a very different picture emerges with between a third to over half of 
the population active in agriculture depending on the level of industrial development (World Bank
2007). In lower-income countries, agriculture represents up to 40 percent of domestic revenues 
(Ibid.). The 48 poorest countries in the world, apart from minerals, have only agricultural 
commodities to offer for export, and have neglected domestic production in favour of cash-crop 
production, becoming net-importers of food (IAASTD 2016, 13). 
The industrial paradigm in farming does not fit nor benefit all: farmers usually have to scale up to 
benefit from hybrid or GMO high-yield and high-input varieties that are increasingly overtaking 
farmers seeds in their countries. The UNCTAD meta-study offers an example of how Argentinian 
soy farmers have to attain a minimum farm size of 500 ha to be profitable, while the researchers 
estimate that in the future this minimum will rise to 5,000 ha (UNCTAD 2013, 270).
54 World DataBank, World development indicators, available: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed 15 September 2015).
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Finally, income inequality is rising even in the richest countries: an OECD (2011) study shows 
that the household incomes of the richest 10% grew faster than those of the poorest 10% from 
1970-2000. The inequalities are especially pronounced in export giants—USA, UK, Israel, Brazil,
Argentina, Mexico—but even in traditionally low-inequality countries: Germany and Denmark. 
Even more troubling is that inequalities have risen in times of economic growth (OECD 2015).
3a) Contribution to global warming
A meta-study on the contribution of agriculture to climate change, which supranational 
institutions have been taking into account, attributes between 19 to 29% of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) to activities in food systems (Vermeulen, Campbell, Ingram 2012). The upper 
bracket includes not only agricultural production—the predominant contributor–but also transport
and packaging for food, processing, retail, waste disposal, and fertiliser manufacture. This makes 
agriculture the main source of man-made GHG emissions after energy production (IAASTD 
2016). 
Industrial farming is responsible for the larger footprint, because it is highly dependent on fossil 
fuels, not only for transport but for oil-based fertilisers. IAASTD (2016, 32-33) laments the loss 
of the “art of locally adapted soil conservation and land use”, in favour of synthetic mineral 
fertilisers. As an example, farmers use more than 110 million tons of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser 
per year (Ibid.). Although providing a temporary boost in nutrients, in the long run this practice 
depletes and acidifies the soil.
3b) Halting and mitigating global warming 
Proper management of plants and soil can reduce global warming and heal agro-ecosystems. Most 
farms are small, under 2 ha in size, and, although more research is necessary, it is estimated that in 
developing countries, small and/or family farms can contribute to up to 70% of total production 
(Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016;  Graeub et al. 2016). Small farms have been consistently shown 
to be more productive and more efficient per unit area than larger farms (Rosset 2000; Barrett, 
Bellemare, and Hou 2010; FAO 2014).
Considering the undeniable negative impacts of industrial agriculture on agro-ecosystems, policy-
makers have taken to promoting small or family farms as a way for countries not only to feed 
themselves but to mitigate climate change. The use of agroecology, a low-tech or "adequate tech" 
science and practice, is pointed out as a viable alternative to continued industrialisation,  
contributing to raising productivity, reducing rural poverty, improving nutrition and adapting to 
climate change (De Schutter 2011, 6). De Schutter points out that agroecology uses on-farm 
resources and knowledge rather than external inputs, improving productivity at a fraction of the 
cost of conventional methods, while employing more people.
4a) Those producing food are among the poorest and hungriest
Hunger and poverty are paradoxically rampant among people that live closer to the means of food
4b) Small farms can provide most of our food
Exactly how much small farms contribute to food production is currently being contested. Recent 
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production: half of the world's hungry are smallholder farmers and an additional 22% are landless 
rural families (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005). Rural areas hold at least 70% of the world's poor, 
making this a predominantly rural phenomenon, with key areas for concern being Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia (IFAD 2010).
FAO (2015) observes how in rural households, in particular small farms, production and 
consumption decisions are intimately linked. Changes in either production or consumption 
standards and/or needs can have a disproportionately large impact, and small-scale farmers are 
studies conservatively placed the share at a minimum of 53% (Graeub et al. 2016). But local 
studies, such as that by de França et al. (2009, cited in Graeub et al. 2016), show that the  
contribution of family and/or small farms can be much higher—in Brazil it was found to be at least 
70% of domestic food consumption. FAO calculated that in low- and middle-income countries 
farms up to 2 ha correspond to 40% of farm land, whereas farms up to 5 ha cover about 70%, 
indicating these are crucial for these countries’ food security (FAO 2014). 
More studies are needed to calculate the exact contribution of small farms to domestic food needs. 
4a) Those producing food are among the poorest and hungriest (cont.) 
easily marginalised, even when the rest of the country is developing. In a reasonably developed 
agricultural country with a large number of rural poor, India, the rural poverty threshold actually 
decreased from 54% of average per capita income in 1973-1974 to only 16% in 2004-2005 
(UNDESA 2009). In comparison, in the wealthier European countries, the poverty threshold is set
at 50% of average per capita income.
4b) Small farms can provide most of our food (cont.)
The High Level Panel of Experts of the Committee on World Food Security (HLPE 2013, 46) 
recommends taking action in this field, because “the fact that smallholder agriculture is able in 
some cases to outperform large-scale agriculture in terms of yield should be reason enough to 
concentrate on the question of overcoming the problem of limited or restricted access to factors and
inputs to production, rather than to focus on the change of model/scale.”
As mentioned in the previous section, smallholder farmers are important for development for many
different reasons: their contribution to the subsistence of their families and communities and for 
lifting these out of poverty, their potential contribution to healing ecosystems, their contribution to 
employment, among others.
5a) The modern food system threatens agro-biodiversity
Industrialised farming relies on a limited number of species of animals and plants: modern plant 
varieties have supplanted traditional ones over the past 60 years, and there are concerns about the 
loss of genetic diversity and about the diminishing results from modern and genetically modified 
varieties that have spurred pesticide use and depleted nutrients in the soil (IAASTD 2009, Global 
5b) Traditional plant varieties still dominate production in the Global South
It is not too late to save the dwindling traditional varieties, which have been associated with yield 
stability, resistance to biotic and abiotic stress, and resilience, as well as compatible with low-input 
agriculture (Altieri and Merrick, 1997; WRI, 2005) .
Small farmers often opt to maintain traditional varieties to minimise their risks for disease, pests, 
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Report, 157-170). The modern food system favours cereals that can be cultivated in monocultures,
are easily stored and just as easily processed in factories. Thus, while there are 10 to 50,000 edible
plant species, only about 150 to 200 are currently cultivated, and out of these, rice, maize, and 
wheat constitute almost 60% of humans' calorie- and protein-intake from plants (FAO 2004). 
Animal breeds are faring even worse: only 770 livestock breeds remain (half of those in existence 
at the beginning of the 20th century), and 20% of these are at risk of extinction (Ibid.). Hybrid 
plant varieties, created in laboratories, are preferred in industrial farming for their potentially 
higher yields, over traditional ones, eroding the plant gene pool. One example, out of many, is that
of the Philippines, where thousands of rice landraces have been replaced by just two modern 
varieties (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 186). 
and extreme weather conditions. Traditional varieties have the advantage of being ideally adapted 
to local conditions and of needing little or no external inputs (i.e. synthetic fertilisers, pesticides, 
increased irrigation). IAASTD (2016) reminds policy-makers that small-scale farmers depend, for 
their livelihoods, on indigenous plants and animals, and that they are, for the most part, unable to 
bear the cost or the burden of industrial quality and hygiene standards, or monitoring systems. They
are either marginalised or forced to cultivate cash crops for export (coffee, tea, tobacco).  IAASTD 
(2016) thus advocates supporting traditional knowledge and practices, while updating them with 
concepts from the evolving science and practice of agroecology.
5a) The modern food system threatens agro-biodiversity (cont.)
The IAASTD (201655) speaks of an “agricultural treadmill”, which is 
[…] based on technological advances achieved through mechanization, plant breeding for
high-yielding varieties, the use of agrochemicals and genetic engineering, etc. With
increasing external inputs, the unit costs of production are declining and the productivity
per worker is increasing. Production is growing and producer prices are falling. The only
businesses that can survive on the market are those that remain one step ahead of their
competitors by investing in rationalization and expansion, or those with locational
advantages. If others catch up with them, another round begins.
The erosion of agro-biodiversity can assume unbelievable proportions: IAASTD (2016, 47) shows
how, in Argentina, genetically modified (GM) soybeans are grown on an area of 21 million 
hectares, mostly destined for export to China and Europe. To “aid” these crops, in 2012, 335 
million litres of pesticides were sprayed on the fields, a nine-fold increase since 1990.  The most 
popular agrochemical in Argentina is glyphosate, a herbicide commercialised by the biotech 
leader Monsanto. IAASTD (Ibid.) warns that:
5b) Traditional plant varieties still dominate production in the Global South (cont.)
Forests should be earmarked as an important contributor to preserving agro-biodiversity. On its 
webpages dedicated to biodiversity56, FAO states that “[f]orests are among the most important 
repositories of terrestrial biological diversity”. Forests provide cover and shade for many animals 
and plants, contribute to soil and water conservation, and are sources not only of food and wood, 
but also fibres and medicines. Finally, forests take carbon dioxide out of the air, helping control 
global warming.
55 Commentary available on the site of the 2016 publication:  http://www.globalagriculture.org/report-topics/about-the-iaastd-report.html (accessed 12 December 2016).
56 FAO, “Biodiversity”, available: http://www.fao.org/biodiversity/en/ (accessed 8 December 2016).
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While the average amount of glyphosate applied per hectare was three liters in 1996, this 
figure is now closer to an average of 12 liters per year; in some areas an even greater 
amount is used. Due to the constant spraying, more and more weeds are becoming 
resistant.
6a) Industrial agriculture degrades ecosystems
Agriculture and forestry use more than 60% of the land surface of the Earth (IAASTD 2016, 18). 
The IAASTD report (2009, Global report) warned that, in all likelihood, at least 23% of all used 
land is already degraded to some degree. The report’s editors inform that “key soil degradation 
processes include: erosion, salinization and water logging, compaction and hard setting, 
acidification, loss of soil organic matter, soil nutrient depletion, biological degradation, and soil 
6b) Small-scale farming based on agroecological principles can heal ecosystems
The former UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter (2014, 6) said in his farewell 
report:
As a way to improve the resilience and sustainability of food systems, agroecology is now 
supported by an increasingly wide range of experts within the scientific community, and by
international agencies and organizations, such as [FAO], UNEP and Biodiversity 
International.
6a) Industrial agriculture degrades ecosystems (cont.)
pollution” (Ibid., 39). They estimate that each year, around 24 billion tons of fertile soil are lost 
because of erosion (IAASTD 2016, 32).
The Comprehensive Assessment of Water management in Agriculture, conducted in 2007, warns 
that the food system is the biggest water drawer: it is currently using 70% of the world's available 
and non-renewable fresh water (from rivers and groundwater), most of this for irrigation 
purposes. If nothing is done, they say, humankind will face “acute freshwater challenges” over the
next 50 years (2007, 2). River and groundwater provide so-called “blue water”, whereas rainfall 
provides “green water”. IAASTD (2016, 27) warns that industrial agriculture is too dependent on 
irrigation: in South-East Asia, yields were increased exclusively thanks to enormous investments 
in new irrigation systems between five and three decades ago. But this irrigation dependence 
means that “by 2030, half the world population will be living in areas with high water stress” 
(Ibid., 31).
Intensive agriculture contributes to changes in land use, which is quick becoming a global 
problem. Foley et al. (2005, 570) warn:
6b) Small-scale farming based on agroecological principles can heal ecosystems (cont.)
Both De Schutter and scientist Altieri are confident that agroecological practices can be scaled up, 
with the advantage of simultaneously increasing farm productivity and food and income security, 
while also halting genetic erosion (Altieri et al. 2012; De Schutter 2014). Altieri et al. assert that 
agroecology can play a key role in supporting small farming systems and boosting their 
productivity. They claim it respects, but also refreshes, peasant practices and techniques, while 
involving the farmers and their families, and adapting technology and solutions to each different 
site. It also avoids the multi-million dollar dependence on large donors that promote synthetic 
fertilisers and pesticides, coupled with commercial hybrid plants, which need to be purchased each 
year (Altieri et al. 2012, 5). Instead, agroecology “takes greater advantage of natural processes and 
beneficial on-farm interactions in order to reduce off-farm input use and to improve the efficiency 
of farming systems” (Ibid. 6). Examples are the optimisation of organic matter and nutrient cycling,
the use of natural enemies in pest control, enhancing nutrient-content of the soil, planting diversity 
rather than monocultures, and creating synergies between the elements of the agro-ecosystem 
(Ibid., 7).
Table 2. (cont.)
The negative leverage effects of agriculture The positive leverage effects of agriculture
As Global croplands, pastures, plantations, and urban areas have expanded in recent 
decades, accompanied by large increases in energy, water, and fertilizer consumption, 
along with considerable losses of biodiversity. Such changes in land use have enabled 
humans to appropriate an increasing share of the planet’s resources, but they also 
potentially undermine the capacity of ecosystems to sustain food production, maintain 
freshwater and forest resources, regulate climate and air quality, and ameliorate infectious  
diseases. We face the challenge of managing trade-offs between immediate human needs 
and maintaining the capacity of the biosphere to provide goods and services in the long 
term.
Loss of forest, on which at least two billion people depend directly, is estimated at about one third
of the total area since the start of agriculture (FAO 2012c, State of World's Forests). 
Meanwhile, meat production is on a steep climb, with unpleasant side-effects: over one third of 
the world’s cereals are already being used as animal feed, and if current trends continue, this will  
Combining diverse and resilient food production with the recovery or creation of forest land, 
agroforestry is increasingly being experimented with (IAASTD 2016, 29).
6a) Industrial agriculture degrades ecosystems (cont.)
rise to 50% by 2050 (De Schutter 2014, 5-6). According to an FAO report on “livestock’s long 
shadow”, livestock production accounts for 70% of all agricultural land and 30% of the land 
surface of the planet, while the expansion of pastures and feed crops is a major source of 
deforestation, especially in Latin America (Steinfeld et al. 2006). They also indicate that 
overgrazing has already degraded at least 20% of the world's pastures and rangelands.
7a) The efficiency of the modern food system leaves much to be desired
A 2011 study estimated that around one third of total food produced for human consumption is 
lost or wasted (FAO 2011). A study by UNEP placed the estimate even higher: at 56% of the 
average 4,600 kcal produced per capita in the world in 2008-2009 (Nelleman et al. 2009). 
UNCTAD (2013) reports that on top of the wastage, subsidies for farmers and agribusiness in the 
Global North have distorted markets and created inequalities between the North and South, and 
between agribusiness and the large food retailers and the farmers at the base of the food system. 
These subsidies reward large-scale, carbon-intensive and polluting agriculture. Ironically, 
7b) Local food systems can provide both sustainability and security
The advantages of supporting small-scale and family farming have been shown by study after study
(see the work of Altieri and the references of reports such as IAASTD 2009 and UNCTAD 2013) 
and have currently been taken to heart by supranational organisations with an interest in food 
systems, such as FAO, UNEP, and UNCTAD. Among the factors that favour small-scale farming 
we find the “inverse farm size-productivity relationship”, which has been systematically observed 
in Russia, India, Africa, Asia, Europa, and Latin America (Barrett, Bellemare, and Hou 2010). An 
analysis of the relationship between farm size and total output for fifteen countries in the Global 
Table 2. (cont.)
The negative leverage effects of agriculture The positive leverage effects of agriculture
countries that wish to trade with the USA or Europe, have to abolish their own subsidies or indeed
any kind of domestic support for their farmers, while the Global North continues to finance their 
exporting companies. The case of Ghana in UNCTAD 2013, 255 illustrates how domestic food 
self-sufficiency was destroyed when Ghana liberalised its agricultural market. The same case 
highlights that many of the US companies exporting to Ghana would not have covered costs, were
it not for the subsidies they received. UNCTAD shows what happened in several vulnerable 
countries where cheaper imports flooded the markets: the percentage drop in local domestic 
production of what was previously a flagship product of the country has been as much as 68% 
(Ibid., 254). The agricultural policies of developed countries are representing a loss of US$ 17 
billion per year for developing countries—not yet including the indirect subsidies for energy that 
agricultural companies also enjoy. Subsidies for farm producers in OECD countries is estimated 
South found small farms to be two to ten times more productive and efficient per unit area than 
larger farms (Rosset, 2000).
Small farms and family-run farms also tend to benefit poorer and vulnerable populations. They can 
be a key to local community development. FAO (2014) stated: “[b]eyond increasing local food 
availability, family farmers play a vital role in creating jobs, generating income and stimulating and
diversifying local economies”. In the same report, FAO reminds us that family-run farms are in a 
better position to safeguard the preservation of traditional crops, which are important for local food
security but have been displaced by commodified cash-crops. 
UNCTAD (2013) claims well-managed small farms, under a regime of agroecology, require none 
or almost no external inputs and minimise their risks through the use of diversity in crops. The use 
of locally produced inputs is a major game-changer, since it removes farmers from the “agricultural
7a) The efficiency of the modern food system leaves much to be desired (cont.)
to have been US$ 252 billion in 2009, or 22% of gross farm receipts (UNCTAD 2013, 256).
Management of ecosystems and non-renewable resources in agriculture also leaves much room 
for improvement. Not only is there a large potential for reducing water use under the current 
system, but agricultural growth can be achieved without intensifying water use. This means 
drastically reducing water resources degradation from erosion, pollution, salinisation, nutrient 
depletion and the intrusion of seawater. It also means reviewing diets, since producing meat, in 
particular bovine meat and pig, and raising dairy cattle, has a large water and greenhouse gas 
footprint (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2010). 
Animal production accounts for 29% of the total water footprint of agriculture. Producing animals
is a lot less efficient, when measured against its nutritional value, than producing what the authors
call “wisely chosen crop product” (Ibid., 39).
World meat production has increased by more than 50% since 1970 in developed countries and by
7b) Local food systems can provide both sustainability and security (cont.)
treadmill”, which requires them to keep using synthetic inputs to maintain productivity (Ibid., 36).
Under agroecology, farmers are both producers and guardians of agro-biodiversity and agro-
ecosystems. UNCTAD also states that agroecology is both efficient and effective in achieving the 
joint goals of improving livelihoods and sustainability. Since it is knowledge-intensive rather than 
external input-intensive, it can be spread at little cost. UNCTAD (2013) presents several studies 
that prove agroecology’s potential. A 2006 study (Pretty et al., cited in UNCTAD 2013, 36) looked 
at 12.6 million farms in 57 countries, and found agroecological interventions improved crop 
productivity by an average of 79%, while also improving agro-ecosystems’ contribution to 
environmental services.
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a factor of more than four in developing countries (Steinfeld et al. 2006). In 2002, consumption 
per capita in the Global North (80 kg/person/year) was still almost triple that of the Global South, 
but this is rapidly changing. Meat production is causing serious environmental and social 
problems. The global assessment on the impact of livestock (LEAD initiative, Steinfeld et al. 
2006) demonstrated that this sector is the largest user of land when we combine the land used for 
feed with that used for grazing, having displaced wildlife and forests. Meat production also has a 
high greenhouse gas footprint, estimated at 18% of global GHG emissions and 37% of methane 
alone. It additionally causes systemic pollution from the run-off from manure (one third of 
nitrogen and phosphorus used globally are seeping into freshwater resources), pesticides (37% of 
pesticide use goes to livestock production), and the over-use of antibiotics. 
The report also points out that meat already makes up 40% of global agricultural gross domestic 
product (GDP), employing 1.3 billion people, while it is a sector that is expected to double 
7a) The efficiency of the modern food system leaves much to be desired (cont.)
between the time of the report and 2050, with the growing of middle class in developing 
countries.
The world's fisheries, and the fish populations they depend on, do not fare any better. The United 
Nations report that in 2006 human consumption of fish reached a record of 16.7 kg / capita. 57 The 
same report concludes that 80% of the world's documented fish stocks are either fully exploited or
overexploited. Larger, predatory fish fare worse than their smaller and vegetarian cousins (over 
80% of tuna stocks are either fully exploited or overexploited or depleted, while 60% of targeted 
shark populations are either overexploited or depleted). Meanwhile, the report continues, fishing 
subsidies have continued to fuel overfishing, amounting to US$ 10 billion in 2000. Additionally, 
illegal or unreported and unregulated fishing and "by-catch"of fisheries (unwanted sea-animals) 
57 UN, “Resumed Review Conference on the Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, 2010, available:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/reviewconf/FishStocks_EN_A.pdf (accessed 18 September 2015).
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represent over 40% of the annual official catch.
Finally, the rising demand for biofuels has created competition between the use of crops for food 
or feed and the use of the same crops (like maize) for biofuels. If this trend continues, an increase 
in biofuel production will raise agricultural prices (IAASTD 2009, Global Report, 291). As of the 
date of print of the IAASTD report, biofuels were not yet cost-effective without significant public 
subsidies. More specific reports, produced by the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, show that biofuels are an excessively expensive way to combat climate change: 
subsidies for biofuels were US$ 11 billion a year in OECD countries in 2006, almost one dollar 
per litre produced.58 The Institute (see for instance Steenblik 2007) warns of the hidden costs that 
must be added to the spending of public money, namely the risk of rising food prices and the 
environmental pressure caused by crops for biofuel (these crops are more prone to erosion and 
7a) The efficiency of the modern food system leaves much to be desired (cont.)
also require higher chemical inputs and water). In its updated report, the IAASTD (2016, 36) 
warns that “[t]he share of the US maize harvest used to make fuel has increased sixfold since 
2000”. Its editors warn that OECD and FAO estimates foresee a triplication of the production of 
biofuel for the period of 2006 to 2024. FAO (2016c) confirms that out of 2.5 billion tons of cereal 
produced annually, only 43% goes to food, the rest is used for feed (46%) and other uses, which 
prominently include biofuels.
UNCTAD (2013) also calls attention to the fact that industrial agriculture is much too dependent 
on fossil fuels, which have not only been extremely cheap in the past, but subject to large 
subsidies, without which many of the agribusiness sectors would not have been profitable. With 
the new volatility of oil prices and the need to curb carbon emissions, industrial and globalised 
agriculture needs to review its modus operandi.
58 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Global Subsidies Initiative, available: https://www.iisd.org/gsi/biofuel-subsidies/biofuels-what-cost (accessed 12 September 2015).
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Finally, IAASTD (2016) warns that the financialisation of agriculture poses serious risk for food 
security. The USA deregulated commodity futures trading in the 1990s, and investors have reacted
positively. IAASTD (Ibid., 14) says: “[s]ubsequently, the percentage of commercial traders has 
decreased remarkably while the number of speculative traders has exploded on the world’s most 
important futures exchange CBOT in Chicago. In 2002, eleven times the actual amount of wheat 
available was traded on the CBOT; in 2011, 73 times the actual US wheat harvest was traded.” 
The speculation with essential food products may have been a factor in the food crises of 2007 
and 2008, and continues to contribute to food price volatility.
A global food polity
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V
The ecological-democratic quality of food politics
In my final chapter, I will be analysing reports from a variety of institutional or otherwise 
organised food actors where they convey their views on food system challenges and the 
policies to be adopted in the twenty-first century. These publicly available reports may be 
considered representative and revealing of the discourse to which the different actors adhere. 
A discourse is understood here as a particular way of representing aspects of social life, 
including aspects that are desired or possible worlds (Fairclough 2001). Fairclough points out 
that discourses reveal the social practices (more or less stable and durable forms of social 
activity) and thus the social structures to which the discursants adhere, revealing relations of 
power and dominance in society. Discourses also come with conventions that, when known to
both discursants and their audiences, organise and constrain the behaviour of all involved 
(Fairclough 2001, 39). The conventions help to reproduce the power relations at play in the 
field of the discourse at hand. Fairclough believes that “in terms of 'power in discourse', 
discourse is the site of power struggles, and, in terms of 'power behind discourse', it is the 
stake in power struggles—for control over orders of discourse is a powerful mechanism for 
sustaining power” (Ibid., 61).
I will conduct an exploratory critical discourse analysis (CDA) based not only on Fairclough's
(2001) recommendations, but also on the classification of environmental discourses by 
Dryzek (2005), and on the methodologies used in two case studies: one of them about the 
paradox of industrialised sustainability (the case of Whole Foods Market by Josée Johnston 
2008); the other a comparison of food security discourses, involving two of the food actors 
whom I will include in my own analysis (Drummond 2012). Since the texts in question can be
considered political discourses, each of them aiming to defend the merits of one or other 
policy option, I also rely on Teun Van Dijk's (1993) recommendations for CDA, which ask to 
focus on argumentation—a big part of political discourse—and to tease out within the 
arguments their local meaning and coherence, the discourse style, and the rhetoric.
I am especially interested in how discourse analysis on the one hand may reveal the 
ideological tensions and contradictions that are thought to underly discourses of equity and 
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sustainability from a capitalist perspective (as patent in Johnston 2008), and on the other hand
can "illuminate how the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and 
contested" (Fraser 1997, in Johnston 2008, 234). I hope to be able to dissect the democratic 
practices of the food actors under analysis, even though Farrelly (2015, 1) warns that "the 
very language of ‘democracy’, as employed by some in positions of influence, insulates 
governments from the effects of democracy". He was referring to governments, but the same 
can be said of the practices of supranational agencies or powerful interest groups. 
Nevertheless, the fact that language can be used to legitimise political decisions and to 
maintain a questionable social-economic order, adds to rather than detracts from the 
usefulness of CDA to lay bare the worldview behind large-scale discourses such as those of 
"food security", "food sovereignty", “green economy", and "climate-smart solutions". 
Another reason discourse analysis is appropriate for this thesis is because an important part of 
the struggle over who runs the world’s food systems, and how they should be run, can be 
attributed to on-going discursive contests over the framing of policy issues and the 
construction of rules, norms, story lines and actor identities, which may lend food actors a veil
of legitimacy to influence policy outcomes (based on Fuchs 2005, who analysed the limits of 
the discursive power of business). 
Fairclough recommends employing three stages of discourse analysis, starting with the text 
itself (use of vocabulary and grammar), moving to the relationship between the text and the 
interaction at hand (the producer of the text versus his or her audience), and finalising with an 
explanation of the relationship between the interaction and the broader social context (Ibid., 
91). Johnston applies this three-dimensional approach to her study of the green consumer 
discourse by the corporation Whole Foods Market. Conversely, Drummond first dissects and 
then reconstructs the narrative from each of the food actors, teasing out the main themes, the 
preferred arguments and versions of truth, the social relations that are implied, and finally, 
possible paradoxes and omissions. Finally, from Dryzek I borrow some important tips on how
to distinguish between discourses that tend to be quite similar—all purporting to solve socio-
ecological problems—but that nevertheless present important differences in their details. 
Dryzek looks at: 1. basic entities recognised or constructed; 2. assumptions about natural 
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relationships; 3. agents and their motives; and 4. key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
(2005, 19).
Selecting the discourses in food politics 
I have chosen nine food actors, seven of them global, one representing the global 
recommendations of a powerful country (United Kingdom), and one national organisation 
(Portuguese). The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was a logical choice, considering
its unequivocal involvement in the management (or perhaps mitigation) of the global food 
production system. The World Bank was chosen because it lies outside of the United Nations 
but commands enormous influence in practically every sector of human activity, prescribing 
its own model for governing. The World Economic Forum is a well-recognised (and 
considered moderate in capitalist terms) voice for the world's largest businesses, with the 
clout and capacity to negotiate directly with governments. The G20 are the most powerful and
wealthiest countries in the world and there is no question that their opinion carries weight. 
The UK's Government Office for Science prepared a report that represented not only the 
views of the conservative government in office at the time, but of the international 
"stakeholders" that were allowed to steer the conclusions. The United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food for the period of 2008-2014 represents a unique perspective 
that blends institutional concerns with the long-standing demands of social movements in 
food and farming. La Via Campesina is one of these social movements, the largest in the 
world, representing around 200 million small farmers, and has conquered a place, if not 
always a vote, at the supranational negotiating tables. Their views are supported by thousands 
of local and national organisations active in food and farming issues for small-scale farming. 
These organisations joined in a declaration at the International Forum for agroecology, at 
Nyéléni, Mali, in 2015, that I have also included in the CDA. And finally, the Portuguese 
Confederation of Farmers (CAP), known to represent the larger and more entrepreneurial 
farming businesses, was added as a check of the influence of global discourses on local 
strategies.
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The reports were chosen for their recency (almost all reports are from 2014-2016, the 
exception being the UK report), for their capacity to convey the view on food production and 
food policy by the food actor in question, and for their relevance to decision-making in food 
production. When necessary for clarification purposes or for additional proof, the reports were
complemented with texts either from the actors' websites or from other reports published by 
them or by related actors. These additional sources are identified whenever they are 
mentioned. The discourse analysis, due to the diversity of actors and written reports, aims at 
comparing food actors' vision for agriculture and identifying common, opposing, and 
contradictory narratives, rather than providing an in-depth view of each discourse.
Below follows a short description of each of the food actors. A full list of the reports and other
texts consulted for the CDA is available in Appendix A.
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (UN): This supranational
organisation, an agency from the UN, was founded in the same year as the United Nations 
itself, 1945, in the aftermath of World War II. As self-stated on its website, the "goal was to 
free humanity from hunger and malnutrition, and to effectively manage the global food 
system"1. Initially only 42 countries were party to FAO, but this number quickly grew to the 
current figure of 194 Member-Nations, and FAO now has offices in over 130 countries. FAO 
has worked on food standards, hunger and undernutrition campaigns, voluntary guidelines to 
manage sensitive industries such as forestry and fisheries, phytosanitary plant protection, the 
annual collecting and publishing of agriculture and food related statistics, the establishment of
a global gene pool for food security, the implementation of the right to food, and the struggle 
against climate change. FAO's emphasis gradually shifted from hunger to nutrition, ensuring 
that all people have access to physiologically and culturally adequate food, by "transforming 
food systems to make nutritious diets available to all"2. FAO publishes a large number of 
reports annually on all imaginable areas related to food production. For this analysis, I chose 
their most recent strategic report, laying out the challenges and FAO's approach to meeting the
new Sustainable Development Goals as adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 
of 2015.
1 A more complete description of FAO and the work of FAO is available here: http://www.fao.org/about/en/
(accessed 12 July 2016).
2 FAO’s Strategic Objective 1: Help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, available:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-au829e.pdf (accessed 18 July 2016).
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The World Bank (WB): This financial institution, currently with 189 member-countries, was 
created in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the famous 
Bretton Woods Monetary Conference designed to help rebuild European countries, of which 
the production systems and infrastructures were severely damaged by the war. With the USA 
as its biggest funder—and consequently the country with the most votes in the WB, a 
situation that persists to this day—the WB shifted its attention to developing countries when 
Europe started recovering its autonomy. To these countries the WB started lending money for 
large infrastructure projects in the 1950s and 60s, switching its focus to more socially and 
economically engaged development projects in the 1970s. According to Goldman (2006), the 
World Bank helped to make a very lucrative business out of development aid by imposing, as 
early as the 1980s, its neoliberal model of socioeconomic organisation on countries in need of
aid or loans. Goldman (Ibid., 12) believes the World Bank is an enormously powerful actor in 
the global political economy that is helping to reproduce "a set of elite power networks". Its 
neoliberal orthodoxy is thought to have created "a series of colossal disasters around the 
world" (Ibid., 16). Because of its broad interpretation of development, the WB is involved in 
every conceivable area of social and economic organisation, including food production. I 
chose the WB's report on the future of food, Shaping a Climate-Smart Global Food System, as
an example of this organisation's view on the management of the global food system.
World Economic Forum (WEF): This is essentially a major business interest group, but 
prefers to present itself as "the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation"3. 
Well-known for its annual meetings of business leaders in Davos, and for the anti-
globalisation and anti-capitalist protests that are simultaneously staged there, the WEF was 
founded in 1971 as the European Management Forum. Its members are the "1,000 leading 
companies of the world"4. Based on the “stakeholder” theory, the WEF aims to reconcile 
entrepreneurship with high standards of “governance” in a global world (I place the terms 
between quotes because they are clearly used as instruments and not as ends in themselves). 
The WEF publishes policy documents that are the result of its independent research and 
projects "committed to improving the state of the world" all over the world. The organisation 
3 World Economic Forum website, available: https://www.weforum.org/ (accessed 10 August 2016).
4 History of the World Economic Forum, available: https://www.weforum.org/about/history (accessed 10
August 2016).
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and its members, by virtue of their economic power, have easy access to politicians and 
scientists, in addition to ample funds to run their independent projects or to sponsor state and 
university initiatives. One of the areas the WEF has focused on in recent years, with the help 
of corporations such as Monsanto, Unilever, and Nestlé, is agriculture and food, having 
launched its own programme entitled "a new vision for agriculture"5. It is their take on 
agriculture that interests me for the present CDA.
The G206: This is an economic forum of 19 countries plus the European Union, of which the 
finance ministers and Central Bank governors endeavour to meet at least once a year. In 
contrast with the G7 (formerly G8 until Russia was asked to leave in 2014), the G20 tends to 
reflect wider interests than only those of the member-countries. The G20 has no permanent 
secretariat, but may rely on the resources of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. In 2015, under Turkish mandate, the G20 published a strategic document to promote 
food security which I will consider for the CDA.
UK Government Office for Science (UK Science Office): This is the research department of
the government of the United Kingdom, which provides science-based policy advice to 
government, in particular the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet. They publish a 
wide number of reports destined to support decision-making by policy makers and other 
professionals and researchers. In 2011, the Office for Science published their comprehensive 
strategic vision for the future of food and farming, based on the testimony of several hundred 
experts and interested parties from across the world and more than 100 peer-reviewed what 
they call "evidence" papers. The project was sponsored by the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and Department for International Development (DFID). Its 
stakeholders, influential in terms of strategic direction and the shaping of conclusions7, 
included representatives from the UK government, from a range of supranational 
5 World Economic Forum, New Vision for Agriculture, available: https://www.weforum.org/projects/new-
vision-for-agriculture/ (accessed 12 July 2016).
6 Description of the G20 on the European Commission website, available:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/forums/g7_g8_g20/index_en.htm (accessed 10 August
2016).
7 High Level Stakeholder Group of the Foresight project, available:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140108135805/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-
work/projects/published-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/high-level-stakeholder-group (accessed 23
August 2016).
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organisations (including trade-oriented organisations such as OECD, WTO, and World Bank),
from large corporations, such as Unilever and Cargill, and influential philanthropists, such as 
the Gates foundation, which is doubly represented through the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa. Only three representatives for farmers were invited, but none of them 
came from small-scale farmers, while for most of the project there was no representative from
civil society. One of the lead scientists had previously been head of R&D at the biotech and 
chemicals corporation Syngenta. Taking into account this kind of member profile, it would 
have been difficult to avoid conflicts of interest, but since this was a publicly funded project, 
the project leaders would nevertheless have had to make an effort to balance the information, 
which is why this report is an interesting addition to the CDA.
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 2008-2014, Olivier de Schutter (UN Special
Rapporteur): Prof. Dr. Olivier de Schutter was probably the first UN bureaucrat to openly 
embrace the concept of agroecology, and to have no qualms as to criticise the corporatisation 
and industrialisation of agriculture, as well as to denounce the damaging consequences of an 
increase in intellectual property rights on food-related resources. On account of his position, 
de Schutter had to provide strong evidence for his view on the excesses of the modern food 
system and for the alternatives he was proposing. His position demanded that he defend the 
right to food as objectively and independently as possible. I therefore consider him to be an 
excellent intermediate voice (to call him neutral would be fallacious), capable of reasoning 
without the burden of certain alliances (whether with industry or with social movements). I 
included his final report to the Human Rights Council: The Transformative Potential of the 
Right to Food.
La Via Campesina (LVC): This international movement comprises 164 local and national 
organisations in 73 countries, representing over 200 million small-scale farmers8. Founded in 
1993, La Via Campesina has already managed recognition as a food actor by, inter alia, the 
EU, FAO, and the UN Human Rights Council. The movement proclaims food sovereignty—a 
term coined by them in 1996 and which I first presented in Chapter 2—as its main goal, and 
has managed to get other interest groups, several institutions, and several governments, to 
8 La Via Campesina, description of the organisation, available:
https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44 (accessed 8 August 2016).
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adopt the term in lieu of, or complementary to, the less proactive concept of food security9. 
The movement denounces a corporate-led political economy, in particular in agriculture and 
food, which it aims to show harms people and Nature. Conversely, its members defend 
"small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote social justice and dignity"10. La Via 
Campesina regularly publishes a variety of newsletters, policy briefings, and reports. I chose 
their 2014 report of Via Campesina’s Sixth International Conference, in which they sum up 
their concerns and their view of the way forward in helping transform the world's food 
systems.
International Forum for agroecology, Nyéléni 2015: The international movements and 
alliances of "small-scale food producers and consumers, including peasants, indigenous 
peoples, communities, hunters and gatherers, family farmers, rural workers, herders and 
pastoralists, fisherfolk and urban people" (Nyéléni 2015 declaration) that gathered at this 
international meeting issued a joint declaration that sums up their opinion of the modern food 
system and its challenges, and presents their vision for healthy and fair food systems. With a 
larger constituency than LVC, their declaration is a useful complement to understanding the 
discourse of the peoples organised to oppose the large institutional food actors (in particular 
the trade-oriented ones, such as WB, WEF, and G20).
CAP - Portuguese Farmers Confederacy: This confederation of approximately 250 farmers 
organisations from different sectors was founded in 1975. CAP is generally considered to lean
to the political Right as well as towards larger and more business-focused farm organisations, 
whereas its counterpart, CNA (National Farmers Confederacy), publicly claims to defend 
small and family farmers and represents the social movement La Via Campesina in Portugal. 
CAP recently published a summarised policy document with their vision for agriculture, 
called Vision 2020.
9 At the World Food Summit in 1996 food security was defined as follows: “Food security exists when all
people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”
10 La Via Campesina, description of the organisation, available:
https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44 (accessed 8 August 2016).
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Designing a Critical Discourse Analysis of prominent food actors
The methodology that I employed, as I mentioned before, is inspired by three discourse 
specialists (Fairclough, Van Dijk, and Dryzek) as well as two case studies in the same field as 
I am analysing (Johnston and Drummond). The steps I took are the following:
1. A reading and re-reading of the texts to familiarise myself with the themes, language 
style, and narrative strategies.
2. Highlighting excerpts of text (statements) that exemplify different themes or 
narratives, looking in particular at the arguments for these themes, narratives or 
discourses, contradictions, paradoxes, apparent omissions, specific narrative styles that
aid in argumentation, and the repetition of certain terms.
3. Classifying statements according to the themes identified, relating or contrasting 
statements from the same themes, identifying key assumptions and common narrative 
strategies, asking how the food actor is validating his or her "version of truth", 
identifying the social relations and/or social order that are implied by the discourse, 
identifying when possible the performance mode and intentions behind the discourse.
4. Situating the texts in their larger context and comparing the themes encountered with 
the narratives previously identified in the chapter on political economy, as well as the 
analysis of the food system and the review of similar case studies, so as to tease out 
the world view and social perspective that is inspiring the discourse. Comparing the 
themes from the different actors and if necessary relating them to supporting texts.
5. Associating the results of the discourse analysis with the attributes for democratic 
quality compiled in Chapter 3. For this final part, I directed the ecological-democratic 
assessment questions that I presented in the introduction to Part 2 at the summarised 
results from the discourse analysis. 
The preliminary analysis revealed approximately 200 words that were either used frequently, 
used in key arguments, and/or used in very different ways by different actors. I then grouped 
these words in clusters of themes or categories, to be able to obtain a meaningful comparative 
analysis. The main clusters were: 
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1. What makes up the food system? The elements of the food system that are either 
recognised or constructed by the food actors and key assumptions they hold about 
these; 
2. Who are the agents of the food system? The entities or groups that each of the food 
actors recognises in the food system, the motives they attribute to them, and the social 
order they construct from the agents and their motives.
3. What are the threats? The threats, challenges, and difficulties recognised by each of 
the food actors and the arguments behind their choices.
4. What are the solutions? Key solutions championed by each of the food actors and 
respective argumentation.
5. The key narrative strategies and versions of truth. A recapitulation of the core 
narratives in each of the discourses and an analysis of their argumentation, paying 
specific attention to omissions, paradoxes, and contradictions.
6. The democratic implications of the different discourses in food politics. What are the 
democratic assumptions that each food actor is operating under and how do these 
contribute to or detract from the possibility of a food democracy?
As much as possible, excerpts from the texts or other proof will be provided alongside the 
analytical judgments. At the end of the chapter, Table 3 summarises how the global food 
polity as a whole as well as each of the food actors was found to score on the four dimensions 
of democratic attributes.
Results of the Critical Discourse Analysis
What makes up the food system? The entities recognised in the food system and key 
assumptions about them.
While there appears to be agreement among all the food actors on some of the main elements 
and characteristics of the food system, in particular the existence of an environment that 
merits conservation and of an agricultural production system that needs to become 
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sustainable; the importance of healthy soil, water, biodiversity, and climate; and the existence 
of a global food system as well as global food actors, there are some striking differences upon
closer inspection. The food actors from the social movements and those that defend the right 
to food, La Via Campesina (LVC), the organisations united in the Nyéléni declaration, and the
UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food (UN Rapporteur), refer to living elements such 
as plants and seeds, in particular traditional plants and landraces, as entities in their own right,
whereas the other actors, besides mentioning them very infrequently (the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and G20 reports have no mention of plants), include them mostly as elements, 
or as ingredients of the agricultural production and trade packages, in which they also include 
soil, water, and ecosystems. Thus the Nyéléni organisations speak of "building life in the soil, 
recycling nutrients, the dynamic management of biodiversity and energy conservation at all 
scales", whereas FAO (2016a, 22) says "(w)e develop effective science-based standards for 
food safety and plant health and develop national capacities for implementing these standards 
and animal health requirements", and the WEF (2016, 29) sees seeds merely as "yield-
enhancing products". The social movements and the UN Rapporteur are also the only food 
actors that speak of "commons" in the food system, not only in the old English sense of "land 
held in common", but in the sense of common property of finite resources. The organisations 
behind Nyéléni (Nyéléni 2015 Declaration) claim that "(c)ollective rights and access to the 
Commons are fundamental pillars of agro-ecology", whereas the UN Rapporteur (2014, 21) 
asks to "(r)espect the rights of special groups, such as indigenous peoples, fisherfolk, herders 
and pastoralists, for whom the protection of commons is vital". The supranational agencies 
have interiorised the idea of improving land-holding by smallholder farmers, especially 
women, but the way they wish to go about this still fits in with the dominant view of private 
property. They have no proposals or language for commonly held land or resources. They 
agree with more access to essential resources, but not with the management of these resources
by the people that need them the most, nor with the exclusion of the more powerful agents 
from these resources. The idea is to improve the status quo, as patent in FAO's statement: 
We support the empowerment of smallholders (farmers, fishers, indigenous peoples, foresters) and family
farmers for improved access to and sustainable management of natural resources, better access to markets,
technologies and services to increase their productivity and income generation. (FAO 2016a, 23)
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Resilience as a desired characteristic of food systems has clearly entered the lexicon of 
supranational agencies, used most profusely by the World Bank (38 mentions), but also to a 
considerable extent by FAO and to a lesser extent by the UN rapporteur. FAO extends the 
meaning of the term to all manner of aspects of the food system: resilience to natural 
disasters, resilience of livelihoods, people, and ecosystems, or in general "resilience to threats 
and crises" (2016a, 15). Even though resilience is one of the three strategic pillars of the 
World Bank's proposal for a Climate-Smart system—i.e. "ensure the food system is 
productive, resilient, and contributes to tackling climate change" (WB 2015, 4)—no definition
is offered and it is not clear how it will be measured. Likewise, the UK Government Office 
for Science (2011, 9) uses the term very generically, speaking of "resilience to shocks and 
future uncertainties". The social movements do not appear to share the institutional food 
actors' fondness for the concept of resilience. The characteristics that they would like to see in
a food system are more sociopolitical than technical in nature: ensuring basic rights (such as 
to food and resources), the freedom to choose food policies and production systems, and an 
end to the commodification and privatisation of agricultural resources. That’s why in LVC's 
report (2014, 8) we can find the following cry for freedom:
Freedom! Even though most nations have gained independence, the people, especially peasants, have not
enjoyed their independence or their basic rights. They and the earth are suffering because of the greed of
neoliberalism. I hope that those who fight in their villages, who have joined the progressive peasant
movements under La Via Campesina, will bring the real independence for all and people peasants in the
world. (H.S. Dillon, Special Envoy for Poverty Alleviation to the President of the Republic of Indonesia)
Similarly, the UN Rapporteur (2014, 3) asks to ensure "a fuller realization of the right to 
adequate food"  and "that the freedom of choice of small-scale food producers is truly 
respected" (Ibid., 12). Elements that are given prominent places in the more technocratic 
approaches of supranational agencies and the UK Science Office—such as ecosystems, 
biodiversity, emissions, and the generic objective of sustainability—are absent or attributed 
less importance in the versions of the representatives of the social movements and the UN 
Rapporteur, to whom the manner in which resources are steered and distributed are 
paramount. Conversely, matters of rights and power imbalances in the food system are largely
ignored in the reconstruction of the challenges for food systems by the supranational and UK 
agencies, although the latter do recognise issues of equity, espectuiyially hunger and rural 
poverty. But their discourse is very pragmatic. Thus the WB (2015, 11) worries that "(w)e 
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cannot achieve food security without preserving the ecosystem services that forests provide" 
and the G20 (2015, 3) believe that a "key element in any long-term, sustainable solution is 
investment in increasing the productivity and resilience of developing country agriculture". 
The UN Rapporteur presents a unique version in that he adopts the lexicons of both the 
supranational agencies and the social movements. 
Nature as an element or entity is ignored by all supranational agencies including the Special 
Rapporteur, as well as by the UK Science Office. Instead, they have embraced a more prosaic 
concept: that of ecosystems, which has become popular with the rise of systems theory and 
environmental modelling. FAO (2016a, 11) places ecosystems at par with people and 
communities: "(e)nhancing the resilience of people, communities and ecosystems". The trade-
oriented food actors use the term more sparingly, whereas the UK Science Office, the report 
of which was based on hundreds of peer-reviewed articles, uses the term abundantly but 
exclusively in the context of what these ecosystems can provide humans or the food system 
with: "(u)nderstanding the economics of ecosystem services is a very active area of current 
research and incorporating the true costs (or benefits) of different productions systems on 
ecosystem services is a powerful way to incentivise sustainability" (UK Science Office 2011, 
35). LVC and the organisations behind the Nyéleni declaration prefer to speak of Nature, to 
whom they attribute proper status and rights, naming her as a victim of the threats that face 
the food system: "(t)he current development model that prioritizes benefits to corporations 
over the lives of people and respect for Nature is leading us to the destruction of the planet" 
(LVC 2014, 25). Interestingly the term Earth as an entity is used by two very different food 
actors, LVC and the organisations gathered in the Nyéléni declaration, and the UK Science 
Office. But the latter's use is closer to how earth scientists and environmental engineers 
describe the object of their research ("(h)uman activities have now become a dominant driver 
of the Earth system" (UK Science Office 2011, 13), whereas the social movements elevate the
Earth to more than a system or combination of systems, transforming it into an entity in her 
own right, more specifically a feminine entity, deserving not only of care or of respect, but of 
legal status. To defend this important entity, social movements ask that the United Nations 
adopt a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth (LVC 2014, 14).
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Nutrition as a desired outcome of the global food system has now been fully recognised by 
governments and supranational agencies, and has been enshrined in the 2014 Rome 
Declaration on Nutrition11. It is therefore not surprising that nutrition is mentioned at par with 
food security in most of the documents of these organisations. It appears as an extension of 
food security, a recognition that food systems must not only supply food for all, but, as FAO 
(2016a, 29) reminds world leaders, must be able to provide nutritious diets available to all 
people. Nutrition has gradually been attributed the same weight as environmental and 
economic needs. However, the commitment to improving nutrient content in food varies 
across actors, as do the policies they recommend to achieve nutrition. The social movements 
embed nutrition within a demand for food sovereignty—i.e. the right to decide their own 
nutrition—and the UN Rapporteur takes care to detail the causes of malnutrition—among 
them the emphasis on high yields of a narrow choice of cash crops, which provide calories but
not necessarily nutrients (2014, 6)—and proposes to focus on peasant-based strategies to 
invert the situation, because, he says "(d)iverse farming systems contribute to more diverse 
diets for the communities that produce their own food, thus improving nutrition" (2014, 9). In 
contrast, FAO avoids committing to any particular strategy, and what I will call the "trade 
hegemonic bloc"—the WB, G20, the UK Science Office and the WEF—appear to have 
simply extended the term food security to "food security and nutrition", without any specific 
strategy for improving the nutritional aspect of food. There is some indication that the latter 
believe improving food security will automatically improve nutrition: "(b)etter nutrition 
resulting from improved food security in turn strengthens the human resource base and human
capital and also improves productivity, growth, and employment generation" (G20 2015, 5). 
The WB uses nutrition haphazardly, sometimes referring to animal feed, sometimes to human 
food, and sometimes to fertilisers (plant nutrition). Besides the UN Rapporteur, who offers 
very detailed strategies, FAO is the only supranational agency to discuss the nutritional 
content of food security initiatives.
11 We can read on the FAO website: "The Rome Declaration on Nutrition enshrines the right of everyone to
have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, and commits governments to prevent malnutrition in all its
forms. The Framework of Action recognizes that governments have the primary role and responsibility for
addressing nutrition issues and challenges." Available: http://www.fao.org/about/en/ (accessed 9 September
2016).
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There is also a marked difference between food actors in how agricultural produce or food is 
referred to. It has become common among institutional food actors to speak of 
"commodities", which is a typical trade term. In fact, agriculture has been—as good as 
possible in light of its multifunctional and, as seen in earlier chapters, "recalcitrant" nature—
integrated into global markets, explaining why the UK Science Office (2011, 23-24) has no 
qualms about equating agricultural produce with merchandise or commodities, i.e. something 
that only has value when sold:
Improving the functioning of commodity markets can reduce the element of volatility that does not reflect
underlying market fundamentals. Well-functioning markets require access to accurate information –
information on international production and the size of commodity stocks is generally poor and in some
cases deliberately withheld. The incorporation of commodities in more complex markets and over-the-
counter traded derivatives, and the effect of automatic computer trades need to be explored further. Also,
the effects of these issues, if any, on excess volatility should be explored to determine if action is needed by
policy-makers.
The definition of agricultural raw produce as commodities is part of a high-value trade-
inspired lexicon that also groups the more lucrative agricultural activities (so-called cash 
crops such as wheat, maize, rice, cotton, sunflower seeds, and tomatoes) into "value chains", 
one of the WEF's favourite words—repeated 42 times, an equivalent of once per page, while 
never actually defined. Value chains (besides systems, whether ecosystems, food systems, or 
financial systems) appear to be the preferred form of organising agriculture, with WEF (2016, 
7) convinced that "stakeholders can develop stronger value chains and systems that lead to 
improved outcomes at each stage of food production and consumption" and the WB (2015, 
22) claiming that growth in their three pillars of climate-smart agriculture can be achieved by 
a "focus on sustainable intensification across systems and value chains, underpinned by 
strategic investment in agricultural science and technology". On the contrary, the social 
movements and the UN Rapporteur reject this compartmentalisation of food and agriculture. 
They are keen on reclaiming the essential resources needed for farming—including 
reproductive resources such as seeds—as part of local and global commons, instead of as 
products put up for trade in global, extremely competitive markets. When they use the term 
"commodification" it is to express their disagreement with a mercantilist view of farming and 
food. Thus we can read in the Nyéléni Declaration:
The corporate model over-produces food that poisons us, destroys soil fertility, is responsible for the
deforestation of rural areas, the contamination of water and the acidification of oceans and killing of
fisheries. Essential natural resources have been commodified, and rising production costs are driving us off
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the land. Farmers’ seeds are being stolen and sold back to us at exorbitant prices, bred as varieties that
depend on costly, contaminating agrochemicals. The industrial food system is a key driver of the multiple
crises of climate, food, environmental, public health and others. 
The use of synthetic chemicals in agriculture is another disputed characteristic of the modern 
food system that pits the supranational agencies and the food industry against the social 
movements and the UN Rapporteur. Whereas the former two types of food actors largely 
avoid referring to chemicals, or even to the milder terms fertilisers and pesticides (with the 
exception of the UK Science Office, of which the more technical report delves into agronomic
details), the social movements and the UN Rapporteur denounce the use of synthetic 
chemicals in agriculture, even coining their own words for them: “agro-chemicals” and “agro-
toxins”, making sure to associate their use with larger-scale agriculture.
Risk appears to be an important characteristic of the food system that is recognised by all the 
supranational agencies and by the UK Science Office and WEF. The G20, FAO, and the WB 
repeatedly refer to risks of climate change, natural disasters, and disease, with the G20 
additionally referring to risks for investment, and price risks. Risks are generally assumed to 
be quantifiable and manageable through risk monitoring and financing. Following this 
reasoning, the WB (2015, 20) states : 
Modern parametric approaches to risk quantification and monitoring have led to the development of
insurance type products that have the ability to manage risk more efficiently, especially at the aggregated
(for example, banks) level, and that can be used to reduce the cost of finance for farmers. Increasingly,
countries are introducing risk financing approaches and products that will enable the catastrophic layer of
loss from events such as floods and droughts to be managed by government and enable compensation to
flow to farmers—for example, the Africa Risk Capacity initiative.
Likewise, the UK Science Office (2011, 11) reduces decision-making about new technologies 
to a decision about competing risks : 
Decisions about the acceptability of new technologies need to be made in the context of competing risks
(rather than by simplistic versions of the precautionary principle); the potential cost of not utilising new
technology must be taken into account.
This organisation assumes even future risks can be managed or hedged against: "[c]areful 
assessment of the implications of these drivers is essential if major pressures are to be 
anticipated, and future risks managed" (Ibid., 13). Even though the UK Science Office admits 
to "shocks and future uncertainties" (Ibid., 9), at the same time it advances the idea that these 
can be controlled, that it is a question of using “futures techniques to embrace the many 
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uncertainties inherent in the future, and to identify choices that are resilient to a range of 
outcomes" (Ibid., 11). In contrast, the UN Rapporteur (2014, 8) criticises what he calls "a 
narrow focus on improved productivity risks ignoring the wide range of other variables that 
foresight exercises should take into account" and introduces under-discussed risks such as 
those of falling into poverty and those associated with international trade (Ibid., 17 and 26). In
a similar vein, LVC's (2014, 11) version of risk is linked to the choices of the agro-industry 
and their financiers: "[t]he financial crisis was led by unregulated private banks that engaged 
in risky financial choices and destabilized entire economies resulting in massive debts" . 
Contrary to the trend in ecological science, as well as to a certain degree in ecological 
economics, to move beyond the concept of risk to the recognition of uncertainties or even 
gaps of ignorance in our knowledge—which would encourage a more holistic, ethics- and 
peoples-based approach to decision-making in critical areas of human activity—the 
international food actors under study here, with the exception of the UN Rapporteur and the 
social movements, continue to uphold a riskmanagement-based approach.
Finally, the concept of markets in the food system is a recurrent theme and recognised by all 
the food actors. However, the role they attribute to this element and to the trade activities 
conducted within it varies significantly. Thus, the more trade-oriented food actors—i.e. the 
WB, UK Science Office, the G20, and the WEF—view markets as more than elements, as 
quasi-organisms that are essential to the global food system and that self-organise to generally
positive effects, needing but a few corrections occasionally to ensure that their functioning 
also benefits more vulnerable groups. Thus, the WEF (2016, 4) states: "(m)arket-based 
approaches, while not the only answer, will be an important tool in the “toolbox” to drive 
change – providing the efficiency, scalability and marketbased incentives to power a large-
scale effort". The UK Science Office (2011, 19) professes its faith in the ultimate equitability 
of a global system of trade, claiming "(f)ood security is best served by fair and fully 
functioning markets and not by policies to promote self-sufficiency" and warns that "allowing
sustainability to be reflected in trade rules may lead to environmental protectionism" (Ibid., 
20). Even FAO (2016a, 23), despite its openness to more equitable solutions, continues 
convinced of the merits of global trade, offering their assistance in the following manner: 
"[w]e help countries to participate more fully in global and regional markets through 
enhanced trade". The UN Rapporteur (2014, 11) disagrees, stating instead that "the expansion 
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of trade also has resulted in the luxury tastes of the richest parts of the world being allowed to 
compete against the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor". Meanwhile, FAO is helping to
run the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), launched by the G20 in 2011 as a 
way of monitoring agricultural commodity markets. This system, although helpful as a 
warning tool for rising food prices, does not look beyond commodities. LVC (2014, 24) will 
have none of what they consider false market-based solutions such as the green economy12 or 
carbon markets, demanding that "the WTO, FTAs and the World Bank are removed from 
agriculture". Essentially they are asking exactly the opposite of what the UK Science Office 
wants: to promote local trade and self-sufficiency in food production for countries in the 
Global South, rather than a focus on global trade that will have countries specialise in a 
narrow range of cash crops.
Who are the agents of the food system? Recognition of key agents, their motives and 
relationships.
Statistically speaking, after consumers, farmers and other food providers such as pastoralists 
or fishers, are the largest interest group in the food system. It is estimated by FAO (2012b) 
that there are around 570 million farms worldwide, of which the majority (90 percent) are 
family farms, and that there are approximately 1.5 billion smallholders (including forest 
keepers and fishers) in the Global South, while a total of about 2.5 billion people live directly 
from food-providing and agricultural sectors. Nearly half of the agricultural work force is 
made up of women. Depending on the region, smallholder farmers may provide up to 70 
percent of domestic food needs. They are an important part of rural and/or indigenous 
communities that are still an important form of social and economic organisation in the 
Global South.
12 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defines the green economy as "one that results in
improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and
ecological scarcities". Available: http://web.unep.org/greeneconomy/what-inclusive-green-economy 
To this LVC responds that "(t)he green economy does not seek to put an end to climate change or
environmental degradation. Instead, it looks to generalize the principle that those who have money can
continue to pollute". Available: https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/actions-and-events-mainmenu-26/-
climate-change-and-agrofuels-mainmenu-75/1707-environmental-and-climate-justice-now-position-paper-of-
la-via-campesina (both sites accessed 23 September 2016).
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These facts are not reflected in the same manner in the discourses from the nine food actors. 
Whereas the social movements, the UN Rapporteur, and to a considerable extent FAO, give 
the agents farmers, women, (local) communities, and indigenous communities the appropriate 
weight according to their place in the food systems, the WB and the WEF grant a prominent 
place to farmers but almost completely neglect women, whereas the G20 and FAO give more 
attention to women than to farmers in general (which in this case may be considered positive 
discrimination). The UK Science Office prefers to refer to the broader group of food 
producers and finally, CAP (the Portuguese farmers' association) speaks of producers as much
as consumers, while only mentioning farmers twice, and also ignoring women. The UK 
Science Office (2011, 9) appears to attribute agency to the food system itself, as patent in their
statement: "[t]he global food system will experience an unprecedented confluence of 
pressures over the next 40 years". They explain that they see the food system as "a partially 
self-organised collection of interacting parts" (Ibid., 10). In their view it is the food system, 
and not necessarily any specific groups or people, that needs to adapt to climate change and 
continuing globalisation. The advantage of conceiving of an agent that is independent from all
the interest groups in the food system is that all manner of “one-size-fits-all” solutions can be 
applied to it, while it is possible to ignore the conflicts of interest or deeper causalities.
Other agents that are mentioned in some or all of the reports in very different degrees are 
partner(ship)s, leaders, stakeholders, business, companies, youth, civil society, peasants, 
migrants, and gender. I will next go into detail for some of these agents, highlighting how 
their presence subtly illustrates the different ways that the different food actors understand the
social and economic order.
The only actors to refer specifically to peasants, rather than farmers or food producers, 
thereby deliberately creating a class—the peasant class, which includes subsistence farmers, 
family farmers and rural workers—are the social movements and the UN Special Rapporteur. 
This overtly political word is non-existent in the lexicon of the other food actors. Additionally,
the social movements and the UN rapporteur provide a picture of diversity when speaking of 
the smallholder producer, who is the main beneficiary of their demands. They speak not only 
of peasants, but of artisanal fishers, pastoralists, indigenous peoples, and even urban farmers. 
They take care to exclude agricultural businesses, which they see as either drivers (in the case 
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of large corporations) of the global, mechanised, and chemicalised food system, or as having 
been co-opted into the industrial food system. Farming for livelihood, in their view, has not 
only been neglected but also directly threatened by the push for industrialisation, for 
privatisation—of natural resources but also of knowledge as seen in the previous chapter—
and by the cutting off of access of peasants to land and other resources for their livelihoods. 
Farmers are, however, not only victims, but rightful and important food actors who can be 
self-reliant and help feed the world, if given the chance. This view of the farmer is not 
corroborated by the supranational agencies and the trade-oriented food actors. The WB, the 
G20, and the UK Science Office, and to a lesser extent FAO (with a direct mission to help 
smallholders and the rural poor), conceive of the smallholder farmer as a failed entrepreneur 
who needs help, in the form of science- and technology-based knowledge, capital, and access 
to markets, and who must learn to manage his or her "investments" and "risks" to become 
more "competitive" and thus see “income increases" (G20 2015, 11). While the farmer is 
expected to become more efficient and productive, family members of the farmer are invited 
to procure "better-paying off-farm work" (Ibid.). Although farmers can undoubtedly benefit 
from learning proven methods to increase their productivity and protect themselves from 
harvest losses, the view of the farmer as an "agropreneur" (FAO 2016a, 14) is ignoring or 
simplifying the rural reality in most countries in the Global South. As the UN Rapporteur 
(2014, 6) reports:
Finally, because global food systems have been shaped to maximize efficiency gains and produce large
volumes of commodities, they have failed to take distributional concerns into account. The increases in
production far outstripped population growth during the period from 1960 to 2000. But these increases
went hand in hand with regional specialization in a relatively narrow range of products, a process
encouraged by the growth of international trade in agricultural products. The associated technological and
policy choices concentrated benefits in the hands of large production units and landholders at the expense
of smaller-scale producers and landless workers, resulting in the growth of inequality in rural areas and a
failure to address the root causes of poverty.
He tells a different story: of how smallholder farmers have not only been discriminated by the
agricultural development model born out of the Green Revolution, but actively harmed, 
through the loss of lands and of access to resources and national markets, maintaining billions
of people in abject poverty (UN Rapporteur 2014, 11). Farmworkers can "barely survive from
their labour on large plantations" and often trade their rural poverty for an urban slum (Ibid.). 
Despite the fact that the other food actors recognise the crucial importance of improving the 
conditions of the rural population and of smallholder farmers as a buffer against hunger and 
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poverty, and against rural migration (see for example the case studies in FAO 2016a, 19), they
insist on their focus on industrialised and mechanised farming and on productivity gains, 
which they believe will automatically improve rural lives. The G20 (2015, 9) goes as far as to 
claim that the blame lies partly with farmers' lack of entrepreneurial instinct:
Risk aversion hinders the adoption of new technologies and practices that may have long-term benefits for
the individual farmer and for overall sustainable productivity growth. Small family farms may choose
lower return crop and livestock production options over more technology and input-intensive options. The
threat of shocks, either general (such as droughts) or farm-specific (such as a crop failure) increases their
financial risks and makes smallholders reluctant to access credit markets – when these are available and
accessible, which is not always the case – due to the consequences of an inability to repay.
The UK Science Office's recognition that value in agriculture is added "beyond the farmgate" 
does nevertheless not result in any recommendations to improve the remuneration and 
security of farmers, beyond helping the poorest of their number. The idea of protecting only 
the very weakest, while insisting all others should be entrepreneurs, is a classical conservative
liberal approach, which appears to be what has inspired the UK Science Office report. 
Farming in this view is seen as unavoidably linked to the food industry, which is then linked 
to global trade, which in turn requires the specialisation of countries in a small number of 
commodities that other countries need. Locally oriented solutions, such as producing food 
exclusively for the region or country, or even diversifying food crops, are explicitly frowned 
upon: "[t]his Report rejects food self-sufficiency as a viable option for nations to contribute to
global food security, but stresses the importance of crafting food system governance to 
maximise the benefits of globalisation and to ensure that they are distributed fairly" (UK 
Science Office 2011, 13). In other words, the food system, albeit recognisably unfair and 
keeping half of the world population in poverty, is not to be changed, but simply managed to 
avoid the worst inequities. Likewise, the Portuguese Farmers Association (2015, 46-47, my 
translation from the original Portuguese) presents a picture of a (probably) male agricultural 
businessman who contributes to the development of rural regions and the wealth production 
of his country by "maintaining and diversifying economic activities associated with agro-
forestry", which include modernising, scaling up, increasing productivity, and attracting 
national and foreign investment.
Migrants are an undeniable interest group in the food system, with on the one hand an 
estimated three million people moving from rural areas to cities every week—accounting for 
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more than a third of the population in large gateway cities such as Sydney, London, and New 
York13—and on the other hand, migrant workers becoming a common feature in agriculture 
(in China alone there were 230 million rural migrant workers reported in 200914 whereas in 
the USA, an estimated 70 percent of farm workers are Mexican-born15). Considering that farm
workers are already recognised as a particularly vulnerable group that lacks work- as well as 
social protection, and who are among the lowest-paid workers, migrant workers are doubly 
vulnerable because they lack any form of social safety net that their family or community 
might have provided. Nevertheless, this interest group is largely ignored by the institutional 
food actors. In contrast, the social movements have embraced this agent as an underclass 
alongside the peasant, with LVC (2014, 10) dedicating a chapter to migration, stating: "The 
peasants and migrants struggle are not very much apart. With land grabbing, a number of 
peasants end up as migrant workers". In LVC's view, migration is "the site of struggle in 
which many separate issues intersect – labor and human rights, gender issues, climate, and 
many more" (Ibid., 22). It is both a consequence of an inequitable and industrialised food 
system, as well as a source of increased poverty and injustices, because of the extreme 
vulnerability of this group. The out-migration of men additionally creates imbalances in 
communities, which in some cases are constituted up to 70-90 percent of women (Ibid.). It is 
therefore surprising that FAO, which has studied the migration phenomenon and the 
consequent "challenges and opportunities for food security, sustainable agriculture and rural 
development"16, does not include migration or rural migrant workers in its prognosis for 
sustainable development. The WB and G20 make no reference to either rural-urban or rural 
work migration. The UK Science Office does make a reference to male out-migration as a 
problem, but does not discuss causes, implications, or other vulnerabilities of the rural 
migrant worker group. The UN Rapporteur is the only institutional food actor in this sample 
13 International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2015, available:
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/wmr2015_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).
14 International Labour Organization, Labour migration in China and Mongolia, available:
http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).
Note: a migrant here is considered to be both domestic and international.
15 Migration Policy Institute, 2013 publication on farm labour markets, available:
 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ripe-change-evolving-farm-labor-markets-united-states-mexico-and-
central-america (accessed 30 August 2016).
16 FAO, Migration, available: http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/work-areas/migration/en/ (accessed 31
August 2016).
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of reports to fully recognise the migratory trend and include migrants as a vulnerable interest 
group, although he does not expand upon specific migrant concerns.
Women as agents in their own right are championed by LVC and to a considerable extent by 
FAO and the G20. In the twenty-first century, the important role that women play in the local 
food systems that feed the majority of the world's population has been officially recognised, 
and the fifth goal of the brand-new Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations is 
to achieve gender equality. The commitment to improving women's access to resources—
whether natural resources such as land, or financial resources—is patent in both FAO's and 
the G20’s report, while recommended in the UK Science report. The WB has no mention of 
women's role, or women at all for that matter, which is an important oversight—even though 
on their site it becomes apparent that the WB does work on gender equality and women 
empowerment, leaving this factor out of a flagship report is not a good sign of their 
commitment—while the WEF mentions the aim of women's economic empowerment as part 
of the description of one of its projects, but does not grant it status as a strategic objective. 
The UN Rapporteur (2014, 18) is a strong supporter of women’s empowerment:
Because gender-based discrimination violates the right to food of women and girls, the empowerment of
women and gender equality, as well as the adoption of social protection schemes that are transformative of
gender roles, should be a priority of such strategies. Enhancing the role of women in decision-making at all
levels, including within the household, moreover, improves nutritional and health outcomes.
He insists that in order to strengthen the protection of the right to food of women, states must 
"(m)ainstream a concern for gender in all laws, policies and programs, where appropriate, by 
developing incentives that reward public administrations which make progress in setting and 
reaching targets in this regard" (Ibid., 25). LVC not only promotes gender equality and 
women empowerment, but actually applies gender parity in its organisational structure. In a 
similar vein, involving youth—a critical interest group to revitalise rural communities—in 
decision-making over food, is a priority for LVC, while targeting youth with policies to 
improve access to resources for food production and improve livelihood opportunities is on 
both FAO’s and G20's agendas. But the WB, WEF and UK Science Office are silent on the 
matter. Finally, indigenous people as agents are recognised by FAO and actively supported by 
LVC, but appear to be a non-issue with the other food actors.
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All the actors recognise governments, the private sector, and civil society as separate agents, 
but they differ in how they see these agents relate. The supranational agencies and the 
business sector have embraced the term "partnership" as an alternative or shortcut to 
government regulation or international agreements. This term has entered the global 
agreements lexicon this century, and has been persistent, replacing other approaches to co-
governance of global affairs. FAO and the WB have embraced it, and it is even part of the 
motto of the new sustainable development agenda "people, planet, prosperity, peace, and 
partnership" as well as the 17th Sustainable Development Goal ("partnerships for the goals"). 
The supranational agencies possibly envision what FAO calls the "major groups", i.e. 
previously identified “stakeholders”, partnering together: "all actors supporting countries in 
implementing and monitoring global goals must partner and share knowledge" (FAO 2016a, 
6). But the WEF, which is especially enthusiastic about partnership—which is one of their top
most used words, appearing over 300 times in their report—possibly thinks of public-private 
partnerships17 when employing the term. In their report, they explain partnerships should be 
"(m)arket-driven with projects led by the private sector and rooted in viable business cases" 
(WEF 2016, 3). The UK Science Office (2011, 35) is also a fan, claiming "(i)nvestment in 
infrastructure and capacity is needed at a scale which will be realised only by innovative new 
partnerships between governments, multilateral bodies and the private sector". Neither LVC 
nor the UN Rapporteur use the word partnership, possibly because they do not consider it 
conducive to a rights-based approach to food democracy, due to the fact that partnerships can 
bypass legislation, as has been shown with the creation of mechanisms such as the ISDS18. 
The use of the term partnership is often paired with that of stakeholder, as in "multi-
stakeholder partnerships". The officially recognised stakeholders are governments, the private
sector, civil society, and farmers' organisations. But in practice, as becomes clear from the 
case studies offered by the WEF (2016) and WB (2015), the stakeholders are governments, 
large international corporations—perhaps working with larger domestic companies in 
countries in the Global South, which are most often the target of these partnerships—
17 This term, referring to partnerships between governments and the private sector, was introduced into the
lexicon of global agreements at the 2000 Johannesburg Earth Summit. Before that it was not common to let
businesses lead environmental solutions.
18 Investor-State Dispute Settlement, a form of arbitration that bypasses legal courts, see the definition of the
European Commission here: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151791.pdf (accessed
24 September 2016).
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supranational agencies (often called donors), such as FAO and IFAD, regional or national 
farmers associations, and international NGOs—perhaps working with local NGOs. Farmers 
and citizens are not expected to have an independent voice, but are expected to get themselves
represented by a large association or an NGO. The WEF (2016, 3) attributes more weight to 
the leaders of these partnerships than to the people represented through them: "(b)uilding a 
multistakeholder partnership is a journey, and partnership leaders continue to improve and 
refine their approach over time". It calls the key leaders of partnerships in agriculture 
“champions” and sees no contradiction in confessing that these "have most often been 
government officials or major private sector players, and these two groups are often most 
critical as starting points to mobilize additional players" (Ibid., 11). Thus a picture emerges of 
investment in agriculture in the Global South that is mostly led by large players. Even though 
there are undeniable benefits for a number of farmers, the solutions thought up for them by 
the WEF and the WB make them and their governments dependent on the money, goodwill, 
and opinion of a small number of powerful actors. One of the partnerships that the WEF 
mentions, for Tanzania, was led by the Minister of Agriculture and the Executive Vice-
President of Unilever, while it was further "enabled" by international organisations such as 
USAID and the (mostly US) foundations behind the AGRA19 initiative. The partnership in 
Mexico joins two large national companies (Grupo Minsa and Grupo Altex) with corporate 
giants Nestlé and PepsiCo. And the project mentioned in Indonesia unites a large local 
company, Sinar Mas Agribusiness, again with Nestlé. Many of the projects thus create a 
captive source of raw materials for multinational agribusiness giants such as Nestlé, 
Monsanto, and Cargill, which can rely on governments to improve infrastructure for the 
transport of the raw materials, reducing cost and improving delivery times, while they are able
to impose their own standards of quality by training the farmers directly. Since the WEF 
represents the interests of major corporations it is understandable, although not justifiable, 
that they would not reflect upon the power imbalances that their projects create. However, 
their "partners", especially the supranational agencies such as the WB and FAO, should be 
expected to protect the interests of vulnerable groups and countries. Even when corporations 
are not directly mentioned—the WB report avoids mentioning the names of private sector 
partners, although in one case study the name of the world's largest organic coffee producer 
19 Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, of which the Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation is a prominent
member.
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Keurig Green Mountain came up—the focus is on globally replicable and largely top-down 
solutions developed in international research organisations such as GRA and CGIAR20 (WB 
2015, 21). One of the tools the WB promotes is that of the Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) 
Country Profiles, which are led by international organisations. Since the "triple win" in CSA, 
according to the WB, is productivity, adaptation, and mitigation (rather than the more 
common interpretation of sustainability: social, economic, and ecological sustainability), the 
resulting profiles do not necessarily incorporate the social and cultural needs of the countries 
involved. The WB (2015, 18) is clear on the bottomline: "(f)armers need to see how they can 
sustainably ‘make money, save money, or save time’ before they are likely to change their 
behaviors, adopt new practices or invest in new technologies". Less clear, but still implicit, is 
the WB’s belief (Ibid.) that public money should kick-start the investments in their CSA 
initiative: 
Where the individual value proposition is weaker, public incentives should align to incentivize farmers and
companies to invest in CSA. It will not always be the case that adoption of CSA will result in short-term
individual returns and so, due to the public good nature of the triple win, public resources should be
aligned to catalyze action on CSA.
Lastly, one powerful agent in the food system has the capacity to divide all the food actors: 
the corporation. The corporation is a business entity that exists separately from its owners, 
and is therefore different from companies held as sole proprietorship or as partnerships, and 
also different from the limited liability company. This distinction has been become clearer 
over the years, with the increase of the average size and wealth of corporations to a point 
where they economically compete with small or even medium-sized countries. Although all 
the food actors recognise business entities as agents, they differ markedly in how they 
characterise them. Thus, the institutional food actors all prefer to refer to business in general, 
and to companies in particular, avoiding any reference to corporations or to the size of 
business players, whereas the social movements and the UN Rapporteur purposefully use the 
term agribusiness, corporation, and transnational corporation, to not only distinguish between 
small and medium-sized local businesses and the behemoths of the agricultural and food 
industry, but also to make their distaste for the practices of the latter known. The UN 
Rapporteur (2014, 14) states: "(t)he dominant position of the larger agribusiness corporations 
is such that these actors have acquired, in effect, a veto power in the political system", while 
20 Respectively, Global Research Alliance and Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research.
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LVC (2014, 19) maintains that "(t)ransnational [c]orporations are being legitimized through 
narratives around their so-called beneficial solutions to various problems which are just 
further profit-making initiatives" and does not hide that they are "fundamentally opposed to 
the domination of Transnational Corporations in the food system and in all the spheres of life"
(Ibid., 19).
The threats, challenges, and difficulties recognised by each of the food actors and the 
arguments behind their choices.
Considerable progress has been made in the global recognition of the worst inequities of the 
modern food system. All the international institutional food actors recognise hunger and 
poverty as major challenges of the modern food system and adopt the eradication of both as 
their top priorities. After the moderate, insufficient advances made with the Millennium 
Development Goals that expired in 2015, governments and supranational agencies have dared 
to be ambitious: the first three Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 are: an end to 
poverty, an end to hunger, and good health and well-being for all. FAO already speaks of the 
ambitious idea of "zero hunger generation". 
In third place after hunger and poverty, the trade-oriented organisations have elected 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) as a major concern: in the World Bank's report emissions is 
the second most frequent word, while the UK Science Office (2011, 9) stresses that "(t)he 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate will become 
imperative", and the WEF adopts an unexplained objective of a 20 percent reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Conversely, the remaining actors prefer to speak of 
climate change rather than emissions (with LVC speaking of a climate crisis) and tend to 
balance this threat with others, such as biodiversity loss, soil degradation, and water stress.
Other threats that the institutional food actors tend to agree on are the growth of the world 
population, increasing urbanisation, changing diets as a result of a growing middle class, 
pressures on natural resources that are leading to a loss in biodiversity and a deterioration of 
ecosystems (including soil and water). FAO has the most complete narrative of all the 
institutional actors, clearly linking social challenges with economic and ecological ones:
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Tackling hunger and malnutrition is not only about boosting food production, but also to do with increasing
incomes, creating resilient food systems and strengthening markets so that people can access safe and
nutritious food even if a crisis prevents them from growing enough themselves. (FAO 2016a, 6)
Across the globe, natural resources are deteriorating, ecosystems are stressed and biological diversity is
being lost. Climate change poses an added threat to global food production. (Ibid., 10)
The trade-oriented food actors differ from FAO in that they tend to stress economic and 
ecological factors over social factors. Thus the WB focuses on the need to increase 
productivity, while avoiding climate shocks and reducing GHG emissions. The WEF focuses 
on the factor of population growth and environmental stress, and the corresponding need to 
increase production without increasing emissions. The UK Science Office tells the story as 
follows:
On the demand side, global population size will increase from nearly seven billion today to eight billion by
2030, and probably to over nine billion by 2050; many people are likely to be wealthier, creating demand
for a more varied, high-quality diet requiring additional resources to produce. On the production side,
competition for land, water and energy will intensify, while the effects of climate change will become
increasingly apparent. The need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate will
become imperative. Over this period globalisation will continue, exposing the food system to novel
economic and political pressures. (UK Science Office 2011, 9)
Likewise, the Portuguese large-farmers' association identifies population growth, dietary 
changes, urbanisation, and climate change as the main global threats, to which it adds its own 
local threats, which are all economic in nature: the rise of production costs, a lack of added 
value in agricultural products, lack of research, complex regulations, difficulty in accessing 
global markets, and a lack of qualified middle to senior managers. Hunger and poverty, or 
even the precarious livelihoods of Portuguese farmers and farm workers, are apparently not a 
concern. Their report therefore reads more like a business plan.
Volatility is a curious threat that is exclusively identified as such by the UK Science Office. 
When mentioned, rarely, by the other food actors, it is considered to be a recent characteristic 
of food prices (FAO, UN Rapporteur, and the other trade-oriented food actors). But the UK 
Science Office uses the term 33 times in barely 40 pages, and also dedicates a full chapter to 
the topic, while it remains unclear how the word is operationalised by them. It is as much 
applied to price fluctuations as to other instabilities in food markets (oil prices, the amount of 
food stocks, food supplies, armed conflict, etc.). Even though the word volatility presupposes 
a lack of predictability, the UK Science Office still believes it is something that can be 
planned for, and included in a risk analysis, even if:
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The number of factors affecting volatility and the levels of uncertainty associated with each make it very
difficult to predict whether the magnitude of fluctuations in food prices will fall or rise in the coming
decades. Although predicting future volatility is complex, there are several arguments suggesting that
volatility may well increase in the future. Also, at least some food price spikes are inevitable.  (UK Science
Office 2011, 22-23)
Despite the fact that all the food actors generally converge on the identification of the main 
crises that humans face in their food systems, especially the well-documented ones, such as 
hunger, extreme poverty, biodiversity loss, soil degradation, water stress, and climate-change 
induced drought, they separate ways when it comes to pointing out the underlying causes for 
these crises. With the modest exception of the UK Science Office, none of the institutional 
actors nor the Portuguese large-farmers association speak of the—widely documented—side 
effects of a highly industrialised and chemicalised agriculture that has been put in place all 
over the world since the 1960s. Despite the fact that some of the impacts are obvious, 
especially the contribution to GHG emissions of a model that is highly dependent on fossil 
fuels, the threats are mostly referred to as if coming from nowhere in particular. 
In contrast, the social movements and the UN Rapporteur understand the crises as the 
consequences not only of the industrialisation and globalisation of agriculture, but also of an 
even deeper underlying cause: the tremendous power imbalances in the food system. To them 
the real threats are the other food actors, in particular the transnational corporations from 
agribusiness, the governments of powerful and wealthy countries, and the supranational 
organisations where the former two actor groups often have a disproportionate amount of 
influence. The organisations united in Nyéléni denounce what they call the "corporate model" 
that "over-produces food that poisons us, destroys soil fertility, is responsible for the 
deforestation of rural areas, the contamination of water and the acidification of oceans and 
killing of fisheries" (Nyéléni declaration). LVC (2014, 11) claims the "current neoliberal 
economic system that favors the concentration of capital is the fundamental reason behind 
these crises". While for the institutional food actors, climate change is a problem in itself, for 
these social movements representing smallholder farmers climate-change is the result of the 
problem, which is "unfettered industrialization that is geared towards consumerism for the 
elite" (Ibid.) and a "development model that prioritizes benefits to corporations over the lives 
of people and respect for nature" (Ibid., 10). As I shall show in the next section, the solutions 
proposed by the the social movements are therefore quite different. Social movements see the 
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corporate model as a threat that bears other threats within it, among them the use of agro-
chemicals, the use of biotechnology—in particular genetic engineering—the imposition of 
rules from the wealthier countries through the celebration of bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements, the privatisation of common natural resources such as land, water, and 
peasant seeds, the loss of biodiversity because of the promotion of a restricted number of cash
crops, and the disparagement of peasant and indigenous knowledge (LVC 2014, 14). None of 
these events, with the exception of land-grabbing, appears as a threat or even as a concern in 
the reports of the institutional food actors, with the lone exception of the UN Rapporteur. 
The latter, although choosing his words carefully, makes no qualms about calling the modern 
food system a failed system. He tells a very different story from the other institutional food 
actors. His review of the evidence leads him to conclude that, even though the productivist 
path that was taken after the Second World War led to yields that are superior to the demand, 
this increase has come at a high price. A global trade in agricultural products based on high-
value inputs and cash crops led to the specialisation of countries and narrowed the total range 
of products. Countries in the Global South, under the effect of food aid and later of the influx 
of cheap subsidised products in their markets, rapidly moved from a trade surplus to a trade 
deficit, condemned to keep exporting cash crops to pay off their debts. The focus on 
monocultures, of which the productivity is boosted by agro-chemicals and intensive irrigation,
resulted in the loss of agro-biodiversity, soil erosion, water pollution, and increased GHG 
emissions (contrary to the other institutional food actors, who advance the number of 25 
percent, the UN Rapporteur attributes about a third of global GHG emissions to agriculture, 
because he adds emissions from the production of agro-chemicals and from transport). The 
UN Rapporteur is not completely alone in his critical assessment of the modern food system. 
Other multi-expert, more broadly participated reports, where industry was not allowed to have
a vote like they were in the UK Science Office report, have concluded very similarly that 
industrial agriculture and the uneven representation of food actors at decision-making fora is 
at the heart of the multiple crises that humanity is facing (IAASTD 2009, UNCTAD 2013).
Finally, the social movements mention additional, worrying threats caused by the current food
system that go unreported by the other food actors. Among these are violence against women, 
against migrants, and against food activists who protest the takeover or monopolisation of 
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resources by transnational corporations. Although FAO makes two mentions of violence 
against women, LVC registers it as a major concern, being the only one to denounce the 
disregard of corporations and governments for the underclass of the poorest peasants and farm
labourers, as well as their capacity for violence against any people that stand in the way of 
their plans21.
What are the solutions? Key solutions championed by each of the food actors and respective 
argumentation.
The trade-oriented food actors under analysis, and to a certain extent FAO, appear to be the 
most optimistic about tackling the challenges they have identified, believing them to be 
largely transformable into opportunities by on the one hand increasing efficiency, and on the 
other promoting market- and technology-based solutions. The G20 reassures readers of its 
report (who are mostly other policy makers) that:
Mechanisms and instruments that promote responsible investment in agriculture and food systems are 
indispensable to achieve higher productivity, inclusive growth, poverty reduction and improved food 
security and nutrition, as they help ensure widespread access to investment opportunities and benefits, as 
well as the sustainability of social, economic and environmental impacts over time. (G20 2015, 3)
Some of these "mechanisms and instruments" are guidelines for management, others are 
continued research and international funding. All of them are guaranteed to be "efficient and 
market-based" (Ibid., 7) while they are all presented in a favourable light, despite the fact no 
solid evidence exists as of yet as to their effectiveness. The WB (2015, 4) is equally confident 
that it can offer its “client” countries a "large spectrum of approaches that deliver productivity
and resilience gains alongside lower emissions". In general, the emphasis is on increasing 
productivity, efficiency, and predictability of the food system.
21 Examples:
The murder of activist Valmir Mota de Oliveira in Brazil, with suspicions of the corporation Syngenta's
involvement, available: https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/biodiversity-and-
genetic-resources-mainmenu-37/441-syngenta-murder-and-private-militias-in-brazil  
The murder of activist Berta Cáceres in Honduras, with suspicions of government and corporate involvement,
available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-bosshard/who-killed-berta-caceres_b_9387964.html (both
sites accessed 28 October 2016).
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In stark contrast to this bright future, the social movements and the UN Rapporteur see 
multiple crises where the other actors see challenges and opportunities, and express serious 
concern about whether and how the former will be addressed. The social movements 
generally consider not only that they are facing the social-ecological challenges posed by 
climate change and the degradation of the world's ecosystems, but also that they are first and 
foremost up against the defenders of the industrial model of agriculture. The struggles they 
face are imagined to be endless: 
We will redouble our efforts to struggle against GMOs, pesticides, land grabbing, mono-cultures and 
industrial agrofuel production. We will continue our struggles against trade liberalization and privatization 
through the WTO and other Free Trade Agreements. We will struggle against military aggression (war, 
military occupations, paramilitary actions and “security” companies) used against the people around the 
world who oppose the plunder of their natural resources for corporate profit. (LVC 2014, 24)
The word crisis is generally avoided by the trade-oriented food actors and is only used by 
FAO in relation to temporary upsets (not general crises), while the word struggle is not even 
part of their lexicon.
The most optimistic food actor, the WB (2015, 4), believes part of the success of the SDGs 
will depend on a food system that is "productive, resilient, and contributes to tackling climate 
change". They call this a triple win: "agriculture and food production practices that not only 
boost productivity but also enhance resilience and lower greenhouse gas emissions" (Ibid.). 
The term resilience remains ambiguous throughout the text, it appears to refer to the capacity 
of food producers to adapt to "climate shocks" (i.e. droughts, floods, and heatwaves). The WB
makes it clear that they believe not only in continuing the path of growth, but also in actually 
accelerating it. This, they say, will end poverty. The threat of climate change in the WB 
narrative, and to a lesser extent in the discourses of the other trade-oriented food actors, 
appears disconnected from its drivers, as an isolated threat to be dealt with directly. Despite 
the fact that agriculture is recognised as a large contributor to global warming (although the 
WB attributes it a lower percentage of GHG emissions than the UN Rapporteur), there is no 
discussion of the agricultural practices that have led to the current situation, only a very brief 
mention of "unsustainable agriculture and other practices" (WB 2015, 8). From this it follows 
logically that most of the solutions advanced by the WB will focus on improving the 
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efficiency and productivity of current agricultural practices, without demanding drastic 
changes of these practices: "[...] better fertilizer use, minimum tillage, alternative wetting and 
drying of rice, biogas production from agricultural waste products/ livestock manure, 
improved irrigation and drainage efficiency [...]" (Ibid.,  9). The WB (Ibid., 8) expresses a 
firm belief in the capacity of science and technology to save humanity:
In short, investing in carbon sequestration techniques in the agricultural sector can deliver food security
and development outcomes while “buying time” for other major technology breakthroughs to deliver on
the mitigation agenda.
The bet is on new seeds, new fertilisers, new breeds, but not necessarily on new choices. The 
WB’s case studies show that much of the investment and research goes to improving the 
productivity of the same cash crops (large-scale livestock for meat, coffee, tea, maize,...) that 
often displace other food products in the Global South.
Technology and innovation are also recurring themes in the reports of the other trade-oriented 
food actors. The G20 (2015, 12) proposes centralising research for poorer countries from the 
Global South in the Tropical Agricultural Platform, which will lead "capacity development for
agricultural innovation systems in tropical countries". Hope is expressed that the farmer will 
become less risk averse and adopt "new technologies and practices that may have long-term 
benefits for the individual farmer and for overall sustainable productivity growth" (Ibid., 9). 
New technologies are also part of the package proposed by the WEF, which suggests 
measuring technology adoption as a success factor. The WEF is very keen on innovation, 
recommending it as a strategy across the board, whether in the business models proposed, the 
partnerships celebrated, the products developed, or the financial solutions that will help pay 
for the other innovations. Innovation appears to be a given in the business sector. The UK 
Science Office (2011, 12) recommends to invest in "new science and innovation", aside from 
the "spread and implementation of existing knowledge, technology and best practice". The 
new research is believed crucial to meet the challenges of food security, such as to deal with 
"new and more virulent pests and diseases", develop "new varieties of crops that are resistant 
to increased drought, flooding and salinity arising from climate change" (Ibid., 17), and reach 
"(s)cientific and technological advances in soil science and related fields" (Ibid., 18). Clearly 
this food actor is convinced that science and technology will resolve many of the present and 
future challenges in agriculture. The UK Science Office also makes no secret of their support 
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for controversial biotechnology, such as the "development of perennial grain crops, the 
introduction of nitrogen fixation into non-legume crops, and re-engineering the photosynthetic
pathways of different plants" (Ibid.). Conscious of the resistance that exists in relation to 
certain technologies, they state that:
Communication is critical – not just to spread new knowledge to policy-makers and potential users, but
also to the public, specifically to engender trust in new science and its application. (UK Science Office
2011, 18)
 They ask that (Ibid., 11):
New technologies (such as the genetic modification of living organisms and the use of cloned livestock and
nanotechnology) should not be excluded a priori on ethical or moral grounds, though there is a need to
respect the views of people who take a contrary view. 
Investment in research on modern technologies is essential in light of the magnitude of the challenges for
food security in the coming decades. 
The two main arguments advanced by the trade-oriented food actors to support a strong focus 
on science and technology are the need to intensify production without increasing the strain 
on the environment, and the possibility of evolving threats. In the background of the 
reasoning of these food actors, the need to increase yields looms large, while they cannot and 
do not deny the evidence of environmental degradation as a result of current production. This 
schizophrenic position helps explain why they wish to place so much faith in science and 
technology. 
FAO has a more balanced view: even though they also subscribe to a strictly evidence-based 
approach, they do not promote the need for new science and technology per se, preferring to 
ensure existing knowledge about sustainable production is widely shared where it is needed. 
FAO explains that its "unified perspective [...] is underpinned by knowledge based on the best
available science, and adaptation at community and country levels to ensure local relevance 
and applicability" (FAO 2016a, 11). 
The social movements and the UN Rapporteur are very much at odds with the mainstream 
“solution package”. They believe nothing less than a paradigm shift will even the stakes for 
the billions of rural poor. The UN Rapporteur imagines:
A new paradigm focused on well-being, resilience and sustainability must be designed to replace the
productivist paradigm and thus better support the full realization of the right to adequate food. (UN
Rapporteur 2014, 13)
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What these interest groups therefore propose is a very different knowledge base for the road 
to sustainable agriculture, which they strongly believe must be first and foremost equitable. 
This new paradigm for agriculture is agroecology, which LVC defines as follows:
Agro-ecology is a production technology that is based on ecological principles. For La Via Campesina
agro-ecology also includes social justice principles. It is a balance of new ecological innovations and
traditional peasant farming knowledge. Agro-ecology is considered to be a science, but has also become a
social movement today, with a growing number of peasants, scholars, citizens and activists that are
promoting it. (LVC 2014, 21)
Contrary to the solutions promoted by the trade-oriented food actors, agroecology is a 
relatively inexpensive way forward, with the potential to change many more lives than the 
high-tech solutions that spring from what are generally more technocratic frameworks. The 
UN Rapporteur concludes: 
Because agro-ecology reduces the cost of farming by minimizing the use of expensive inputs, it improves
the livelihoods of farming households, particularly the poorest households. And it supports rural
development: because it is knowledge-intensive and generally more labour-intensive, it creates
employment opportunities in rural areas. (UN Rapporteur 2014, 9)
Agroecology is more a way of life and practice than a set of tools and as such, as a bottom-up 
methodology, its transformative potential is superior. It does not need to wait for sophisticated
technological solutions to become available and for the unavoidable funds that will be 
necessary to pay for them. It can be embraced the moment a farmer learns about it. What is 
more, the infrastructure to teach and spread agroecological practices are already in place in 
many countries in the Global South. Conversely, the solutions championed by the institutional
food actors invariably require large investments, which benefit targeted and not all groups of 
farmers and rural populations. As an example, the WEF speaks of a US$ 10.5 billion in 
investment commitments from their members, of which currently US$ 1.9 billion has 
benefited 9.6 million farmers. A rough calculation shows us they can potentially reach a little 
under 50 million farmers, out of a total of 1.5 billion smallholder farmers. Undoubtedly, some 
of the investments are lasting and will benefit a wider population, but the fact that the model 
depends on large amounts of financing makes it subject to large fluctuations according to the 
economic climate of the donor countries. As I have shown, the WEF model has another 
important obstacle to replication: most of the projects are partnerships with transnational 
corporations, and therefore are not likely to escape the current logic of trade and profit. TNCs 
would not get involved if there would be no benefit for them, in fact, they are bound by a code
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of conduct to maximise return on investment for their shareholders. Theirs is a business model
without room for subsistence farmers or for exclusively social objectives such as increased 
employment. The model is predicated on raising income for individual farmers, often by 
streamlining their operations and reducing the need for labour, and by inserting them into the 
so-called "value chains" of agricultural trade, with the TNCs buying their products as long as 
these products are geared towards their needs. Even a local food player such as the Portuguese
farmers association mostly dreams of expanding the existing production potential, gaining 
efficiency through scale, while improved management will miraculously increase the 
efficiency of resource use and therefore reduce the pressure on ecosystems. This model 
clearly does not mean for regions or countries to reform their troubled food systems so that 
their rural population can feed itself through access to land and natural resources, and through
protected local markets. We can read in the WB report that "deforestation free palm oil", 
"participatory outgrower schemes” (where farmers produce under contract), and the 
widespread adoption of improved plant varieties are some of the solutions that the trade-
oriented food actors would like to see. They imagine leading food agents in each country 
working with international agents to create "value chains" based on "the most impactful 
crops/geographies/issues", within a market-driven business model that is "led by the private 
sector and rooted in viable business cases" (WEF 2016, 8). And even though the UK Science 
Office, similar to any institutional food actor today, accepts the duty to end hunger and 
poverty, while trying to privilege low-income countries by giving them priority access to 
knowledge and markets, they leave a clear message that any attempt at localising food 
economies is frowned upon: "(f)ood security is best served by fair and fully functioning 
markets and not by policies to promote self-sufficiency" (UK Science Office 2011, 19).
Despite a preference for market- and technology-based mechanisms of reform, or perhaps 
because of it, the institutional food actors all promote social protection as a solution to shield 
the poor from the worst hunger and extreme poverty. They have interiorised the insight from 
Amartya Sen (1991) that access to food is often dependent on being able to afford the food, 
not only for it to be available, but are yet to recognise the underlying reason for food having 
become both more expensive and less nutritive in countries in the Global South. We can read 
in the report of the UN Rapporteur (2014) how this phenomenon derives from the focus on 
cash crops for exportation and the import of subsidised food products from the Global North
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—often imposed under trade agreements. Social protection, although an absolute necessity 
that has been used by capitalists over the centuries to ease the suffering of those left out of the
growth cycle, is not a structural solution to hunger and poverty. Moreover, even though FAO 
has experimented with more targeted forms of social protection, such as school meals and 
other support to directly relieve hunger while promoting education, in general business is 
allowed to go on as usual.
There is also general agreement that some form of land reform is essential, and that this 
should be biased towards women, who are recognised as better able to leverage their family 
out of hunger and poverty than men. But it is not clear how far the institutional actors will go 
to ensure land is restored to smallholder farmers, and more worryingly, there is no mention of 
the increasing occupation of peasant and indigenous land by transnational corporations and 
foreign governments such as China and India, as well as exclusively financial entities. This 
land-grabbing occurs with the connivance of local governments that either fail or do not wish 
to protect their rural populations. The social movements are particularly bitter about the 
continuing land grabs despite international voluntary agreements to end them and warn that 
land grabs are "legitimized using the rhetoric of beneficial or responsible investments by 
governments and global institutions such as the World Bank" (LVC 2014, 22). 
Besides access to land, most institutional food actors believe smallholder farmers in the 
Global South will benefit from access to finance, (technical) knowledge, and markets. In this 
view, the smallholder farmer is a potential agricultural entrepreneur that has the same needs as
a larger farmer or farming business. The G20 (2015, 13) warns that "limited access to 
financial services can severely constrain smallholder investment, especially if combined with 
market failures such as lack of access to productive assets (e.g. land), information, and 
markets", while the WB (2015, 20) states:
Equally, we must develop the opportunities to leverage the commercial relationships within the food
system. With over 90 percent of risk and emissions lying at the production level in food supply chains,
food processors and retailers must work with farmers to develop resilient supply chains that help both sides
to reduce risk and emissions. The key to success lies in creating leveraged finance that will enable farmers
to invest in their farms and play a more active role in established supply chains. This new interdependence
between farmers and companies is driving an improvement for farmers in terms of new financial
opportunities. 
The UN Rapporteur disagrees, arguing instead for a more holistic approach, claiming:
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Finally, because food systems are in need of reform, it is not sufficient to protect existing entitlements or to
preserve the status quo. Instead, transformative strategies must be adopted, with a view to guaranteeing
access to adequate food for all by simultaneously supporting small-scale food producers’ ability to produce
food sustainably, improving employment opportunities in all sectors and strengthening social protection.
(UN Rapporteur 2014, 17)
The UK Science Office, possibly influenced by government representatives on the steering 
committee of the project, takes advantage of the fact that their report will be widely read by 
policy-makers all over the world, to press for the conclusion of the latest round of World 
Trade Organization negotiations—the Doha Development Round—which is deadlocked due 
to the resistance of poorer countries that have realised that they are usually the losers in the 
global trade game. This pressure, as I mentioned previously, is also exerted on the SDG 
Agenda under the goal for partnerships. Wealthier countries would prefer a global trade 
agreement that removes trade barriers, opening up new opportunities for both buying and 
selling all over the world, while poorer countries are complaining that they can't compete with
heavily subsidised agricultural products from the wealthier countries. The latest negotiations 
have been conducted under the guise of more development for poorer countries, but so far no 
evidence to this effect has materialised. We can read in the UK Science Office report:
An essential first step towards a more equitable global trading system for poor agricultural producers is the
realisation of a genuinely pro-development Doha Development Agenda agreement via the negotiations of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). (UK Science Office 2011, 20, emphasis in original)
The other institutional actors are silent on the issue of trade agreements, even though the WB 
is a known defender of the WTO agreement, and has itself imposed trade-facilitating 
measures on many countries in the Global South under the contested Structural Adjustment 
Programmes. LVC, on the other hand, is vehemently opposed to any trade agreement between
wealthier and poorer countries, whether bilateral or multilateral:
These agreements are just arrangements which make it easier for Transnational Corporations to operate
freely at the expense of the livelihoods of small peasants and food producers. In most of cases, they are
concluded between unequal trading partners. (LVC 2014, 20)
I have discussed one of the democratic mechanisms that is being advanced, in different 
degrees, by most of the food actors, which is the idea of guaranteeing vulnerable agents 
access to key resources, including information. Some of the institutional food actors advocate 
going further, speaking of empowerment of vulnerable groups. On their part, the social 
movements ask for more than what is being offered. I will discuss the democratic implications
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of the food politics discourses in the last section of this chapter, after summarising the way 
each of the discourses is constructed.
What are the key narrative strategies and versions of truth?
Throughout this analysis it has become clear that, even when they recognise the same 
elements and events in the food system, different food actors tell different stories, arriving at 
different strategies depending on their ultimate interests. It may seem unavoidable that interest
groups act according to their interests, but it can be problematic when these interests are not 
declared or when they are downplayed, or when the interest group in question holds more 
power than other groups in the food system. The WEF tries to portray its organisation as 
independent of the corporations that fund it, with a mission that has it "committed to 
improving the state of the world" as the "International Organization for Public-Private 
Cooperation" (on the WEF website). But it is an undeniably powerful organisation that can 
dole out a lot of money to whom it likes (for example, they reserved around US$ 11 billion 
for their New Vision for Agriculture projects), without any guarantee that it will not withhold 
it from whom it doesn't like. It has infiltrated or even helped create regional platforms in the 
Global South such as Grow Africa and Grow Asia, from whence it can promote its particular 
idea of "a transformation of the agricultural sector, leveraging market-based approaches 
through a coordinated effort by all stakeholders, including farmers, government, civil society 
and the private sector" (WEF 2016, 5). The WB, by comparison, is a more complex case. Its 
status as a supranational agency for development insulates it from much of the criticism, 
while its undemocratic decision-making structure (bigger donors having more votes, as I 
showed in Chapter 4) is sure to bias its decision-making towards wealthier countries. This can
be felt in the levity with which the report glosses over the challenges faced in the food system,
skipping the analysis of how these challenges came about, to arrive quickly at the apparently 
preferred (but unexplained) "triple-win" strategy of "higher agricultural productivity, 
increased resilience to climate change and lower emissions" (WB 2015, 4). FAO (2016a, 11) 
appears to suffer less from the pressure of powerful interest groups and advances more 
integrated solutions, where they purposefully place vulnerable groups at centre stage so that 
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"(p)rotecting and improving rural livelihoods and social well-being" becomes as important as 
natural resource management and ecosystem preservation. 
Food actors also speak more or less freely depending on who commissioned the report they 
are preparing. For example, there appears to be a gap between what the UK Foresight report 
found when reviewing studies and consulting experts in 35 countries, and what they were 
"allowed" to recommend. Even in the Executive Summary there is a discontinuity between 
the facts presented and some of the recommendations that appear to flow from them. The 
excessive reference to the necessity of accepting evidence-based decisions and avoiding 
moral, ethical, and human considerations, may be explained by the fact that the 2011-2015 
Conservative government, which commissioned the report, was a strong supporter of 
biotechnology, despite the distrust regarding its use in food and farming felt by a majority of 
UK citizens. The UN Rapporteur sits on the opposite end of the “free speech” spectrum. His 
"bosses" were the members of the United Nations Human Rights Council, while he was 
publicly recognised as an independent expert. His mandate was also restricted in time. These 
conditions together with Olivier de Schutter's personal convictions resulted in a series of 
unrestrained reports, of which I analysed the last. Finally, the social movements, including 
LVC, have as their "bosses" the most vulnerable groups on our planet, which I have flagged as
an underclass and which are often in crisis or at the point of crisis, giving their spokespersons 
the moral outrage and courage to point fingers at questionable interest groups and practices in 
the food system.
The narrative employed by the institutional actors, with the exception of the UN Rapporteur, 
offers, at first glance, a cohesive diagnosis of the challenges faced by humanity in the twenty-
first century. This diagnosis considers that global food production needs to increase by 60 
percent by 2050 to feed over nine billion people projected to be living on Earth (a statistic 
used by all institutional actors), while at the same time the stress that agriculture exerts on the 
world's ecosystems, especially on forests, water sheds, and topsoil, needs to diminish. It also 
recognises that food and agriculture have a special role to play at all levels of sustainability: 
social, economic, and ecological. And finally, it recognises that vulnerable groups, among 
them most rural populations in the Global South, continue to be excluded from the growth of 
the food system. Based on this diagnosis, the institutional food actors minus the UN 
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Rapporteur arrive at the general conclusion that we should make our "agriculture and food 
systems more efficient and sustainable, and to shift to more sustainable consumption and 
production approaches" (FAO 2016a, 10). Although more a mission than a strategy, this 
objective has in the last year been merged with the newly endorsed Sustainable Development 
Goals, which have the advantage of being very comprehensive (169 targets in all) and of 
focusing on all dimensions of sustainability, to such an extent that the goals read like a 
declaration of human rights (i.e. No Poverty, Zero Hunger, Good Health and Well-Being, 
Quality Education, etc.). This is undoubtedly a positive achievement in global politics, but 
unfortunately the experience with the Millennium Development Goals that preceded the 
SDGs, and with the tragic Kyoto Protocol, show us governments more often than not fail to 
achieve the goals they set out. The previous development goals were very specific and even 
though the final reports attempt to highlight what was achieved—ignoring the indicators that 
were agreed upon—a quick comparison of the statistics shows that the majority of goals were 
only partially reached, with some falling very short of their objectives22. In the same report we
can read that global emissions of carbon dioxide, rather than having decreased by 5 percent as
was agreed among governments, have increased by a dramatic 50 percent in comparison to 
the base year 1990. The drafters of the SDGs were careful not to be as specific this time in 
establishing the targets, which therefore weakens their effectiveness23. 
There is no doubt much is being done and will be done, as the case studies presented by FAO 
indicate, but there is something crucial missing from the narrative: what will be asked of 
industrialised countries, their governments, and of transnational corporations? This question is
curiously absent from the reports and visions of FAO, the WB, the WEF, and the G20. They 
all seem quite eager to reform agriculture and food systems in countries in the Global South, 
through partnerships in which they are included while they often benefit corporations from the
Global North. However, beyond the recently launched Technical Platform on the 
Measurement and Reduction of Food Loss and Waste, which is also aimed at countries from 
the Global North, none of the institutional food actors minus the UN Rapporteur is advancing 
22 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015, available:
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf
(accessed 5 September 2016).
23 Sustainable Development Goals and respective targets, available: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs
(accessed 5 September 2016).
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any strategy to tackle the consequences of a highly industrialised food system in the Global 
North and BRICS24 countries, responsible for the lion share of the world's GHG emissions, 
water shed pollution, soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. The way these food actors 
interpret agency may have contributed to this crucial omission: in their narrative, global food 
systems are at risk not from any particular group or because of any particular action taken by 
a group, but from an inanimate "(r)ising demand, scarce resources and increased volatility" 
(WEF 2013, 2). The UK Science Office (2011, 9) puts it this way:
The global food system will experience an unprecedented confluence of pressures over the next 40 years.
On the demand side, global population size will increase from nearly seven billion today to eight billion by
2030, and probably to over nine billion by 2050; many people are likely to be wealthier, creating demand
for a more varied, high-quality diet requiring additional resources to produce. On the production side,
competition for land, water and energy will intensify, while the effects of climate change will become
increasingly apparent. The need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate will
become imperative. Over this period globalisation will continue, exposing the food system to novel
economic and political pressures. 
While the WB (2015, 4) says:
Droughts, floods and rising temperatures are already cutting crop yields, threatening food, fish and meat
supply and pushing people deeper into poverty. Climate change and the effects of climate shocks are
dampening the prospects for future productivity growth. Agriculture and land use changes already
contribute 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. A more climate-smart food system is urgently needed to
address these challenges.
Even though the trade-oriented food actors are quite accurate in their exposition of the threats 
that humanity is facing in the food system, none of their stories present a source for the 
problems. What is more, besides avoiding finger-pointing, the conception of the food system 
as an independent self-organised organism that is suffering a number of challenges has the 
added advantage that solutions only need to deal with the symptoms, not with their underlying
causes. Where recognition is given to the effects of industrial agriculture (only in the UK 
Science Office report), no specific mention is made of the locus and agents of industrial 
agriculture. There is a gap between identifying the threats and arriving at conclusions about 
what needs to be done. This gap of unexplained dynamics of the food system allows each 
actor to develop their own version of truth. Additionally, it weakens the effectiveness of their 
solutions upon deeper analysis. For example, the World Bank foresees that, if nothing is done,
agriculture will account for 70 percent of allowable emissions needed across the board to limit
the temperature increase to 2º C. They nevertheless propose to increase production, without 
24 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
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explaining how they will reduce emissions simultaneously. Their unwillingness to look at 
major sources of emissions, such as the production and use of agro-chemicals, transport, and 
the meat sector, and at the imbalances between large and small contributors to GHG emissions
(i.e. TNCs versus smallholder producers, wealthier countries versus poorer countries), 
ultimately precludes a positive outcome. Although the case studies they present are sure to 
effect some local changes, even if these solutions were to be widely replicated, major changes
would need to be effected in the sectors and countries mentioned above that are responsible 
for the largest share of emissions (and other forms of pollution). The greatest potential for 
emission reduction unquestionably lies in the Global North. Instead, the only measure 
proposed by the institutional food actors (minus UN Rapporteur) that cuts into the lifestyle of 
the developed countries is the reduction of food waste and loss. The increase in a meat-based 
diet (the production of which is known to be very land and water intensive) and in the 
production of biofuels (which replace food production in the Global South, while the crops 
are exclusively destined for markets in the Global North), and the bias of actors in global 
markets towards the more affluent consumer, are problems that remain undiscussed in all the 
institutional reports with the exception of that of the UN Rapporteur.
The gap that exists in the narrative of institutional food actors between the enumeration of 
threats to food security and agro-ecosystems and the solutions proposed to deal with them, 
which I call the "systemic gap", might also explain why these actors are so keen on investing 
in new technologies. On the one hand, they may genuinely think this will solve some of the 
worst paradoxes in the food system (such as the rapid deterioration of the resource base for 
food production), and on the other, it is a way to maintain growth in a sector that technically 
shouldn't grow anymore. The focus is therefore on internationally coordinated scientific 
research, possibly more cutting-edge and potentially more valuable, but which may be biased 
towards larger farmers and existing markets, and which ignores the low-cost but high-impact 
farm-based innovations that are taking place in many countries of the Global South, led by 
social movements, indigenous movements, grassroots NGOs, and agroecological scientists 
(see the Nyéléni declaration for agroecology). 
The systemic gap may also exist because the economic-interest groups and those that depend 
on them (such as the WB) are unwilling and/or unable to consider harming the revenue of 
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their members. A focus on small-scale, peasant-based, “dechemicalised” agriculture, would 
seriously threaten the business of the corporations that depend entirely on the maintenance of 
an industrialised food system where agricultural inputs are external—agrochemicals and 
commercial seeds—and raw materials for food processing—wheat, maize, oil seeds, etc.—are
cheap and abundant.
Additionally, issues of equity and power imbalances are not addressed by institutional food 
actors. Many of the proposed solutions maintain the focus on cash crops that has created a 
trade deficit in countries of the Global South in the order of US$ 11 billion25. The fact that at 
the same time heavily subsidised agricultural products from the Global North are flooding the 
fragile markets in the Global South is something that is glossed over. The WB's "triple win" 
does not include a measure of justice, it is instead assumed that increases in productivity will 
have the classical (and already disproven) trickle-down effect. The idea is that farmers "make 
money, save money, or save time" (WB 2015, 18), thus ignoring subsistence farming and the 
possibility of using non-financial (and non-market) inputs. It is assumed that with the right 
"value proposition", farmers and companies will make "climate-smart investments and follow 
climate-smart behaviors" (Ibid.). The reasoning behind this is that the possibility of gains is 
the success factor here, and that investments and incentives should be channeled to this aim.
Besides incomplete and unreflexive, the trade-oriented food actors are also generally 
unrealistic in their prognoses. The UK Science Office (2011, 35) solves all the threats with 
one concept, "sustainable intensification", by which they understand: "simultaneously raising 
yields, increasing the efficiency with which inputs are used and reducing the negative 
environmental effects of food production". This is naturally what everyone wants, but without
sacrifices made on the part of wealthier countries and wealthier consumers, and without 
drastic changes in the industrial model of agriculture, it is impossible to achieve, as the UN 
Rapporteur and the afore-mentioned IAASTD and UNCTAD reports point out. The WEF 
offers unexplained and far-off goals that they propose to achieve by changing "everything" 
except the way the global food system actually works. Their "Vision 2020" expects a 20 
percent "improvement in each area per decade until 2050", the areas being food security, 
environmental sustainability, and economic opportunity. Although unexplained in most of 
25 FAO 2004, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets, available:
http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5419e/y5419e03.htm (accessed 23 September 2016).
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their reports and on their site, I found a 2012 report that offered some rough indicators to 
measure this progress. Their rigour is questionable: one of the measures for food security 
proposed is tonnes of food produced, when it is well-known that food production is not an 
adequate predictor of food distribution (Sen 1991). As another example, the objective of 
environmental sustainability is measured exclusively in GHG emissions and water use. 
Without a comprehensive road book that presents the indicators and measures progress, it is 
hard to see how the WEF will claim their 20 percent improvement per decade. 
The narratives of the trade-oriented food actors are based on the assumption that the risks 
faced in the food system, now and in the future, can be known, and that any decision should 
weigh one risk against the other. The possibility of uncertain or unknown events is either not 
recognised or it is dismissed. The precautionary principle, a term and a tool used for at least a 
decade after it was coined (at the 1992 Earth Summit), and which has been incorporated in 
environmental legislation of European Union countries, appears to have disappeared entirely 
from the discourses of the institutional food actors. The only actor mentioning the concept, 
the UK Science Office, actually dismisses it, reverting to the risk paradigm approach that was 
the reason for developing the precautionary principle in the first place. Whereas the 
precautionary principle asks to not equate the absence of evidence with the absence of harm, 
the UK Science Office (2011, 11) insists that  "(d)ecisions about the acceptability of new 
technologies need to be made in the context of competing risks" whereas "the potential costs 
of not utilising new technology must be taken into account" .
The diagnoses of LVC, the Nyéléni organisations, and the UN Rapporteur are diametrically 
opposed to the above stories of social and environmental contingencies that can be minimised 
through efficiency and innovation. They instead tell a story of social and political power 
struggles that have put a corporate-dominated and corporate-serving food system in place. In 
the Nyéléni declaration we can read:
The industrial food system is beginning to exhaust its productive and profit potential because of its internal
contradictions – such as soil degradation, herbicide-tolerant weeds, depleted fisheries, pest- and disease-
ravaged monocultural plantations – and its increasingly obvious negative consequences of greenhouse gas
emissions, and the health crisis of malnutrition, obesity, diabetes, colon disease and cancer caused by diets
heavy in industrial and junk food.
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But they have to speak loudly to be heard, because their version of events openly antagonises 
very concrete interest groups and precludes their participation in solutions that have otherwise
been accepted by important institutional food actors, solutions such as partnerships with agri-
business corporations or with philanthropic foundations that support these corporations, or in 
general, any solution that promotes industrial agriculture. The fact that they are embracing 
confrontation rather than reform may explain why LVC chooses a different vocabulary from 
the one used by the institutional actors. By provocatively speaking of peasants, crises, 
struggles, agribusiness and “agro-toxins”, patriarchy, or even violence, and by insisting on 
placing blame for the threats that humans are facing on a system and a class that has imposed 
an industrial and neoliberal development model on most of the world, LVC creates a new 
narrative, a new explanation for what is happening, demanding very different solutions than 
the ones advertised by the institutional food actors. The UN Rapporteur, probably in order to 
maintain his primary audience—i.e. the other institutional actors, in particular the 
supranational agencies—has blended the two vocabularies, although he avoids the more 
controversial terms (such as “neoliberal” or “agro-toxins”). He adopts two of the strategies 
championed by LVC and the organisations behind Nyéléni: food sovereignty and agroecology.
These strategies are another way that the food and farming social movements carefully 
distinguish their discourse from that of the food actors they are lobbying. Both approaches are
built on an extension of human rights—right to food, right to resources, but also to a certain 
extent the right to autonomy in decision-making—and have peasants and their livelihoods at 
their locus, rather than agribusiness, global markets, consumers, or even farmers in general. 
The approaches also contrast with the solutions proposed by supranational agencies in that 
they are built bottom-up rather than top-down, while they aim to secure self-replicating, low-
budget, Do-It-Yourself reforms, rather than donor-, infrastructure-, and in many cases 
industry-dependent reforms that can only be replicated with more donors, infrastructure, and 
commercial commitments.
LVC has managed to catch the ear of the Committee on World Food Security and of FAO. 
These organisms see some merit in their claims of injustice, and are endorsing some of their 
demands, such as the official recognition of the Rights of Peasants, stopping the land grabs, 
defending smallholder agriculture, and promoting agroecology as an alternative knowledge 
base for sustainable agriculture. The buck stops, however, at recognising food sovereignty 
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because, as explained in an analysis prepared for FAO (2013), food sovereignty not only 
questions the asymmetry of power in the global food system and asks that it be corrected, it 
also rejects industrial agriculture. FAO, incorporated as it is in the United Nations, where it 
has to respond to member-countries, cannot (or won't) endorse a paradigm that would destroy 
the economic base of many of its members.
The democratic implications of the different discourses in food politics
After reviewing the results, three general democratic visions emerge from the discourses of 
the nine food actors, also applicable to the modern food system as a whole. I have termed 
these the "trade hegemonic bloc", the "social capitalist", and the "radical ecological 
democratic" world visions.
The trade hegemonists26 (the WB, the WEF, the UK Science Office, G20 and CAP), despite 
their overt neoliberal inclination, subscribe or have been forced to subscribe, due to strong 
indicators, to improving the equitability of the global food system. As capitalists, they also 
subscribe, on principle and out of self-interest, to freedom and equality. Freedom and equality 
are basic attributes for a trade-oriented world. But freedom does not necessarily mean 
freedom from coercion, nor does equality necessarily mean equity. Thanks to the “good 
governance” principles that were developed in successive international environmental and 
humanitarian summits, the trade-oriented food actors also subscribe, on principle, to rules of 
accountability. The same process opened them up to everyone's right of having rights, 
including of course, corporations that have their status partially equated to that of a citizen. 
Nevertheless, their openness to rights has led to the gradual adoption, on principle, of more 
inclusive rights, such as socioeconomic rights and the right to food. Finally, also due to the 
successive negotiations at Earth Summits, they have accepted the necessity of inviting the 
parties affected by decisions to participate in the discussions prior to the decisions. This is 
more or less how far the trade hegemonic bloc will go in conceding other interest groups their 
democratic rights. Their score does not go much beyond what I termed "basic democratic 
dimension".
26 As I said before, I follow Gramsci in the idea of consensual, unopposed power wielded by an unspoken
alliance of political and economic elites, which is legitimated by a persuasive discourse.
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The "social capitalists", here represented by FAO and to a certain extent the UK Science 
Office and G20, the latter two appearing divided between a more exclusively trade-oriented 
approach and a more inclusive approach, subscribe to the basic democratic dimension, and to 
some of the attributes of the popular control dimension. I use the term social capitalism in the 
same way the term social liberalism was used 100 years ago, in the sense of the strongest 
version of welfare capitalism identified in Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990, cited in Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001). I additionally upgrade the term to 
include my observations as to the democratic inspiration of contemporary progressivists or 
reformists. Esping-Andersen relied on Polanyi’s insight into the way capitalism mitigates its 
worst inequities, for instance through the offering of social protection to vulnerable groups. 
He conceptualised three ways in which nation-states placed these brakes on capitalism, the 
most interventionist of which he called the “social-democratic regime”. I build on this work to
give renewed meaning to the term “social capitalism”. FAO is the institutional actor that 
embraces more attributes, albeit in practice the substance of their policies is thinner than on 
paper. Thus, they believe in actively including the people that need decisions most or that will
be most affected by them, while they wish to see a more equitable distribution of access and 
benefits of natural resources. They have also recognised the merit of other forms of 
knowledge such as agroecology, and believe in active participation of the beneficiaries of 
their projects in the management of the project. The UK Science Office, mostly on principle 
(since their conclusions indicate the dominance of two powerful interest groups: the English 
Conservative party and large agribusiness), also subscribes to these attributes. The "social 
capitalists" recognise that the current system is inequitable and unsustainable and propose 
some democratic measures to correct the worst inequities. They will even address some 
attributes falling under the dimension I termed "autonomy", although never fully, because to 
grant full autonomy to peoples and communities would endanger their main donors, the 
governments of wealthier countries, which in turn depend on the industries that made them 
rich. To harm the interests of industry would be to harm the interests of the countries where 
they operate. That is why FAO may play with ideas of food sovereignty, but might never 
adopt the concept. FAO may reflect on the consequences of industrialised agriculture and ask 
to reform it, but not suggest to abolish it.
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The social movements and the UN Special Rapporteur, which I have called the "radical 
ecological democrats", are not burdened by their dependence on powerful governments or 
powerful industrial interests. They are also not weighed down by a need to make a profit from
the exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour. They either live a subsistence-style life 
or they represent people that live these lives. With not much to lose in their often desperate 
situation, but everything to gain, they are free to experiment with substantive democratic 
ideas. They adopt the full spectrum of democratic dimensions that I drew up based on the 
thoughts of the most imaginative of democratic thinkers. Some of the attributes, such as 
cognitive justice, social legitimacy in the sense that it is used in this research, social control 
over resources, Rights of Nature, and altruism, were coined either by them or by the thinkers 
of the radical ecological democracy movement, among them Vandana Shiva and Ashish 
Kothari.
Table 3 presents a summary of my conclusions as to the ecological-democratic quality of the 
global food polity and of the discourses of each of the food actors included in my analysis. 
The results are obtained by directing the questions that operationalise each of the attributes 
(presented in the introduction to Part 2) to the data characterising each of the entities / food 
actors. For each of the questions, I reviewed the indications that would permit to answer them 
affirmatively or negatively. Often, the democratic attributes are recognised on principle by the
food actors, but are missing in their final decisions and practices. When this is the case, I 
distinguish between theory and reality.
The most striking, although unsurprising, result is that reality is much worse than theory, 
whereby theory I mean the policy proposals made by prominent food actors in the modern 
food system. The global food polity as a whole scores terribly on any of the indices of 
ecological-democratic quality, even on the most basic democratic attributes that most 
decision-makers anywhere would claim to uphold: political equality, political freedom, 
accountability, and responsiveness. Only the most vulnerable groups (and similarly, the most 
vulnerable natural organisms or ecosystems) are deemed worthy of protection, all others are 
expected to fend for themselves, in true liberal fashion. I advance at least two reasons for the 
fact that the global food polity does not reflect the promises of its decision-makers: the views 
of corporations have only been included through the WEF, which necessarily moderates its 
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discourse in order to be able to negotiate with all the other food actors; and discourses 
generally represent intentions and not actions nor even a willingness to act. Nevertheless, by 
zooming in on the narratives of truth, the depictions of reality and the respective 
contradictions found therein, the critical discourse analysis conducted here was capable of 
teasing out the true intentions and real interests of the institutional food actors, finding that 
they stand in striking contrast with their professions of democratic and ecological solutions to 
the challenges that we collectively face as humans. In fact, with the exception of FAO and the 
UN Rapporteur, their claims of equity and justice sink mostly into the quicksand of their true 
interests.
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Table 3. The ecological-democratic quality of the global food polity
Democratic
dimensions
Related
attributes
Modern food
system / polity
as a whole
Food and
Agriculture
Organisation
The World
Bank
World
Economic
Forum
UK
Government
Office for
Science
G20
Special
Rapporteur
Right to
Food
La Via
Campesina
Nyéléni
Forum
CAP -
Portuguese
farmers'
confederacy
Basic
democratic
dimension
Political 
equality
Not always on
principle and
not in practice
Yes, at least on
principle
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes Yes Yes
Yes on
principle
Political 
freedom
Yes on
principle, but
with restrictions
and existence of
coercion
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle, but
not in practice
Yes Yes Yes
Yes on
principle
Accountability
Poor
accountability
Yes
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes Yes Yes
Yes on
principle
Responsiveness
Poor
responsiveness
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes Yes
Yes on
principle
Popular 
control
Active 
Inclusion
Although
examples exist
of inclusion, it
is not
systematic
Yes 
Yes on
principle
Limited to
leaders of
major interest
groups
Yes on
principle
Yes on
principle
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes, this is a
core value
Example:
women, youth
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes on
principle
Equitable 
distribution of
common 
resources
Very weak
equity
Yes on
principle
Compensation
for the most
vulnerable
Compensation
for the most
vulnerable
Compensation
for the most
vulnerable
Compensation
for the most
vulnerable
Yes this is seen
as a core
necessity
Yes this is seen
as a core
necessity
Yes this is seen
as a core
necessity
Non-issue
Deliberative 
decision-
making 
process
Even when
processes are
deliberative,
decisions are
rarely taken
cooperatively
and in the
interest of the
common good
Yes on
principle Yes on
principle, but
limited to
invited groups
Negotiation
among major
interest groups
Yes on
principle Negotiation
among
governments
and major
interest groups
Yes, part of
modus
operandi
Yes, part of
modus
operandi
Yes, part of
modus
operandi
Non-issue,
possibly
accepts
negotiation
among major
interest groups
Table 3 (cont.)
Democratic
dimensions
Related
attributes
Modern food
system / polity
as a whole
Food and
Agriculture
Organisation
The World
Bank
World
Economic
Forum
UK
Government
Office for
Science
G20
Special
Rapporteur
Right to
Food
La Via
Campesina
Nyéléni
Forum
CAP -
Portuguese
farmers'
confederacy
Cognitive 
Justice
In general
cognitive
justice is not
respected
Yes on
principle
No No
Only as
secondary
sources
Only as
secondary
sources
Yes
Yes, this is a
core value
Example:
agroecology
Yes, this is a
core value
Ex.: agro-
ecology,
peasant
wisdom
No
Social 
legitimacy
In most
decisions, the
affected parties
are not the
decision-
makers,
whereas the
burden of proof
remains with
them
Affected are
heard, but
never in
charge
Representa-
tives of interest
groups are
heard, but
never in charge
Leaders of
major interest
groups are
heard,
government
and or
investors
decide
Affected are
heard, but
never in
charge
Affected are
heard, but
never in
charge
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes, this is a
core value
Adheres to
idea of
bargaining
among interest
groups
Political 
participation
Affected parties
are sometimes
involved in the
middle phase of
decision-
making, but
public affairs
are generally
run by elites.
Yes on
principle
Participation
through
representation
of some
interest groups
Major interest
groups are the
participants
Participation
through
representation
of some
interest groups
Participation
through
representation
of some
interest groups
Yes, seen as
crucial
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes, this is a
core value
Participation
through
representation
of some
interest groups
Autonomy
Contestation
Conflicts are
considered
according to the
strength of
respective
voices, and
decisions can
rarely be
overturned by
non-economic
minorities
Addressed, not
embraced
Avoided Avoided Yes on
principle, but
as complement
to an
"evidence-
based"
consensus
Avoided Yes Adopted as
modus
operandi
Adopted as
modus
operandi
Avoided
Table 3 (cont.)
Democratic
dimensions
Related
attributes
Modern food
system / polity
as a whole
Food and
Agriculture
Organisation
The World
Bank
World
Economic
Forum
UK
Government
Office for
Science
G20
Special
Rapporteur
Right to
Food
La Via
Campesina
Nyéléni
Forum
CAP -
Portuguese
farmers'
confederacy
Reflexivity
Decision-
makers
generally do not
confront their
own ideas, and
there is
indication of
path
dependence
rather than
social learning
Some capacity
for reflexivity
None None None None
Yes, makes a
systematic
effort
Yes, listens to
minorities
among its
ranks, changes
tactics
Yes, listen to
minorities
among their
ranks, change
tactics
None
Social control 
over common 
resources
Only in very
rare and
controlled cases
(indigenous
groups) are
primary users
allowed to
control
common
resources
Only if
according to
rule of law
Private or
public control,
not social
Private or
public control,
not social
Private or
public control,
not social
Private or
public control,
not social
Recommends
greater
freedom of
communities
in managing
their resources
Yes, this is a
core value
Yes, this is a
core value
Private or
public control,
not social
Diversity
The right to
self-
determination is
only recognised
for a few very
vulnerable
minority groups
Yes on
principle
Non-issue Non-issue Non-issue Non-issue Yes Yes Yes Non-issue
Altruism
In general, not
embraced, the
norm is charity
Yes on
principle
Not deemed
necessary,
other solutions
assumed
available
Non-issue
Some
indication that
this was
considered, but
very tentative
Not deemed
necessary,
other solutions
assumed
available
Yes,
recommends
change in diet
and lifestyle
for affluent
consumers
Yes Yes Non-issue
Table 3 (cont.)
Democratic
dimensions
Related
attributes
Modern food
system / polity
as a whole
Food and
Agriculture
Organisation
The World
Bank
World
Economic
Forum
UK
Government
Office for
Science
G20
Special
Rapporteur
Right to
Food
La Via
Campesina
Nyéléni
Forum
CAP -
Portuguese
farmers'
confederacy
Negative 
dimension
Rights of 
Nature
Not recognised
Recognises
some merit,
does not
endorse
Not recognised Not recognised Not recognised Not recognised
Open to the
idea
Yes, promotes
the concept
Yes, promote
the concept
Not recognised
Restriction of 
elite control
Although
sometimes
restrictions are
placed on the
use of resources
by elites, the
latter are not
barred from the
decision-
making on
these
restrictions and
their interests
are always
respected to a
significant
degree
Might be open
to the idea
This would go
against
freedom to
conduct
business
This would go
against
freedom to
conduct
business
Non-issue
This would go
against
freedom to
conduct
business
Yes, this is a
core problem
Yes, this is a
core problem
Yes, this is a
core problem
This would go
against
freedom to
conduct
business
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Conclusion
Food glorious food
What wouldn't we give for
That extra bit more
That's all that we live for
Why should we be fated to do
Nothing but brood on food
Magical food,
Wonderful food,
Marvellous food, 
Fabulous food,
Beautiful food,
Glorious food
—excerpt from the song “Food, Glorious Food” of the musical Oliver!, written by Lionel Bart, 1963 
The popularised version of the nineteenth century story by Charles Dickens springs to mind as
I prepare to bring together the ideas developed throughout my dissertation. It’s not surprising 
that Food, Glorious Food is a key song in the musical, if we consider that hunger was a key 
theme in Dickens’ novel and a widespread phenomenon in industrialising Britain. Hunger was
the manifestation of a brutal society that believed that the destitute were responsible for their 
own fates. In his book, Dickens denounces the Poor Law of 1834, which forcibly sent 
“paupers”, including orphans such as the fictional Oliver Twist, to workhouses, where 
conditions were deliberately made harsh, because the general opinion of the wealthy was that 
poor people did not deserve better. Two hundred years later, the industrialised countries have 
not entirely shaken this cruel view. They may have substituted glaring hunger and poverty 
within their borders for less visible manifestations of malnutrition and social exclusion, but in 
the countries where most of their products are now produced, conditions are often just as 
harsh as they were in the 1800s in the Global North. 
Even though the 795 million chronically hungry can be found predominantly in countries in 
the Global South, worldwide at least 2 billion people suffer from some form of micro-nutrient
deficiency (lack of certain vitamins or minerals), while an equal amount of people are 
overweight, a different but equally pernicious form of malnutrition. Increasingly, overweight 
and obesity, once the hallmark of wealthy countries, are creeping up on the less wealthy 
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countries, and we have reached a point where overweight and undernourishment co-exist in 
the same households, communities, and countries.
That more than half of the world’s population can be considered malnourished at a time when 
WHO estimates that average food availability has gone up 25 percent compared to fifty years 
ago, and 40 percent in the Global South alone—currently possibly enough to cover the dietary
needs of nine billion people—is one of the many internal contradictions that I came across in 
my analysis of the modern food system.
The picture that was revealed as I peeled away the manifestations of the global food system 
and the food politics that hold it in place, is far removed from the bucolic ideal that is still 
transmitted in Western primary school classrooms. Food and agriculture are part of a multi-
trillion dollar industry that sustains oligopolies or near-oligopolies in all sectors, except for 
the sector of the farmers themselves, the primary resource suppliers. Although 1.5 billion 
smallholder farmers, most of them poor, continue to struggle to make the most of the 
resources their land, animals, and their labour offer, a minority of very large farmers have 
become, as Bookchin put it in 19761: “an airplane pilot who dusts crops with pesticides, a 
chemist who treats soil as a lifeless repository for inorganic compounds, an operator of 
immense agricultural machines who is more familiar with engines than botany, and perhaps 
most decisively, a financier whose knowledge of land may be less than that of an urban cab 
driver”. The enormous monocultures of predominantly grains (maize, soybean, to a lesser 
extent wheat), forage crops, and fibre (cotton), which cover large areas in the biggest 
agricultural exporting countries such as the USA, China, Brazil, and Mexico, have almost to 
perfection completed the “metabolic rift” that Marx warned of. While often under contract 
from an input agribusiness company such as Monsanto or Pioneer—from which they are 
obliged to annually buy a stipulated package of seeds and pesticides—the richest of these 
agricultural entrepreneurs use algorithms and drones rather than their hands or noses to 
calculate the exact dosages of synthetic chemicals that will boost their single crop and replace 
the nutrients of their deadened soils. Similarly, the produce that they sell obeys to the 
standards of a highly lucrative food processing industry—such as ease of storage, transport, 
1 Bookchin 1976, 4.
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compatibility with industrial processes—whereas taste, nutritional content, and public health 
have become secondary values. Shiva (1993) has called the commercial society’s obsession 
with standardisation and homogenisation the “monocultures of the mind”.
The depth of the capitalist economy’s penetration of this “recalcitrant” sector, replacing 
nature, humans, and animals with commercial products would have shocked even Marx, who 
foresaw the commodification of agriculture and food. What has now become more of a “life 
sciences industry”, joining the sectors of chemicals, biotechnology, energy, pharmaceuticals, 
defence, and—well-hidden in the background—that of “big finance”, is pushing against the 
last frontier of exploitation and accumulation: the capacity of life to reproduce itself. The 
Canadian corporate watchdog ETC Group, one of the few civil society initiatives monitoring 
the trend in life sciences exploitation, warns that we are in for the biggest “earth grab” ever: 
“the gravitational pull of biomass is creating new constellations of corporate convergence 
across diverse industry sectors”2. The new joint ventures between corporate giants are looking
to take advantage of the search for clean and carbon-neutral technology to develop hitherto 
unheard of synthetic products and synthetic organisms, based on the exploitation of organic 
matter.
Even before it was able to develop hybrids of plants on a commercial scale, and long before it 
was able to genetically modify them, the industrial-age agribusiness developed its lobbying 
skills. As I showed in Chapter 1, what I called the “biocapitalist food regime” paved its road 
to ever-growing profit with publicly-funded research, government subsidies and political 
support, the securing of strong corporate rights as well as intellectual property rights on living
organisms, and finally, with free trade agreements that gave it access not only to the fragile 
markets, but also, more importantly, to the biodiversity spoils of the Global South. While the 
agribusiness transnational corporations enjoyed, and still enjoy, a measure of protectionism 
from their home countries, they helped “kick away the ladder” (of development, in Chang 
2002) from the countries in the Global South.
In Chapter 1 and 4, I gathered indications that biocapitalism did not only overstep the 
boundaries of the world’s ecosystems, or breach the barrier between species, but also 
2 ETC Group 2011, ii.
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dispossessed and disqualified the original care-takers of agricultural land. Agro-industry now 
dictates what is produced, how it is produced, and where it is produced, controlling both the 
in- and outputs of farming. The expansion of the rights of TNCs occurred simultaneously with
the shrinking of the rights of farmers and people in general. An example of the erosion of 
social and economic rights is the prohibition, inscribed in the UPOV (plant variety protection)
convention, for farmers to save seeds that they have bought. Most, if not all, of the bilateral 
free trade agreements that the USA celebrates with countries in the Global South, include a 
clause for a “seed law”, restricting or prohibiting the use and reproduction of local seeds 
whenever there is a commercial “alternative” available.
The globalised food system has become the epitome of a capitalist economy. The tragic 
downside of the success in accumulating capital beyond the biological barriers that agriculture
poses, is the fact that, like in other resource-based industries, the capitalist solution in 
agriculture can only create wealth for some, while the majority remains in misery. Also, like 
in other industries, while profits are privatised, costs are socialised, spelling disaster for the 
financially insecure as much as the environment. But unlike other industries, this power 
imbalance ironically takes away the capacity to provide in their own food from the primary 
producers of food, both the smallholder farmers and the raw agricultural commodities 
exporting countries. After all, the objective of a global agri-food sector is trade, not food, and 
the primary concern is to ensure property rights over the key elements of the agri-food chain, 
not to fight hunger (Friedmann 2005).
How, then, to summarise the political economy of food that emerges from a critical analysis 
of the modern food system and of the behaviour of some of its main actors? Having observed 
the trend of commodification of what strictly speaking constitutes a commons—land, water, 
seeds, food—its subsequent privatisation as well as the increasing privatisation of the 
knowledge associated with the commons through patenting, and the parallel legitimation 
process of the previous two activities through intense lobbying, I am reminded of Polanyi’s 
assertion that “laissez-faire was planned; planning was not”3. I believe his idea of a double 
movement still largely applies, with the laissez-faire project being counter-balanced and even 
3 Polanyi 1944/ 2001, 147
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slowed down by attempts to re-embed the economy in society. But my discourse analysis 
revealed a split in the counter-movement, almost constituting a triple movement. The 
countermovement to neoliberalism consists on the one hand of people and organisations that 
want to reform and/or mitigate the capitalist economy, the group I have called “social 
capitalists”, and on the other hand of a more radical, albeit heterogeneous group, which 
desires changes of a more systemic nature, and which I have called the “radical ecological 
democrats”. The triple movement shows that capitalism is proving very adept at stretching the
limits to growth, as exemplified by the discourse of the “trade hegemonic bloc”, whose 
defenders continue to search for market- and technological fixes for the un-sustainability of 
the food system that they have reluctantly had to recognise. They take refuge in new concepts 
that hide old practices, such as “climate-smart” agriculture, the “green economy”, the 
“bioeconomy”, and “sustainable intensification”. 
Concurrently, society continues resisting its complete reduction to market dynamics, in fact, 
society is proving to be the ultimate “recalcitrant sector”. The social capitalists are willing to 
give up some of their wealth to heal the gross inequities and injustices of the modern food 
system. They are tentatively embracing new views of agriculture, among these the science and
practice of agro-ecology, and the idea of local food sovereignty for vulnerable communities. 
They have taken the step to embrace more ambitious goals, such as zero hunger, zero poverty, 
and full equality for women. However, they stop the buck at overt autonomy of peoples, 
communities, or countries in the shaping of their food systems, when this impacts the global 
food system. They also still see corporations as “stakeholders” and “partners”, even though, 
so far, agribusiness and public sector partnerships have yielded benefits mostly for the former.
Finally, the radical ecological democrats are significantly more critical and go significantly 
deeper in their analysis and demands. This group is generally made up of people who are 
unburdened by a dependence on powerful governments or on powerful industrial interests. 
They either live a subsistence lifestyle (identifying as peasants or indigenous peoples) or 
defend people who live that way. This is why they add, to the basic tenets of ecological 
sustainability and social equity that social capitalists also recognise, values that are part of a 
vision of an alternative world, such as the respect for diversity and pluralism, the need for 
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cooperation instead of competition, the assignment of responsibilities to rights (ethical 
citizenship), the recognition of the dignity of labour, the acknowledgement of the subsistence 
economy—which sustains most small farmers and rural populations—and finally, a new 
conceptualisation of the "good life" (Buen Vivir) as "simple living and the qualitative pursuit 
of happiness"4.
My thesis has been a quest for the ecological-democratic quality—the degree to which 
decision-making is responsive both to its demos and to the environmental and social 
challenges of our time—of decision-making in the modern food system. To answer my 
question, I developed a framework for assessing this ecological-democratic quality, based on 
an analysis of theories and proposals for “substantive” democracy. I believe that the 
“substantiveness” of a democratic model depends on how close it is to fulfilling its original 
promise of “rule of the people”. Ecological-democratic quality is obtained, in my 
conceptualisation, by grounding democracy in the human activity of food and basic needs 
production, while making it both socially and ecologically responsive to its demos. My insight
derives from having observed the political economy of food, from its genesis at the beginning 
of the industrial revolution to its current “life sciences” form. 
I found agriculture and food to be at the heart of the commercial society, which at the same 
time has embraced a mixture of liberal democracy and supranational rule-making as its 
preferred social arrangement, creating a democratic gap in decision-making. I also found 
agriculture to be both a source and solution of major challenges that humanity is facing, most 
prominently persistent hunger and poverty, climate change, biodiversity loss, and systemic 
pollution, which together constitute the ecological gap. Finally, agriculture is at the centre of a
conflict for resources, especially land and water, but increasingly also seeds and knowledge. 
This conflict materialises as a highly unequal battle between, on the one hand, TNCs and the 
governments that often back them, and on the other, extremely vulnerable social groups, 
generating tremendous injustices and increasingly resulting in violence. 
The era of globalisation has brought to the fore a contradiction between the simultaneous 
practice of state-bounded democracy and a weak respect for democratic values at the global 
4 Kothari 2009, 404.
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scale. The primacy of trade rules over national laws has created severe inequalities between 
peoples living in different parts of the world, and between two or more new groups or classes:
on the one hand, a dominant class, as also suggested by Sklair (2001)—made up of the 
bureaucrats of supranational supervising institutions, politicians of trade-leading countries, 
executives of transnational corporations, the services and media professionals that support 
them, and to a certain degree the middle classes that depend on the former four groups—and 
on the other hand, a heterogeneous class consisting of all those that have been left out or 
subjugated by the dominant class. The dominant class secures its power firstly by relying on 
the path dependence that characterises the global growth economy—which locks it in 
institutions that are favourable to a global elite5—and secondly by fomenting the "culture-
ideology of consumerism"—persuading people that "the business of society is business". 
Within the underclasses we can find the new “global untouchables”, most of whom are from 
the rural world: peasants, indigenous peoples, and migrants. Not a class as such, but without a
doubt an actor to be reckoned with, are the dissident members of Sklair’s transnational 
capitalist class, members who are mostly from the middle-class but who have joined, helped 
create or at least animate, the social and environmental justice movements that are resisting 
the TCC all over the world.
In the commercial society, our democracies have become very thin, to use Barber’s words. 
"Thin" democracies that are based on an economic rationale have no incentive to adequately 
feed the world, especially those who can't afford what's offered on sale. I used my exploratory
democratic framework to assess the modern food system, based on documentary indicators, 
and on the food policies proposed by nine different food actors in the global system, to see if 
my political economic reflection on the food system could be corroborated according to more 
systematic criteria. My final framework retained the best ideas and practices from a large 
number of democratic thinkers. Collectively they opened up several avenues to the 
“deepening” of democracy.
A rights-based approach focuses on essential human rights and proceeds to expand them as far
as they will logically and morally stretch, adding criteria of democratic quality that go beyond
5 As also demonstrated by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) and Habermas (1992).
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the classical dimensions of freedom and equality. Food sovereignty may be considered a 
radical outgrowth of the rights-based approach to democratising the food system, combining it
with elements of commons and radical ecological democracy. Food sovereignty places the 
needs of primary food producers at the core of food system decision-making, over the 
demands of markets and corporations. But developing rights is not sufficient, we must 
conquer first and foremost the “right to have rights”, as Arendt warned after the Second World
War left many people state-less. The existence of rights does not guarantee that they will be 
respected, as has been shown time and again.
Republicanists believe the solution lies in an active citizenship, i.e. in the elevation of political
participation to the main democratic dimension. They neither romanticise public life as the 
playground of associative life nor humans as naturally cooperative and solidary. They believe 
humans have to strive to be citizens, while enjoying equal status in dignity and freedom. Their
option has the downside that it requires an a priori significant upgrade in the political and 
civic education of people.
Others have proposed creating an economic democracy to reign in the excesses of ruling 
elites, whether economic or political. Solutions that I looked at vary from elevating workers to
owners of the means of production, restricting private ownership of the means of production 
to small-scale enterprises, or creating a “Machiavellian democracy”6, with modern tribunates 
from whence the wealthy are excluded and with political trials to judge policies. 
Another way to go is to elevate essential resources to the status of commons. Commons 
democrats believe that when democracy and economy are grounded in a shared responsibility 
for the commons, this may facilitate the creation of spaces of social autonomy where state and
market have subordinated roles. The expectation is that by bringing the potential victims of 
environmental degradation within the political process, not only are fairness and legitimacy of
environmental decision-making improved, but also its quality, in terms of the effective 
protection of natural resources and satisfaction of those that depend on them. 
6 McCormick 2011.
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Ecological democrats share the idea of a commons, but also call attention to the need for 
realising environmental justice, understood as the fair distribution of benefits versus 
environmental risks and harms across social groups. They premise a direct link between 
economic arrangements and social and environmental inequities, and are therefore sceptical of
simple so-called “governance” or “public participation” solutions, believing inclusion will 
have to be more active. Decision-making by largely self-selected groups through governance 
and public participation approaches has become a depoliticised activity, which ends up mostly
serving the interests of the state, supra-state institutions, and large economic entities that have 
often already made their decision and are merely looking for legitimation.
Finally, radical ecological democrats adopt the full spectrum of democratic dimensions that I 
developed and presented in Table 1. Some of the attributes that I chose, such as cognitive 
justice, social legitimacy (in the sense that it is used in this research)7, social control over 
resources, Rights of Nature, and altruism, were coined by the thinkers of the radical 
ecological democracy movement, among them Shiva and Kothari.
The title of my dissertation is “a global food polity”. I have purposefully only referred to a 
food polity as a goal. My analysis did not reveal support for the existence of a global food 
polity, in its original sense of a democratic commonwealth, common government, or citizen 
body applied to the organisation of agriculture and food. I found strong indicators for a 
political economy of food, i.e. the social, political, and economic dynamics that tie food actors
and food agents together in the modern food system. This political economy is strongly biased
towards a political-economic elite, which enjoys considerable support, including culturally, 
from bureaucrats, scientists, professionals, and conventional media. The political economy as 
a whole scores worse on any of my indices of ecological-democratic quality, even according 
to the most basic of democratic attributes, than the policy proposals made by prominent food 
actors in the modern food system. It seems that only the most vulnerable groups (and 
similarly, the most vulnerable natural organisms or ecosystems) are deemed worthy of 
protection, all others are expected to fend for themselves, in true liberal fashion. As I said in 
my introduction to Part 2, after more than twenty years of international promises in matters of 
7 Dewey 1925-1927/ 2012, 22: "the burden of proof must rest with those who seek less rather than more
inclusive arrangements".
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environmental and social justice, the world is both different and the same. It is different 
because the social struggle for equity in the food system has been globally recognised and 
important advances have been made in identifying the factors that underlie persistent hunger 
and poverty. The right to food has been inscribed in several national constitutions and is an 
integral part of international agreements. A more prominent role, albeit largely consultative, 
has been granted to civil society groups in decision-making. But it is also the same because, 
while food production continues hitting all-time highs, and while drug, chemical, and biotech 
behemoths, which own patents on our food and other organic resources, continue to merge in 
multi-billion dollar deals, half of the world is not getting the diet they need and an equal 
amount still lives with less than two dollars a day, while at least a third of the world is truly 
destitute. It is additionally the same because, under the guise of “multi-stakeholder 
partnerships”, an economic elite continues to wield an equal vote to the people it is 
dispossessing from their common resources, while they mask their continuing wealth and 
resource accumulation with terms such as “green economy” and “climate-smart agriculture”, 
which have even infiltrated agronomy and environmental science courses.
It seems that our recent history, which coincides with that of the capitalist creed, is one of 
advancing two rungs on the ladder of enlightenment, and subsequently descending one, while 
sometimes slipping down two or three—especially in times of acute economic, financial, 
social, and environmental crises, the likes of which we have already seen numerous times in 
the past decades, and of which we are bound to see more. Polanyi’s double movement, which 
I have given an extra fork on one end, manifests itself in every aspect of the modern food 
system. While agribusiness celebrates land- and exploitation deals in vulnerable countries, 
they also sit at the table with supranational agencies to promise voluntary guidelines for 
responsible land tenure. Conversely, when governments of the world decide to definitively 
end hunger, poverty, and ecosystem degradation, they also accept “trade caveats” that limit 
their action to achieve these goals. My hope is, since I have identified three general, distinct 
views on food politics in the political economy of the modern food system—of which one 
embraces the full spectrum, and the other a significant part, of ecological-democratic quality
—that their conjoint efforts will create the necessary leverage to pull humanity out of the 
commercial society, towards a food democracy. Since the concepts and practices of food 
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sovereignty, agroecology, right to food, and the restriction of corporate rights, are not 
compatible with the acceptance of “trade caveats”, it is possible that by attempting to erase 
the glaring contradictions in decision-making on food, the more inclusive projects will gain 
the upperhand. I propose that decision-making on matters of commons always be verified as 
to its ecological-democratic quality, to avoid the prolongation of false promises that do no 
more than conceal the true intentions of economic elites.
In this dissertation I have offered my best analysis of food politics at the time of this particular
cut-off point, in the hope that it contributes to furthering our critical understanding of the 
dynamics of food politics in a global, industrialised, and currently highly neoliberal world, 
and of the criteria that could help measure whether our decision-making is furthering the 
goals of substantive equity and sustainability, in the sense of economic, ecological, and social 
justice. My field of research was knowingly too broad to be able to derive specific 
conclusions or make specific recommendations. What I have mostly achieved is a 
contribution to the conceptualisation of the modern food system as a political economy of 
food, as well as to the conceptualisation of a democratic and ecological gap in food politics. I 
have also developed a comprehensive exploratory framework for the achievement of 
ecological-democratic quality, which I tested against documentary and discourse data, finding 
that the only attributes capable of distinguishing between the many “equity and sustainability”
rhetorics are those that defend the autonomy of peoples, the rights of organisms other than 
people, and the exclusion of political-economic elites from decision-making on primary 
resources. All of the classical democratic attributes (freedom, equality, accountability, 
responsiveness) and many of the more progressive attributes that have been promoted in the 
past decades, relating to popular control (in particular active inclusion, deliberation, and 
political participation) have been adopted into the discourses of even the staunchest defenders 
of neoliberalism. Where what I have called the “systemic gap” becomes truly apparent is 
when policies and practices are tested against their capacity for incorporating contestation, 
diversity, and altruism, their ability to self-confront, and finally, to what degree they will 
allow underclasses to self-organise in the management of natural resources. By confronting 
food policies and practices with these radical attributes, the mask drops and a space opens up 
for alternative world visions to take hold.
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I hope that my ecological-democratic framework will be picked up by scholars and 
practitioners from the schools of food sovereignty and radical ecological democracy so that it 
may be tested in more controlled settings, taking care to include the underclass to which I 
have alluded but not been able to interact with, so as to refine the ecological-democratic 
attributes, complete their operationalisation, and gain a more complete understanding of those
attributes that are the best predictors of substantive democratic decision-making styles.
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